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ABSTRACT 
The development of the Foreign Oil and Gas Investment (FOGI) Database permitted a 
systematic study of all reported upstream projects involving foreign investors throughout 
FSU, in order to assess the reaction of western capital to the opening up of the FSU's oil 
industry. While we identified 292 upstream projects either under discussion or 
development and representing a potential investment of $231 - $308 billion, there is a 
wide dichotomy between the high level of interest and the low level of investment 
incurred. It is misleading to assess potential levels of investment in the FSU in isolation 
of global upstream investments which are estimated at $106 billion per year over the next 
decade. Of this amount western IOCs are expected to contribute approximately $55 
billion per year. The challenge for the FSU is to attract its share (or increase its share) of 
global upstream capital expenditures. The latter implies a transfer of productive capacity 
from elsewhere in the world. 
International efforts vis-ä-vis the World Bank, IFC, EBRD, OPIC and various export 
credit agencies have failed to inject substantial credits into the FSU's petroleum industry. 
Disbursements remain slow and their claimed catalytic role appears to be overstated. As 
the FSU ranks very poorly on a scale of political/country risk, western commercial banks 
remain wary of extending credits. We believe the rejuvenation of the FSU's oil industry, 
particularly outside Russia, is pre-conditional upon the involvement of the `Major' IOCs 
who possess the requisite capital and technology to initiate the necessary projects. But, 
our research indicates that IOCs are pursuing a cautious policy of self-financing and 
staggered development. Thus the real onus of financing lies with the host-governments 
to provide the economic, legal and fiscal environment which will permit these projects to 
earn sufficient profits for reinvestment. Should such conditions be created in Russia, 
where a large domestic oil industry already exists, then the domestic industry would 
likely contribute a large portion of the needed investment as they would themselves be in 
a position to reinvest their own earnings. 
xiv 
There is a strong correlation between levels of potential FDI and the location of known 
reserves as IOCs seek to minimise geological risk. In Central Asia and the Caspian Sea 
region where $55 - $75 billion in potential upstream investments have been reported, 
transportation uncertainty is singled out as the most critical impediment to growth. There 
are no realistic alternatives to the construction of new pipeline capacity which will act as 
the ultimate regulator of foreign upstream investment. For the time being large volumes 
of western investment capital remains cautious and beyond the reach of the FSU's 
petroleum industry. 
Part I 
INTRODUCTION 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
I. I Statement of Objectives 
The principal objective of this thesis is to document, quantify, assess and explain the 
reaction of western capital to the opening of the former Soviet Union's oil and gas 
industry. 
1.2 Introduction 
The former Soviet Union (FSU) is well endowed with large reserves of both oil and 
natural gas. This simple fact combined with the favourable perception of making 
additional discoveries makes the region of particular interest to the international oil 
industry. At the same time, the successor states of the FSU have inherited an operational 
oil industry in which problems abound; it is inefficient, under-capitalised, heavily taxed, 
operates at environmental and technical standards well below those found in the West and 
since its peak production in 1987, overall crude output has declined 40%. The maturing 
of key geologic provinces (firstly, the Volga-Urals and then Western Siberia) has also 
been a major factor contributing to the decline in oil production. 
The future success of the petroleum industry in the FSU depends on many factors, one of 
which is the provision of investment capital. Investment capital may either be externally 
sourced or domestically sourced. With regards to the latter, the state has foregone its 
historical role of supplier of investment capital through budgetary allocations to the oil 
and gas industry. Ninety-five percent of Russian commercial bank lending is short-term 
credits (i. e. maturities of less than one year) which cannot be used to support long-term 
investment programmes. The weak balance sheet of most domestic oil companies 
prohibit them from expanding (or even sustaining) capital investment programmes from 
their own internal resources nor are they capable of borrowing large amounts of capital. 
However, the apparent lack of domestic investment capital is not the problem itself, at 
least in the case of Russia where a large petroleum industry exists, but rather a 
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consequence of structural imbalances, i. e. detrimental pricing and fiscal policies. ' The 
presence of a competitive pricing regime and rational tax structure comparable to those 
found in the West, would undoubtedly permit the domestic industry to generate its own 
investment capital. But at the present time, this still is still not the case. This naturally 
leads us to question and indeed examine the potential role of foreign capital development 
of the FSU's oil industry, and it is this issue which lies at the heart of our proposed 
research. 
1.3 Aims of the Study 
The cornerstone of our study is that the availability of investment capital is an essential 
precondition for the rejuvenation and future growth of the region's upstream oil industry. 
Without new investment the industry will remain out-dated, inefficient and production 
will only decline further as new reserves are not brought on-line to offset a maturing 
production profile. Foreign capital undoubtedly has a role to play in the development of 
the FSU's oil industry, but its exact role and the modality of western investment are 
issues that need to be addressed. Do western perceptions of investment mesh with those 
of the former Soviet Republics (FSRs) or do the East and the West talk at cross-purposes? 
Who are (and will be) the principal suppliers of foreign capital and how will such funds 
be channelled from the West to the East? How much interest has been expressed by 
western companies and where do they intend to invest? What are the principal 
impediments to the large-scale flow of capital from the West to the East, and can they be 
realistically eliminated? Any meaningful examination of foreign investment and 
financing of upstream oil and gas projects will in the main, need to address the preceding 
questions. But to reiterate, the basic overall aim of this study is to document, quantify, 
assess and explain the reaction of western capital to the opening of the FSU's upstream 
oil and gas industry by examining its availability in the context of potential upstream oil 
and gas investment opportunities. By documenting all known `press reported' foreign 
investment proposals we aim to demonstrate that their aggregate amount far outstrips 
I In general see IEA, Ener2V Policies of the Russian Federation 1995 Survey, (Paris: IEA/OECD, 
1995) and IEA, Russian Energy Prices, Taxes and Costs 1993. (Paris: OECD/IEA, 1994). 
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levels of investment that will realistically materialise and we seek to explain why this is 
the case. 
1.4 Justification 
Financing natural resource ventures by transnational corporations is a well developed 
subject which has been studied extensively from an academic, legal and business 
perspective. The same can be said for the legal and fiscal provisions of petroleum 
development agreements2 and specific financing techniques such as project financing. 
However, much of the financing literature predates the dissolution of the FSU. We are 
not suggesting that the tried and tested methods of international financing are not 
applicable. On the contrary one of the challenges facing the FSU is how to utilise and 
adapt these techniques to suit their own needs. Thus, while financing upstream oil and 
gas ventures is not a new subject, there is plenty of scope for a re-examination in the 
present day context of the FSU, including an assessment of foreign investment and 
associated risks. The fact that FSRs could benefit from western capital and technology in 
order to rejuvenate their oil industries is a cardinal principal of post-1991 western policy 
makers and hardly needs restating. But to borrow an expression of Philip Wood's, this 
thesis represents "my voyage of discovery into what is really going on. "3 There is an 
acute need to look beyond general statements of principle, to observe and assess what is 
actually happening on the ground. 
As far as we are aware there are no studies which have systematically tried to document 
the potential involvement of foreign oil and gas companies undertaking upstream 
operations throughout the whole of the FSU. While sporadic individual country reports 
exist, the absence of a collective approach is a serious flaw. The FSU possesses an over 
2 The term "Petroleum Development Agreement" is being used rather loosely as there are a number 
of types of agreements signed between an international oil company and the host government, these 
include inter alia, licence/concession, production sharing contracts, joint ventures, service contracts, and 
hybrids. 
3 Philip R. Wood, Project Finance. Subordinated Debt and State Loans, (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1995): p vii. 
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abundance of known but hitherto undeveloped deposits; policy makers, both in the East 
and the West, tend to be overwhelmed by this profusion of natural resources and often 
assume that the vast majority of projects will proceed. But this attitude ignores what 
economists refer as, the `fallacy of composition' problem. 4 That is, it is not possible for 
every company or indeed country to produce the same thing at the same time with a high 
degree of success. Overproduction will result in falling prices and undermine the market. 
Therefore, is it realistic to expect all of the investment proposals to proceed? Individual 
FSRs now compete amongst themselves for inward investment, as does the whole of the 
FSU compete with other petroleum producing regions of the world. The FSU's oil 
industry can no longer be considered in isolation to the dynamics of the industry outside 
its borders. This study attempts to quantify the interest expressed by foreign oil 
companies which is believed to be a fruitful line of inquiry. Only by doing so may we 
begin to understand the process which is unfolding and thereby allow us to make an 
educated judgement about the future role of western capital and companies in the FSU's 
petroleum industry. This will be of particular interest to policy makers of FSRs who are 
charged with the responsibility of attracting western investment. While many 
commentators have picked up on individual `press reported' investment proposals, 
aggregate analysis has up to now been lacking in contemporary research. This thesis 
seeks to address this imbalance by providing such aggregate analysis. 
Furthermore, we believe an analysis of the efforts of official sources of financing to 
catalyse private sources of financing vis-ä-vis the multilateral institutions and export 
credit agencies is needed. It is often assumed that these organisations are capable of 
overcoming investment risks which private investors or commercial banks are unable to 
undertake. But is this really the case? We will document the actual lending record of 
these institutions in the FSU, and then based on the results, assess which commonly held 
perceptions of these institutions are warranted. 
4 George Philip, The Political Economy of International Oil, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1996): p 175. 
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In summary it is our opinion that Financing Upstream Oil & Gas Ventures in the 
Transitional Economies of the Former Soviet Union: A Study of Foreign Investment and 
Associated Risks is justified as a timely contribution to an area of current debate, 
uncertainty, and potential. To quote Norman White who wrote in 1978 that "... financing 
techniques and the international petroleum industry are both dynamic, [and] never 
static.... It will be a long time before the 'last word' can be written about financing and/or 
the international petroleum industry. "5 This statement is just as relevant today as the oil 
and gas industry in the FSU provides new challenges and opportunities for western 
capital and companies. 
1.5 Methodology 
1.5.1 Interdisciplinarity 
A study of financing and foreign investment in the upstream petroleum industry of the 
FSU requires that we employ an interdisciplinary approach drawing on technical, 
economic, legal and political factors. A single discipline study cannot possibly provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the integration of western capital and companies into the 
FSU. The evolution of transitional economies is by definition a highly dynamic process 
influenced by an interplay of forces which traverse traditional academic disciplines with 
little respect for their boundaries. At times we employ economic arguments at other 
times legal arguments, but all with the intention of assessing the reaction of western 
capital to the opening up of the FSU's upstream oil and gas industry. The main benefit of 
our research lies in fact that it is based on an interdisciplinary approach and this is the 
correct methodology to employ in such a study. Our decision to penetrate difficult 
interdisciplinary issues, rather than providing an in-depth analysis of detailed issues 
under certain disciplines, is based on the need to provide a balanced approach to the 
subject matter which requires establishing the necessary linkages across academic 
disciplines. 
S White, Norman A. et al. Financing the International Petroleum Industry, (London: Graham & 
Trotman Ltd., 1978): p xi. 
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1.5.2 Foreign Oil and Gas Investment (FOGI) Database 
We are aware of no studies which have systematically tried to document the potential 
involvement of foreign oil and gas companies undertaking upstream operations 
throughout the whole of the FSU. The absence of a collective approach is a serious 
shortcoming. The Foreign Oil and Gas Investment (FOGI) Database was developed by 
ourselves as a means of recording and tracking the growth of the oil and gas sector 
projects involving foreign investors throughout the whole of the FSU. It represents an 
integral part of this thesis contributing to its originality. Moreover, the FOGI Database 
can now act as a baseline study to support further lines of inquiry and with regular 
updating provides an ideal medium for continually assessing the evolution of the FSU's 
oil and gas industry. Further discussion on the FOGI Database is provided in Volume U 
- Appendix. 
b 
1.5.3 Sources of Information 
This study is based on a programme of research which was conducted in 1994 through 
the summer of 1996 at the Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, 
University of Dundee. Primary sources of relevant laws, regulations and contracts were 
obtained from the Centre's own' collection and supplemented by requests to 
Petroconsultants and Barrows Company in addition to various oil companies and law 
firms. However, all primary and secondary source material is from the public domain 
and nothing contained herein breaches any form of confidentiality. We took full 
advantage of the Centre's annual Summer Seminar Programme to meet speakers and 
delegates from a broad cross-section of nationalities and disciplines which provided us an 
excellent forum for obtaining firsthand knowledge and acting as a fertile breeding ground 
for testing new ideas. Initial contacts made at these and other conferences have typically 
resulted in additional information during follow-up correspondence and meetings. The 
Centre's growing network of "stake-holders"6 in industry represents a unique asset base 
for augmenting regular academic research. Because this thesis contains a high level of 
6 "Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Update, " Research Newsletter of CEPMLP, No. 3, 
Jun. 1996, p 1. 
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industry input, whether in the form of raw data, comments and or criticism, we hope it 
represents academic writing in its most valuable form; that it is not just a document which 
satisfies academic qualifications but proves useful to the very industry about which it is 
written. 
Through the Centre's consultancy activities, country visits to Georgia, Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan were made possible. Additional research has been carried out at the OPEC 
Library in Vienna, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in London; London Business 
School; and the Institute of Petroleum also in London. 
1.6 Structure 
1.6.1 Part I: Introduction 
The thesis is divided into four sections. Part I, INTRODUCTION, consists Chapter 1- 
Introduction; while Part II, BACKGROUND, consists Chapter 2- The Soviet/Russian 
Petroleum Industry: Past and Present. Part III, FINANCING FOR THE FSU, is 
subdivided into three chapters: Chapter 3- Foreign Direct Investment; Chapter 4- 
Capital Needs of the FSU: A Global Perspective; and Chapter 5- External Sources of 
Credit. Part IV, INVESTMENT RISKS, is subdivided into four chapters: Chapter 6- 
Overview of Investment Risks, Chapter - Political Risk; Chapter 8- Transportation Risk 
and Uncertainty; and Chapter 9- Conclusion. The current chapter, the Introduction, 
outlines the aim of the thesis, justification for the research, its methodology, structure, 
and limitations. 
1.6.2 Part II: Background 
We submit that a historical account of the evolution of the Soviet petroleum industry 
including its attitude to past bouts of foreign participation provides a useful insight on the 
potential role of and attitude towards' foreign investment today. Chapter 2- The 
Russian/Soviet Petroleum Industry: Past and Present is intended for this purpose. A 
historical understanding of the petroleum industry is essential: (a) to grasp the 
complexities facing the industry today; (b) demonstrate that foreign oil firms and western 
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capital have played crucial roles in the past; and (c) help assess whether isolationism is a 
viable option for the FSU's petroleum industry. 
1.6.3 Part III: Financing for the FSU 
Chapter 3- Foreign Direct Investment centres on an analysis of the FOGI Database to 
quantify the reaction of western oil companies to the dissolution of the FSU. The 
profusion of potential projects involving western investors contrasts sharply with known 
levels of foreign investment to date. We shall examine emerging investment trends in 
respect of geographical location, potential value and modality of investment (joint 
ventures versus production sharing agreements). The absence of any similar collective 
study encompassing the whole of FSU is a flaw of concurrent research efforts which this 
chapter seeks to redress. 
In Chapter 4- Capital Needs of the FSU: A Global Perspective the capital requirements 
of the oil industry in the FSU, including the potential levels of investment, will be 
assessed in the context of global upstream oil and gas capital expenditures. We wish to 
establish what level of investment international oil and gas companies may direct towards 
the FSU, based on the fact that the FSU is an integral part of the global oil industry and 
that many of its potential investors are multinational corporations which pursue global 
investment agendas. The mere existence of an investment opportunity (i. e. the presence 
of a discovered but undeveloped oil and gas field) does not ensure that such investment 
will necessarily take place. If every known field in the FSU were to be developed (or the 
Middle East for that matter) the level of capital investment required would be 
astronomically high. Instead aggregate FSU investment proposals must be understood in 
the context of global investment opportunities. Additionally, the implications of 
employing a staggered approach to development vis-a-vis self-financing and the use of 
reinvested earnings is also discussed in regards to reducing the call on foreign capital. 
Having assessed potential levels and patterns of FDI in the FSU's petroleum industry, 
Chapter 5 addresses the availability of External Sources of Credit. The analysis 
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concentrates on official sources of financing, but also touches on why commercial banks 
have hitherto been reluctant to participate in the process. Acknowledging the high risk 
environment of the FSU, the orthodox view held by western policy makers, is that official 
sources of financing will be necessary in the transition period as a means of catalysing 
private sources of either debt or equity. This view is predicated on the belief that official 
sources of financing are capable of overcoming the investment risks which commercial 
sources are unable or unwilling to accept. This chapter questions such reasoning in light 
of the fact that many official sources of credit are increasingly been driven by commercial 
criteria. We intend to show that the international financial institutions have in general 
failed to inject large volumes of credit into the FSU's petroleum industry. 
1.6.4 Part IV: Investment Risks 
The overall reaction of western sources of capital towards the FSU's oil industry 
ultimately needs to be explained by an assessment of investment risks. The purpose of 
our analysis of investment risk and its management is not intended to review the wide 
body of literature already written on the subject, but rather draw attention to areas which 
we feel have not yet received adequate attention or where an alternative perspective 
should be aired. As `risk' is a wide subject area, we have broken our analysis into three 
chapters. Chapter 6- Introduction to Investment Risks includes specific treatment of 
Geological Risk and Environmental Risk whereas Chapter 7 deals specifically with 
Political Risk including Russian attitude towards: (a) oil fields discovered during the 
Soviet era but residing outside of its territory; and (b) the legal status of the Caspian Sea. 
We draw attention to these subjects as Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region enjoys a 
disproportional level of interest by IOCs as compared to the rest of the FSU. Chapter 8- 
Transportation Risk and Uncertainty is just as important in that the bulk of potential 
upstream investment will only materialise as new export capacity emerges. This physical 
constraint-may in fact transcend all other forms of investment risk. 
Chapter 9- Conclusion summarises the main findings of each chapter and suggests 
additional lines of inquiry as a basis for future research. 
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The large amount of data which was amassed as an integral part of this study is 
reproduced in Volume II - The Appendix which contains six sections: A) Foreign Oil 
and Gas Investment (FOGI) Database; B) Equity Ownership of Upstream Sector JVs; C) 
Forecasting Upstream Capital Expenditures; D) Official Sources of Financing for Oil 
and Gas Projects, including the Negative Pledge Clauses of the World Bank and the 
EBRD; E) Political Risk Ranking of the World's Oil Reserves; and F) Portion of World 
Oil Production by Western Oil Companies. 
1.7 Limitations 
1.7.1 Transition Period 
The single biggest obstacle of the proposed research is the transitory nature of the study 
area. Many scholars, myself included, are reluctant to commit pen to paper during such 
turbulent times which can quickly change one's perception and make obsolete one's 
arguments. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, nearly five years have passed since the 
dissolution of the FSU, providing scholars with an immense wealth of foreign company 
experience in such a short period of time. Despite the rapid pace of change, it is 
important to capture this process as it unfolds. Indeed, viewed from the future it is hoped 
that this study will provide a useful benchmark to judge the progression of financing and 
foreign investment in the FSU's petroleum industry. Inevitably a certain degree of 
imperfection will arise as a result of the contemporary nature of this study, but this 
appears unavoidable. 
1.7.2 Domestic Financing 
Earlier in § 1.2 we acknowledged the issue of domestic financing resources, resources 
which will grow in the future as the non-payments crisis is resolved, the internal tax 
situation improves, export bottlenecks are removed, et cetera. Similarly as a healthier 
banking sector emerges, medium to long-term domestic credit will become available. 
There exists a sizeable build-up of personal savings in Russia which currently remains 
inaccessible because of the lack of proper financial intermediation. The continued 
development of the domestic stock market and instruments such as mutual funds will 
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improve the accessibility of domestic private savings, but all this will take time. 
However, the practical problems of actually quantifying domestic financing resources are 
not easily overcome. First of all, the organisational structure and conditions with which 
the industry finds itself are highly fluid. Secondly, the level and quality of financial 
reporting is still far behind its western counterparts. Finally, the author's only limited 
knowledge of the Russian language prohibits a serious investigation of Russian based 
financial reporting at least under the auspices of this research agenda. It is for these 
reasons we have focused our efforts solely on the availability and reaction of western 
capital to the opening up of the FSU's oil industry. Furthermore, it is not possible to 
study everything and while domestic sources of financing may in fact transcend external 
sources of financing over the long-term period - at least in the case of Russia where a 
sizeable domestic industry exists - the provision of external capital at present requires 
analysis. 
1.7.3 Statistical Reporting 
The deficiency of Soviet era statistics, including those pertaining to the energy sector, 
have been described as a "kingdom of distorting mirrors" .7 
The fact that oil reserve 
figures were considered state secrets during the Soviet era highlight the limitations of pre- 
1992 oil sector studies. Following the dissolution of the FSU there has been an explosion 
of information available to the West. However inconstancies are common and again 
there is a lack of regular reporting on investment statistics of comparable quality to those 
found in the West, although the situation is improving. 
1.7.4 End of Study Period 
Whilst the FOGI Database was designed as a medium to continually track the progression 
of FDI in the FSU's petroleum industry, for the purpose of this thesis, the data contained 
herein reflects reported projects up to mid-August 1996. 
Igor Zimin, "Discussion, " Energy Policy 19 (1991): p 342. 
Part II 
BACKGROUND 
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2. THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: PAST & 
PRESENT 
2.1 Introduction 
"The present for him was merely a stage of the past moving quickly into 
the future. What appeared inconceivable to conventional analysts was 
always the natural outcome to him. "(Robert Kaplan on the subject of 
Milovan Djilas, 1993)1 
We purport that a historical analysis of the Soviet/Russian oil industry is useful for 
assessing the long-term role of western capital. In fact, one could go so far as to say 
"there are so many precedents, similarities, and coincidences in a study of Russian 
petroleum that discussion of the present generates a sense of deja vu. " 2 The period 
during the 1920s following the Russian revolution provides, in our opinion, a germane 
example of Russia's need and attitude towards foreign investors in a situation which is 
not that dissimilar from today. 
2.2 Past Cycles of the Soviet(Russian Oil Industry 
2.2.1 The Early Years - It's Caspian Origins 
The birth of the Russian oil industry was Baku, on the western shore of the Caspian Sea, 
in what is today the capital of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan. The area has long 
been known for its petroleum potential due to the abundance of natural oil and gas seeps. 
In 1821, a franchising/leasing system was set-up for those who wanted to produce and 
sell petroleum, but since the four year lease was subject to arbitrary revocation with no 
option for renewal (i. e. no security of tenure) the system was quite unsuccessful. 3 In fact, 
it lead to excessive exploitation and precluded any serious exploration as successful 
efforts could not be capitalised on during the short period of tenure. 
I Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts A Journey Through History. (London: Papermac, 1994): p 74. 
2 Marshall I. Goldman. The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum Half-empty or half-full? (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1980): p 13. 
3 Ibid., p 14. 
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The regulatory regime changed in January 1873, when the Czarist administration, 
abolished the franchising/leasing system and replaced it with a public auction system 
which permitted the awarding of concessions to the highest bidders .4 While a primitive 
oil industry began to flourish under the presence of competitive private 
entreprenuership, s the system still had its limitations as the parcels of land were generally 
quite small in order to maximise revenue to the Government 6 Unfortunately, ingrained 
bad habits (i. e. wasteful) remained the basic philosophy of Baku oil men despite the 
change in the regulatory regime. Nevertheless, significant growth took place as 
compared to the previous system. Of particular relevance to this thesis, is the fact that the 
industry's growth was dominated by a foreign producer - the Nobel Brothers Petroleum 
Producing Company (BRANOBEL). 7 The Nobel family provided not only the necessary 
seed capital, but also strove to maintain the industry as the most technologically advanced 
in the world. The incessant drive of Ludwig Nobel to continually innovate and introduce 
new production, refining and transportation techniques invariably permitted BRANOBEL 
to stay ahead of its competitors. However, as his innovations proved successful, they also 
permeated to other producers thus benefiting the region as a whole. Baku's crude oil 
production quickly rose from 600,000 barrels per annum in 1874 to 10.8 million barrels 
in 1884,8 and 23 million barrels by 1888.9 The latter being 80% of the entire American 
cum world oil production. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Daniel Yergin, The Prize, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1991): p 58. 
6 Robert E. Ebel, Energy Choices in Russia, Significant Issue Series (Washington: CSIS, 1994): p 
16. 
7A detailed account of the Nobel family's involvement in the early Russian Petroleum industry is 
found in Robert W. Tolf, The Russian Rockefellers, (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institute Press, 1976). See 
also A. Fursenko, The Battle for Oil: The Economics and Politics of International Corporate Conflict ove 
8 Yergin (1991) supra note 5, p 59. 
9 raid., p 61. 
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However, Baku's production was limited solely to the Russian market due to geographic 
constraints -a problem which still persists today! As the market was limited in size, 
over-production and fierce competition between the different producers led to a 
significantly deflated oil prices. Access to a new market (i. e. the West) was necessary. 
Two producers, named Bunge and Palashkovsky, formed a syndicate of investors and 
under a government concession began to jointly build a 560-mile railway west across the 
Caucasus to the Black Sea port of Batumi. '° But construction was only completed in 
1883 when a loan from Rothschild saved the cash strapped venture (the Nobel family, 
which pioneered and virtually monopolised the Baku-Astrakhan-Volga tanker-barge route 
was not invited to provide assistance). I1 The $10 million loan was secured in exchange 
for guaranteed shipments of Russian crude at favourable prices (known today as pre- 
export financing) and mortgages on various oil facilities. 12 The entrance of Rothschild 
marked the beginning of the second major foreign-owned interest in the early Russian oil 
industry and was in direct competition with the well established interests of the Nobel 
Family. With the completion of the railway, Batumi quickly became one of the world's 
most important oil ports and initiated a long struggle between European, American and 
Russian oil producers for control of the world's oil market. Competition for exports soon 
intensified when Nobel completed a 42-mile pipeline in 1889 thereby circumventing the 
steepest section of the railway which posed as a transportation bottleneck. Despite the 
economical efficiency of a pipeline covering the entire distance from Baku to Batumi, the 
Government's vested interests in railway tariffs precluded the completion of the entire 
pipeline for another 17 years. 13 These historical accounts, while considerably dated, are 
nevertheless indicative of today's environment. 14 Access to a secure export route, which 
10 Tolf (1976) supra note 7, pp 84-85. 
11 Goldman (1980) supra note 2, pp 16-17. 
12 Yergin (1991) supra note 5, p 60. 
13 Tolf (1976) supra note 7, p 97. 
14 As an anecdotal piece of evidence, it is interesting to note that the present day Azerbaijan 
International Oil Company (AIOC) responsible for a 3.5 billion barrel oil development in the Caspian Sea 
has in its headquarters a 1905 study by the London Institute of Economics, entitled Baku: Oil Capital of the 
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in itself implies regional stability, is one of the essential underpinnings of any petroleum 
development in the FSU, and labelled in this thesis as Transportation Uncertainty. It is a 
factor which foreign investors and potential providers of finance will consider carefully. 
In this regard the control of such facilities is paramount. 
One further change took place in the regulatory environment in the pre-Revolutionary 
phase of the Russian petroleum industry. In 1896 the Czarist government introduced a 
combined auction royalty system designed to provide additional revenues to the treasury. 
Historically speaking even the maximum capped rates of 40% would seem appealing to 
many oil companies today, but at the time it marked a substantial deviation from current 
practice. 15 The result was quite predictable, producers cut back production and scaled 
down investment - not too dissimilar to the situation today in the Russian Federation 
with respect to its current fiscal regime. 
2.2.2 The Early Years - The October Rebellion 
While the detrimental effects of the excessive royalties should not be discounted, they 
were increasingly being overshadowed by evolving political turmoil and instability. The 
preceding years of openness towards foreign investment, including the appointment of 
Count Sergius Witte as Russia's dynamic western-oriented finance minister in 1892,16 
were gradually being replaced by open feelings of hostility. During his term in the late 
1890s it was the Nobel family, in particular, the stalwarts of capitalism and foreign 
investment in Russia, who had benefited from and supported Count Witte's policies. 
"Emanuel [Nobel] enjoyed an excellent rapport with the tireless minister, 
supporting wholeheartedly his successful efforts to stabilise the Russian 
rouble, put the country on the gold standard, and build the Trans-Siberian 
rail-road.... [F]oreign capital would be attracted to invest in a stable gold- 
standard economy, engineers, trained technicians, businessmen would 
World, which concludes that "Azerbaijan's prospects depend on the regional stability and a pipeline to 
take the country's black gold westward. " James M. Dorsey, "Consortium Sees Beak in Disputes Clouding 
Caspian Oil Pipeline, " Wall Street Journal Europe, 26 Apr. 95, p 1. 
15 Goldman (1980) supra note 2, p 20. 
16 Sidney Harcave ed. & trans. The Memoirs of Count Witte. (Armonk, NY.: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 
1990): p 163. 
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follow the foreign capital. And that was the cornerstone of Witte's 
program: the infusion of foreign capital. With the strong support of Tsar 
Alexander he was able to promulgate such a policy in the face of great 
opposition within the State Council and those forces of orthodoxy and 
reaction working from the shadows of ignorance and inefficiency. " 17 
(emphasis added) 
The dismissal of Count Witte occurred in August 1903, one month after the country's 
first general strike. While his dismissal was a direct result of his opposition to the 
Government's Far East policy, 18 his departure from an active role in the Government was 
a serious blow for foreign investors. His policy of openness was being replaced by that 
of nationalism. Baku, the centre-piece of Russia's oil industry, and in the eyes of many 
an example of flagrant western capitalism, became known as the "revolutionary hotbed 
of the Caspian" as the series of oil worker related strikes, led by none other than losif 
Vissarionovich Stalin, climaxed in the autumn rebellion of 1905. The destruction was so 
severe that two thirds of all oil wells were decimated; annual production fell by 3 million 
tons and exports fell by half. 19 
In the following years Baku's oil industry continued to be marred by political turmoil and 
the after-effects of over-production20 as irreversible formation damage pushed the costs of 
production higher and higher thus making Russian oil less competitive on the world 
market. For it was the competitive advantage of cheap large scale production which had 
originally made Russian oil so attractive. 21 But rising production costs coupled with 
increased transport tariffs made Russian oil properties less attractive purely from a 
commercial standpoint without even taking into account anti-foreign sentiment or the 
17 Tolf (1976) supra note 7, p 118. 
18 Harcave (1990) supra note 16, pp 314-315. 
19 Goldman (1980) supra note 2, p 20. 
20 The fluid mechanics of an oil field are such that not all of the oil in place can be produced and 
recovered. The best technology and reservoir management practices of today can only extract up to a 
maximum of 40-45% of oil in place. In order to do so the production rate cannot exceed the maximum 
efficient rate (MER) otherwise physical waste in the reservoir would occur (i. e. theoretically recoverable 
oil is left behind). Thus over-production refers to producing a well at rate greater than MER. The long- 
term benefit of greater cumulative production is sacrificed for the short-term gain of higher rates of 
production. 
21 Yergin (1991) supra note 5, p 132. 
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general political upheaval of the time. Moreover, Russian technology quickly fell behind 
western advances. In fact by 1912, Rothschild having grown weary of their Russian oil 
venture, sold their entire interests to Royal Dutch/Shell who were pursuing a strategy of 
diversification. 
The stagnation in production from the Baku region was in part compensated by 
discoveries in the Grozny and Maikop regions to the north. Less well known than Baku, 
these regions provide us with another historical example of active foreign participation. 
This time it was the British, through the use of London-based investment trusts, who 
poured money into a proliferation of joint stock companies beginning in 1905.22 Without 
a doubt some of the principle discoveries of the region were again directly attributable to 
western capital and technology. Perhaps of equal importance was the publication of a 
prescient guide by the Pall Mall Gazette in 1910.23 The report warned of the speculative 
nature of investing in the newly emerging joint ventures. Six years later only five of the 
original sixty companies were still in business. Perhaps this is a lesson which should not 
be lost on current day investors. 
2.2.3 The Early Years - World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution 
Similar to the rebellion 1905, the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, caused another 
substantial drop in annual production, this time in the order of 2 million tons. 24 
Moreover, on 1 June 1918 the oil industry was nationalised and all western interests were 
expropriated. This was in fact not the first time that nationalisation had been 
contemplated - the conclusion of a specially commissioned study on Baku's oil industry 
in 1906 to nationalise had been approved by the Duma, but was eventually set aside by 
the Ministry. The turmoil did not cease there, with the Turks gaining control of Baku in 
22 Tolf (1976) supra note 7, pp 188-189. 
23 Pall Mall Guide to the Oil Companies, (London: Pall Mall, 1910) as cited in Tolf (1976) ibid. 
24 Goldman (1980) supra note 2, p 21. 
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September 1918, and the British regaining control in November 1918.25 One of the first 
things the British did was to reinstate the former property owners causing a flurry of 
renewed interest by foreign investors - Standard Oil of New Jersey concluded a contract 
with the independent Government of Azerbaijan which entailed a signature bonus of 
approximately one third of a million dollars. But upon recapturing Baku the Bolshevik's 
renationalised the oil industry in May 1920. Renationalisation notwithstanding, Standard 
Oil of New Jersey purchased half of Nobel's interests in July 1920 thereby gaining 
control of 33% of all Russian oil output, 40% of refining, and 60% of the Russian internal 
market. 26 This was a huge gamble as it was not clear whether Nobel still possessed legal 
title to the assets for sale as they had been nationalised. Furthermore, the perennial 
question of the day was would the Bolsheviks eventually be defeated. To many people's 
surprise, they were not. 
2.2.4 The Early Years - Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) 
The dire circumstances of the industry, and indeed the economy as a whole, was 
recognised by Lenin stating that "we cannot by our own strength restore our shattered 
economy without equipment and technical assistance from abroad. " 27 The short term 
production gains made by the brief flurry of foreign investment after the British 
denationalised the industry, all but terminated with the consolidation of the Bolshevik's 
power. In fact from 1920 to 1923 practically all drilling ceased; the actual level of 
drilling was less than one percent of the level in 1900.28 Moreover production further 
suffered from water in-fill. 29 
25 Ebel (1994) supra note 6, p 17. 
26 Yergin (1991) supra note 5, p 238. 
27 ]bid 
28 Tolf (1976) supra note 7, p 224. 
29 The large volume of salt water which underlies an oil reservoir may be used to drive the oil out. 
Provided the rate of production is below MER (supra note 20) water will enter the reservoir at the same 
rate as the oil leaves. However at rates above MER in reservoir whose permeability (i. e. the ease at which 
fluid can flow through the rock) is not uniform water will channel through the least resistive route thus 
bypassing some of the oil. At some point the water may reach the actual well and further reduce the 
volume of oil produced, this is known as water in-fill. 
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Recognising that the Soviet State faced a looming economic catastrophe in light of its 
weakened stance from years of civil war, famine and blockade, 30 Lenin initiated a policy 
of offering concessions to foreign investors beginning in November 1920, and more 
formally in March 1921 with the promulgation of the New Economic Policy (NEP). The 
policy shift legalised private industrial production and trade thereby encouraging foreign 
capitalists to return to the Soviet Union. 31 However, not all those in the Soviet Union 
were supportive of such a policy, and Stalin was perhaps its greatest antagonist warning 
of the dangers of increased involvement by bourgeois interests on Soviet territory. 
Lenin's policy prevailed as it was seen to offer the only realistic means of rebuilding the 
economy. The Soviets by themselves just did not possess the necessary resources of 
technology, management skills and capital. 
For the petroleum industry, the most important quasi-concession (i. e. what would become 
known as a Technical Assistance Contract) of this period was awarded to the 
International Barnsdall Corporation of the United States for the renovation of the Baku 
oil fields. The first contract was signed in October 1921 and was followed by two more 
in September 1922.32 The significance of these contracts are two-fold. Firstly, being 
concluded prior to the formal enactment of Lenin's Concession Law of 1923 it was 
intended that these petroleum sector contracts would entice other hopeful IOCs. 
Secondly, the work of the International Bamsdall Corporation plus a few other key 
equipment suppliers rejuvenated Baku's production. 
30 Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum, 1926 Reprint, 
(Westport, CT.: Hyperion Press Inc., 1975): p 237. 
31 Harry Schwartz, The Soviet Economy. (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1965): pp 12-13. The NEP was 
also fully applied to Russian electrification via foreign direct investment. Andrei Konoplyanik and F. von 
Halem, "The Energy Charter Treaty: A Russian Perspective", in The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West 
Gateway for Investment & Trade. Ed. Thomas W. Wälde, London: Kluwer Law International, 1996, p 158. 
32 Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1917 to 1930. 
(Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Publications, 1968): pp 18-27. 
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For the previous oil producers, such as Royal Dutch/Shell and Standard Oil of New 
Jersey, the NEP was a mixed blessing. On the one hand a more favourable business 
climate for foreign investors was welcomed, but on the other many of the potential oil 
properties on offer were those which had been purchased by themselves and subsequently 
nationalised by the Bolsheviks. They both considered the nationalisation of their 
properties illegal for which no compensation was ever given. When the Soviets finally 
began to negotiate with western oil firms, the latter's monopolistic demands over oil 
properties were deemed too severe. The formation of Front Uni, a syndicate of western 
oil producers, was a concerted effort to boycott Soviet oil production and pressure the 
Soviets to relent. The basic tenet of Front Uni was that the Soviets would never be able 
to recover from their difficulties without major assistance from wester companies. If 
Front Uni could preclude that assistance, the belief was that they would be in a strong 
position to dictate the terms of foreign investment. However, the Soviets, under the 
astute guidance of their new Commissar of Foreign Trade, Leonid Krassin, "the Count 
Witte of the Communists" 33 successfully played the eagerly anxious western oil firms off 
against one another. 34 By the time Front Uni collapsed two years after its inception, the 
influx of new foreign capital and technology had made a dramatic difference. Soviet oil 
production quickly revived from its dormant period during the first few years of the 
1920s, 35 and by 1927-28 they were exporting some 2.7 MMtpy to twenty-two different 
countries 36 The favourable policy towards foreign investment that prevailed in the early 
1920s, despite internal opposition, resulted as the state was negotiating from an initial 
position of weakness and saw little alternative to foreign investment. Ironically the 
growing confidence of the Soviet economy fed the ever present internal discontent 
towards foreign investment as the circumstances which had made foreign investment so 
33 Tolf (1976) supra note 7, p 218. 
34 See Yergin (1991) supra note 5, pp 240-243; and Goldman (1980) supra note 2, p 24. 
35 For a statistical record of Russian oil exports and production from 1881 to 1927 see Fursenko 
(1990) supra note 7, pp 228-231. 
36 Tolf (1976) supra note 7, p 223. 
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necessary, began to dissipate. It was not long before the voices of the antagonists were 
outweighing those of the protagonists. In the words of one official writer at the time: 
"Foreign capital... can invest profitably in the Soviet Union. But anyone 
who imagines that we will surrender even the minutest achievement of the 
revolution or infringe upon our own economic interests for the sake of 
attracting foreign capital is grossly mistaken. " 37 
The importance of technical assistance contracts grew towards the end of the decade at 
the expense of new concessions. 38 At the same time Soviet officials began revoking 
concessions and by the beginning of 1931 almost all foreigners were once again locked 
out of the region's oil industry. 39 The failure to recognise the subtle shift in bargaining 
power has been interpreted by one author as a fatal error of the powerful western oil trusts 
because they failed to regain their concessions 40 Had the oil companies exhibited more 
flexibility during the early phase of negotiations the outcome may have been much 
different. With the benefit of hindsight perhaps their rigid stance appears justified in 
dealing with a regime which would in turn revoke all newly issued concessions as well. 
As a producing region, Baku retained its dominance within the Soviet oil industry during 
this period and up until the end of the Second World War. Production peaked at 22.2 
million tons in 1940. But Soviet interest in the area waned in light of new discoveries in 
the Volga-Urals in the 1950s and 1960s and Western Siberia in the 1970s and 1980s. In 
fact, Azerbaijan's production in 1940 represented approximately 72% of all oil production 
in the FSU whereas by 1980 that figure had been reduced to almost 2% and has remained 
so ever since. 41 From a strategic point of view this shift was critical, in that it took place 
long before the full petroleum potential of the Caucuses and the Caspian Sea was fully 
realised. As a result vast deposits of petroleum still remain untapped and the newly 
37 Quoted from Fischer (1926 Reprint, 1975) supra note 30. 
38 Sutton (1968) supra note 32, p 9. 
39 Goldman (1980) supra note 2, p 25. 
40 Fischer (1926 Reprint, 1975) supra note 30, pp 237-238. 
41 Michael Levitsky et al., Azerbaiian Energy Sector Review. Report No. 12061-AZ, (Washington: 
World Bank, 31 Aug. 1993): p 10. 
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independent Republics of this region are currently in direct competition with Russia for 
investment resources and capital. 
2.2.5 The Early Years -A Reflection 
At this point it is a worthwhile exercise to reflect on the historical account presented so 
far and assess any bearing it may have for foreign investors at present. For during this 
period, the world witnessed the abolition of monopoly of control over the oil industry, 
both tremendous growth and decline, significant participation by foreign interests, anti- 
foreign sentiment, over-taxation, western advances in technology and the eventual 
dominance of the Soviet State. At present we must not forget that foreign direct 
investment had a very prominent role in the early growth of the Russian oil industry. 
Perhaps the degree of foreign participation became excessive, but nevertheless, the 
transfer of advances in western technology played a positive role in the growth of 
production. It seems that anti-foreign sentiment both then and now necessitates a much 
more balanced approach - any return to foreign domination will be inherently unstable. 
While current developments in Azerbaijan suggest a very substantial foreign position is 
emerging, ownership will not be held by just one or two main companies, as was the case 
with the Nobel or Rothschild interests in the late 19th century. In fact it may be possible 
to distinguish Central Asia from Russia by the degree of foreign investment each region 
will permit - this topic will be further expanded in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7. 
Additionally, the risks of doing business in the FSU should not be underestimated. 
Access to a secure route for exports was a problem then and still needs to be reconciled 
today; excessive taxation in the from of transport tariffs, royalties and auction bidding 
contributed to the decline in the competitiveness of Russian oil; additionally the political 
risk of outright expropriation and/or civil unrest may be just as relevant today as it was 
then. On the other hand the rewards of days gone by are enticing foreign oil companies 
back into the fold. The potential for high profits, the existence of large undeveloped 
reserves by today's standards are just as much of an enticement as they were then. The 
question remains whether companies today are willing to accept the risks like Shell did 
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when it acquired Rothschild's interest or Standard Oil of New Jersey when it acquired 
Nobel's interest, knowing the risks today and the track record of the past. Certainly, 
Shell's involvement today seems to be very cautious and rightly so, its own experience 
has shown how badly things can go wrong. 
Finally, this historical review has presented two periods when there was a concerted 
effort on behalf of the Government to attract foreign investment. Firstly, during the 
1890s under the guidance of Count Witte as Russia's Minister of Finance, and secondly 
in the 1920s under Lenin's NEP and the efforts of Leonid Krassin. It is critical to 
recognise that the success of these periods was underpinned by the absolute authority and 
support by the leaders for these policies. Both Count Witte and Krassin fully understood 
the capitalist game, and were in significant positions and could influence policy at the 
highest level. Despite some opposition towards increased foreign investment from 
certain comers of the Government, the proponents were able to prevail for a time. From a 
current perspective, foreign investors do not necessarily enjoy the same level of host 
government support, although one could argue the dominant authority of certain 
Presidents such as Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan or Gaidar Aliyev in Azerbaijan 
provide a much clearer line of authority as compared with Russia. Historically 
affirmative foreign investment policies have proved successful when combined with the 
pervasive support of the authorities. If these conditions are repeated today, the chances 
for success are good. The positive reception accorded to foreigners seeking concessions 
in the 1920s appears to be an inverse function of the prosperity of the country and we 
cannot help but wonder if today there too exists a limited window of opportunity for 
securing large-scale PSAs. 
2.2.6 Post-World War II 
Despite the importance of oil to the rest of the world, the Soviet Union was slow to adopt 
a very pro-oil policy for its own energy mix - hitherto its predominant interest in oil was 
for export purposes. Indeed as recently as 1959, solid fuels accounted for 65% of primary 
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soviet fuel production. 42 But in the late 1950s there was a change in policy due to the 
realisation of their huge petroleum potential. Initially the petroleum industry expanded 
into the Volga-Urals and Ukraine in the 1950s and then to Western Siberia in the 1960s. 43 
Although oil was discovered in the Volga-Urals as far back as 1929, major finds did not 
take place until 1944, and serious drilling only began in the 1950s. 44 Output increased 
year after year until it peaked in the early 1970s. Unfortunately the excessive use of 
water flooding45 proved quite unsuccessful, leading to many problems and inevitably 
reducing the maximum output of production. If there ever was period in the history of 
the Soviet's oil industry which could be considered indigenous with the least influence 
from the outside world, this was it. The height of the cold war precluded the importation 
of even the most basic components such as drill pipe. As a result, the Soviets were forced 
to innovate and they did have some notable success - technological innovation was not 
limited solely to the West. The introduction of the turbo-drill (the pre-cursor of the 
down-hole motor widely employed throughout the world today) in the 1940s and early 
1950s was ideally suited to the hard rock formations of the Volga-Urals and by 1956 it 
accounted for 85% of all drilling a6 
With the peak output of the Volga-Urals approaching, another oil discovery was made in 
1960 but this time it was in Western Siberia - this subsequently led to the discovery of 
42 Thane Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and 
Gorbachev, (Oxford, Princeton University Press, 1989): p 22. 
43 Ibid., 23. 
44 Goldman (1980) supra note 2, p 34. 
45 A secondary recovery method in which water is pumped through a pattern of injection wells 
surrounding the producing wells (i. e. creating an artificial water drive) which sweeps the moveable oil to 
the latter. However the MER caveat still applies. Supra note 20 and 29. 
46 Robert W. Campbell, Trends in the Soviet Oil and Gas Industry, (Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1976): p 20. The development of the turbo-drill was as a result of the Soviet's 
inaccessibility to sufficiently high grade steel pipe needed for rotary drilling. In absence of such steel, the 
Soviets adapted by developing this down-hole motor which was driven by the flow of mud through the 
inside of the pipe. The bottom motor turned rather than the whole drill string, thus allowing the Soviets to 
drill deeper than they would have otherwise been able with their inferior drill pipe using rotary drilling. 
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the super-giant Samoltor field in 1965 - one of the true oil wonders of the world 47 
First commercial production began in 1969 and by 1975 it was producing around 87 
MMtpy, (-- 1.7 MMbopd) 48 Samotlor and then Western Siberia became the mainstay of 
the Soviet oil industry as the rapid increase in production was coupled with decreases in 
output from the traditional oil producing areas of the Caspian and the Volga-Urals. In 
contrast to the Volga-Urals, western technology would play a much greater role in 
Western Siberia, although direct western involvement was still not permitted. The soft 
rock formations of Western Siberia were ill-suited to the turbo-drill. The Soviet's 
response was to import vast amounts of high-grade steel drill pipe on a barter exchange in 
return for future deliveries of oil and gas 49 The limit of in-house resources was reached 
and external assistance in its most constrained form of pure supplier was again necessary. 
Any analysis of the gradual shift in oil activity from the Caspian to the Volga-Urals and 
then to Western Siberia should recognise the following. The Soviets until recently have 
benefited from the discovery of easily accessible, geologically simple and low cost 
producing fields as their previous core production areas have entered into irreversible 
decline. This has allowed them to steadily increase overall production without having to 
use the most efficient means of technology available in the West. As will be shown in 
the next section, the sustained decline of Russian oil production since 1987 has been 
caused by their inability to bring on-line a new suitable production base to replace 
Western Siberia. The remaining fields are not as large, occur in more remote and 
technologically difficult areas and in some cases the most promising fields are even 
located in what are now independent republics. 
47 Gustafson (1989) supra note 42, p 26. 
48 Throughout the thesis we employ the US Department of Energy approved conversion rates: 1 
tonne of crude oil equals 7.27 barrels and 1 cubic metre equals 35.315 cubic feet for natural gas. 
49 Goldman (1980) supra note 2, p 43. 
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2.2.7 The Origins of the Oil Crises 
The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 exacerbated the already growing problems of the 
Soviet oil industry which became apparent during the latter years of Brezhnev's 
leadership. The ensuing flow of new information to the West confirmed the previously 
held belief that the oil industry was in a crisis amid plenty. 50 The years of neglect and 
wasteful policies of the communist planners had seriously undermined its productive 
capabilities. Perhaps the earliest and certainly the most notorious prediction of a bleak 
future for oil production in the FSU was published by the US Central Intelligence Agency 
in a series of three reports in 1977.51 As history showed and subsequent reports 
documented many of the CIA's predictions were proved profoundly wrong -- for one, 
the CMEA did not become a net importer of crude oil. However, the reports were correct 
in pointing out that then Soviet oil industry was suffering from severe managerial 
deficiencies, if nothing else the reports achieved the aim of raising awareness both 
internally and externally to these problems. 
The period from 1970 to 1977 which culminated in the publishing of the CIA reports has 
been characterised by Gustafson as one of complacency. 52 With production declining in 
the Volga-Urals, the reaction of the central planners was to increase their call on West 
Siberian crude, despite warnings by petroleum engineers highlighting the formation 
damage that would inevitably result. Furthermore, 75% of drilling in the early 1970s was 
supporting development, not new exploration. This meant that by 1975 the Tyumen oil 
industry was for the most part dependent on two or three of its largest fields, namely 
Samotlor, because of insufficient reserve additions. Clearly long-term considerations 
were sacrificed at the expense of short-term revenue gains and can only be attributable to 
5o Gustafson (1989) supra note 42. 
51 Central Intelligence Agency, The Interi 
(Washington, DC.: Apr. 1977); Prospects for Sc 
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Gower Publishing Company, 1987): p 3. 
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ER77-10270 (Washington, DC.: Apr. 
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5,229; and Jonathan P. Stem, Soviet 
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52 Gustafson (1989) supra note 42, p 22. 
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a gross mismanagement on the part of central planning, particularly as the central 
planners chose to ignore the warnings and opposition from engineers in the field. 53 Lev 
Tchurilov, the last Oil Minister of the USSR, states in a personal reflection of the Soviet 
oil industry that 
"the very idea of not fulfilling a production target was taboo.... Instead of 
waiting for each field to be fully explored, Gosplan and the Council of 
Ministers decided that all this seemingly endless bounty should be 
developed as rapidly as possible.... Unfortunately, our haste had negative 
consequences. Because we never knew how big a field was when we 
began development work, our approach was often technically 
inappropriate. It was ironic that in our obsessively plan-oriented state, no 
clear, long-term targets existed for individual oil fields. " 54 (emphasis 
added) 
Complacency came to an abrupt end in 1977 when the first Soviet oil crisis (1977-1980) 
broke. Not only did the CIA publish their condemning report that year, it was the first 
time that the explorationists failed to meet their planned targets for addition to reserves 
and the first time that overall growth output of West Siberian crude began to fall. 55 
Despite opposition, Brezhnev managed to implement a programme of dramatically 
increased oil investment. The immediate crisis forecast by the CIA was averted as oil's 
share of Soviet industrial investment rose from 9.1% in the first half of the 1970s to 
nearly 14% in 1980.56 Furthermore, the a major initiative to increase natural gas 
production which began in 1980-81, had the further effect of stabilising the share of 
hydrocarbons in the Soviet energy balance. In summary the prime cause of first oil crisis 
was a deficient exploration policy - insufficient reserves were being added at a time of 
increased production. 
But it wasn't long before the second oil crisis (1982 - 1986) came into fruition. The past 
effort of massive increased investment, while safeguarding immediate output targets, did 
53 Ibid., p 86. 
54 Lev Tchurilov, Lifeblood Of Empire: A Personal History of the Rise and Fall of the Soviet Oil 
Industry. (New York, NY.: PIW Publications, 1996): pp 108-109. 
55 Gustafson (1989) supra note 42, p 27. 
56 Ibid., p 28. 
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little to tackle the principal structural deficiency of the Soviet energy policy (i. e. one 
driven by supply and seeming oblivious to demand). 57 Essentially, all the Brezhnev 
programme had achieved was to delay the inevitable, by transferring productive capacity 
to Western Siberia. The insatiable appetite for oil within the economy, the increased call 
on Western Siberia, had pushed up the cost of oil as smaller more remote fields had to be 
developed. Then in 1982, Tyumen failed for the first time to meet its production target 
- no longer could the Western Siberian `lifeboat' be expected to save the day. When 
Tyumen oil production peaked in 1984 and then began to decline two problems were 
endemic: firstly, an epidemic of idle wells (i. e. one out of every six wells was idle); and 
secondly the oil industry had quite simply failed to develop new prospects quickly 
enough. 58 As a result, the over-dependency on older fields intensified. Opposed to the 
first oil crisis, the cause of the second oil crisis was development and production driven. 59 
Surprisingly, the fall in output was sharply reversed in 1986 and 1987, however the 
emergency response of the Government was similar to its response to the first oil crisis - 
a massive capital injection. Oil investment rose by 45% during the first four years of 
Gorbachev's leadership, and was, for the most part, directed once again at development 
drilling. 60 
It is interesting to note that at this point, Gustafson in his analysis, alludes to the 
likeliness of a third oil crisis, 61 without the foresight of the impeding dissolution of the 
FSU in 1991, but based purely on the sole assumption that historically the Soviet 
response to oil crises has been to utilise a massive capital injection (i. e. a diversion of 
investment resources away from other industrial sectors). While such a strategy is easy to 
57 Ibid., p41. 
58 Ibid., p 104. 
59 Ibid., p 107. 
60 Ibid., p 119. 
61 Ibid., pp 123-133. 
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implement and provides short-term relief it does little to alleviate the long-term structural 
deficiencies inherent in the oil industry. On two occasions the wealth of Western Siberia 
absorbed such a rudimentary response, but the consequences of Raubwirtschaft (i. e. 
predatory exploitation)62 has been severe. As will be discussed in the next section, a third 
oil crisis did materialise, and was exacerbated by the dissolution of the FSU. The 
question remains what is the real solution for the oil industry's continuing crisis and does 
it require the massive injection of capital, which has so often been used in the past. 
2.2.8 Summary of Past Cycles 
The preceding discussion has spanned 150 years of the Soviet/Russian oil industry, 
bringing the study to a point in time just before the formal break-up of the Soviet empire. 
Throughout this period almost every conceivable situation has occurred - growth, 
decline, private ownership, nationalisation, state ownership, periods of conflict, periods 
of peace, technical innovation and the use of substandard technology. Anyone who can 
claim to predict the future should first give due consideration to the turbulent past which 
the FSU's petroleum industry has hitherto experienced - and looks to be continuing 
today. Recognising the limitation of making broad-brush characterisations, we would 
summarise the key historical points as follows: 
Firstly, up until 1930, foreign investors played a large role in the petroleum industry of 
the North Caucasus, namely in the Baku and Maikop regions. While new prolific 
discoveries played a major role in the region's success, technical innovation through the 
direct participation of western investors was equally important. Initially, this was spurred 
on by Nobel in the late nineteenth century and then transferred on an individual 
concession basis in the 1920s, the most important being the two contracts held by the 
International Barnsdall Corporation. 
62 Raubwirtschaft is a German word translated as predatory exploitation, that is, producing at rates 
grossly exceeding MER. Leslie Dienes, Istvan Dobozi and Marian Radetzki, Energy and Economic 
Reform in the Former Soviet Union, (New York, NY.: St Martin's Press, 1994): pp 49 and 174. 
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Secondly, in the late 1920s, the Soviet administration, having previously nationalised all 
oil properties, began to revoke and repeal all foreign oil contracts. By the early 1930s, no 
foreign companies were left operating in the upstream sector of the Soviet oil industry - 
a situation which basically remained until the late 1980s. 
Thirdly, from the 1930s onwards, the success of the Soviet oil industry was essentially 
predicated upon the discovery of a new oil province each time the core production area 
entered into terminal decline. In the 1950s the Volga-Urals oil basin replaced declining 
production in the North-Caucasus, and then from the late 1960s onwards production in 
Western Siberia dominated. Much of this growth was based on exploitative practices and 
despite warnings by field engineers, long-term gains were habitually sacrificed for short- 
term revenue. While foreign investors essentially played no upstream role, turnkey 
factories and imports in the 1970s were used to over-come some of the most pressing 
technological barriers that could not be solved internally. Furthermore, where it was 
recognised that in-house resources were insufficient, even in the upstream sector, joint 
development projects were contemplated. For instance the Japanese consortium, the 
Sakhalin Oil Development Corporation (SODECO), began preliminary work on the 
development of oil and gas reserves off of Sakhalin Island63 - although the project has 
still to come to fruition. Table 2.1 summarises the historical participation of foreign 
investors in the oil industry of the FSU. 
Fourthly, while the first oil crisis (1977-1980) and the second oil crisis (1982-1986) were 
both caused by a poor management of the country's oil resources, the exact area of failure 
was different. The prime cause of first oil crisis was a deficient exploration policy 
whereas the prime cause of the second oil crisis was predominantly development and 
63 For a discussion on the early history of this project see William T. Onorato, "West-East Foreign 
Investment in the International Petroleum Sector: the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Project, " 
I. C. S. I. D. Rev. - F. I. L. J. 3 (Fall, 1988): pp 326-337. For an description of the more recent events see 
Keun-Wook Paik, Gas and Oil in Northeast Asia: Policies, Projects and Pipelines, (London: RITA, 1995): 
pp 206-255; and Eugene M. Khartukov, "Russian Far East: Oil and Gas Policies, Risks and Rewards. " 
East-West Centre Working Papers. Energy and Mineral Series. No. 4,1994. 
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production driven. However, in either case the response of the Government was the 
same, a large sum of investment funds were transferred into the oil sector at the expense 
of other areas of the economy. While these emergency programmes may have appeared 
to solve the problem, in fact all they did was to aggravate the situation further by delaying 
the natural outcome of raubwirtschaft by a few years. In this respect, the third oil crisis 
(to be discussed below) which evolved during the dissolution of the FSU, owes much of 
its occurrence to these past legacies. It is unlikely that a simple injection of investment 
funds would solve the present crisis as this strategy has failed in the past. 
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Table 2.1 Historical Modalities of Foreign Participation 
Period Type of System Remarks 
- 873 Franchising/Lease -Maximum four year period System -No security of tenure 
1873-1896 Public Auction System -Awarding of Concession to the highest-bidder 
1896-1917 Combined Action -Concession bidding Royalty System -High rates of royalty (maximum government take = 40%) 
1923 - nud KOPF- Pure Concession -No property rights 1930's (Type I) -Royalty payments to the USSR 
-Foreign firm requested to invest stipulated amount of 
capital and introduce latest western technology 
-Firm contract for 20 - 30 years 
-Profit and capital repatriation warranty 
e. g. Gouria Petroleum (UK) - Gouria Concession 1923 
e. g. Duverger (France) - Baku Concession 1923 
e. g. F. Storens (Norway) - Busachi Concession 1925 
e. g. Societä Minere Italo-Belge di Georgia (Italy) - Shirak Concession 1923 
1923 - mid 
1930's - 
Mixed Company 
(Type II) -Soviet 
auman has deciding vote 
-Foreign Firm provides capital and technology 
-Soviets provide investment opportunity and specify Mixed Soviet - Foreign location Participation (50: 50 and -Labour partly imported later on 51: 49 -Profits split according to equity 
ownership) e. g. Duverger (France) - Emba Concession 1923 1923 - mid 1930's -Technical Assistance (Type III) - 
oviets pure ase of technology or services from foreign 
companies 
e. g. International Barnsdall Corp. (US) - Baku Concession 1921-1992 
s oint Development -e. g. SODECO apanese, Sakhalin Island) 
-e. g. VOSEI 100 (Canadian, Siberia) late s Furnkey Manufacturing -e. g. Dresser Industries (USA): drffl bits Plants -e. g. Pressindustria (Italy): non-ionic surfactants 
-e. g. Deutsche Babcock (FDR): C02 liquefaction 
-e. g. Struther Wells (USA): C02 liquefaction 
to s- -US Restrictions on Exports of Technology to the 
mid 1980's 
- 1987 - 1990... Joint Enterprise2 - of equal to the g o-axon concept of JV 
-JE had possession, use, & disposition of property. 
Participant could only retain contribution to charter fund, 
not their % interest in -'s assets. 
-Limited legal capacity 
-Did not enjoy state immunity 
-Board consisting of representatives of participants 
` Decree of 8 March 1923 replaced by Law of 21 August 1923 amended in 14 December 1927 and 
supplemented by special ordinances of 23 May 1926 and 17 April 1928. Sutton (1968) op cit. p 7. 2 Decree No. 49 dated 13 Jan. 1987. 
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2.3 Post 1991 - The Current Crisis and An Industry in Transition 
By 1991, the oil industry's worst fears had materialised, what had initially been a slow 
decline in production since a peak FSU output of around 625 MMt in the years 1987 - 
1988 was rapidly accelerating into a free-fall; total FSU production dropped 10% in 1991, 
13% in 1992 and a further 13% in 1993 (see Figure 2.1). The third oil crisis was well and 
truly underway. While the subsequent transition process has appropriated much of the 
blame for the continued decline this is not entirely the case. It is certain that the domestic 
industry was (and still is) suffering from a lack of capital and equipment, 64but in order 
for these factor inputs to be effective they must be managed properly. Considerable 
debate was under-taken both by scholars and policy makers as to whether a 1948 
Marshall-Aid type programme which was used to rebuild the Europe after the second 
World War could be reapplied to Eastern Europe and the FSU. The general consensus on 
this debate, was that the Marshall plan of yesterday would need to be turned upside down 
in order to meet today's requirements. That is, rather than being long on financial aid and 
short on technical assistance, western assistance to Eastern Europe and the FSU, should 
reverse their relative importance, 65 because it will first be necessary to improve the 
absorptive capacity of these countries. In the words of one commentator 
"with appropriate reform measures, aid will not be needed. Without it, aid 
will be wasted. Large-scale concessional aid to the Soviet Union is an 
idea that should be interred before it is revived. It is neither something 
that the West should promise, nor that those who seek genuine reform in 
the Soviet Union should be encouraged to expect "66 
64 IEA, Energy Policies of the Russian Federation 1995 Survey. (Paris: IEA/OECD, 1995): p 110. 
65 P. B. W. Rayment, "Is a `Marshall Plan' Needed for Eastern Europe, " reprinted in The Road to 
Capitalism: Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, David Kennett and 
Marc Lieberman eds. (Orlando, FL.: The Dryden Press, 1992): p 286; and Jack F. Matlock Jr., Autopsy on 
an Empire: The American Ambassador's Account of the Collapse of the Soviet Union, (New York, NY.: 
Random House, 1995): p 78. Cf. James R. Millar, "The Economies of the CIS: Reformation, Revolution 
or Restoration, " in The Former Soviet Union in Transition, Eds. Richard F. Kaufman and John P. Hardt for 
the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States. (New York, NY.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993): p 53. 
66 Charles Wolf Jr., Economic Transformation and the Changing International Economic 
Environment. (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 1993): p 28. 
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In order words the provision of capital and equipment in the absence of macroeconomic 
reform (i. e. whereby producers are exposed to undistorted market signals) and an 
accompanying transfer of modem techniques and managerial practices would fail. 
Figure 2.1 Annual Oil Production in the FSU 
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Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 1994,1995,1996. 
It is incorrect to apportion the blame of the third oil crisis, solely on a shortage of capital, 
thus one should not look exclusively to the supply of capital as the solution either. This 
was clearly illustrated during the two previous oil crises - money alone does not solve 
the underlying problems. Many of the difficulties witnessed today are exacerbated by the 
transition process, but they have their roots firmly in the past. 67 The first hang-over effect 
is that caused by the gross historical planning discrepancy between exploration and 
production drilling. 68 An oil company or country must continually carry-out new 
exploration to replace its depleting reserves if production is to be maintained or increased 
67 This view finds support from Russian commentators as well: V. A. Nesteov, "The Petroleum 
Industry and the Future of Russia, " Resources: The Newsletter of the Canadian Institute of Resources Law 
(Summer, 1995): p 1; and Tchurilov (1996) supra note 54. 
68 An exploration well is a well drilled to test a potential but unproved hydrocarbon trap or structure 
where good reservoir rock and closure combined with a potential source of hydrocarbons. An appraisal 
well is drilled to confirm the size and quality of a hydrocarbon discovery. A development well is any well 
drilled in the course of the extraction of hydrocarbon which could either be a production well (i. e. from 
which hydrocarbons are produced) or an injector well. 
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in the future. But the probability of successful exploration is less than compared to 
successful appraisal and development drilling. Therefore a short-term investor or one 
which discounts the future at a higher rate or one who has an immediate need for revenue 
will prefer to invest in additional production rather than new exploration. The latter 
scenarios characterise events in the FSU since the late-1970s where field development 
was emphasised over exploration. 
Figure 2.2 Level of Development and Exploration Drilling in Russia69 
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While development drilling has witnessed a more extreme decline in absolute terms since 
the late 1980s as compared to exploration drilling, the ratio between the two has actually 
worsened. Whereas at the peak of development drilling in the late 1990s the ratio of 
development drilling to exploration drilling was roughly 7: 1, in 1995 this ratio had 
slipped to 9: 170 For Azerbaijan the operational bias in 1995 is even more skewed: 69,150 
metres of development drilling in comparison to 2,072 metres of exploration drilling (i. e. 
a ratio of 33: 1). Contrast the experience of these two FSRs with another mature 
production area, but this time outside of the FSU - drilling on the United Kingdom's 
Continental Shelf (UKCS); while the ratio of production drilling to exploration drilling 
69 Reproduced from IEA (1995) supra note 64, p 110. 
Development Drilling 
E' plombon Drilling 
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70 During 1995,9923.3 Ian of production wells were drilled and only 1078.6 Ian of exploration 
wells were drilled. Interfax Petroleum Revort, 2-9 Feb. 1996, pp 18-19. 
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has varied over the past 15 years in the UKCS, it has never exhibited the skewness of 
FSU operations. In fact in some years exploration and appraisal drilling has actually 
outpaced production drilling (see Table 2.2). But over the last five years drilling 
activities in the UKCS have been split equally between exploration and appraisal drilling 
and production drilling - this is in itself an implicit indicator of the industry's 
confidence in the North Sea as a future production base despite it maturity. Companies 
are willing to commit risk funds for the purpose of maintaining future levels of 
production. An entirely different philosophy prevails within the FSU - the emphasis 
still remains on immediate production. 
Table 2.2 Ratio of Production to Exploration Drilling in UKCS 
r ear No. Production No. hxpl. & Ratio of Prod. to 
Wells Appraisal Wells Expl. Wells 
199F- 12 54 2.26: 
1995- 133 157- U. 85T- 
1991 125 166 0.75: 1 
199T 140 113 1.24. T- 
1993 134 96 1.40: 1 
1994 154 86 1: 79: 1 
vg. o-; 199094 
unce: e Mute o etro Bum, "Petroleum Statistics, slightly ditterent 
time series of exploration wells is provided by Petroconsultants as cited in Bryan Land, "Taking Stock of UK Licensing Activity, " O. G. L. T. R. 13 (1995): p 454. 
Figure 2.2 indicates the continued tendency of Russian companies to discount the future 
at much higher rates. Companies lacking confidence about the future choose short-term 
benefits (i. e. immediate revenues from development drilling) over the long-term gains 
from more risky exploration. 
Compounded to this problem is the fact that marginal productivity from both new wells 
and old wells is becoming less and less attractive (see Figure 2.3). This not only 
represents the natural shift to smaller less prolific fields, but also indicates how 
historically the giant fields have been over-produced in the past. The result of exceeding 
a field's MER is a much sharper decline in production in later years. The combination of 
declining productivity and decreased development drilling make a return to previous peak 
levels of production highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. The real solution for 
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Russia and indeed for many other of the oil producing FSRs is to rectify the current 
imbalance between exploration and development drilling, while at the same time 
employing more efficient technological and managerial resources. 
Figure 2.3 Level of Well Productivitv7l 
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The final hangover effect is the level of idle wells in the FSU. While we have only been 
able to construct a time series for Russia, this problem is not isolated to Russia. In 1993 
the World Bank reported that 2,000 of Azerbaijan's 9,700 onshore wells were inoperative 
(i. e. 20.6%) while offshore at the Neft Dashlary ('Oil Rocks') Field some 400 out of 
1,300 wells (i. e. 30.8%) were idle. 72 Examining the data for Russia in Table 2.3 it is clear 
that this problem was well established before the transition period - even as far back as 
1985,16.6% of all wells were idle. Since that time the problem has only worsened - the 
one exception being in 1993, when the total number of idle wells actually decreased by 
1,500 as a direct result of foreign companies involved in well reactivation. 
N ew ells 
01 d ýýltells 
71 Reproduced from IFA (1995) supra note 64, p 109. 
72 Levitsky et al. (1993) supra note 41, pp 14,16. 
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Table 2.3 Level of Idle Wells in Russia 
1985 1988 1991 1992 1993- 1 --1994-1 
Number of e Wells 5,000 7000 25,000 32,0002 30,5004 33,340 38,5146 
0oe Wells ota e 16.6% 20.0% .. .. .o .o 
ývvLC: ^u LL U% 4I "bui ! cu Lv W. cuu vl ycCl LLlucbb UU LW LAC m4wu. 
1 Gustafson (1989) supra note 42, p 104. 
2 Vice President of Rosneftegaz, cited by Ilya Leshchinets, "Capital Requirements - Domestic and Foreign Investment Orvortunities. " in Proceedings of 2nd Annual Russian Oil Conference- The Russian Oil 
US International Trade 
. ras sectors or me tnergy-rroaucmg Mates or me rormer soviet union, investigation No. sie-. i (Washington, DC.: USITC, June 1993): p 3-1. 
4 P1anEcon Energy Report, Apr. 1995, p 9. In the first nine months of 1993,1,500 idle wells were 
reactivated by foreign firms, "On the Wire, " R. P. I.. Dec. 1993/Jan. 1994, p 25. 
5 Another source stated that the number of idle wells in Western Siberia was greater than 20% by mid- 
1991 stood. Dienes et al. (1994) op cit. p 53. 
6 Number of idle wells in Russia as of August 1995. Interfax Petroleum Report, 22-29 Sept. 1995, p 18. 
Additionally, In the first 3 months of 1995, the number of idle wells in Russia rose by 1,300. Brian Killen, 
"Oil Industry Blasted for Low Output, " Moscow Times International Weekly Edition, 21 May, 1995, p 31. 
See also B. R. P. M. 12 Jan. 1996, p 10 which states the number of idle wells at the end of Oct. 1995 as 
38,800 (26.8%). 
In summary, the current and third oil crisis has been the result of inherited inefficiencies: 
improper balance between exploration and development expenditures; declining well 
productivity; and the dramatic increase in the number of idle wells. In addition there is 
the environmental factor, while not directly effecting production, the past damage has 
been excessive. 73 There is no doubt that the transition period has placed further strains on 
the production of oil in the FSU, investment capital is in short supply, but it has been 
shown that the industry's problems cannot be solely attributed to the latter. While 
exacerbating past problems, the present should be interpreted as a necessary period of 
rationalisation for the oil industry, no matter how painful. It is clear from where the 
industry has come, the benchmark for the future is most certainly the modem petroleum 
industry of the industrialised West. Domestic industries must make the successful 
transformation, there is no returning to the past as that door has already been closed. The 
largest and most accessible deposits are depleted, without bringing the industry in-line 
with modern standards there is little hope of achieving adequate reserve replacement to 
ensure a viable future. 
73 IEA (1995) supra note 64, p 129. 
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Although the preceding discussion aimed to discount the transition period as the cause of 
the third oil crisis, it has undoubtedly affected the industry by enveloping it within the 
sweeping changes taking place. It is fair to say that while these changes may be painful 
they are necessary, only the discipline of a market economy provides the incentive to 
make oil producers change their past habits. But, it is not only the companies themselves 
that must change - recall it was the engineers in the 1970s who fiercely opposed the 
government's excessive production targets. The Government must also be transformed 
According to Mr. Anatoly Fomin, First Deputy Minister, Ministry of Fuel and Energy of 
the Russian Federation this means the "Government will have to create all indispensable 
economic conditions. " 74 Given the correct market signals and the freedom to react to 
those signals the oil industry will be compelled to act in a manner which should correct 
the deficiencies of the past. Whether one is an advocate of `shock therapy' or the 
gradualist approach no-one questions the far reaching changes that must occur: price 
liberalisation, promulgation of new regulatory and fiscal frameworks, privatisation 
including the (re)establishment of new spheres of control both at the corporate level and 
at the three levels of government (federal / regional / local), shift in sources of investment 
capital from state credits to private capital and the gradual transnationalisation75 of large 
companies which can successfully compete on the international market with other TNCs. 
It is a highly complex process exacerbated by timing discrepancies in the achievement of 
individual goals of reform. In an ideal world one would snap their fingers, and 
miraculously, a perfect market economy would materialise. But the reality is that many 
of the changes have yet to run their full course and their outcome is far from predictable. 
The result is that while oil companies, notably in Russia, now have the freedom to act, 
74 Scottish Enterprise and Grampian Regional Council, "Market Report: Tyumen Region Western 
Siberia, " Feb. 1995, p 13. 
75 Transnationalisation implies the expansion of a company's operations beyond it own home 
country. LUKoi1, Gazprom and to a lesser extent Yukos have all initiated aggressive expansion strategies 
within other FSRs, Eastern Europe and even in the industrialised West in some circumstances. Essentially, 
one is witnessing the birth of a new generation of oil majors. Consider the changes PIW's Ranking of the 
World's Top 50 Oil Companies. In 1994 only two Russian companies (Gazprom and LUKoi1) were listed 
whereas in 1995 seven more Russian companies (Sidanco, Surgutneftegaz, Yukos, Rosnefft, Tyumen Oil, 
Sibneft and Slavneft) were added thereby displacing previously established western firms according to 
PIW's grading procedure (reserves, production, refining capacity and product sales). See "PIW Ranks 
The World's Top 50 Oil Companies, " P1W - Special Supplement Issue. 18 Dec. 1995, pp 2-4. 
40 
their rational decision in an imperfect world of high taxes and uncertainty is biased 
towards short-termism. 76 
On a more optimistic note it appears that the third oil crisis is stabilising in some 
regions.?? Whether the FSRs can build on this momentum probably depends to what 
extent they are willing to embrace foreign capital and foreign equity participation in their 
domestic industries. It is suggested that much of the improvement witnessed hitherto has 
been the direct result of foreign capital and technology, 78 and if FSRs have aspirations of 
(re)joining the club of industrialised countries, then foreign investment has an important 
role to play. Whether this is politically feasible at the present time is another matter. But 
statements to the effect that economic success will be achieved with a maximum foreign 
participation of 10% show an ignorance of global capital flows amongst industrialised 
nations (see §3.2). 
This section began with a discussion on the causes of the third oil crisis, followed by the 
assumption that although the third oil crisis has been exacerbated by the current transition 
period, it is a necessary and painful constituent of the process of rationalisation which the 
oil industry is undergoing. The fact that the third oil crisis in Russia may be starting to 
76 For example, the continuing emphasis on production rather than exploration (since 1993 the 
discovery of new reserves has failed to offset production) or instances where the unprofitable export oil is 
continued just because hard currency customers tend to pay their bills on time as opposed to domestic 
clients. 
77 While overall FSU oil production is still declining, although at a lesser rate (i. e. 2% between 1994 
and 1995) Uzbekistan has increased oil production, Kazakhstan has slightly increased production, while in 
Russia some domestic fums have increased production. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996, p 6; 
and R. P. I. Mar. 1996, p 84. 
79 E. g. Tatneft whose oil production was up 6% in 1995 compared with 1994 has been the recipient 
of $50 million credit line from a consortium of German Banks led by Deutsche Bank and guaranteed by 
HERMES. Tatneft operates the Tatex, Tatoilgas and Tatoilpetro JVs with western partners. 
Kogalymneftegaz, a subsidiary of LUKoil, increased its production by 3% in 1995 over 1994 and is a 
recipient of World Bank credits. Chernogorneft's oil production in 1995 was 96.2% of 1994 levels 
representing a significant drop in the rate of annual decline which was 29% in 1994 over 1993. 
Chernogorneft operates three JVs with western partners (Vanyeganneft, Chernogorskoye and Yugraneft) 
and has been the recipient of EBRD credits. A high priority for Uzbekistan is achieving energy self- 
sufficiency. Although its production goal remains small on a regional scale (i. e. 9 MMtpy by the year 
2000), Uzbekistan has increased production through the use of oil and gas service contracts with foreign 
investors. Rupert Wood, "Uzbekistan" in Investing in the Caspian Sea Region: Opportunity and Risk, 
Martin McCauley eds. (London: Catermill Publishing, 1996): pp 88 and 93. 
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bottom out suggests increasing exposure to market forces and the positive contribution 
played by foreign capital hitherto. Before concluding this chapter, a brief discourse on 
the natural gas industry will be presented. While natural gas is not the prime focus of this 
thesis, we wish to raise the point of why the gas industry should learn from the mistakes 
of the oil industry. 
Z4 The Natural Gas Industry -A Similar Pattern? 
As with the oil industry, the production of natural gas in the FSU is dominated by Russia, 
but this was not always the case. Central Asia, Caucasus, and Ukraine accounted for 78% 
of all production in 1970,79 but the development of world class gas fields in the Soviet 
far north completely reversed this position - in 1995 Russia accounted for 84% of all 
FSU natural gas production. 80 The late 1970s and 1980s can be considered the glory 
years of the Soviet gas industry as production rose year after year. But since 1991, 
overall natural gas production in the FSU has decreased thus breaking with the past trend. 
Will this trend continue as has been the case in the oil industry or is it only a temporary 
readjustment? In order to ascertain the answer, one first needs to examine the cause of 
the drop in output. Is it attributable to a drop in consumption, production problems, or 
some combination of both? The latter is probably the more likely scenario, but proving 
this to any extent would be difficult as most gas usage in the FSU is unmetered, so in 
some ways the gas industry remains more of an enigma. 
Similar to the oil industry, most FSRs' gas industries have experienced declines in 
production, only recently have Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan managed to 
increase their production of natural gas whereas the other principal producers Ukraine, 
Turkmenistan and Russia have sustained further losses. It is highly likely that natural gas 
production will increase in Central Asia, namely from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, but 
also with the emergence of a new player, Kazakhstan with their planned development of 
79 Ebel (1994) supra note 6, p 49. 
$o BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996, p 22. 
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the huge Karachaganak gas field. Gas production in Azerbaijan has increased by virtue 
of the offshore gas compression facility completed by Pennzoil and Ramco in 1995 which 
now captures 3 to 4.3 million m3 of natural gas per day which was previously vented. 8' 
Figure 2.4 Annual Natural Gas Production in the FSU 
reliance on a few key gas fields. 
"Although Yamburg and Urengoy will not dry up overnight, it is uncertain 
whether they can carry the gas industry until new fields are brought in. In 
the absence of the capital investment needed to restore reservoir pressure, 
natural gas flows will continue to decline. " 82 
This assessment is by no means unchallenged, Jonathan Stem argues that 
" [p]roduction capacity [in Russia] can be maintained at 1994 levels by 
producing gas from deeper horizons of existing fields and developing 
smaller satellite fields in the Nadym-Pur-Taz region. ... Only as the industry approaches 2010 may new sources of high-cost gas [i. e. Yamal 
Peninsula], accessed through new high-cost transmissions systems be 
81 Cf. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996, p 21. 
82 Ebel (1994) supra note 6, p 57. 
On the other hand the position of Russia may be more worrying due to their heavy 
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required; and even this is not certain, given Russia's options to supplement 
its own supplies with gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 83 
So even among the experts there is a divergence of opinion about the future production 
capacity of the FSU industry. But what is certain is that in recent years, exports of 
natural gas have challenged the oil industry as the region's greatest earner of hard 
currency exports. 
Table 2.4 Exports of Oil. Oil Products and Gas from Russia to Non-CIS Countries 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
Volume of Oil t 66.2 79.81 
Export rice per tonne) 129.1 104.9 . 
Value of Exports 8,5452 8,3702 10,406 
Vol ume of Oil Products (MMt) 25.3 34.51 39.1 . 
Export rice per tonne 164.9 100.63 86.2 
Value of Exports 4,1712 3,4711 3,370 , 
Volume of atura as (Bcm) 88.91 96.0 109.6 
Export rice per Mcm) 84.1 77.53 72.8 
Value of Exports 7,4792 7,4432 , 
Total ue 20,195 19,284 , , % of Natural as to Total 37.0% 38.6% 38.1% -77 -Wo 
Ratio of Natural as to i 
' PlanEcon Energy Rehort, Apr. 1995, pp 13,14. 
2 Alan Smith, Russian Foreign Trade in the Transition, (London: RIIA, 1995) as cited in McCauley (1996) 
op cit. note 78, p 59. 
3 Derived from data given (i. e. Value + Volume) 
4 Russian Economic Trends 4, no. 4 (1995): pp 83-84. 
5 Russian Economic Trends 4, no. 3 (1995): p 109. 
The value of natural gas exports now accounts for 40% of Russian energy exports, 
excluding coal. Furthermore the ratio of the value of natural gas exports to crude oil 
exports has crept up to 0.94 in 1995. If the importance of the natural gas industry is to 
increase or at least maintain its position, new investment is paramount. Figure 2.4 clearly 
illustrates that FSU gas production has peaked and will likely decline unless preventative 
measures are taken. One may argue that the needs of the natural gas industry are neither 
as complex nor as pressing as the needs of the oil industry84, but the former cannot afford 
83 Stern (1995) infra note 84, p xv. 
84 Jonathan P. Stern, Oil and Gas in the Former Soviet Union The Changing Foreign Investment 
Ate, Post-Soviet Investment Forum, (London: RIIA, 1993): p 16. 
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to be complacent and should heed the mistakes made in the past by the oil industry. 85 
While there is some debate as to which investments should be pursued, both Stem and 
Ebel stress the importance of renewed efforts to maintain productive capacity. The 
uncertainty of the development of the next generation of gas fields in the remote and 
hostile Yamal Peninsula lies in its timing but not in the goal per se. 86 Furthermore, much 
of the natural gas pipeline system, like the oil pipeline infrastructure, is ageing and 
requires maintenance, up-grading and even replacement. Delays in investment today will 
not be masked by the tremendous growth in gas production and revenues as was the case 
in the 1980s. If the gas industry is to learn from the mistakes of the oil industry, 
particularly in Russia, then the expedient flow of well directed investment now is 
paramount for ensuring a sustainable future. Whether Gazprom can finance these 
investment requirements is another matter, and the conclusion of one study is that 
"... despite the major problem of non-payments by customers, the company 
is capable of creating sufficient resources for investment form sales 
revenues to sustain high production levels. It is far less certain however, 
that the company will be able to mobilise sufficient resources from 
internal sources to carry out enormous projects for the development of 
new giant gas fields. " 87 
2.5 Conclusion 
This first part of this chapter presented a history of the oil industry in the FSU. Up until 
the 1930s, foreign companies played a significant role in the industry's development. 
Western firms were instrumental in transferring technology and acting as a source of 
investment capital. Even in the 1920s when there was considerable opposition to foreign 
participation, the Soviets showed themselves to be quite pragmatic when balancing 
ideology and commercial requirements. With production restored, foreign companies 
85 Stem (1989) supra note 51, p 8. 
86 E. g. the Barents Sea, Kara Sea including the Yamal Peninsula, East Siberia, Lena-Tunguska, and 
Sakhalin. For recent discussion on the implications of the Yamal gas project for Western Europe see 
Jonathan P. Stem, The Russian Natural Gas Bubble: Consequences for European Gas Markets, (London: 
RIIA, 1995); Roelof D. Visser, "Yamal - Key to a Free Gas Market in Europe, " in Energy Charter Treaty: 
Selected Topics, Thomas W. Wälde and Katherine M. Christie eds. (Dundee: CEPMLP, 1995): pp 5.1 - 
5.12; and Thane Gustafson and Vadim Eskin, "Can Russian Gas Compete in the New Century? " CERA 
Private Report - FSU Energy, Jan. 1994. 
87 Valery Krykukov and Arild Moe, The New Russian Corporatism? A Case Study of Gazprom, 
Post-Soviet Business Forum, (London: R1IA, 1996): p 27. 
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were then expelled from upstream operations in the FSU's oil industry from the 1930s 
onwards. With the exception of some key turnkey manufacturing plants the situation 
remained as such until the 1980s. However the growth witnessed by the Soviet oil 
industry was predicated by the discovery of a prolific new basin each time the preceding 
area of core production entered into decline. Their prolific oil fields amply compensated 
for their lack of modem technology. However, the planning targets set by Gosplan 
consistently exceeded the maximum efficient rate of production, and as a result oil fields 
were terminally damaged and entered into a sharper decline than would have otherwise 
been the case. The production boom enjoyed by the Soviet's was based on a false 
premise of Raubwirtschaft - an entirely unsustainable form of reservoir management. 
The occurrence of three oil crises (1977-80,1982-86, and 1990-95/6? ) provide ample 
evidence of the destructive nature of this policy. The Soviet response to the first two 
crises was the same -a massive infusion of investment capital to the oil industry. 
However, as production targets reigned supreme, drilling activity remained biased 
towards production, a trend that still continues today. As capital alone did not solve the 
first two oil crises, we must not believe that capital alone will be the solution to the third 
ongoing crisis. It is essential that a substantial transfer of technology and management 
skills accompany any large flow of capital. Foreign investment, through the participation 
of IOCs, can satisfy all three requirements. Equally though, the onus is upon the host 
governments to provide an favourable environment which permits their industries to 
prosper and freely act according to undistorted market signals. 
Finally, we briefly touched on the natural gas industry which is relatively healthier than 
its oil industry counterpart, but cannot afford to be complacent and should heed the 
mistakes of the latter. The fact that the oil industry is undergoing a painful process of 
rationalisation is a blessing in disguise. The natural gas industry, in particular Gazprom, 
continues to enjoy an absolute monopoly, and has yet to be exposed to the same market 
forces as the oil industry. Without the financial discipline of the market the gas industry 
risks repeating the experiences of the oil industry. 
Part III 
FINANCING FOR THE FSU 
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3. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter traced the evolution of foreign investment in the pre-Soviet and 
Soviet oil and gas industry, and then drew attention to some of key challenges facing the 
industry today. During periods of history when foreign investment was permissible the 
beneficial effects were forthcoming. Not only did foreign investors play a significant role 
in developing Baku's oil industry in the late 19th century, the concession granted to the 
Barnsdall Corporation was instrumental in reviving the region's production in the 
aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. ' The Barnsdall Corporation provided investment 
capital and facilitated access to the latest standards of modem technology and oil 
production techniques. These are still considered to be among the principal benefits and 
justification for FDI. 2 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the status of FDI in the upstream petroleum 
sector of the FSU, bearing in mind prevailing host country attitudes to such activity. We 
shall quantify the interest expressed by IOCs and identify any existing trends. The 
dissolution of the FSU created a heterogeneous grouping of newly independent sovereign 
states whose values and needs are not necessarily the same. Therefore, we postulate that 
foreign investment even in marginal deposits is now possible, though this would not have 
I The analysis given by Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 
1917 to 1930. (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Publications, 1968): pp 16-44 gives greater weight to the 
contribution of foreign firms in the economic recovery of the Caucasus oil fields which then represented 
the core of Soviet oil production, than does the account by Louis Fischer, Oil Imperialism: The 
International Struggle for Petroleum, 1926 Reprint (Westport, CT.: Hyperion Press Inc., 1975): pp 110-111 
and 121. Although the latter study does acknowledge the existence of such improvements. 
2 The amount literature which has been written about FDI is immense. Interested readers are 
directed to the list of references contained in UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1995: Transnational 
Corporations and Competitiveness, (New York, NY.: United Nations Publications, 1995). 
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been the case when such deposits were considered as integral parts of the whole USSR. 
This chapter draws heavily upon the Foreign Oil and Gas Investment (FOGI) Database 
which was developed for this purpose and is outlined in Appendix A. 
3.2 Trends of Foreign Direct Investment in General 
The level and structure of long-term financial flows to developing countries has changed 
dramatically over the past decade. In 1987 when the total of long-term financial flows 
stood at $68.5 billion, official development assistance (ODA) accounted for 63.4%, net 
private loans of 14.3%, FDI of 21.3%, and portfolio investment of 1%. 3 By 1994, when 
long-term financial flows had reached $227.3 billion, ODA only accounted for 23.9%, net 
private loans of 24.4%, FDI of 34.3%, and portfolio equity investment of 17.4%. 4 In 
absolute terms FDI has increased by a factor of 5 whereas portfolio equity investment has 
increased by a factor of 50.5 
Table 3.1 shows a break-down of global FDI inflows according to developed countries, 
developing countries and Central & Eastern Europe. While the latter enjoyed healthy 
growth in the early part of the 1990s, their share of global FDI has remained small at 
approximately 3% of the total. Clearly there is room for expansion. If we are to assume 
that Russia is to become the prosperous and modem economy of the 21st century to 
which it aspires, 6 then it must be willing to accept a high level of foreign investment. 
3 World Bank Annual Revort 1995, p 214. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Vis-ä-vis Russia efforts to become a member of the G-7 industrial group of nations. Cf. Czech 
Republics accession to OECD in Dec. 1995. 
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Xenophobic statements by nationalists who feel that Russia can succeed in becoming a 
developed country, but in isolation of western capital, seem to ignore the fact that 
developed countries still consume over 60% of global inflows of FDI. 
Table 3.1 Global FDI Inflows. 1982-1994 
Year Developed 
Countries 
($US Bn) 
Developing 
Countries 
($US Bn) 
Central & Eastern 
Europe 
($US Bn) 
All Countries 
($US Bn) 
1982-1986 43 19 0.02 61 
1987-1991 142 31 0.60 174 
1989 172 29 0.30 200 
1990 176 35 0.30 211 
1991 115 41 2.50 158 
1992 111 55 4.40 170 
1993 129 73 6.00 208 
1994 135 84 6.30 226 
source: UINcIAU (1993) supra note 1, p 14. 
But it has not been Russia with its vast endowment of natural resources which has 
captured the bulk of the FDI inflows to the Central & Eastern European region, but rather 
countries such as Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. While Russia's presence is now 
noticeable in absolute terms, its record pales in comparison to Eastern Europe or the 
Baltic States on a per capita basis. For instance, as of June 1995 the cumulative inflow of 
FDI for European transitional economies stood at just over $21 billion ($64 stock per 
capita), including the Baltic States at $938 million ($122 stock per capita), Czech 
Republic at $3.8 billion ($365 stock per capita), Hungary at $7.4 billion ($717 stock per 
capita) and Russia which attracted just under $4 billion ($27 stock per capita).? Overall 
Eastern Europe still accounts for three quarters of cumulative inflows of FDI. From the 
perspective of net inflows (i. e. the difference between inflows and outflows) Russia's 
position is even more worrisome as it has for the most part been a source of net outflows 
7 UNECE, Economic Bulletin for Europe 47 (1995): p 100. 
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rather that inflows (see Table 3.2). Perhaps the comparison with the transitional 
economies of Eastern Europe is a little unfair as their reform process has been underway 
for a longer period of time, but this is not the case for the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania who only reasserted their independence in 1991. Even these smaller 
countries have out performed Russia with respect to net inflows of FDI, particularly on a 
per capita basis. 
Table 3.2 Flows of Net FDI into European Transition Economies 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
January - June 
1994 1995 
FDI flow 
per capita 
1994 
Eastern Europe 443 2303 3066 4522 3247 1269 1709 30 
Czech Republic 120 511 947 1094 749 206 388 72 
Hungary 311 1459 1471 2328 1097 495 464 106 
Poland 10 117 284 580 542 291 336 14 
Others 2 216 364 520 859 277 521 18 
Baltic States N/A N/A 109 242 398 270 194 52 
European CIS -400 -100 95 887 0 115 84 0 
Belarus N/A N/A 7 7 10 5 5 1 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 12 5 7 3 
Ukraine N/A N/A 200 198 151 41 74 3 
Total 43 2203 3270 5651 3645 1654 1987 11 
Source: Calculations based on selected entnes trom UNhUh, Economic Bulletin for Europe 47 (1995): p 
95; and "Investing in Central and Eastern Europe, " Financial Times Survey, 15 Apr. 1996. 
As far as formulating a judgement on other members of the CIS we are hampered by the 
lack of reliable statistics, and any attempt by ourselves to assign a quantitative value 
would be very speculative. Generally speaking the observation that FDI has hitherto been 
limited and well below expectations appears justified, particularly in contrast to the 
proliferation of joint venture registrations. The latter provide us with a barometer of the 
high level of interest expressed by foreign investors in the region. In Russia, the number 
of registered JVs increased from less than 1000 at the beginning of 1990 to more than 
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16,000 by the beginning of 1995.8 Similarly, in Kazakhstan the number of registered JVs 
increased from 8 in 1989 to 500 in 1992 to 1509 by mid-1994.9 These numbers are not a 
true indicator of FDI as they take no account of JVs which fail to start-up or are 
subsequently liquidated and not removed from the official registers, '° nevertheless they 
establish the fact that the number of foreign companies contemplating investment is high. 
But this is in sharp contrast to low levels of FDI flows and stocks actually observed. In 
other words, the CIS region as a whole, and in particular Russia, has hitherto failed to 
crystallise the interest of prospective foreign investors into a commensurate degree of 
actual investment. In summary, there continues to be a wide disparity between the low 
level of investment and the high level of interest. 
These general comments can be extended to the petroleum sector of the FSU, where 
foreign investors have expressed the most enthusiasm. In Russia, the proportion of total 
FDI in the fuels and energy complex increased from 16% in 1993 to 50% in 1994.11 In 
countries such as a Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan these percentages are likely to be higher 
due to the prospect for the petroleum industry to play a larger role in their domestic 
8 Statistics on the number of registered Ns tends to be erratic often exhibiting discrepancies among 
sources. Although time series may differ, all indicate a proliferation of registrations. See Yevgenia L. 
Yakovleva, "Trends in Foreign Direct Investment, " in Foreign Investment in Russia: Salient Features and 
Trends, Second Report, Alexander Z. Astapovich Ed., (Moscow: 1NFOMART Agency, 1995): pp 27-46; 
and UNECE, Economic Bulletin for Europe 46 (1994): p 130. 
9 See "Facts & Figures: N's Mushroom in Kazakhstan, " Delovie Lyudi - The Letter. No. 29,16 
Dec. 1992, p 1; and Paul Thomas, Kazakhstan: Investment Opportunities in the Energy Sector, (London: 
Financial Times Energy Publishing, 1995): p 29. 
10 Data for the CIS as a whole show that in 1992 and the first three quarters of 1993 the percentage 
of registered Ns which were operational was only 52% and 65% respectively. Yakovleva (1995) supra 
note 8, p 38. 
11 Russian Economic Trends 4, no. 1(1995): p 118. An alternative estimate based on the first three 
quarters of 1994 is as high as 70%. Yakovleva (1995) supra note 8, p 45. 
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economies. Our analysis now turns specifically to foreign investment in the upstream oil 
and gas sector of the FSU. 
3.3 Why is the FSU attractive to IOCs? 
The dissolution of the FSU brought with it the opportunity for IOCs to theoretically 
access the region's petroleum resources. Based purely on a judgement of known 
recoverable reserves the FSU, is comparatively speaking, not as attractive as other parts 
of the world (see Table 3.3). The FSU's share of global oil reserves has been steadily 
declining over the past twenty years as has been the case for Europe, Asia and Australia, 
and more recently North America. In this respect the FSU currently only ranks fifth (i. e. 
0 
5.5% of the total) dropping from second in 1975 and third in 1985. All the while the 
Middle East continues to dominate global distribution of oil reserves. 
Given that over 60% of the world's oil reserves are "closed" or "off limits" to western 
IOCs, even the FSU's relatively modest level of reserves are attractive. 12 But, what really 
counts in long-term exploration and development strategies is not so much the current 
level of known reserves, but rather the possibility of additional reserves as a result of 
further investment. Because the FSU possesses 37% of the world's sedimentary basins, 
compared to North America (2%) and the Middle East (11%), 13 the perception of making 
further discoveries is highly favourable when compared to the mature petroleum 
producing regions of North America and Europe. 
12 This concept is further elucidated in §5.4.2 which ranks the world's oil reserves according to 
political/country risk ranking. 
13 Marshall I. Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum Half-empty or half-full? (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1980): p 127. 
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Table 3.3 Regional Distribution of Reserves 
Region P roved Oil Reserves at Year En d 
1975 
(%) 
1985 
(%) 
1995 
(%) 
1995 
(Bn bbls) 
Middle East 55.2 56.1 64.9 659.5 
North America 8.5 13.1 8.5 86.6 
S. & Central America 3.9 4.9 7.8 78.9 
Africa 
Asia & Australasia 
9.8 
6.2 
8.0 
5.3 
7.2 
4.4 
73.1 
44.1 
Europe 4.3 4.0 1.7 17.7 
Total 100% 100% 100% 1016.9 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996, p 4. 
A rough approximation of the ability to add reserves in any given country is provided by 
the density of drilling (i. e. the more wells that have already been drilled the less likely are 
the chances of making further discoveries). While it would be desirable to know the total 
number of wells drilled per square kilometre in each and every petroleum basin, a 
simplification is to just compare the total the number of wells drilled to-date divided by 
the region's share of the world's sedimentary basin. A 1994 publication indicates that the 
cumulative number of wells drilled in North America is in excess of 3.2 million, in the 
Middle East less than 50,000 and in the FSU approximately 600,000.14 Thus, exploration 
and development activity in North America amounts to approximately 1.6 million wells 
per 1% of the world's sedimentary basin, in the FSU approximately 16,200 wells have 
been drilled per I% of the world's sedimentary basins, and in the Middle East 4,500 wells 
have been drilled per 1% of the world's sedimentary basins. These calculations are only 
an approximation, but they do demonstrate the favourable geological potential of the 
FSU, compared to North America which has the highest density drilling. 
14 Daniel Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts, 
(Tulsa, OK.: PennWell Publishing Company, 1994): p 205. 
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Opinion on estimates of the FSU's ultimate recoverable oil & gas reserves differ, but 
some commentators suggest that the FSU's possible oil & gas reserves are twice as great 
as Saudi Arabia's known reserves [sic]. 15 Such optimism is perhaps not unwarranted, 
provided it is treated cautiously. Witness the contrasting response of the Kazakh 
Government versus those of IOCs towards the results of a seismic survey carried out in 
the north-east quadrant of the Caspian Sea. While the former believed the results 
indicated possible reserves of 10 billion tonnes and 2.5 Tcm, western oil companies 
involved in the project estimated the region's potential at 4 billion tonnes of oil with the 
corresponding caveat that no wells have yet been drilled. 16 To put these estimates in 
perspective, 10 billion tonnes exceeds Russia's known oil reserves by 50%. For our 
purposes, the absolute value of any of the foregoing estimates is of limited practical use. 
What is fundamental to our analysis is the favourable perception held by IOCs of making 
additional discoveries, regardless of what the exact level may or may not eventually be. 
This, combined with the possibility of gaining access to previously discovered but 
hitherto undeveloped deposits, has resulted in a high level of interest by IOCs. 
3.4 Upstream Investment Trends l Forecast for the Future 
Beginning in the 1990s foreign interest in the oil and gas resources of the FSU 
accelerated. Our research indicates the existence of 292 upstream projects either under 
discussion or development within the FSU, that involve foreign investors. Furthermore, 
15 This exercise is not strictly speaking correct as it compares Russia's position taking into 
consideration likely future additions to oil and gas reserves without allowing the same for Saudi Arabia. As 
was indicated in the text of our discussion density drilling is actually lower in the Middle East than 
compared to the FSU, thus it seems logical that more additions to oil and gas reserves may be made in the 
Middle East as opposed to FSU, not the other way around. Robert A. Gray, "Investment in the FSU Oil 
and Gas Industry: A Financial Advisor's Perspective, " Oil & Gas Guide to the Former Soviet Union. 
(London: The CIS Technical Publishing Institute, 1993): p 43. 
16 "Kazakhstan Reports Huge Offshore Oil Reserves, " OMRI Daily Report, No. 125, Part I, 27 June 
1996. 
54 
we believe this to be a conservative estimate as it excludes expressions of intent to co- 
operate and fail to identify a particular deposit. '? Our total also excludes secondary 
supply and services contracts (i. e. sub-contracts) associated with a given project, as their 
inclusion would cause the erroneous multiple counting of the same project. '8 Table 3.4 
provides a summary of all upstream projects involving foreign investors as recorded in 
the FOGI Database. 
Upstream projects are segregated into two principal categories: firstly, Classic Upstream 
which includes exploration, exploration and development, and development projects; and 
secondly, well rehabilitation, workovers and enhanced oil recovery (EOR) type projects. 
As the only real difference between well rehabilitation and well workovers is in the name 
in which they are reported, and the fact that they are often combined with EOR, we 
combine all three into one category for summary purposes making no distinction between 
them. The data in Table 3.4 reveals a number of salient trends. 
17 In fact, if we were to include such expressions of intent made by companies and/or governments 
which fail to mention a specific deposit the total number of proposals rises to 336. See Appendix A. 2: 
FOGI Database: Upstream, p UpSumntl. 
18 For instance the FOGI Database includes 12 secondary contracts with foreign companies 
associated with Conoco's Polar Lights Project in Russia, but the project itself only counts as one single 
entry. 
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Table 3.4 Summary of Upstream Projects Involving Foreign Investors 
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Firstly, the majority of potential projects is located in Russia (i. e. 58% by number and 
75% by value). This is to be expected as Russia accounts for 86% of the FSU's known oil 
reserves and oil production. 19 Furthermore, there exists a strong correlation between the 
value of potential projects and the known level of reserves in each country. A correlation 
of the average potential level of investment with known level of reserves and current 
production, produces correlation coefficients of 0.991 and 0.986 respectively. 20 
Azerbaijan which possesses 2% of the FSU's oil reserves, is attracting 8% of projects by 
number and 6-7% of projects by value, similarly Kazakhstan with 9.3% of the FSU's oil 
reserves is attracting 17% of projects by number and 16-18% of projects by value. This 
correlation is partially explained by the fact that investment estimates are dominated by 
projects based on explored reserves. Companies do not forecast and report investment 
plans (except in the case of pure exploration) in the hope of discovering future reserves 
but rather on the existence of known reserves. Investment estimates contained in the 
FOGI Database are dominated by development plans of known reserves. 
Secondly, while there exists a correlation between the distribution of reserves and 
potential projects, a bias towards Central Asia and the Transcaucasus (including the 
Caspian Sea) is emerging. In this region the number and value of projects is 
proportionately greater than the amount of known reserves, whereas in Russia the same 
figures are proportionally less. The bias towards Central Asia and the Transcaucasus 
becomes even stronger if we exclude rehabilitation projects and only consider our classic 
19 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996, p 6. 
20 See Appendix A. 2: FOGI Database: Upstream, p UpSumm. 3. 
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upstream operations. Using such criteria Central Asia and the Transcaucasus accounts for 
39% of potential projects by number and 24% by value, whereas Russia only accounts for 
55% by number and 75% by value. Presumably the perception that the former region may 
contain much more oil than is currently known combined with an easier sense of doing 
business than hitherto experienced in Russia, are two of the most important factors 
contributing to this trend. 
The third important feature is the predominance of rehabilitation projects in Russia 
accounting for 70% of the reported total. Furthermore, of this amount 71% of Russian 
rehabilitation projects are located in Western Siberia, a region which accounted for 69% 
the country's production in 1995.21 The strong correlation between existing production 
and the location of rehabilitation projects needs little explanation, obviously this is where 
such projects would occur. However, the predominance of Western Siberia rehabilitation 
projects can explained by the fact that of Russia's mature petroleum basins, overall 
depletion rates in Western Siberia are the lowest, 22 although for some particular fields the 
depletion rate are much higher than the average. In other words rehabilitation projects in 
Western Siberia are likely to yield the highest incremental production per unit of 
investment compared to other regions and explains why World Bank and EBRD credits 
for rehabilitation projects have focused on this region. The advantage of rehabilitation 
projects is that they can offer a very high financial rate of return within a short payback 
period (see §5.2.1.3.1). 
21 CIS Petroleum Map, (Geneva: Petroconsultants, 1996). 
22 According to estimates by the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy the Volga-Urals region is 68% 
depleted, the North Caucasus 83% depleted, Komi Republic (part of the Timan-Pechora Basin) is 48% 
depleted, and Western Siberia is only 40% depleted. lEA, Energy Policies of the Russian Federation 1995 
Survey, (Paris: OECD/IEA, 1995): p 108. 
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Fourthly, the bulk of potential foreign investment will focus on "classic' upstream 
operations. Overall it will account for 81% of potential projects by number, and 
potentially more than 99% by value. The potential dominance by value is caused by two 
factors. Firstly, of the rehabilitation projects underway, investment estimates are often 
not reported and thus are not recorded in the FOGI Database. In this sense our database 
suffers from under-reporting of smaller activities. Secondly, if and when such investment 
figures are reported, they pale in comparison to the potential capital investments of the 
mega-projects under consideration. Clearly, IOC's are focusing on projects where the 
perception of making significant additions to their own reserve base is highly favourable, 
thus the long-term emphasis on classic upstream operations. The pure exploration 
category still plays a relatively minor role due to the preponderance of existing yet 
hitherto undeveloped deposits. We observe that of the 237 classic upstream projects only 
21 (i. e. 9%) are pure exploration accounting for less than 2% (-- $4 billion) of potential 
investment by value. Although IOCs believe the region is favourable from an 
explorationist's point of view, prudence suggests that within a high risk business climate, 
foreign investment should concentrate on projects which utilise known assets. Such a 
strategy meshes with a staggered or staged approach to investment, hence the existence of 
projects which combine an element of exploration alongside the development of known 
reserves. Exploration and Development projects account for 32% of potential upstream 
projects by number and 31 - 34% by value (i. e. m $79 - 95 billion). Finally potential 
development projects account for 60% of the total by number and 63 - 67% (i. e. m $146 - 
207 billion) by value of the total. It seems logical that if foreign investors are not capable 
of developing a known deposit then their chance for success of pursuing grassroots 
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exploration through to development is even less likely. This theory may not be watertight 
as it is arguable that a newly found discovery may not attract the same degree of domestic 
opposition as the foreign investor is seen to be creating new wealth as opposed to 
exploiting known wealth. Furthermore, a greenfield project obviates the risk of inheriting 
problems associated with a pre-existing project or deposit (e. g. environmental liability for 
past damage, unsuitable labour force, entrenched bad working practices, etc. ). 
Our fifth observation concerns the attraction of foreign investment into FSRs other than 
the principal oil producing FSRs (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia). For the other 
republics which collectively account for 2.6% of FSU's known oil reserves, the 
correlation between value of projects (1.6%) roughly holds, but the relationship by 
number (16%) breaks down. Collectively these other republics will not be able to attract 
a disproportionate value of investment compared to the three principal oil producing 
FSRs, but they may be able to attract a proportionately greater number of projects albeit 
of a smaller nature. Had the FSU maintained its unity it is inconceivable that foreign 
investors would have seriously considered upstream projects in the Baltic States, 
Armenia or Moldova, because they would have been low priority for the Union as a 
whole. But after the break-up, each sovereign state is seeking to attract investment 
tailored to their own national interests. This implies maximising the use of indigenous 
hydrocarbon resources despite the fact that they may be insignificant compared to a 
neighbouring country's. While a 2,000 bopd field is of little significance to Russia which 
in 1995 collectively produced 3.2 million bopd, such a field would be of paramount 
importance to Georgia. The obvious qualification being that the cost-benefit analysis of a 
project (i. e. the economic return to society as a whole as opposed to the financial return of 
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the project itself) must be greater than the alternative of importing `competitive' sources 
of energy. As Russia has eliminated highly subsidised exports of crude oil, the 
indigenous development of even marginal deposits outside of the principal three oil 
producers is viewed favourably. Clearly, the collective value of such upstream 
investments will not, on a proportional basis, exceed the value of investments elsewhere 
in the FSU as the potential investment is a function of the level of reserves to be 
developed. Nevertheless, there exists the opportunity for companies to undertake smaller 
projects in countries where the bulk of the FSU's reserves are not located. All that is 
required is for the republics in question to offer terms and conditions which are tailored to 
the geologic circumstances at hand (i. e. the fiscal terms will need to reflect the fact that 
many such deposits are likely to be marginal). The corollary is that a minor petroleum 
producing country should not blindly import the fiscal terms relating to exploitation of 
hydrocarbons from one of the principal petroleum producing FSRs. 
Finally, the population distribution within the FSU will to some extent influence the 
impact proposed foreign oil and gas projects may have on their national economies. 
Should all the `press-reported' investment take place, the whole of the FSU would be host 
to $924 of upstream oil and gas investment per capita. Foreign investors have expressed 
the greatest interest in Russia, but on a per capita basis foreign oil and gas investment 
may only total $1,369. On the other hand Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan may enjoy a higher 
average per capita investment of $2,240 and $2,776. Thus foreign oil and gas operations 
are likely to have a much greater impact on the local economies of Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan than in Russia. Conversely, if Russia wished to obtain the same effect from 
foreign oil and gas operations then they would need to attract 40 times the level of 
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investment in Azerbaijan or 9 times the level of investment in Kazakhstan, something 
which is unlikely to occur. Whether the proposed levels of investment are realistic or not 
is another matter and Chapter 4 will examine this issue in the context of global oil and 
gas capital expenditures forecasts. 
In summary, we conclude by restating the five emerging investment trends based on the 
information collected in the FOGI Database: a) there is strong correlation between the 
level of known reserves and the value of upstream projects being considered; b) the bulk 
of rehabilitation projects occur in Russia, of which Western Siberia is the focus; c) 
without prejudice to point (a) there appears to be a slight bias towards Central Asia and 
the Transcaucasus (including the Caspian Sea); d) given the preponderance of existing yet 
hitherto undeveloped deposits, pure exploration represents a small portion of upstream 
projects being considered; and e) even FSRs with marginal petroleum deposits are 
capable of attracting smaller foreign oil companies to undertake development projects. 
Our discussion now turns away from reported levels of potential investment to the 
modality of that investment. 
3.5 The Modality of Foreign Investment 
3.5.1 Joint Ventures 
Joint Ventures (JVs) are the most widespread mechanism of FDI in the FSU because of 
their ease of formation and the fact that they were the first formal mechanism of entry 
into the FSU permitted by law. The foreign partner typically contributes cash (or access 
to financing) and technology while the domestic partner's contribution consists of its 
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existing assets including licences to explore and produce hydrocarbons. 23 In Russia, 
roughly 2,000 wholly or partly foreign-owned oil and gas ventures were registered as of 
March 1996,24 implying that less than 12.5% of all registered JVs in Russia are in the oil 
and gas sector. 25 As to what proportion of these are undertaking upstream operations we 
are less certain. The FOGI Database records the existence of at least 145 JV based 
projects in the upstream oil and gas sector of which 89 are in Russia, 26 in Kazakhstan, 
and 9 in Azerbaijan. 26 What is more important however is the number of JVs actually 
producing oil. As for Russia, only 38 JVs were producing oil at the start of 1994 
increasing slightly to 40 by the first quarter of 1995.27 With respect to Kazakhstan only 
eleven out of the twenty registered joint ventures to undertake upstream operations were 
actually operational 28 If one is to draw any conclusions from the above is it is that 
investment qua operations is falling well short of both investor and host country 
expectations. 
Within upstream oriented oil and gas JVs, our research indicates that the 50: 50 equity 
ownership is the most common (see Figure 3.1). Outside of this central grouping, there is 
23 Christopher Osakwe, "Model Joint Venture Foundation Documents for a Russian-American Joint 
Stock Company, " Russian Oil & Gas Guide. 3, no. 3 (1994): pp 2-19. Further examples of JV documents 
and Model JV Agreements are reproduced in Barrow's Russia & NIS Basic Oil Laws & Contracts Series. 
24 Interfax Petroleum Rehort, 29 Mar. -5 Apr. 1996, p 10. 
25 Supra note 8. 
26 A "N based project" implies that a JV may be undertaking one or more projects. E. g. The FOGI 
Database records for the Tatex JV in Russia three separate projects (Romashkino field well stimulation, 
Onbyskoye field development, and the Almetyevsk vapour recovery project). 
27 "Russia's Trouble Joint Ventures Enjoy Tax, Export Relief, " P. I. W.. 29 May 1995, p 4; and 
"Theory and Practice, " R. P. L. July/Aug. 1994, p 23. 
28 Interfax Petroleum Report, 8-15 Mar. 1996, p 12. 
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a slight bias towards domestic majority (e. g. 51%), even if only for symbolic reasons 
and the western partner maintains de facto management control vis-a-vis appointment of 
board members etc. 
Figure 3.1 Histogram of JV Ownership 
Histogram of Domestic Ownership in Upstream Oriented 
JVs with Foreign Partners 
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Source: N entries from FOGI Database for which ownership data is available. A table version including 
the N's name and host country is reproduced in Appendix B. 
Provided domestic majority is not mandated by law, domestic participation can 
theoretically reach 0% at which point the venture would become a wholly owned foreign 
enterprise. At the other end of the spectrum it is extremely rare to find domestic 
ownership in a JV greater than 70%. This is a direct consequence of early legislation 
governing foreign activity and taxation which granted incentives to foreign investors 
contributing more than 30% of JV's statutory capital. Such provisions included the right 
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for the N to freely export its product without a licence29 and the granting of tax 
holidays. 30 
3.5.2 Joint Ventures versus Production Sharing Agreements 
Despite the proliferation of JVs they have not proved to be a robust mechanism for 
foreign investors as they generally do not offer protection from the ever changing legal, 
regulatory and fiscal regimes. The practical result is that although the number of Ns is a 
good indicator of the high level of interest expressed by foreign investors, this 
mechanism is unlikely to facilitate a high level of investment. The disparity between the 
high level of interest and the generally low level of investment to date seems to confirm 
such an assessment. In this regard, the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) is touted as 
being the mechanism which offers foreign investors the necessary assurances and 
stability for undertaking capital intensive long-term investments. However, not all 
commentators necessarily agree. It has been speculated that at least in Russia, where 
there exists large and experienced domestic oil companies 
"... the form of a joint venture - with the Western partner taking a 
minority and transitory role - is much more likely than the production- 
29 E. g. Art 25 of the Russian Law on Foreign Investment, " dated 4 July 1991; Art. 25 of the Azeri 
Law on the Protection of Foreign Investment, " dated 15 Jan. 1992; and Art. 16 of the Turlanen Law on 
Foreign Investment, " dated 19 May 1992. 
30 E. g. Russian Presidential Decree No. 1004 "On Certain Issues of Tax Policy, " states that if the 
paid up charter capital of an enterprise, comprising at least 30% foreign investment, is greater that $10 
million, then the enterprise is exempt from profit tax for two years provided that the production activity is 
more than 70% of the total annual income. Art. 16 of the "Turkmen Law on Foreign Investment, " dated 
19 May 1992, exempts a foreign investor who has paid more than 30% of the charter capital in freely 
convertible currency an exemption from paying tax on dividends and profit tax for the period of recouping 
their investment. See also "Turkmen Law on Free Economic Zones, " dated 8 Oct. 1993. Art. 20 of the 
Kazakh Law on Foreign Investment, date 7 Dec. 1990 (as amended 8 Apr. 1993) provided a five year tax 
holiday from profit tax and a reduced profit tax by 50% for the next five years if the share of the foreign 
investor exceeded 30%. While the latter has been superseded by the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
Concerning Foreign Investments, dated 27 Dec. 1994, Art. 6 of the new law provides a stabilisation 
guarantee against changes in legislation for a period of 10 years. See Elena Kirillova et al., Production 
Sharing in the Former Soviet Union, (London: McKenna & Co., 1996). 
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sharing, service and concession contracts that currently prevail in many 
producing countries. " 31 
In contrast, in the southern FSRs of Central Asia, it is argued that the production-sharing 
contract, with IOCs taking the leading role behind a veil of national ownership may be 
more appropriate and prevail. 32 This reasoning plays heavily on the existence of a strong 
nationalist sentiment in Russia and that the southern republics of Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus are naturally weaker in both economic and political terms in comparison 
to Russia. While we can appreciate this reasoning we find such arguments unconvincing. 
It is not so much the minority or majority position of foreign interest which is so crucial 
but rather the stability which accompanies such interest. Figure 3.1 demonstrated that the 
50: 50 JV is a perfectly acceptable structure, even a slight domestic majority is not 
considered unreasonable. 33 Foreign investors are not opposed to majority domestic 
ownership, but they do require assurances that their business venture will be managed 
prudently, and that the rules and regulations governing the investment are reasonably 
predictable. However, any opportunity initially enjoyed by Russia for utilising the JV as 
a long-term mechanism for supporting foreign investment in its upstream petroleum 
sector, has likely been lost due to the poor track-record of such investments to date. 
While problems associated with JVs are not the preserve of Russia alone (Cf. 
Turlanenistan's treatment of JVs, see §7.3.3), the Russian experience has tarnished their 
reputation throughout. As a result such JVs have not translated into large investments, 
nor do the bulk of potential foreign investments still contemplate the use of JVs. There 
31 Thomas W. Wilde, "Foreign investment in CIS oil and gas and its implications for other 
countries, " OPEC Bulletin. July/Aug. 1994, p 19. 
32 Ibid. 
33 E. g. ARCO's intention to form a 46: 54 N with LUKoi1, under which the latter would provide $3 
billion in financing over a ten year period. See entry in FOGI Database. 
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appears to be two emerging trends: firstly, the increasing use of a PSAs a priori ; and 
secondly, the use of a PSA in conjunction with an earlier JV agreement. In the latter 
case, we have recorded the existence of at least 15 such arrangements, and within Russia, 
11 foreign investors currently involved in JVs have expressed their intention to transfer 
their operations to a production sharing format. This is on top of the application of 
domestic oil companies within Russia to shift more than 500 fields, groups of adjacent 
fields and blocks to PSAs 34 In Russia, of the reported potential upstream projects under 
consideration by foreign investors, $82-$117 billion are expected to occur under the 
production sharing mechanism. The comparable reported figure for Ns is only $18 
billion, which in hindsight, given the poor performance of this mechanism, should now 
be considered overly optimistic. 
This does not necessarily mean that PSAs are the only answer. Comparable figures for 
Kazakhstan are $10-28 billion för PSAs and $25 billion for )Vs. In this case the 
proportion of potential PSA/JV investment is only 2.5-1.1: 1 as opposed to the average of 
4.5-6.5: 1 in Russia. The difference between the Russian and Kazakh experience is 
explained by the dominant position of the TengizChevroil IV in Kazakhstan which 
expects to invest $20 billion over the project's life. However, a reading of the 
TengizChevroil JV documents reveals that they are considerably different from their 
counterparts in Russia. In particular, the Presidential Edict of Kazakhstan dated 8 Apr. 
34 From this list Roskomnedra, the committee on Geology and the Use of Underground Resources, 
eventually, submitted 200 entries for consideration by the Duma. "On the List, " R. P. I.. Apr. 1996, p 29. 
However, the Russian Duma has yet to approve any list and in all likelihood the final list will be 
substantially reduced. 
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199435 guarantees the tax and royalty terms set-out in the foundation agreements of the 
TengizChevroil N. 36 Thus, even though Chevron and Kazakhstan chose to utilise the JV 
format, Chevron secured the fiscal stability which a PSA purports to provide. In the case 
of Azerbaijan the ratio of potential investment using PSA structure to JV structure is 
almost 120: 1, indicating the preference for the PSA mechanism by foreign investors and 
the willingness of the host government to accept such a formula. This is in part due to the 
fact that Azerbaijan has yet to enact a modem petroleum law. 
We believe there is a good deal of truth behind the prediction that "foreign investment in 
the FSU will increase, but much slower and in a much less dominant role than originally 
envisaged. "37 It is not, however, because of a transitory and minority foreign position as 
is suggested but rather that the high risk business climate of the FSU requires a staggered 
investment approach. It is equally certain that such investment will not occur unless the 
foreign partner who is supplying capital and technology receives adequate investor 
protection. As indicated in the case of Kazakhstan, this need not necessarily be a PSA. 
After all, three-quarters of the world's countries and fiscal systems continue to be 
governed by concession-style arrangements 38 Any mechanism which maintains and 
35 "On Approving TengizChevroil Joint Venture (Guarantees Terms and Fiscal Provisions)" dated 8, 
Apr. 1994, Russia & NIS Basic Oil Laws & Contracts, Supp. 16,1995, p 71. 
36 Art. 6 and 7, "Chevron Joint Enterprise Foundation Agreement (Tengiz), " dated 18 May 1991, 
Russia & NIS Basic Oil Laws & Contracts. Supp. 19,1995, pp 38-50. 
37 Walde (1994) supra note 31. 
38 Gordon H. Barrows, "World Review: Fiscal Incentives for Exploration & Exploitation 1990- 
1995, " Paper presented to CEPMLP's International Oil and Gas Investment Policies Seminar, St. Andrews, 
Scotland, 20-22 Sept. 1995. Cf. Pedro van Meurs, World Fiscal Systems for Oil, (New York, NY.: 
Barrows, 1995). 
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guarantees a balance of interests39 over time will suffice. It just so happens that the 
current momentum of the international oil and gas industry is towards PSA. Within the 
FSU, PSAs have been concluded in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine. 
In Russia the PSA mechanism is far from tried and tested. The issue is not whether the 
PSA will eventually be used, but rather how long will it take Russia to make all the 
necessary amendments to its legislation to guarantee the workability of the PSA 
framework in its entirety. Judging from experience, this will take longer than expected 
and when it does occur, one should not expect the high estimates of potential investment 
established herein to be suddenly translated into actual investment. There will be no 
`opening of the flood gates'. Even foreign investors having concluded PSAs will proceed 
with caution and employ a staggered or stepped approach to investment -a theme which 
is examined in more detail in §4.4.3.2. 
It may well be that the cumulative share of foreign investment in Russia's oil and gas 
industry will remain comparatively small given the pre-existence of a large domestic 
industry with well established vested interests. If foreign investors are not afforded the 
level of investor protection and stability which they require, then FDI will remain small 
by choice. But, could this role be transitory as suggested above? This too is unlikely 
unless the domestic oil industry is capable of remaining technologically competitive from 
within. If we speculate that sufficient FDI takes place to modernise and transform 
39 - Alfred C. Boulos, "Mutuality of Interest Between Companies and Governments - Myth or 
Fact? " in Energy Law `90: Changing Energy Markets - the Leea1 Consequences: Proceedings of the 
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Russia's oil industry, then the domestic industry would need to carry and maintain the 
momentum by itself, if the role of FDI were to be transitory. However, in order for FDI 
to occur in the first place (i. e. transfer of capital, technology and management resources) 
foreign investors will need to be assured of more than a transitory role. The use of JVs 
has to date failed to transform potential investment into actual investment at least on the 
scale initially envisioned. Moreover, the reputation of JVs as a viable mechanism for FDI 
in the upstream oil and gas sector has been seriously undermined. 
In order for the petroleum sector of the FSU to become a modem, competitive and 
efficient industry of the 21st century, the FSRs must first provide a sufficient form of 
investor protection and guarantees to attract the investment which will play an integral 
role in that transformation. As suggested above, this need not be a PSA, but it seems 
equally certain that it now cannot be a JV (that window of opportunity has passed), and 
given the effort expended on PSAs, it makes sense to pursue this avenue which is gaining 
in familiarity and popularity in other parts of the FSU. 
3.5.3 Portfolio Investment and Privatisation 
A third vehicle to support foreign investment is the purchase of equity in privatised 
domestic companies 40 Whilst Russia witnessed a speculative boom in portfolio 
Advanced Seminar on Petroleum. Minerals and Energy Resources Law. IBA Series. (London: Graham & 
Trotman, 1990): pp 3-31. 
40 On Russia's privatisation process in general see Richard C. Schneider Jr. "Privatisation in One 
Country: Foreign Investment and the Russian Privatisation Dynamic, " Hastings Int'l. & Comn. L. Rev. 17 
(1994): pp 697-740. In regards to the oil industry see Irena Agalliu, "Privatisation of Petroleum Industry 
in Russia, " Unpublished paper submitted to Transnational Investment Law Course, CEPMLP, University 
of Dundee, Dundee, Scotland, 20 Jan. 1995; Catherine Locatelli, "The Reorganisation of the Russian 
Hydrocarbons Industry, " Energy Policy 23 (1995): pp 809-819; Valeriy Kryukov, "Russian Oil 
Companies, " O. G. L. T. R. 13 (1995): pp 389-394; and Arild Moe and Valeriy Kryukov, "Observations on 
the Reorganisation of the Russian Oil Industry, " Post-Soviet Geography 35 (1994): pp 89-101. 
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investment in 1994 following mass privatisation, 41 this only involved short-term investors 
seeking quick profits by bidding up prices on the secondary market and hardly constituted 
the long-term investment which the oil industry requires. But in order for long-term 
strategic investors to take a stake in a privatised domestic company two basic conditions 
must be met. Firstly investors must be assured of the integrity of their basic shareholder 
rights and secondly investors must believe these companies can prosper in the economic 
and political climate of the future. Undoubtedly, on the first count, shareholder rights in 
Russia's nascent stock market are improving and the 15% limit on foreign ownership in 
Russian oil companies that existed since December 1992 has now been eliminated. 42 
The most notable investment to date has been ARCO's purchase of 8% of LUKoi1 
through two convertible bond issues 43 Alternatively, American investors may choose to 
purchase American Depository Receipts (ADRs) whereby a custodial bank purchases 
shares on behalf of an investor and issues in return an ADR evidencing the underlying 
share to the investor. In this manner the ADR bank acts both as a depository and stock 
transfer agent. Thus far LUKoil and Chernogorneft are the only Russian oil companies to 
have issued ADRs, but Tatneft and Purneftegas are apparently negotiating with the US 
Security and Exchange Commission to do the same. Regardless of the actual method 
employed in purchasing stock, a western investor becomes exposed to the very 
commercial risks that they have been so reluctant to assume in the past. If this had not 
41 Russian Economic Trends 4, no. 1 (1995): p 127. 
42 Cf. Law of the Russian Federation No. 208-FZ "On Joint-Stock Companies, " dated 26 Dec. 1995 
and effective 1 Jan. 1996. [Accessed through the Internet: http: //www. inforsis. nnov. su]. See also 
Debevoise & Plimpton, "The New Russian Joint-Stock Company Law, " 28 Mar. 1996; and Clifford 
Chance, "Russian Joint Stock Company Law, " Newsletter: Russian and the Other States of the CIS. Feb. 
1996, pp 1-4. 
43 CS First Boston. "LUKoil The Power of Ten. " Equity Research - Russia. 29 Mar. 1996, p 14. 
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been the case, IOCs would have pursued investment under the JV mechanism without 
waiting for a suitable PSA framework. In other words the value of an equity investment 
is conditional upon the domestic company being able to generate profits and pay 
dividends. But this is a tall order in the current uncertain business climate of excessive 
taxation, continuing non-payment and rising transportation charges, etc. The fact is that 
Russia's oil industry continues to be hampered by many systemic problems which 
adversely effect the commercial operations of foreign IOCs and domestic companies 
alike. A foreign IOC reluctant to proceed without a suitable PSA framework is equally 
unlikely to purchase large-blocks of Russian oil company stock either. For this reason we 
believe large-scale flows of FDI in the form of a long-term strategic purchase of domestic 
equity will not be forthcoming until the commercial viability of the domestic industry is 
assured. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Over the past decade we have witnessed an increasing trend towards private sector 
financial flows and away from official development assistance. The dissolution of the 
FSU represents a new opportunity for FDI. At present Eastern Europe and the FSU are 
only receiving 3% of total FDI inflows to developing countries. Ironically, it has not 
been Russia with its massive reserves of natural resources which has attracted the bulk of 
FDI but rather countries like Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland which have proven 
more successful. While foreign investors have expressed a high degree of interest in the 
FSU vis-a-vis the proliferation of JVs, investment has remained small. This observation 
for the economy as a whole can be extended to the petroleum sector where potential 
projects worth $231-$308 billion have been reported. There is a strong correlation 
between the location of explored reserves and potential investment, but a slight bias 
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towards Central Asia and the Transcaucasus exists among foreign IOCs. This is likely 
caused by the easier sense of doing business in the region as opposed to Russia and the 
favourable perception of making additional discoveries. Even FSRs possessing minor 
geological reserves are now capable of attracting FDI into their oil and gas sector. 
Projects involving the development of existing reserves dominate reported projects with 
pure exploration projects only accounting for 7% of the total by number. Rehabilitation 
projects are concentrated in Russia and in particular Western Siberia. 
Overall foreign investment in the upstream sector of the FSU's petroleum industry is 
occurring at a much slower rate than many would have hoped, partially due to the 
incapability of the N mechanism to ensure the necessary protection and stability which 
foreign investors require. PSAs offer the best means forward, not because alternatives do 
not exist. Had the FSU opened up before the mid-1960s, concessions would have likely 
been espoused as the way forward. Today, it is the PSA which is in fashion, and a great 
deal of effort has hitherto been expended by all parties to establish this mechanism as the 
premier means of facilitating the flow of investment capital into the upstream petroleum 
sector of the FSU. While portfolio investment offers another means of channelling 
foreign capital into Russia's oil industry, we believe IOCs will be reluctant to whole- 
heartedly embrace this technique until the commercial viability of the domestic industry 
is assured. 
Our analysis of FDI trends has been based upon the potential level of investment 
associated with reported projects. But are such figures realistic and over what time frame 
may the investment occur? The next chapter is an examination of the financial 
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requirements of the FSU's oil industry and reported proposed projects in light of its 
international setting. The FSU's oil industry is becoming ever more inter-linked with the 
global oil industry and no longer should the two be considered in isolation. IOCs will 
evaluate upstream prospects in the FSU as an integral part of a diversified global 
portfolio. 
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4. CAPITAL NEEDS OF THE FSU: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
4.1 Introduction 
The global oil industry, characterised as the "world's biggest and most critical 
industry, " 1 is associated with up-front capital intensive investments. The immense scale 
of aggregate investment can overwhelm casual observers. A typical reaction, while not 
within the lexicon of the professional economist, is an impassioned warning of an 
impending capital shortage. 2 But to believe that insufficient funds will be available to 
meet the industry's needs is misconstrued. Capital will always be available for those 
projects which are well conceived, tightly structured and economically viable. 3 In other 
words, if an investor confidently believes that a project will generate an adequate rate of 
return, 4 then the project should proceed at least on an economic basis. After all an 
adequate rate of return is the rate of return which provides an appropriate supply of 
capital and the function of a market is to allocate scare investment resources. Currently 
the FSU faces a `localised' shortage of investment capital due to the high level of risk. 
Investors account for this risk by applying a discount factor to cash flow forecasts. The 
higher the risk, the higher the discount factor and rates of 30% are not atypical for FSU 
project appraisals. 
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate that the capital requirements of the oil industry 
as a whole is not of a concern, rather the uncertainty lies in the allocation of the 
I Anthony Samson, The Seven Sisters, (Kent, Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1993): p 1. 
2 
em, London, 13 Feb. 1995; Andrew C. E. Hilton, "Ui1, energy and capital: A coming crunch? "" 
Policy, 20 (1992): pp 963-972; Edgardo Curcio, "Investment Requirements in the Oil Sector up to 
ear 2000, Are there Sufficient Capitals? " Paper presented to the IAEE 15th Annual International 
ýrence, Tours, France 18-20 May 1992; Wiebe Goslinga, "Capital Shortage in Financing Oil 
cts? " Paper presented to the Oil & Money Asia & The Pacific Conference. Singapore, 11-12 May 
; and Patrick Connolly, "Day of Reckoning: Global Energy and Capital in the 1990s, " CERA Private 
rt, Mar. 1991. 
3 Terry Newendorp (President of Taylor-Delongh), "Private sector takes charge, " FIRST 
Magazine vol. 9, no. 3 (1995). 
4 This assessment paraphrases the conclusion of a much earlier study which examined, among other 
things, a perceived capital `crunch' or `squeeze'. Jermone E. Hass, Edward J. Mitchell and Bernell K. 
Stone, Financing the Energy Industry. (Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1974): p 29. 
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investment. In this sense a competition for capital does exist. 5 A country wishing to 
attract a larger portion of the world-wide capital investment pool must adjust its 
combination of acreage and terms such that their offer is better on a risked rate-of-return 
basis than these presented by other countries. 
We commence with a review of historical levels of capital expenditure and demonstrate 
the strong positive correlation between investment and oil prices. Next we compare five 
published forecasts of capital expenditures for the global oil and gas industry over the 
next decade. As there is little consensus among the forecasts we cross-check the results 
via a regression of oil prices and historical levels of capital investment. Our overall aim 
is to provide a perspective on how the industry as an aggregate is expected to invest over 
the next decade. Will it be $25 billion per year, $50 billion or $100 billion per year? 
Only by establishing such a figure can we realistically address potential levels of 
investment in the FSU. Next we compare published forecasts of capital requirements of 
the FSU and aggregate investment proposals as recorded by the FOGI Database to global 
upstream capital expenditures and in the context of six internationally recognised 
forecasts of FSU crude production. Furthermore the crucial but often understated role of 
reinvested earnings is discussed as means of limiting the call on external sources of 
financing. Finally, we highlight the contribution of the `Major' IOCs in funding global 
upstream activities because the level of risk in the FSU necessitates the involvement this 
select group of companies. 
4.2 Historical Capital Requirements Oil & Gas Industry 
World-wide upstream capital expenditures by western IOCs has consistently been above 
$40 billion per year since 1978 and rose to a maximum of $111 billion in 1984. It 
subsequently fell to $45 billion after the oil price collapse in 1986 and since 1991 has 
5 Petroleum Finance Company and Price Waterhouse World Petroleum Industry Group, 
Competition for Capital in the International Oil & Gas Industry (New York, NY.: PIW Publications, Nov. 
1995); Andrew Seck, Review of Competition for Capital in the International Oil & Gas Industry, by PFC 
and Price Waterhouse, O. G. L. T. R. 14 (1995): pp 325-326; Petroleum Finance Company, Competition for 
Capital in the International Oil & Gas Industry, (Washington, DC.: PFC Ltd., Aug. 1993). 
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fluctuated between $50-60 billion per year (see Table 4.1). It is important to note that the 
figures reflect a survey of some 250 IOCs which unfortunately excludes many of the key 
state oil companies .6 In this respect the survey considerably underestimates world-wide 
upstream capital expenditures because it does not capture the contribution of OPEC or 
FSU producers, or for that matter companies such as PEMEX in Mexico or CNPC in 
China or Petrobras in Brazil. In §4.3.2 we shall return to this issue and apply an 
approximate correction factor. Nevertheless, this survey is of great relevance to our study 
as it captures the bulk of capital expenditures by IOCs whose role is likely to strengthen 
due to the worsening financial situation of many traditional oil producing countries (e. g. 
OPEC members)? The ability of these countries to continue to use self-generated 
financing is becoming more problematic and they are likely to seek external sources of 
capital either through additional borrowing or IOC equity participation. 8 Comparatively 
speaking, the financial health of the FSU is much worse than OPEC member states. We 
believe IOCs possess the pool of technological resources and capital (or a conduit for 
such capital) which can be called upon to meet the requirements of the petroleum industry 
in the future. Not only are state-owned companies being privatised, IOCs are being asked 
to carry out upstream operations in areas that were previously off-limits (e. g. FSU, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, China's Tarim Basin etc. ) .9 
6 Companies such as OMV (Austria), Statoil (Norway), Petro-Canada, Elf Aquitaine (France) and 
Repsol are included, but more significantly the key national oil companies of OPEC member states are 
excluded, for example ARAMCO, National Iranian Oil Company, Iraq National Oil Company, Kuwait 
Petroleum Company, etc. 
7 Ibrahim A. H. Ismail, "Raising oil output in major producing regions: the financial implications. " 
OPEC Bulletin 26, no. 10 (1995): p 17. 
8 Henry T. Azzam, "Competing For Capital: Financing OPEC's Capacity Expansion, " Paper 
presented to the 15th Annual Oil & Money Conference, London, 17-18 Oct. 1994. 
9 Sugit Das, "Democratisation and World Petroleum Trade in the Year 2000, " Energy 19 (1994): pp 
783-793. 
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Table 4.1 World-wide Upstream Capital Expenditures by IOCs versus Oil Price 
ear 
Arabian Light/Dubai CAPEX2 
($ US / bbl) 
1 
($ US billions) 
1(Y7, ) 1(lOL Aý.. t:.. _ T: -La 1COG 1 APIA T1.. I. DD0-. 4.. 
ti.... lDe..: e... -CAi7--IA L`.. ems.... 1fln -1'1 
2 Sa1; mon Brothers, Chase Manhattan and PFC as cited in PFC&PW (1995) op cit. note 5, p 38. 
The capital expenditures time series when viewed in a graphical format (see Figure 4.1) 
suggests a possible correlation between upstream expenditures and oil prices. In order to 
test this hypothesis properly we conducted a number of mathematical correlations. A 
correlation of oil prices (OP) and upstream capital expenditures (CAPEX) over the period 
1972 to 1994 produces a positive correlation coefficient of 0.865 which suggests a very 
strong correlation between capital expenditures and oil prices. This implies that 86.5% of 
upstream capital expenditures in any given year can be explained by the current price 
level, but this is intuitively somewhat surprising given the long-term planning horizons of 
the international oil and gas business. In order to examine this issue in more detail two 
more correlations were conducted. 
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Figure 4.1 World-wide Upstream Capital Expenditures versus Oil Price 
In the first case CAPEX(t) was correlated with OP(t+1) and in the second case CAPEX(t) 
was correlated with OP(t_1). The results are reproduced in Table 4.2. When CAPEX(t) 
was correlated against the future oil price OP(t+1) the correlation coefficient dropped to 
0.639 suggesting that the relationship between capital expenditure in any given year and 
realised future oil prices is not as strong as the relationship with actual level of oil prices 
in that particular year. In fact IOCs may adjust their budgets during the year according to 
oil prices as they unfold. Salomon Brothers latest annual survey of world-wide oil and 
gas exploration and production expenditures supports this assessment. 10 
Table 4.2 Correlation of Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Oil Price (OP) 
CAPEX OP Time Period (t) Correlation 
Coefficient 
t t 1972-1994 0.86517 
t t+1 1972-1993 0.63859 
t t-1 1973-1994 0.90580 
t+1 t 1972-1993 0.90580 
10 If Brent oil prices were to average $20 per barrel in 1996,57% of all companies which responded 
would increase exploration and production spending by 15-20%, conversely 51 % of the companies 
indicated that they would reduce spending if the average price of Brent was $14 per barrel in 1996. See 
Salomon Brothers, " Survey and Analysis of 1996 World-wide Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Expenditures, " 2 Jan. 1996, p 13. 
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On the other hand the correlation between CAPEX(t) and OP(t_1) is more revealing - the 
relationship is represented by a correlation coefficient of 0.906 and is stronger than the 
correlation between expenditures and prices in the same year. This suggests that 
companies do budget according to the known level of oil prices from the preceding year. 
Statistically speaking this is the same as a correlation between ones year's oil price 
(OP(t)) and the next year's capital expenditure (CAPEX(t1)). 
In summary, 90% of upstream capital expenditures in any given year are explained by the 
previous year's oil price. Clearly oil prices are not the only factor, but they are definitely 
the main independent variable. I l Therefore if oil prices are weak, the aggregate level of 
capital expenditures will be smaller as will be the pool of capital which supports such 
investment programmes, similarly if oil prices are strong, the overall pool of associated 
capital will be larger. The challenge for the FSU is to attract its share (or increase its 
share) of this capital irrespective of the size of the overall pool of capital available for 
upstream capital expenditures. But, given the additional risk premium currently being 
applied to FSU ventures, this task is made more difficult during a period of low oil prices. 
As to the future level of oil prices it is anybody's guess and experience has shown our 
inability to predict oil prices with a high degree of prescience. Our discussion now turns 
to published forecasts of future capital expenditures, but we shall return to relationship 
between oil prices and capital expenditures as a means of cross-checking published 
estimates. 
4.3 Future Investments by the International Oil & Gas Industry 
During the oil crisis of the 1970s many countries went to great lengths to diversify their 
energy supply and reduce their dependency on foreign oil. World oil consumption, which 
peaked in 1978, fell to a low of 57 MMbopd in the year 1983, and has been, by and large, 
11 This conclusion is also supported by Salomon Brother's annual survey of capital expenditures in 
which 68% of world-wide respondents cited energy prices as a key factor for determining capital budgets 
-- others factors were attractive drilling prospects, operating cash flow, availability of capital, drilling 
success and operating costs. Ibid. p 12. 
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increasing ever since. 12 The average annual growth in oil consumption of 5.4% in South 
East Asia since 1985 has been partially counterbalanced by the 12.5% average annual 
decline in FSU oil consumption since 1990.13 Overall world oil consumption rose at an 
average annual rate of 1.4% from 1985 to 1995. Between 1990 and 2010 experts predict 
that oil consumption should rise at 1.5% per annum reaching a total of 89 MMbopd. 14 
This translates to approximately one million barrels of incremental oil production each 
year. We will now try to assess whether there is a general consistency regarding future 
projections of capital expenditures by the oil industry to meet this growing demand. 
4.3.1 Published Forecasts 
Three estimates of international oil and gas capital expenditures until the turn of the 
century are reproduced in Table 4.3. Given that each survey is carried out over a slightly 
different time period, we calculated an average yearly expenditure in each category for 
ease of comparison. For the ABN AMRO study, the yearly expenditures are calculated as 
the average of the high and low case scenarios. The most salient feature is that few of the 
figures agree but an aggregate investment of $1-1.5 trillion over the next decade is 
forecasted. The average yearly aggregate figure varies from approximately $130-140 
billion to a maximum of $265 billion. The fact that total expenditures are of the same 
order over slightly different time periods suggests that the exact timing of future capital 
expenditures is also uncertain. 
12 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1995 and 1996. 
13 The average annual percentage change is calculated as the average compounding figure not the 
more common but misleading method of calculating the percentage change over the whole time period and 
dividing by the number of years. Ibid. 
14 US Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, International Energy Outlook 1995, 
(Washington, DC.: US GPO, May 1995): p 25. 
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Table 4.3 Published Forecasts of Global Petroleum Capital Expenditures 
N 
uu & uas IAEE' ABN AMRO' United Nations] 11 
Investment Sectors 
$ US Billions Est. Avg. r Mm. Max. Avg. r Est. v¢. r 
IAEE Study cited by Curcio (1992) op cit. note 2. 
2 ABN AMRO Study cited by John E. Martin, "International Equity as a source of Finance for the Oil 
Industry, " Paper presented at The Institute of Petroleum Conference on Financing the International Oil 
P m 
Emerging Markets, " Paper presented at the CEPMLP Financing International Oil and Gas Operations - Business Seminar, St. Andrews. Scotland, 18-19 Sept. 1995, p I. 
3 United Nations Study cited by Rojer Benedict, "United Nations Sees $1 Trillion Oil Spending in 
1990s, " The Oil Daily, 13 July 1992, pp 1-5. 
The Upstream category is most relevant to us as we are concerned with the availability of 
capital to increase the productive capacity of the FSU's oil industry. The IAEE study 
provides an estimate of $75 billion per year (i. e. 55% of total expenditures); ABN AMRO 
gives an estimate of $63 billion per year (i. e. 29% of total expenditures); and the United 
Nations forecast that upstream expenditures will be only $31 billion per year (i. e. 24%). 
Accordingly these studies imply that upstream expenditures, until the turn of the century, 
will be somewhere between $31-$75 billion per year and account for 24-55% of the 
industry's total capital expenditures. Thus, there is a wide divergence among forecasts of 
capital expenditures and none should be interpreted as being overly precise. Additional 
studies conducted by the Petroleum Finance Company and Price Waterhouse (PFC & 
PW) seem to reinforce this assessment (see Table 4.4). What is surprising is the extent to 
which the forecasts presented in Table 4.4 vary over the space of two years. Presumably 
as the PFC was involved in both studies a higher level of methodological consistency 
would have been maintained than is likely to be the case with studies carried out by 
different organisations. Yet upstream capital requirements vary from $59 billion per year 
in the 1993 study to $70 billion per year in the 1995 study. 
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Table 4.4 Forecasts of Capital Expenditures from PFC & PW Study 
vu & leas PFC' PFC & PW2 
Investment Sectors (1993 - 2005) (1995 - $ US Billions Mm. I Avg. /Yr Mm. Max. Avg. r 
Upstream *594 1 94.3 1 *)9 Z) /Z 1 900 1 70 
ownsream -e mmo 
I PFC (1993) op cit note 5, p 21. 
2 PFC & PW (1995) op cit. note 5, pp 22-23. 
Combining this data with the previous three studies and ignoring both the highest and 
lowest cases, we calculate a composite forecast of $64 billion per year. Despite having 
derived a consensus figure the comparative exercise has highlighted the considerable 
ambiguity among forecasts. We believe this to be caused by methodological differences 
and/or that each study employs a slightly different sectorial coverage (i. e. they are not 
actually measuring the same thing). In particular, it is not certain to what each study has 
tried to incorporate the expenditures of state oil companies in key OPEC member States. 
Again given this lacunae, it appears that such surveys are once again underestimating the 
true level of global upstream capital expenditures. Nevertheless, we ultimately wish to 
ascertain what portion of the $64 billion per year (or another similar figure adjusted 
upwards) will be realistically allocated to the FSU, but first our analysis will proceed by 
cross-checking theses figures based on projected figures derived from historical 
investment patterns. 
4.3.2 Forecasting Capital Expenditures Using Regression Analysis 
Recalling the historical levels of capital expenditures reproduced in Table 4.1 or Figure 
4.1, a forecast of $64 billion per year does not seem unreasonable nor is it atypical of the 
industry. In this manner we strongly disagree with those who speak of an impending 
capital `crunch' based on forecasted levels of investment. If oil prices drop there will be 
a natural down-grading of investment plans, on the other hand if oil supply tightens new 
investment will be encouraged. The oil industry is a cyclical industry. 15 Given the 
15 "'The flow of capital to the petroleum industry follows the industry cycle. The cyclical upturn 
creates a ready pool of new capital available for investment in exploration and production. This flood of 
new capital derives from both the rising cash flow associated with production from existing capacity and 
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strong correlation of oil prices and capital expenditures we conducted a simple least 
squares regression using oil prices lagged by one year as the explanatory variable in order 
to determine the dependent variable CAPEX. The full results of this exercise are 
reproduced in Appendix C. 1 and for those readers not familiar with their interpretation, 
Appendix C. 2 explains the most salient parameters. The resultant equation is 
CAPEX(t) = (t-1) + 9.830, where 
R-Square is 0.820,16 F-Ratio is 91.397 and t-statistics are 9.560 and 1.790 respectively. 
Capital expenditure is in billions of US dollars, oil price of Arabian Light/Dubai is in US 
dollars per barrel, and time (t) represents the year in question and all currency figures are 
in current dollars terms (i. e. not adjusted for inflation). This equation provides a 
rudimentary means of cross-checking the previously published forecasts. Knowing that 
the average spot price of Dubai Light was $16.09/bbl in 1995 and $16.89 in the first six 
months of 1996,17 we chose three price scenarios over the next decade to estimate 
potential capital expenditures (see Figure 4.2). A flat oil price of $16.89 for the 
remainder of the next decade would result in an estimated total upstream capital 
expenditure of $570 billion over the period 1995-2005 (or an average of $52 billion per 
year). A 5% annual increase would result in total capital expenditures of $619 billion (or 
average of $56 billion per year, but rising to $64 billion by the year 2005); whereas a 5% 
annual decrease would result in total capital expenditures of $527 billion (or an average 
of $48 billion per year). These calculations are reproduced in Appendix C. 3. 
from external capital markets. " PFC, World Petroleum Markets 1988, World Bank Tech. Paper No. 92 as 
quoted in Economics of World-wide Petroleum Production, by Fraser H. Allen and Richard D. Seba, 
(Tulsa OK.: OGCI Publications, 1993): p 67. See also Elisabeth L. Robinson, "Finance for a cyclical 
industry, " Resource Policy 17 (1991): pp 124-132. 
16 The square root of R-square, known as Multiple R or the Correlation Coefficient, is 0.906. This is 
the same value which was calculated in Table 4.2. 
17 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996, p 14; and "Updated Price Scorecard For Key World 
Crudes, " P. I. W. - Special Suvvlement Issue, 29 July 1996, p 2. 
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Figure 4.2 Forecast of Upstream Oil & Gas Expenditures Based on Oil Prices 
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Whether one accepts a forecast of $52 billion per year or $56 billion per year or any other 
figure thereabouts, all are well within the range of previously published forecasts. 
However, the discrepancy suggests that we do really need to apply a correction factor to 
account, for the fact that none of the surveys are truly estimating global upstream capital 
expenditures because of their failure to account for key state petroleum companies. 
4.3.3 Estimating the "True" Level of Global Upstream Capital Expenditures 
We approached the aforementioned problem, by first estimating the percentage 
contribution of western oil companies operations to global oil production. This was 
achieved by tabulating the 1995 global oil production profile as published by the Oil and 
Gas Journal. 18 Then by utilising the breakdown of company specific production 
information contained therein we estimated the contribution of western oil company 
operations to each country's production profile. While the results reproduced in 
Appendix F, Portion of World Oil Production by Western Oil Companies, are only an 
approximation, they suggest that western oil companies are in fact only responsible for 
only 43% of the world's oil production. This means that instead of a forecasted global 
upstream capital expenditures in the order of $52 to $56 billion per year over the next 
decade the true figure is likely to be of the order of $126 billion per year which far 
exceeds any of the published forecasts as well. 
To investigate this matter further, we made a simple calculation based the cost of finding 
and developing enough new production to satisfy the global demand for oil while 
maintaining a reserve to replacement ratio of exactly one. Using an average finding and 
development cost figure of $5.12/bbl'9 and a current production rate of 68 MMbopd, we 
18 It should be noted that this data series does not produce the same figures as those used in BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy, however, they have the advantage of breaking down a country's 
production by company. "World wide Production: OGJ Special, " Oil and Gas Journal. 30 Dec. 1996, pp 
42-73. 
19 This is based on using the average finding and developing cost for the years 1985-1993 of 
$5.12B0E. The finding and development costs for Amoco, ARCO, BP, Chevron, Exxon, Kerr-McGee, 
Mobil, Phillips, Royal Dutch/Shell and Texaco were taken from two studies. See Michael Mayer, 
Exploration and Production Results: A Comparative Analysis, 1987-1991,2nd Ed. (New York, NY.: 
Wertheim Schroder, The Energy Group, May 1992): p 23; and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly and price 
Waterhouse World Petroleum Industry Group, Ranking the World's Top Oil Companies. (New York, NY.: 
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derived an expenditure forecast of $127 billion per year. The fact that our two 
calculations produce similar figures is encouraging, however, it is probably incorrect to 
extend the average cost of finding and developing oil based on western company 
performance to the world as a whole, particularly as such companies are presently 
excluded from the largest and lowest cost reserve base in the world, the Middle East 2° 
Therefore, as a final downward correction we apply a finding and development cost 
figure equal to half the figure for western oil companies to the Middle Eastern oil 
producing states21 Thus, our final estimation of world-wide upstream capital 
expenditures becomes $106 billion, of which western oil companies contribute roughly 
$55 billion per year. 
We believe these latter figures are the suitable global benchmarks when considering 
potential FSU investment plans. The issue of capital expenditures is then reduced to the 
question of its geographical allocation. This can be metaphorically described in the 
following manner. There exists pool of capital which will be allocated to the upstream 
sector each year, the actual level of the pool is highly and positively correlated with oil 
prices. In order for capital to reach a project in a given country a channel must be made 
which connects a potential investment project and the pool of capital. The straighter the 
path the more easily the capital will flow. In this respect the channel represents a 
country's legal and fiscal framework. The straighter and deeper the channel the more 
transparent and investor-friendly the country's foreign investment regime. Capital will 
easily flow to those projects which are linked by a well constructed channel. But, 
unfortunately many of the pathways to the FSU are shallow, meandering, and are often 
blocked -- despite the geological attractiveness of the area. Consider the world as being 
a collection of countries distributed about a metaphorical watering hole. Some are close, 
P1W Publications, 1995): p 24. 
20 See discussion in Chapter 5 at §5.4.2. 
21 Thus we assume that for Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, Iraq, UAE, Qatar, Libya and Algeria (i. e. 
roughly 75% of OPEC production) an average fording and development cost of only $2.31/boe applies. 
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some are far away, some are located on an uphill slope (geologically unattractive), others 
are located downhill (geologically attractive). The ultimate goal of any country is to 
attract its share of investment capital - some may be able to provide this by themselves, 
but this situation is less than certain. Whereas the financial situation of many OPEC 
member states is becoming strained, the NIS are experiencing a severe drought. 
Therefore our world consists of a collection of unequally endowed countries who are in 
competition for investment funds. Those countries which offer a transparent and stable 
legal and fiscal framework stand a much better chance of receiving a flow of investment 
capital. In this sense there is a very real competition for capital, but not a shortage of 
capital at the aggregate level per se. The industry will always find enough capital to 
support its needs although regionalised shortages may exist. In times of high oil prices, 
our pool of capital will be over-flowing perhaps even enough to overcome the most 
tenacious of barriers, on the other hand during a period of weak oil prices the level of 
capital in our pool is lower. In the latter circumstance, countries wishing to maintain or 
increase there share of investment funds will need to improve their mechanisms for 
assisting that flow. Investment incentives (i. e. a pump) may need to be installed. 
It is from this perspective, that one may now correctly assess the capital requirements of 
the FSU's petroleum industry. Speaking of tens or even hundreds of billions of dollars is 
meaningless without being able to benchmark such expenditures against what is normally 
spent by the international oil and gas industry. Having established a benchmark of $106 
billion per year, our study will now turn to estimates of upstream capital requirements of 
the FSU's oil and gas industry and discuss them in light of global requirements. Given 
the continued integration of the FSU's oil industry with the international industry it is no 
longer sufficient, nor correct, to analyse the two in isolation. 
4.4 Capital Requirements of the Upstream Oil Industry in the FSU 
The purpose of this section is to assess whether published estimates of the capital 
requirements of the FSU's petroleum are realistic. If every known deposit in the FSU 
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were to be developed, the investment required would indeed be astronomical, but is such 
a scenario is likely? We commence with a review of published forecasts. 
4.4.1 Published Forecasts 
When assessing the capital requirements of the FSU's oil industry there has been a 
tendency among analysts to choose a historical point in time as a benchmark and then 
estimate the amount of capital required to re-establish this level of production. Ironically, 
even Western analysts, whom have long criticised Soviet planners for their fixation on the 
supply side of the equation, appear to have adopted a similar strategy for their own 
forecasts. Consider any of the following: 
"It is estimated that Russia's crude petroleum sector alone needs an initial 
investment of $25 billion and then capital injections of $6-7 billion 
annually to regain its 1988-89 production levels by the year 2000. "22 
"Estimates of the capital required to restore oil production in the FSU to 
its peak level of 12.5 MMbopd [627 MMtpy] and to ensure that gas 
production continues to rise range from $50 billion to $100 billion over 
the remainder of the next decade. An estimated $30 billion is required to 
simply stabilise production at current levels of 9.2 MMbopd [462 MMtpy) 
in the FSU as a whole and 7 MMbopd [351 MMtpy] in Russia 
specifically. "23 
"Maintenance of oil and condensate output at an annual level of around 
440 million tonnes between 1993 and 2000 will require a total investment 
expenditure of $70 billion, or some $8 billion per year (constant 1990 
money). Raising output by another 50 million tons per year will augment 
investment expenditure much more than proportionately. "' 24 
Each of the above assumes a return to the past. At best this methodology provides a 
benchmark for potential capital expenditures, but it is far from certain that a return to the 
past is feasible or desirable. Chapter 2 emphasised that the tremendous growth in FSU 
production in the latter half of the 20th century was based on exploitative practices which 
emphasised short-term production increases in lieu of maximising long-term output. The 
FSU is still suffering the consequences of this misguided policy. It is unlikely that the 
22 Deutsche Bank Research, "Focus: Eastern Europe, " 6 Jan. 1993, p 4. as cited in 
Jun. 1993): p 3-1. 
23 PFC (1993) supra note 5, p 4. 
24 Leslie Dienes, Istvan Dobozi and Marian Radetzki, Energy and Economic Reform in the Former 
Soviet Union. (New York, NY.: St. Martin's Press, 1994): p S. 
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region will emulate such growth ever again, particularly if one is to conduct operations in 
"accordance with good international petroleum industry practice. " 
Furthermore such forecasts tend to treat the FSU in isolation, that is, they take no account 
of the level of oil production outside of the FSU. Earlier we proposed that world-wide 
upstream oil and gas capital expenditures would be of the order of $106 billion per year 
over the next decade. Irrespective of the actual source of this capital (e. g. debt, equity or 
internal cash flow of IOCs), it will be an integral part of the total world-wide upstream 
capital expenditures. One approach is to assume that the FSU can expect capital 
investment in proportion to its share of global oil production. In 1995 the FSU accounted 
for 10.9% of the world's oil production including Russia which accounted for 9.4%. 
Should the FSU maintain its share of global oil production then annual capital 
expenditures of $11.5 billion are theoretically possible. However, $11.5 billion of 
externally financed investment - at least by IOCs -- would imply a complete 
substitution of domestic oil company production by foreign oil company production, a 
highly unlikely scenario, particularly in the case of Russia. 25 In other words, the level of 
upstream capital expenditures that western IOCs may commit to the FSU will be, to a 
great extent, limited by the future percentage of a country's production profile that 
foreign companies will be permitted to control. But, since 60% of FSU oil production is 
presently consumed domestically, it is only natural that a high portion of the total capital 
expenditures will have to be met domestically. This tendency is likely to be reinforced 
by the preference of domestic companies to exploit reserves within their own country. 
Whether the economic and fiscal circumstances permit domestic companies to generate 
profits sufficient for reinvestment is another matter and there is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that domestic companies are having to seek external sources of financing. If we 
assume that western IOCs may be permitted to control 40% of the region's oil production 
then annual capital investments in the region of $4 to $5 billion per year may in fact be 
possible, but this presupposes that the domestic industry is capable of satisfying the 
25 See discussion in Chapter 7 at Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2. 
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remainder. If this is not the case, then the argument can be made that IOCs could 
increase their FSU investment profit, provided it is politically feasible to do so. But, 
because IOCs will maintain geographical diversity within their world-wide investment 
portfolios, a disproportionate channelling of investment towards the FSU is unlikely. 
After all $4 to $5 billion per year would represents almost 10% of global upstream capital 
expenditures by western oil companies, and the only way in which this percentage can be 
realistically increased is if western oil companies increase their share of global oil 
production or they transfer their production operations from elsewhere in the world to the 
FSU. 
In sum the level of externally financed upstream investment is conditional upon degree to 
which foreign oil companies are permitted to contribute to a country's production profile. 
The greater percentage of future production to be carried out by IOCs then the greater the 
level of external financed upstream capital investment may occur. Ultimately the overall 
level of investment both domestic and external is a function of the FSU future share of 
global oil production.. However, none of our estimates of future investment foresee an 
initial lump sum capital injection to stabilise production as is suggested in the forecasts 
of capital requirements of the FSU's oil industry - the process will be gradual. 
Perhaps the most incredulously estimates of capital expenditures emanate from wishful 
officials of the FSU. Take for instance the case of Kazakhstan. While Kazakhstan has 
concluded natural resource contracts valued at an estimated $90.5 billion in investment 
under 20 year licences (including $30.6 billion for oil, $46.8 billion for gas, and $2.7 
billion for gas condensate), the Government has stated that another $600 billion is still 
needed. 26 $600 billion approximates our forecast of total world-wide upstream capital 
expenditures by western IOCs expenditures over the whole of the next decade! A recent 
report by Wood Mackenzie stated that oil and condensate production could increase from 
26 Serikbek Daukeyev, the Kazakh Minister for Geology and Protection of Mineral Resources, 
quoted in Interfax Petroleum Reitort, 2-9 Feb. 1996, p 5. 
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0.4 MMbopd to 1.4 MM. bopd by the year 2010 from existing fields alone, but only at a 
cost to foreign investors of $35 billion. 27 But as a 1994 US Congressional Report pointed 
out, even if Kazakhstan reaches its production target of 1.65 MMbopd by the year 2005, 
this would only account for 2% of the US DOE forecast of world production capacity. 28 
In this context slightly over $2 billion per year is perhaps a more realistic figure. 
Hitherto, foreign companies have invested $1.51 billion in the country's oil and gas 
sector (i. e. only $300 million per year). 29 
In summary there is a wide discrepancy between published forecasts of the capital 
requirements of the FSU's oil industry and investment that will likely take place. 
Furthermore, this position is formulated without even taking into consideration the 
breadth of investment risks facing foreign investors. While we have couched our analysis 
in terms of a competition for investment capital, the fundamental competition is in fact 
over global oil output. Capital is only needed to produce this output and if the FSU is to 
attract a larger share of global upstream capital expenditures, then this presupposes that 
the FSU will end-up producing a proportionately larger share of global oil output. If 
FSRs wish to increase their share of global upstream capital expenditures then they will 
need to provide conditions which permit the transfer of productive capacity to the FSU 
from other areas of the globe. Cited estimates of the capital requirements of the FSU's 
petroleum industry share the following characteristics: all vary with respect to the actual 
amount; each is difficult if not impossible to verify as supporting calculations are rarely 
provided; 30 every forecast is subject to many uncertainties; but all estimates are large and 
27 Report by Wood Mackenzie dated 22 Nov. 1995 as cited in E. E. E. Report, Nov. 1995, p 5. 
28 US General Accounting Office, International Trade: Kazakhstan Unlikely to be Maior Source of 
Oil for the United States. Report to Congressional Requesters. GAO/GGD-94-74. Washington, DC.: US 
GAO, Mar. 1994, p 2-3. 
29 Interfax Petroleum Reno rt, 8-15 Mar. 1996, p 12. 
30 This is not the case for the forecast provided by Dienes, Dobozi and Radetzki 11994) supra note 
24. 
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likely overestimate the level of actual foreign investment that will take place. In this 
regard, we now specifically turn to forecasts based on proposed level of investments. 
4.4.2 Forecasts based on Proposed Level of Investments 
Our analysis of the FOGI Database in the previous chapter revealed that foreign investors 
have expressed an interest in 292 upstream projects involving $231 - $307 billion in 
investment; of these, 168 projects ($175 - $230 billion) are located in Russia. But 
aggregate `press-reported' investment figures of such magnitude are misleading. Clearly, 
the FSRs do not have access to such capital and external sources of capital will be 
necessary. But proposed levels of investment do not assure us of their eventual execution 
nor the time frame over which the investment will occur. The existence of petroleum 
reserves per se only concerns the supply side of the equation not the demand side - 
global energy markets would have to absorb the resultant increases in production which 
at a present is only expected to grow at approximately 1 MMbopd per year. Forecasts 
based on aggregate project proposals overestimate the FDI that is likely to occur. 
The opening up of the FSU is commensurate with a gold/petroleum rush which 
characteristically takes place surrounding any new bonanza. Once new prospective 
acreage is known or opened up, investors rush to stake as much as possible. In the 
petroleum industry, this process begins by securing `exclusive negotiating rights' to a 
given deposit. With that in place, investors will then embark on the arduous process of 
obtaining full rights to explore, develop and produce petroleum. But, there is a big 
difference between a proposal to invest `X'-amount of dollars and actually doing so. 
Furthermore, `contract announcement' investment figures are often promoted by 
governments for internal political reasons as opposed to representing a legal commitment 
to invest that amount. Consider the Government of Kazakhstan's reported contract 
announcements totalling $33 billion worth of oil and condensate investment. Such a 
level of investment suggests finding and developing 6.5 billion barrels of oil, 31 which is 
31 Supra note 19. 
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equivalent to producing 1 MMbopd for 18 years. Although, geologically possible, the 
feasibility under the current economic and political conditions is altogether another 
matter. 
The other uncertain variable to be assessed is the time frame over which the investment 
will occur. In the case of Kazakhstan, the $33 billion worth of concluded oil and 
condensate contracts utilised a 20 year licence period (i. e. an average of $1.7 billion per 
year). Viewed from this perspective, the expenditures do not seem as unrealistic as first 
assessed. Conversely, the potential aggregate investment figures for the whole of the 
FSU derived from the FOGI Database suggest an average annual investment of $11.6 - 
$15.4 billion based on a twenty year time frame. But if we are correct in assuming that 
foreign oil companies will not be permitted to completely supplant domestic oil 
companies and a more realistic level of foreign investment may be of the order of $4-5 
billion per year. It then takes a time frame of 50-60 years to reduce the proposed 
aggregate investment figures to an annual level which we believe is realistically feasible. 
Therefore statements to the effect that another $600 billion worth of contracts are needed 
or that western firms may undertake projects worth $231-307 billion are meaningless 
without an accompanying time frame. 
4.4.3 Tempering Capital Expectations 
Estimates of capital requirements or aggregate investment proposals give the impression 
of massive flows of western sourced capital. But, having established that western IOCs 
are likely to invest globally $55 billion per year out of a total of $106 billion over the 
next decade, any factors which reduce the call on foreign based capital make it more 
likely that the demands of the FSU can be more easily accommodated within the context 
of global upstream investment. We believe that (Un)Realistic Production Forecasts and 
Staggered Development & Reinvested Earnings are two factors which will mitigate the 
call on foreign capital. 
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4.4.3.1 (Un)Realistic Production Forecasts 
Evidenced by the three published forecasts shown in §4.4.1 we believe the pre-occupation 
of forecasters to return to previous levels of production tends to cloud the issue of 
estimating the capital requirements of the industry. Indeed, there is dearth of evidence 
supporting the perception that the FSU will ever return to its `golden age'. 32 As far as 
discoveries are concerned the period 1968 to the early 1980s is likely to remain 
unrivalled, and it is after all, new discoveries which support increases in production. Let 
us examine the results of six internationally recognised production forecasts for 
EE&FSU. 
Table 4.5 Forecasts of Oil Production for EE&FSU 
(MMbopd) 1994 Actual 1995 Actual 2000 2010 
EE&FSU RF EE&FSU RF EE&FSU4 RI FE&FSU4 RF 
IE095 446.8 572.4 
IEA 386.6 537.2 
PEL 386.6 471.9 
PIRA 427.7 :.. 
DRI 406.7 
NWS 386.6 
Average 375.5 317.8 369.5 306.8 406.7 
RF MFE-1 320.0 350.02 
RF MFE-2 
ý, mý::. a _.. 
1 ýi u` 320 - 
3503 
BP Statistical R eview of Wo rld Ener gy 1995, p 4; BP Statis tical Review oI ýý i! l u<< _; 
l o, p 6. 
` Russian MFE as cited in "Oil Industry in Russia Remains in Deep Unsis Due "1o Shortages of crash and 
Investments, " Interfax Petroleum Report, 29 Dec. 1995 -5 Jan. 1996, p 12. 3 Inter-Agency Commission for the Co-ordination of Programme Development, "Energy Strategy For 
Russia, " dated 7 Dec. 1994 in Energy Policies of the Russian Federation 1995 Survey, (Pans, OECD/IEA, 
1995): pp 287-289. For a discussion on an early draft see "Back to Basics, " R. P. I., Apr. 1994, pp 9-11. 
4 US Department of Energy, Energy Information Agency, International Energy Outlook 1995, DOE/EIA- 
0484(95) (Washington DC.: GPO, Jun. 1995): p 23 citing Energy Information System World Energy 
Projection System (IE095), International Energy Agency (IEA), Petroleum Economics Ltd. (PEL), 
Petroleum Industry Research Associates (PIRA), DRI/McGraw Hill (DRI), and NatWest Securities (NWS). 
32 Lev Tchurilov, Lifeblood of Empire: A Personal History of the Rise and Fall of the Soviet Oil 
Industry, (New York, NY.: P1W Publications, 1996): p 108. 
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Interpretation of the above can be approached from two points of view. Firstly, at the 
aggregate level. The consensus view of the six internationally recognised forecasts is that 
a recovery of total EE&FSU production to 406.7 MMt is possible by the year 2000, and a 
further 20% increase in production to 520.9 MMt is expected by the year 2010. Critically 
though, none of the above six production forecasts foresee a return to the peak levels 
witnessed in the latter half of the 1980s on which the published capital requirement 
forecasts were based, even by the year 2010. The whole idea of estimating the capital 
required to stabilise and return production back to historical levels appears to be 
conceptually flawed. Why must the FSU production return to previous levels, is this in 
fact possible, and on what time frame will this occur? We believe the three forecasts of 
capital investment shown in §4.4.1 overestimate the level of funding which the West will 
be called upon to support, because a return to such production levels is unlikely. By 
downgrading forecast levels of production the call on external financing is equally 
reduced. 
The data in Table 4.5 should also be examined from the point of view of Russia being the 
region's largest oil producer. During the 1980s, Russia accounted for approximately 88% 
of total FSU oil production. Since 1992 its position has slipped slightly to 85%. If we 
were to assume that Russia will continue to account for 85% of total FSU production; the 
six international forecasts suggest that oil production in Russia will be 346 MMt and 443 
MMt in the year 2000 and 2010 respectively. Yet the Russian MFE predicts future 
production levels of only 310-320 MMt in 2000 and 320-350 MMtpy in 2010 depending 
on the price scenario used to generate the forecast. Combining the NYE forecast with the 
consensus forecast, Russian oil production may decline to 79-76% of total FSU 
production by the year 2000 and slip further to 67-61% of total FSU production in 2010. 
This conclusion is quite startling when considering the allocation of capital expenditures. 
It suggests that despite the size of Russia's oil industry, other regions of the FSU will 
enjoy proportionately more growth. The MFE forecast implicitly suggests that Russia 
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will be unable to attract the level of investment which they desire. On the other hand, if 
we assume that Russia will maintain her proportionate share of FSU production, not an 
unreasonable assumption given Russia's stranglehold on export infrastructure, then 
clearly the six international forecasts are overestimating the recovery of FSU production. 
Either interpretation suggests that the overall level of investment by IOCs will be lower 
than expected. Perhaps the final word on unrealistic production forecasts as a benchmark 
for capital expenditures is best expressed by a former Russian Oil Ministry. 
"Oil output may be in decline, but I'm sure that Siberia has not yet had the 
final world. True previous, peak production levels may never be attained 
again, but I think an annual flow of some 250- to 300- million tons is a 
realistic goal. " (emphasis added)33 
Undoubtedly the FSU needs external capital, but estimates of capital requirements based 
on the precept of returning to peak levels of production are fundamentally incorrect. The 
`golden age' of discoveries has passed, at least in Western Siberia, and the exploitative 
practices of the past which led to such high production rates are unlikely to be repeated. 
Apart from down-grading most production forecasts, a staggered approach to investment 
and the use of reinvested earnings will also reduce the call on foreign sourced capital. 
4.4.3.2 Staggered Development & Reinvested Earnings 
Given the volatile and unpredictable nature of the FSU, most companies are not willing to 
commit up-front the capital needed to complete a development project in its entirety. 
Companies will employ a staggered approach to development and make full use of 
reinvested earnings as a means of funding future development. 
4.4.3.2.1 White Nights JV 
The experience of the White Nights JV34 between Phibro Energy Production Inc. (US), 
Anglo-Suisse (US) and Varyeganskneftegaz (RF) attests to the risks of not pursuing a 
33 Ibid. p 133. 
34 For background information on the White Nights N see: Peter S. Adam, "Joint Ventures in 
Russian Oil Production, " Oil and Gas Quarterly 42 (1994): pp 451-452 and 461-462; Igor K. Lavrovsky, 
"Case Study of Joint Ventures in the Oil Sector of Russia, " OTA Contractor Report, Aug. 1993, pp 29-32; 
Phibro Energy Production Inc., Company Information Pamphlet, N. d.; "White Nights Contract of 12 Oct. 
1990 (Phibro Energy / Anglo-Suisse), " English Translation reprinted in Basic Oil Law's Russia & NIS, 
Vol. 1, p 321 et seq.; and "The White Nights Contract: Selected Excerpts, " P. I. W., 5 Aug. 1991, pp 1-8. 
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`self-financing' strategy. Between September 1990 and the first half of 1992, Phibro's 
initial debt and equity investment totalled nearly $120 million. 35 This consisted of $80 
million of equity and $40 million of debt (i. e. a debt equity ratio of 1: 2 which is 
unusually low). From a shareholder's point of view the risks of committing such a high 
level of up-front capital has been realised as the project has been beset by problems 
relating to Russia's unstable legislative, fiscal and regulatory regime. Despite having 
generated gross sales proceeds of $46 million in 1993 (from exporting 3.2 MMbbls), $52 
million in 1994 (from exporting 3.6 MMbbls), and $60 million in 1995 (from exporting 
3.8 MMbbls) the JV has still to make a profit. In fact, from 1 January 1992 to end of 
1994, the company paid a total of $33 million in export taxes alone, although effective 
from 1 Sept. 1994 the JV did finally receive an exemption from the onerous $5/bbl export 
tax. The export tax exemption combined with increased oil production has allowed the 
JV to cover its operating costs and on-going capital expenditures, but thus far only $16.8 
million of current and prior interest plus $1.1 million in principal has been repaid to 
Phibro. Combined with a $20 million write-down in 1993, Phibro's exposure to the 
White Nights JV stood at $47 million at the end of 1995 versus $58 million at the end of 
1994. Investors wary of the `White Nights' experience are reluctant to externally fund 
development projects in their entirety whether in the form of debt or equity. Therefore 
investors, as Phibro has been doing since the latter half of 1992, now pursue a 'self- 
financing' strategy for their projects. While `self-financing' does not strictly reduce the 
capital requirements of the FSU's petroleum industry, it does have a direct impact on the 
call of externally sourced financing. While western investors may be willing to support a 
project initially, and `get it off the ground', the real onus is upon the host countries 
themselves to provide a legal, fiscal and regulatory environment that will permit such 
ventures to earn a profit from which earnings can be reinvested to support further 
development. For instance, a project which entails a capital expenditure of $100 million 
should not be interpreted as meaning that the call on the IOCs will be $100 million, 
although domestic partners and governments may hope this to be the case. Instead, IOCs 
35 Salomon Inc., Annual Report 1994, p 19; and Annual Report 1995, pp 13-14. 
98 
will seek a minimum level of exposure and in turn use reinvested earnings for the 
remainder. This applies to not only to the smallest of joint ventures but also to mega- 
projects. The only exception being pure exploration which is always financed by risk 
capital. Consider any of following examples. 
4.4.3.2.2 Bula Resources (Holding) plc 
Dula Resources (Holding) plc is a small oil and gas exploration company based in Ireland 
with oil reserves in Russia. Its entry began with its purchase of an option to acquire 51 % 
in the West Siberian company Aki-Otyr in November 1994. Aki-Otyr holds production 
licences to the Lower-, Middle-, & Upper-Shapinskoye, and Ryamnoye Fields whose 
combined recoverable proven and probable oil reserves are 525 MMbbls. 36 This option 
was exercised in the autumn of 1995 when Bula also acquired a 25% interest in Mir 
Space International ("Mir") whose main asset is a 50% interest in aj oint venture with the 
open joint stock company Khantymaniyskneftegasgeologia which holds the licence to the 
western section of the Salymskoye oil field estimated to contain proven and probable 
recoverable oil reserves of 585 MMbbls. 37 Dula has an option to acquire the remaining 
"Mir" stock which would increase its stake in the Salymskoye oil field from its current 
level of 12.5% to 50%. As a result of Bula's fund raising activities in 1994, the company 
has sufficient resources to carry-out the intermediate development of the Middle- and 
Upper-Shapinskoye fields. However, the development of the Ryamnoye, Lower- 
Shapshinskoye and Salymskoye fields are expected to cost $851 million, of which $689 
million will be financed from cash flows generated by the oil fields. 38 That is, 81% of the 
development costs will be covered by cash flows or reinvested earnings. With regards to 
the remaining $162 million, Dula intends to arrange this funding through new debt, 
equity and disposal of core assets. 
36 Bula Resources (Holding) p1c, Annual Report & Accounts 1994, p 5-7. 
37 Bula Resources (Holding) p1c, "Interim Report 1995. " 
38 Bula Resources (Holding) p1c, Annual Report & Accounts 1994, p 4. 
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4.4.3.2.3 Dana Petroleum plc , 
Dana Petroleum plc is another Irish based independent oil production company whose 
main interests are three projects in Western Siberia. 39 Dana was created with the 
acquisition of T. M. Oil in August 1994 who had been conducting studies of various oil 
fields in Western Siberia in conjunction with domestic companies. 40 From this 
preliminary work, Dana formed in November 1994 the 50: 50 YoganOil JV with Yogan- 
neft, whose participants include LUKoi1, Kogalymneftegas, Megionneftegazgeologiya 
and the Siberian Oil Corporation. The principle activity of the YoganOil JV is to develop 
the South Vat-Yaganskoye field estimated to contain proven and probable recoverable 
reserves of 34.72 MMbbls 41 
According to the YoganOil Founders Agreement, the principal obligation of Dana 
(Cyprus) is to "... provide or arrange loan finance, up to a maximum of US 
$20,000,000.00, for YoganOil until it is able to finance project activity from its own 
resources. "42 While the agreement has not specified the extent of total development costs 
required, an earlier report of T. M. Oil's plans by Petroconsultants cited a total capital 
expenditure of $42 million, and total operating expenses of $185 million to develop the 
South Vat-Yoganskoye Field. 43 Even without knowing the proportional split between 
CAPEX and OPEX for the first $20 million, clearly external resources will only be 
expected to cover a maximum 50% of the total capital expenditures, the rest will be self- 
financed. While this analysis represents our best estimate given the available 
39 While the project described herein, represents Dana's most advanced undertaking, the company is 
also pursuing 30% interests the Sortymskoye Field estimated to contain proven and probable recoverable 
reserves of 44.46 MMbbls and the north eastern part of the Mamontovskoye Field estimated to contain 
proven and probable recoverable reserves of 72.39 MMbbls. As of the publication of Dana's Annual 
Report for 1994 on 13 July 1995, neither the respective SortymOil or YuganskOil Ns for these additional 
projects had been formed. 
40 Dana Petroleum plc, Admission to the Official Lists of the London Stock Exchange and Irish 
Stock Exchange: Placing. Open Offer and Intermediaries Offer, Dec. 1995, p 10. 
41 Ibid., p 11. 
42 Ibid., p 25; see also Dana Petroleum plc., Annual Report and Accounts 1994, p 21. 
43 Petroconsultants, "Addendum 2: CIS Contract Terms, " in Foreign Scouting Service, Jan. 1995, p 
34. 
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information, YoganOil Founders Agreement states that "in order to determine the extent 
of financing required... Dana and Yogan-neft will agree a plan estimating the total finance 
required until YoganOil is self-financing (up to a maximum of $20,000,000). "4 
Furthermore, the release of such funds will be carried out in tranches conditional upon the 
progress of development. 
Dana's second project, the development of the Sortymskoye oil field, is far less advanced. 
The SortymOil Founders Agreement pursues a similar strategy in that Dana and its 
Russian partners will estimate and provide the financing for the JV (up to an agreed 
maximum) until SortymOil is able to finance its activity from its own resources 45 
4.4.3.2.4 TengizChevroil JV 
While the above examples are representative of relatively small JV projects, the 'self- 
financing' analysis applies equally to mega-projects as well. On 6 April 1993 Chevron 
formed the 50: 50 TengizChevroil JV in Kazakhstan to develop the Tengiz and 
Korolveskoye oil fields estimated to contain between 6-9 billion barrels of recoverable 
oil. Chevron reckons that it will invest $20 billion over the project's 40 year licence; by 
the end of 1994 almost $1 billion had been invested. However, Chevron frustrated with 
its inability to expand export capacity in Russian controlled pipelines, reduced its capital 
expenditure programme from $500 million per year down to $50 million per year in 
February 1995.46 Chevron stated that this action was a direct result of "not being able to 
realise the revenues we had anticipated" and was "consistent with our original plans to 
reduce risk by making the project self-funding. " . 47 
44 Dana Petroleum p1c. (Dec. 1995) supra note 40, p 25. 
45 Ibid., p 27. 
46 "Minor Leagues, " R. P. I. Apr. 1995, p 42. 
47 Espy Price (Vice President of Chevron) as quoted in "Chevron Slashes Outlays for Kazakhstan 
Oil Field, " World Energy Update, Mar. 1995, p 7. Similarly, Frank Duffield (President of Sakhalin 
Energy Investment Company Ltd. ) speaks of `phased development'. See "Progress made on Sakhalin 
Deal but Snags Remain, " E. E. E. Reuort, May 1996, p 1. 
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4.4.3.2.5 Staggered Development & Reinvested Earnings Summary 
The lessons learned from the early experience of the White Nights JV has not been lost 
on subsequent investors. In hindsight the confident approach of Phibro was overly 
optimistic, but their actions were representative of the prevailing attitude of foreign 
investors immediately following the dissolution of the FSU. Just as Phibro opted for a 
`self-financing' strategy since the latter half of 1992, subsequent investors appear to be 
utilising such a policy from the start. The outcome of our analysis is consistent with the 
results of a 1970 study on the financing of foreign subsidiaries 48 The study indicated 
that the 
"... parent in a Small MNE [Multinational Enterprise] is less likely to 
expect to invest additional funds in a subsidiary once that subsidiary has 
started. ... Rather the smaller enterprise expects 
is subsidiaries to grow 
through their own borrowings and retained earnings" 49 
The staggering of development in line with reinvested earnings minimises exposure to 
investment risks. Although it does not change the actual capital requirements of the 
FSU's petroleum industry, it alters our perception of where the financing burden lies. 
The concept that the global oil and gas industry is facing an impending capital crunch 
because of the needs of the FSU's oil industry is misplaced. Undoubtedly, both capital 
and technology are being sought from the West, but the experience of foreign investors 
indicates that IOCs, even the largest, are unwilling to fund entire development projects 
up-front. The corollary is that considerable onus is placed upon host governments to 
provide the requisite regulatory, legal and fiscal regimes to permit these ventures to earn 
a profit which can then be reinvested. While statements to the effect that the FSU's 
upstream petroleum industry require $50 - $100 billion over the next decade, one must 
not interpret this to mean that the international financial community along with IOCs will 
supply such funds. Much of the financing will come from reinvested earnings or not at 
all. Before concluding this chapter we wish to highlight the pre-eminent role of the 
largest IOCs in funding global upstream oil and gas expenditures. 
48 Robert Stobaugh Jr., "Financing Foreign Subsidiaries of U. S. Controlled Multinational 
Enterprises, " J. I. B. S. (Summer, 1970): pp 43-64. 
49 kid., p 51. 
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4.5 Financing the Global Oil Industry - The Role of the Majors 
Recalling our historical time series of upstream oil and gas capital expenditures presented 
in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 it is paramount to recognise the dominant role of the largest 
IOCs. Table 4.6 presents a time series of upstream expenditures of the nine largest 
western oil companies versus total western upstream capital expenditures since 1990.50 
The contribution of this select group of companies has accounted for 45-56% of total 
upstream capital expenditures by the western world. 
Table 4.6 Contribution of Majors to Upstream Oil & Gas Expenditures 
(Sus n 1995e 1996e 
G1P 1.750 2.588 2.841 1.980 1.521 2.110 2.155 
Amoco 
evron 2.271 2.400 2.432 2.570 2.700 2.700 2.875 
Aquitaine 
Exxon 
- of =7U- 
Royal Dutch/Shell 
exaco 1.920 2.29U 
um o Majors 24.371 27.6 2 30.160 
World ota . 
% of Major--s o 0 0 0 o 
source: inaiviauai company ngures from various issues of aaiomon nromers, purvey ana Hnaiysis of 
World-wide Oil and Gas Exploration and Production Expenditures, " 1991,1992,1993,1994,1995,1996. 
Data from Annual Surveys 1983-1996 supplied courtesy of Geoff B. Keiburtz and Stephen D. Gengaro of 
Salomon Brothers. 
This simple fact should not be lost on those FSRs which are seeking FDI. It is not to 
belittle the role of all the other companies whether independents, small exploration and 
production companies, or indeed other substantial IOCs, such as UNOCAL, Total, 
ARCO, Pennzoil, Statoil, etc. whose aggregate contribution make up the other 50%. But, 
from the point of view of attracting oil and gas related FDI into the FSU, it is imperative 
that investment conditions which satisfy the needs of the `Major' IOCs be created. 
The reason for highlighting this select group of companies is their financial wherewithal. 
Should these companies choose to invest in the FSU they have access to large sums of 
internally generated cash flow and if external debt is necessary, then their balance sheets 
50 Excluding the state-owned oil companies of the non-western world, supra note 6. 
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will permit them to raise financing without necessarily having to resort to the most 
expensive option of project financing. It is not our intention to discount the role of 
external financing as the oil and gas industry has established itself as premier use of 
external capital in international financial markets 51 But the FSU is and will remain for 
the foreseeable future an inherently risky target for inward investment. Any source of 
external finance in which the lender is exposed to additional risks beyond the regular 
credit worthiness of the borrower will naturally attract a cost premium. It is not that 
smaller companies cannot successfully finance an economically sound project, but it is 
more difficult and time consuming than in the case of a project involving one of the 
`Majors' or for that matter any of the larger integrated IOCs which make up the next 
corporate tier of the international oil and gas industry hierarchy. Numerous 
contracts/proposals have hitherto been negotiated by small companies which lack the 
requisite funds or `deep pockets' to see a project through to its completion within the 
volatile investment climate (hence their inevitable reliance on strategies of 'self- 
financing'). The recent position expressed by St. Mary Land & Exploration Company 
involved in the Chemogorskoye JV in Russia was that "we're too small to be in 
Russia. " 52 Smaller companies having previously secured acreage often turn to farm-outs 
as the only means forward. 
In summary, the involvement of the `Majors' as the principal players who are able to 
absorb a far higher level of risk than other investors, is seen as being critical to rebuilding 
the productive capacity of the FSU. A role will be played by other firms as the `Majors' 
are not interested in anything less than mega-projects. But the success of these latter 
projects will provide the necessary infrastructure, expertise and training which will instil 
51 The multitude of external sources of capital ranges from equity, public debt/bonds, derivatives, 
commercial paper, syndicated debt, project financing, multilateral agencies (MLAs), export credit agencies 
(ECAs), or even more non-traditional sources such as oil indexed bonds or trusts. See PFC & PW (1995) 
supra note 5, p 25. 
52 Platt's Oilgram News, vol. 74, no. 62,28 Mar. 1996, p 4. 
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confidence in the region. They are the bellwether projects which can singularly make a 
noticeable contribution to a country's production profile. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter commenced with a review of historical levels of upstream capital 
expenditures by IOCs. When capital expenditures (CAPEX(t)) are correlated with oil 
prices lagged by one year (OP(t_l)), the resulting correlation coefficient of 0.906 suggests 
that 90% of upstream capital expenditures can be explained by the previous year's oil 
price. Next we reviewed five published forecasts of oil and gas capital expenditures 
spanning the time period 1990 to 2005. We established a consensus forecast of world- 
wide upstream capital expenditures of approximately $64 billion per year from 1995 to 
the year 2005. Taken in the context of historical levels of capital expenditure this 
estimate is not particularly onerous. But as considerable differences exist between the 
individual forecasts we conducted, a least squares regression of capital expenditures and 
oil prices lagged by one year to provide an alternative means of forecasting upstream 
capital expenditures. The result was as follows. 
CAPEX(t) = 2.526*OP(t_1) + 9.830 
Using the above we forecast average annual upstream capital expenditures over the 
period 1995-2005 of $48 - $56 billion per year depending on the exact price scenario. 
However, both the published forecasts and the historical time series of upstream capital 
expenditures seem to ignore the relatively large contribution of non-western state owned 
oil companies. After applying an approximate correction factor to account for this 
lacunae, we believe the true level of global upstream capital expenditures appears to be 
of the order of $106 billion. Of this amount roughly $55 billion per year is undertaken by 
western IOCs. These latter two figures represent a suitable benchmark for assessing the 
potential level of investment in the FSU. 
With regards to the FSU's upstream oil industry, our review of three published forecasts 
shows them to exhibit little consistency, but imply capital expenditures of $50 - $100 
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billion over the next decade. On a global basis, this does not seem particularly onerous, 
what is less certain is the degree to which such investment could be externally financed as 
this presupposes a substitution of domestic operations by foreign operations. 
Alternatively, the FOGI Database records 292 proposed projects with an estimated 
aggregate investment of $230 - $307 billion. A weakness of the latter is that no frame is 
provided for such proposals. Would the investment occur over 10,20 or even 50 years? 
It is our opinion that all such figures are over-inflated within the early time horizon of the 
21st century. Firstly, the published forecasts are based on a return to historical levels of 
production. None of six international oil production forecasts reviewed herein foresee 
such a buoyant recovery in production levels. Production forecasts by the Russian MFE 
are even more pessimistic, but are probably the more realistic. Obviously, the lower the 
production forecast, the lower the investment required. Furthermore, forecasts predicated 
on a return to historical levels of production are misleading in that they treat the FSU in 
isolation. It is not certain why the region must receive such a high proportion of 
investment. If the period since 1991 is anything to go by, the region is unlikely to meet 
its investment targets. Secondly, the concept of reinvested earnings is often overlooked. 
Given the risks involved with up-front capital expenditures, companies are adopting self- 
financing strategies which in some instances implies that up to 80% of the development 
costs will be provided by reinvested earnings. Such a strategy shifts the financing burden 
upon domestic operations to fund future expansion and which can go a long way in 
tempering the level of capital expenditures which must be met by external resources. 
Thus, it is up to the host government to provide a favourable macroeconomic climate and 
legal, fiscal and regulatory frameworks which permit investors to earn profits which can, 
in turn, be reinvested. If not, the bulk of FDI will likely never occur. Using our 
regression based forecast, it is not unreasonable to expect that IOCs could invest $4-5 
billion per year in the FSU's upstream oil sector provided the region as whole permits 
40% of their production to be carried out by foreign companies. If our analysis of 
reinvested earnings holds then the total investment resulting from such seed capital and 
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contributions by domestic companies would likely meet the requirements of FSU's 
upstream oil industry. 
However, even if utopian investment conditions were created, only a fraction of the total 
proposed projects as registered by the FOGI Database will proceed due to what 
economists call the `fallacy of composition'. The FSU in a sense possesses too many 
deposits seeking too few investors with sufficient resources and access to markets to 
undertake development. In other words, all producers cannot produce the same thing at 
the same time without undermining the market. Global energy markets must be of 
sufficient size to absorb the resultant production increases. A perfect investment climate 
would only intensify the competition for funds and allocate scarce capital to the `best' 
projects but within the global context of the international oil industry. 
Within the context of meeting the capital requirements of the FSU's upstream oil 
industry, the role of the `Majors' who account for half of all upstream expenditures by the 
western world is emphasised. We believe that only this very top tier of IOCs enjoy access 
to a level of capital which could support one or more of the proposed mega-projects and 
could singularly make a visible impact on a country's production profile. This is not to 
down play the role of smaller IOCs -- there are plenty of opportunities for them as well, 
but it will be the mega-projects and their sponsors which contribute the necessary 
infrastructure, expertise and training to instil confidence in the region as a sensible 
location for FDI. These projects represent the barometer against which all others will be 
measured. 
In summary, the FSU currently faces a localised shortage of investment capital, but a 
realistic production forecast and the use of reinvested earnings will substantially reduce 
the call on western capital. The idea that IOCs along with the international financial 
community will have a hard time meeting the level of required investment in the FSU is 
misplaced. The region will receive funds commensurate with its position on a risked 
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basis compared to other global opportunities. The real onus of financing lies with the 
host government. They must provide a macroeconomic climate combined with the 
legislative, fiscal and regulatory regimes to permit these projects to earn profits. 
Undoubtedly seed money, expertise and technology are required to get many of these 
projects of the ground, but in the end it will be the projects themselves which provide the 
ultimate source of financing. Furthermore, should such conditions be created, then the 
domestic industry would contribute a large portion of the needed investment as they 
would themselves be in a position to reinvest their own earnings. 
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5. EXTERNAL SOURCES OF CREDIT 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the level of future estimated upstream capital 
expenditures in the FSU and their relative position in the context of similar estimates. 
We concluded that most capital expenditure forecasts for the FSU's petroleum industry 
are the result of an overly optimistic perception of the future and that the Major IOC's 
which account for approximately 50% of western oil companies upstream expenditures 
may be required to play a significant role. Our judgement was further buttressed by the 
belief that domestic sources of financing are currently insufficient to meet the level of 
investment commensurate with the region's geological potential, ' and that External 
Sources of Credit for the most part remain quite limited despite the existence of officially 
sponsored programs. This chapter will show that although the MLAs have exhibited a 
high degree of enthusiasm, and indeed innovation in some cases, their efforts to inject 
western credits has been below expectations. Little relief from western commercial banks 
is foreseen in the near future as the region is likely to remain a relatively high risk 
environment (from the bank's perspective). 
The structure of this chapter is divided into three segments: Multilateral Agencies; Export 
Credit Agencies; and Commercial Banks. Our analysis will contain a review of each 
institution's policy / objectives with regards to the FSU's petroleum industry, and 
establish their levels of commitment to date. There is disparity between the practical and 
theoretical use of (and protection offered by) officially supported credits. Press releases 
and tombstone announcements promote a false, if not tempered, optimism about the 
current lending environment, even in the case of officially sponsor credits, particularly 
when one examines the disbursement record. Given that it is our intent to quantify both 
the extent and limitations of these programmes it was necessary to collate and table 
I However, we are also of the opinion that this is likely only to be a temporary situation as domestic 
sources of financing may over the long-term transcend externally sourced investment, particularly in 
countries such as Russia where the domestic industry is unlikely to accept a large scale substitution by 
foreign operations. 
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information on every project slated to receive officially sourced financing. The results of 
this work are presented in Appendix D and can be used to estimate the total level of 
commitments to date and the extent of multisourcing. Furthermore the evidence suggests 
that the catalytic effect of official financing is not as high as often claimed. 
5.2 Multilateral Agencies (MLAs) 
With regards to multilateral sources of credit potentially available to the upstream 
petroleum industry of FSRs, the activities of three MLAs are of particular relevance: the 
World Bank Group consisting of inter alia the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). 2 Analysis of the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) is also included herein due to OPIC's strong global 
mandate. 
Although the International Monetary Fund (M) is active throughout the transitional 
economies of EE&FSU through the use of its Standby/Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility and Systematic Transformation Facility, their efforts focus on the macro- 
economic/budgetary level3 and credits are not specifically directed to the petroleum 
sector. These credits help facilitate the creation of a stable, low inflationary economies 
conducive to foreign investment thus their indirect support is invaluable. However, in 
order for a transitional economy to qualify for MLA credits, a key precondition is an 
2 Another regionally specialised MLA which may have some bearing on credits affecting the FSU's 
petroleum industry is the European Investment Bank (EIB). As the `house bank' of the EU, the EIB is 
mandated to "... contribute to the balanced and steady development of the common market in the interest of 
the Community. " Art. 198(e), "Treaty on European Union, " reprinted Nigel Foster ed. Blackstone's EC 
Legislation, 4th Ed. (London, Blackstone's Press Ltd., 1993): p 85. For instance, the EIB could provide 
loans and or guarantees to support an export infrastructure project from the FSU and transiting one of its 
member states. On the other hand its remit is wider in the sense that it could extend credits to projects 
outside of member states if such projects promote EU policy or enhance energy security. See Sir Brian 
Unwin, "Financing the future in a world competing for limited funds, " Petroleum Review. Apr. 1996, pp 
182-185; and Vinter (1995) infra note 87, pp 105-107. 
3 In the period 1992-1994 the IMF made arrangements totalling $4 billion with Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. UNECE, 
Economic Bulletin for Europe 46 (1994): p 112. In 1995 the IMF expanded its operations to include 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. IMF Annual Report 1994 and 1995. Hitherto, its two largest facilities 
are for Russia: $6.25 billion standby loan which began in March 1995 and a standby loan for $10.2 billion 
which started in April 1996 and is to be drawn down over a two year period. UNECE, Economic Bulletin 
for Europe 47 (1995): p 37; and Chrystia Freeland and Robert Corzine, "$IObn IMF loan for Russia boots 
Yeltsin, " Financial Times, 23 Feb. 1996, p 16. 
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arrangement with the RVIF. As of the end of 1995, all FSRs with the exception of 
Turkmenistan had achieved this goal. Using its credits as leverage, the IMF typically 
attaches stringent conditionalities associated with the release of monthly tranches in order 
to compel the recipient countries to adhere to the reform process. In Russia, the $10.2 
billion standby loan was partially conditional upon the abolition of oil and gas export 
tariffs by July 1996. In summary while the IMF does not have a direct link with 
petroleum financing, its `seal of approval' indicated by standby arrangements is crucial 
for FSRs seeking MLA credits. 
Throughout our discussion we shall examine the conceptual bridging role of MLAs 
between public and private sources of finance (see Figure 5.1). Our oil and gas financing 
diagram identifies five options. The first zone is characterised by purely state funded 
projects (i. e. budgetary allocations). At the other end of the spectrum, the fifth zone 
denotes those projects being funded purely by the private sector and would include both 
foreign and domestic sources of debt and equity. Zone 5 is one of the ultimate aims of 
transition (the process of privatisation and foreign direct investment). The three zones in 
between depict the bridging role of MLAs. Towards the private end of the spectrum (i. e. 
Zone 4) we find projects which are supported by private sponsors and credit from either 
the IFC or the EBRD. Towards the left hand side of Zone 3 we find both the World Bank 
and the EBRD extending credits to state-owned companies or governments. Zone 2 
portrays projects which are multisourced in the sense that the EBRD or World Bank 
provides credits to support a portion of a state-owned company's share of the costs in a 
joint venture or production sharing arrangement with a western private firm (who may or 
may not seek credit from either the EBRD or IFC). According to their proponents, 
MLAs have a `significant' role to play in financing petroleum developments in the FSU 
for the foreseeable future because of commercial banks' reluctance to operate in what 
they perceive is too risky an investment climate .4 However, our research 
indicates that 
4 View espoused by Robert Gale, the head of the IFC's Moscow's office. "Western investors still 
await Russian legislation protection, " E. E. E. Renort, May 1994, p 3-4. 
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there is a practical limit to what these institutions can achieve and ultimately, if 
transitional reforms are to succeed, private capital must play the leading role. 5 
Figure 5.1 Oil & Gas Financing Map for the FSU 
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Although all MLAs share the founding principle which seeks to remove the political risk 
burden from the investment, they should not be expected (nor can they) achieve this goal 
in its entirety. In other words, their ability to absorb political risk is finite however they 
are being better suited to dealing with such risks than commercial banks. There are 
enough examples of failed, deferred or scaled down transactions to call into question the 
orthodox belief that participation by these institutions provides the panacea which 
investors seek. Our assessment is that in reality these institutions are just as frustrated by 
the nascent legal and fiscal frameworks and will not, in the process of extending credit to 
the FSU, jeopardise established principles of international lending. Given, the initial 
euphoria surrounding the oil and gas sector upon the dissolution of the FSU both the 
MLAs and export credit agencies undertook considerable exposure in this region. But a 
review of annual reports shows a tapering off of new commitments to this specific sector. 
We suspect that commercial realities are tempering the initial desire `to be seen to be 
doing something' in support of reform. Even MLAs seek to balance their risks and 
5 US GAO/GGD-95-60 (1995) infra note 207, p 68. 
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rewards, furthermore, these institutions do not just have a FSU/CIS ambit (the IBRD and 
IFC's portfolio encompasses developing and transitional economies all over the world 
and the EBRD is also responsible for Central and Eastern Europe), nor are their activities 
limited to one particular economic sector. 
5.2.1 World Bank 
The IBRD, established in 1945, is the oldest and largest member institution of the World 
Bank Group, 6 and together with the IDA, their objective is "... to promote economic and 
social progress in developing nations by helping raise productivity so that their people 
may live a better and fuller life. " 7 In order to facilitate productive investment the World 
Bank shall "... promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or 
participations in loans and other investments made by private investors. " 8 However, the 
World Bank is not to compete with other sources of financing, 9 and because of its limited 
resources, the Bank's role is intended to be primarily that of a catalyst and lender of last 
resort. 10 
5.2.1.1 History of World Bank Support for Petroleum Operations 
The World Bank made its first oil and gas loan to Pakistan in 1954, but during the next 
two decades only another 8 projects were undertaken. Following the oil shocks of the 
1970's the World Bank became a truly active participant in the oil and gas sector, with a 
mandate to support oil and gas exploration in petroleum importing developing 
6 The World Bank Group consists of the following Institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) established in 1945; the International Development Association 
(IDA) formed in 1960; the International Finance Corporation (IFC) established in 1956; and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) formed in 1988. Collectively the IBRD and IDA are 
known as the World Bank. 
7 The World Bank Annual Report 1995. p 4. 
8 Art. I(ii), "Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, " U. N. T. S. 2 (1947): pp 134-205. Opened for signature on 22 Jul. 1944, as amended 
effective 17 Dec. 1965, and hereinafter referred to as IBRD Articles. 
9 Art. I(ii) and III(4)(ii), IBRD Articles. 
10 Herbert V. Morais, "World Bank Promotion of Private Investment Flows to Developing Countries 
Through Co-financing and Other Measures, " I. C. S. I. D. Rev. - F. I. L. J. 3 (1988): p 2. 
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countries. l l The rationale for this programme stemmed from the detrimental impact the 
purchase of imported oil was having on their national balance sheets. The challenge was 
to expedite the discovery, appraisal and development of hydrocarbons in such countries 
in the absence of sufficient interest by the private sector. In 1977 it was proposed that 
the World Bank make petroleum sector lending a priority and between 1977 and the end 
of 1981 more that $1.5 billion was committed to 37 projects in 20 countries. 12 
Figure 5.2 Oil & Gas Lending by the World Bank 
Source: World Bank (Jan. 1994) infra note 17, p 1; World Bank (Feb. 1995) infra note 18, Annex 1, p 1. 
Note, these figures do not include funds administered under Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs), that is 
loans to support specific policy changes and institutional reforms. 
By 1983 annual disbursements for this sector had climbed to $1 billion voicing concern 
by the Regean Administration, that the activity of the World Bank was in fact displacing 
private investment. 13 With the benefit of hindsight, this charge appears unjustified. 
Ii It is quite unusual for a commercial bank to directly finance exploration which is by nature an 
extremely risky undertaking, and although the World Bank is not a commercial bank, it operates using 
commercial principles by lending from its own capital market borrowings, retained earnings and the flow 
of repayments on its loans. 
12 Theodore H. Moran, "Does the World Bank have a Role in the Oil and Gas Business, " C. J. W. B. 
17 (1982): p 47. 
13 Ibid. 
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Recalling the upstream capital expenditure time series presented in Chapter 4, the World 
Bank lending programme of $1 billion per year was only equivalent to 0.90-1.25% of 
annual level of upstream investment undertaken by IOCs during the period 1981-1985.14 
Moreover, this figure can be reduced further as some of the World Bank's support was 
for the downstream sector (e. g. $200 million for a Argentinean refinery in 1981). 15 
Nevertheless, at the time the debate proved to be highly contentious and resulted in a 
major internal review in 1983 whose findings were reflected and codified in new 
operational guidelines. 16 The desire of the World Bank's management to placate its 
critics and their `claimed' perception of a weak future demand for oil, 17 resulted in a 
sharp curtailment of their lending programme to approximately $300 million in 1986. 
Come the beginning of the 1990s the World Bank's policy shifted to encouraging the 
growth of the private sector including privatisation and support for the development of 
natural gas as a substitute for the traditional fossil fuels. Since 1990 their lending 
programme has exhibited an increasing trend for the oil and gas sector and is one which is 
forecast to continue. Overall, the World Bank approved 149 oil and gas loans during the 
period 1975 - 1994, totalling $10.579 billion, '8 of which 54% ($5.713 billion) was for 
upstream projects. Thus, the World Bank is a relevant source of funds for the petroleum 
industry, however its role should not be optimistically exaggerated nor is it the cure all 
which many transitional economies may wish it to be. The World Bank's upstream 
lending efforts over the past two decades are only equivalent to 0.47% of total global 
upstream capital expenditure by western IOCs. 19 As this is the case, one may ask why 
14 Table 4.3 supra §4.2.2. 
15 Moran (1982) supra note 12, p 48. 
16 Infra §5.2.1.2.1. 
17 World Bank, Profile, FPD Paper No. 1, Jan. 1994, p 1. 
18 World Bank, "The World Bank's Role in Oil and Gas: Review and Recommendations, " Draft 5b, 
17 Feb. 1995, Annex 1, p 1. See also Hossein Razavi, "Oil and gas financing by the World Bank, " 
Energy Policy, 23 (1995): p 1003. 
19 5.713 + 1208 x 100% - 0.47%; Cf. Table 4.3, §4.2.2. 
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does the World Bank bother at all? Perhaps the oil and gas sector should just be left to 
the private sector or the host countries' respective governments? Whilst this view has its 
proponents it tends to belittle the positive contribution that this institution can play in 
developing and transitional economies. 
Firstly, many governments of transitional economies or developing countries are unable 
to provide or raise independently on the international capital markets the level of funds 
which their industry requires. Secondly, the apportionment of government budgets 
towards a capital intensive and inherently risky industrial activity is questionable given 
the wide number of competing social objectives (e. g. education, social welfare, medical 
care etc. ). Thirdly, some transitional economies have inherited a distrust of foreign 
investors especially in their natural resource sectors and therefore there maybe scope for 
NII, As, like the World Bank, to act as an honest broker. Finally, most of the transitional 
economies in the FSU lack adequate laws, policies and institutions with which to 
effectively absorb foreign investment. From the perspective of these four points perhaps 
the World Bank's oil and gas lending programme can make a positive contribution. 
5.2.1.2 World Bank through Transition 
The World Bank, unlike the EBRD (which is discussed in §5.2.3), was established long 
before the collapse of the FSU. Therefore, it is necessary to establish whether their 
policy guidelines are compatible with the economic and political context of the FSU 
today. Just as criticism voiced in the early 1980s resulted in the promulgation of the 
OMS 3.82 Guidelines for Petroleum Lending, there is an impetus for a current review. It 
is unlikely however, given the difficulties associated with the FSU's investment climate 
in general, that the World Bank would face the same `displacement of private investors' 
criticism as in the past. The following two sections will examine the provisions of its 
1984 Guidelines for Petroleum Lending (still officially in force) and the selected waiver 
of its negative pledge policy. 
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5.2.1.2.1 World Bank Guidelines for Petroleum Lending 
In 1983 the World Bank initiated a major policy review of the transition taking place 
within developing countries towards higher priced energy. 20 In conforming to such a 
view, stress was placed upon "... the need for a major increase in energy investments ... and 
the likelihood of a substantial shortfall in financial and managerial resources. "21 
Therefore, 
"given the scarcity of the [World] Bank's resources, it was agreed that the 
[World] Bank should emphasise its catalytic role, through a strong effort 
to assist in planning and implementing improved energy policies and 
investment strategies and through the use of its financial participation to 
attract loan and risk capital. " 22 
The importance of mobilising private sector resources is reiterated throughout the 
guidelines, 23 but is most comprehensively addressed in Paragraph 8 as follows: 
"There is considerable scope for attracting private equity investment for 
exploration and development projects, particularly for oil, and for 
borrowing commercially to help finance development and infrastructure 
projects. Raising equity capital from foreign oil companies, private 
international companies or nationally owned oil companies of 
industrialised countries particularly for exploration, provides a means for 
governments to invest more in petroleum without increasing the financial 
liability and risks borne by the domestic public sector.... [World] Bank 
petroleum operations should therefore be used to help borrowers to 
mobilise risk capital and commercial debt financing to the maximum 
extent possible. " 24 
In the process of implementing its objectives, any petroleum lending proposals will be 
assessed by the World Bank by reviewing a country's energy policy. This includes a 
review of. a) the relationship of petroleum development in the country's overall 
investment programme; and b) how the World Bank can most effectively participate. 25 
Whether the World Bank's efforts are to facilitate institution-building, technology 
20 World Bank, The Energy Transition in Developing Countries, (Washington, DC.: World Bank, 
1983). 
21 World Bank, "Guidelines for Petroleum Lending, " OMS 3.82,28 Nov. 1984, §1, Para. 1, on file 
with author. 
22 Ibid. 
23 §1, Para. 2, Para. 3; §1I, Para. 5, Para. 6(c), and Para. 7(d), OMS 3.82. 
24 §11, Para. 8., OMS 3.82. 
25 §1, Para. 10, OMS 3.82. 
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transfer, policy formation, the mobilisation of finance or any combination thereof. The 
essential criterion remains the attainment of the maximum benefit possible from a limited 
involvement of World Bank's resources. 
While this philosophy was codified in the Guidelines as a means of deflecting the 
criticism over the perceived `displacement of private investors', much of the impetus for 
this policy (i. e. the criticism) is no longer present. There is scarcely a foreign investor 
today who would not welcome the involvement of the World Bank, if practical benefits 
were assured - the `displacement of foreign investors' theory is considered inapplicable 
in the context of the FSU today. Within the 1984 Guidelines, participation in four 
different types of petroleum operations are envisioned: Exploration Promotion; 
Exploration/Appraisal; Petroleum Development and Infrastructure. 26 
5.2.1.2.1.1 Exploration Promotion 
The World Bank's exploration promotion loans are designed to assist "... countries offer 
private investors access to prospective exploration areas on appropriate terms and 
conditions... "27 Moreover, the World Bank will only participate in areas where there is 
no significant exploration activity taking place, or where there is no oil company holding 
such rights or is in the process of obtaining such rights. 28 The objectives of the 
exploration promotion activities are to: establish the policy framework to attract the 
private sector; improve geological information; and procure the skills the government 
needs in order to design appropriate policies, negotiate agreements and monitor such 
activities. 29 
26 See also William T. Onorato, "World Bank Financing of Petroleum Sector Development Projects 
in Member States: An Overview and a Case Study, " O. G. L. T. R 8 (1989/90): pp 70-75. 
27 §VI, Para. 19, OMS 3.82. 
28 Ibid. 
29 §VI, Para. 20, OMS 3.82. 
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Given the high level of IOC interest in the FSU, the scope for World Bank participation 
at the Exploration Promotion stage appears limited. World Bank participation in 
institution building activities at the exploration stage will only be permissible when such 
activities are designed to ensure a "realistic understanding within the country of its 
petroleum potential and risk, and of its relative attractiveness to the private petroleum 
industry compared with other countries. " 30 As FSRs compete amongst themselves to 
attract foreign investment, they should also be competing internationally with other 
petroleum producing regions of the world. Yet a 1995 comparative study of World Fiscal 
Systems for Oil demonstrates that countries in general only compete regionally, as 
opposed to oil companies which compete globally. 31 The ability of FSRs to attract foreign 
upstream operations and to maximise government take will be predicated upon the 
existence of competitive terms. The World Bank may be able to assist this process, but if 
the non-existence criterion of private interest or exploration rights (§N, Para. 19) is 
strictly adhered to then petroleum lending under this category appears inadmissible to all 
republics except Belarus, Estonia, Tajikistan and possibly Armenia. 32 
5.2.1.2.1.2 ExploratioNAppraisal 
The second category of petroleum operations in which the World Bank may participate is 
the Exploration/Appraisal stage. In general, the World Bank's task in exploration 
"... is to review with the government the country's exploration strategy, 
considering geological, institutional and policy factors. The review of 
geological potential carried out by Bank staff provides an opportunity to 
discuss the prospectivity of the country, its position compared to that of 
other countries and its strategy for improving knowledge of its oil and gas 
potential. " 33 
30 § VI, Para. 22, OMS 3.82. 
31 Van Meurs & Associates Ltd., World Fiscal Systems for Oil, (New York, NY.: Barrows 
Company, 1994). The exception to the rule is Latin America which offers a combination of acreage and 
terms that compete relatively effectively and globally over a wide range of investment criteria. Vol. 1, pp 
105-107. See also Pedro van Meurs, "Governments cut takes to compete as world acreage demand falls, " 
Oil & Gas Journal 24 Apr. 1995, pp 78-82. 
32 The FOGI Database records no foreign IOC upstream activity in any of these countries, except for 
Armenia which secured a two well exploration programme for natural gas and partially funded by USAID. 
33 §N, Para. 29, OMS 3.82. 
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The World Bank may partially finance exploration activities where the geology suggests 
that such exploration will result in economic production, 34 and that the World Bank is not 
displacing available private capital. 35 Thus the World Bank will, under normal 
circumstances, only consider financing exploration or appraisal drilling being carried out 
by a JV between a state-owned enterprise and a competent private investor. 36 
Again, as there is overwhelming interest by IOCs in the FSU, it is unlikely that the World 
Bank would consider funding exploration or appraisal drilling. However, where the 
domestic partner to such a joint venture (or PSA) is still majority state-owned, short of 
investment capital and does not enjoy a full carried interest, World Bank loans are 
permissible. However, the balance between the likelihood of successful exploration 
efforts and the potential to mobilise sufficient private capital remain crucial for 
determining World Bank support. For instance, Armenia which has no indigenous supply 
of hydrocarbons, is the most geologically unattractive FSR for petroleum exploration. 
Would it not make sense for the World Bank to allocate a portion of its limited resources 
to supporting exploration in Armenia? Probably not as the chances of success are very 
poor. Interestingly, a two well exploration programme in Armenia has been completed 
with funding from an official source of finance (USAID) in conjunction with funds raised 
from Armenia Diaspora, but both wells turned out to be dry. 37 We highlight the 
Armenian example to illustrate an exploration opportunity that may have fit the World 
Bank investment criteria, but recognising that such opportunities in the FSU as a whole 
will be scare due to the high level of private interest. 
34 §IV, Para. 32, OMS 3.82. 
35 §N, Para. 33, OMS 3.82. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Unfortunately, both wells turned out to be dry. Author's conversation with Dr. Yuri H. Kazarian 
(Director of Yerevan Regional Centre of Vniiegazprom) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, on 27 Mar. 1996. 
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5.2.1.2.1.3 Petroleum Development 
Given the large number of known, but undeveloped deposits, the risks of petroleum 
development in the FSU are comparatively low. Essentially, IOCs involved in the FSU 
are swapping lower technical risks for higher political risks, but this does not change the 
fact that development is financed from sources of both debt and equity as opposed to just 
risk capital in the case of exploration activities. Given the lower risks, the World Bank is 
more likely to support development, however, it is equally understood that private 
sources of finance will also be more readily available. Therefore, 
"... its financial participation... [shall be]... the minimum necessary to 
achieve the effective implementation of the [World] Bank's institution- 
building and policy-development objectives and to mobilise the necessary 
external financing. " 38 
The corollary of this guideline is that if insufficient progress is made on either the 
institution-building or policy-development front, then World Bank financing is likely to 
be curtailed or deferred. 
Similar to its policy on Exploration and/or Appraisal activities, the World Bank will 
normally only finance a portion of the State's or national oil company's share in a 
participation arrangement with private investor(s). 39 But the Guidelines specifically 
envision projects that are less likely to attract private investors, such as natural gas 
developments, rehabilitation and/or secondary recovery projects 40 These guidelines 
likely require some adjustment in the case of the FSU, particularly as there is 
considerable scope for both secondary and tertiary recovery at older fields whose rates of 
return can be extremely attractive to private investors provided a favourable tax regime is 
in place (see Table 5.2). 
38 §IV, Para. 38, OMS 3.82. 
39 §N, Para. 39, OMS 3.82. 
40 Aid. 
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5.2.1.2.1.4 Infrastructure 
Infrastructure, which includes pipelines, loading and distribution facilities, is the final 
category of petroleum operations to which the World Bank may provide assistance. The 
criteria the World Bank employs are not linked, as is the case of Petroleum Development 
projects, to the successful implementation of its institution-building and policy- 
development objectives. If the World Bank is to: 
"... finance the infrastructure component of a petroleum development 
project, it appraises the production aspects (even though these are not to be 
financed by the [World] Bank) and/or receives from the producers 
acceptable guarantees covering production, such as guaranteed throughput 
contracts or lease/purchase arrangements. "al 
5.2.1.2.1.5 Other Covenants and Considerations 
With the exception of exploration promotion projects where the World Bank is assuming 
a much higher degree of risk than is normally the case for a bank, standard practices for 
evaluating commercial viability and financial soundness of a project will be applied. In 
general the World Bank 
"... requires a reasonable prospect that the entity's revenues will be 
adequate to meet its operational, debt service and, where appropriate, 
dividend requirements, provide a reasonable return on its invested capital, 
and enable it to mobilise internally a reasonable part of the resources 
needed for its investment programme. It also should have appropriate 
financial polices, particularly regarding capital structure and liquidity, 
which take into account the degree of risk involved in its operations. " 42 
As one of principal foundations of the World Bank's oil and gas lending policy is to 
preserve and maintain its catalytic role, the Guidelines acknowledge the importance of 
`limited or non-recourse financing' as a means of increasing its financial leverage: 
"The financing of petroleum projects `off balance sheet' makes them 
extremely attractive to investors and governments that cannot mobilise 
private resources on the basis of their own credit standing but may be able 
to do so for enclave projects. Although projects in developing countries 
do not commonly satisfy all the criteria for full non-recourse financing, the 
Bank should make every effort to apply financing techniques developed in 
advanced counties, perhaps in modified form, so as to reduce to a 
minimum the financial claims on public sector resources. " 43 
41 §N, Para. 48, OMS 3.82. 
42 §VH, Para. 57, OMS 3.82. 
43 §VII, Para. 80, OMS 3.82. 
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5.2.1.2.1.6 Summary of Guidelines for Petroleum Lending 
Despite the fact that the World Bank's current guidelines were promulgated in 1984, they 
appear to be relatively robust in their applicability to the new conditions of the FSU. The 
financing of exploration and appraisal wells is unlikely to be undertaken by the World 
Bank in the case of the FSU, due to the overwhelming interest by the foreign private 
sector. Although as Chapter 2 discussed exploration drilling by domestic companies is 
lagging development drilling. The likely areas for World Bank participation remain in 
the Development and Infrastructure sectors, particularly in helping state-owned 
companies to meet their share of cash-calls in participation arrangements with private 
investors provided sufficient progress is made on the policy, institutional and regulatory 
development front. In this manner the World Bank intends to use its resources as an 
inducement to support reforms. With regards to other issues such as the environment, the 
guidelines are relatively silent: 
"... the Bank evaluates the adequacy of the measures taken to ensure safety 
of personnel, avoid pollution and more generally ensure that any potential 
damage can be brought rapidly under control. " 44 
This more or less reflects the prevailing attitude of the day and does not reflect the 
advancement in environmentally-conscious thinking which has occurred over the last 
decade. Clearly, this is one area where the Guidelines will need to be expanded or at least 
formally linked with more recent environmental policies. 
As rehabilitation projects can offer attractive returns if a favourable fiscal framework is 
applied, there may be less need for World Bank involvement in this sector than the 
Guidelines suggest, although as §5.2.1.3.1, will demonstrate this has been the mainstay of 
the World Bank's oil and gas lending programme to date. The most efficient allocation 
of World Bank resources perhaps lies in their support for infrastructure projects, in 
particular pipelines transiting more than one state, where the realities of negotiating such 
44 §VU, Para. 78, OMS 3.82. 
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large and politically sensitive projects would likely benefit from the direct involvement of 
MLAs. 45 
In conclusion, the World Bank's Guidelines on Petroleum Lending appear to have 
withstood the test of time. In contrast, the negative pledge policy of MLAs is one area 
where significant changes have recently taken place, although we believe there is scope to 
question the effectiveness of these changes. 
5.2.1.2.2 Negative Pledge Policy 
Given the high level of investment risks within the FSU it is assumed that MLAs have a 
significant role to play in both providing credits to the FSRs while encouraging support 
from private commercial banks and/or export credit agencies. However MLAs, in 
particular the World Bank, commonly include a negative pledge clause within their loan 
agreements which can, in certain circumstances, discourage third party lenders from 
extending credits, because such clauses limit the private lender's ability to obtain 
security. This section explains the purpose of the negative pledge clause, its potentially 
adverse impact on encouraging the flow of credit to FSRs, the restricted use of World 
Bank's negative pledge waiver and the EBRD's response. We then address whether a 
waiver of the negative pledge clause has really made any difference. 
5.2.1.2.2.1 What is a Negative Pledge? 
The negative pledge clause46 is included in loan agreements to provide an unsecured 
lender reassurance that the level of assets (both current and future) upon which the lender 
based the decision to extend credit to the borrower, will not materially change during the 
45 "Finance: World Bank Rethinks Oil Aid Policy, " W. P. A. 23 Jan. 1995, p 5. 
46 In general see Philip R. Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated Debt and State Loans, (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1995): pp 164-165; Matthew H. Hurlock, "New Approaches to Economic 
Development: The World Bank, the EBRD and the Negative Pledge Clause, " H. I. I. J. 35 (1994): pp 345- 
386; Tracy Hobbes, "The Negative Pledge: A Brief Guide, " J. Int'l. Bus. L. 7 (1993): pp 269-274; Lee C. 
Buchheit, "How to Negotiate the Negative Pledge Clause, " Int'l. Fin. L. Rev. Dec. 1992, pp 28-30.; Lee C. 
Buchheit, "Negative Pledge Clauses: The Games People Play, " Int'l. Fin. L. Rev. July 1990, pp 10-11.; 
Michael Bradfield and Nancy R. Jacklin, "The Problems Posed by Negative Pledge Covenants in 
International Loan Agreements, " C. J. T. L. 23 (1984): pp 131-142; Philip Wood, Law and Practice of 
International Finance, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980): pp 146-155; G. R. Delaume, Legal Aspects of 
International Lending and Economic Development Financing, (New York, NY.: Ocean Publications, 
1967): pp 251-256. 
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term of the loan by the borrower granting rights to those assets to another creditor. In 
other words, the primary creditor, is seeking a defence against the subordination of his 
rights. Should the borrower grant security over its assets to a subsequent creditor then the 
primary creditor will enjoy in the security both equally and rateably. In the case of 
sovereign borrowings the principal objective of the negative clause is to "... inhibit the 
diversion to a single creditor of a state's foreign currency reserves and other assets which 
might be available to meet its external debt.... 1147 A key feature of the World Bank's 
negative pledge clause is that it has an extremely wide and generous ambit48 and it can be 
said that the World Bank `casts its net widely' - i. e. the inclusion of the assets of any 
subdivision, or agency of the state, particularly including the Central Bank. 
But do negative pledge clauses in the case of sovereign loans achieve their objective in 
practice? Unfortunately there are some practical problems which inhibit the clause's 
effectiveness. Firstly, if a sovereign government were to declare bankruptcy the value of 
the sovereign's unencumbered assets held outside that country is likely to be small in 
comparison to the size of the claims. 49 Secondly, creditor banks will be reluctant to 
foreclose on state assets as such action would damage their relationship and reputation 
both within and outside the country in question, thereby adversely affecting its ability to 
attract future sovereign lending business. Sovereign lending is an entirely different 
activity compared to domestic private house mortgages, and while creditors may show 
little flexibility and great willingness to foreclose in the case of the latter, a long-term 
sovereign creditor needs to exhibit flexibility when a sovereign state finds itself in 
temporary difficulties. Thirdly, such rights are extremely difficult (if not impossible) to 
enforce -a pure negative pledge simply prohibits the creation of a subsequent security 
47 Ibid.. Wood (1980): p 146. 
48 §9.03 of the IBRD General Conditions to Loan and Guarantee Agreements which deals with its 
Negative Policy is reproduced in Appendix D. 1. 
49 Buchheit (1990) supra note 46, p 11. 
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interest, it does not create an enforceable security interest. 50 Finally, in the case of the 
World Bank's negative pledge clause, its wide remit often raises political objections from 
the borrower, as the state may choose to argue that subordinate entities have 
constitutional autonomy which are infringed by the clause. In summary, while the 
negative pledge clause does in theory protect the sovereign creditor, the presumption that 
the lender will be able to successfully exercise legal and equitable remedies against the 
borrower in the event of default is questionable - such efforts through litigation are 
unlikely to lead to `significant' recovery of the outstanding portion of the debt. sl 
So although sovereign lenders may or may not be able to achieve the protection intended 
from a negative pledge clause, the presence of such a clause in a sovereign loan does have 
very real implications for the borrower. Specifically, it hinders a sovereign state from 
providing security for other external borrowings. Secured lending which supports foreign 
investment will be in breach of the World Bank's negative pledge clause if state-owned 
assets are pledged as a security. Ironically, a legal device which was designed to enhance 
the quality of loans to a developing or transitional economy is accused of discouraging 
commercial banks funding. This situation is exacerbated in the FSU, where the majority 
of economically significant industrial assets remain state-owned. Finally, the rationale 
behind the negative pledge was developed in an era (i. e. Post-World War II) when funds 
from the World Bank accounted for a much higher percentage of capital flows to 
developing countries. But since 1990 private capital flows to developing countries have 
almost quadrupled while official development finance has stagnated. 52 Therefore, it was 
recognised that organisations, such as the World Bank, needed to re-examine its negative 
so Hurlock (1994) supra note 46, p 348. 
51 Ibid., p 349. 
52 Michael Prowse, "Wolfensohn's task, " Financial Times 22 Apr. 1996, p 24. In 1990 the total 
official development assistance was $57.9 billion, whereas the sum of private sourced funds (net private 
loans, FDI, and portfolio equity investment) was $45.6 billion. In 1994 these figures had changed to $54.4 
billion and $173 billion respectively. See The World Bank Annual Report 1995. Appendix 11, p 214. 
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pledge policy which could in theory be inhibiting support for FDI in developing 
countries, and in particular the FSRs, by commercial banks. 
5.2.1.2.2.2 Negative Pledge Policy Review 
As far back as 7 August 1990 the executive directors of World Bank considered a 
Presidential Memorandum reviewing the bank's negative pledge policy. 53 The Policy 
Paper recommended that the World Bank should not change its policy. The granting 
waivers for enhancements of new money in the context of concerted financing packages 
is not permitted and the few the exceptions provided in the IBRD General Conditions 
Applicable to Loan and Loan Agreements (§9.03(c)) [hereinafter IBRD General Terms 
and Conditions] would be adequate in most circumstances S4 However, it was explicitly 
stated that "should experience indicate a pressing need for reconsideration of this view, 
the matter will be brought to the Board for further review. " S5 Subsequently, such a 
review did take place, and on 30 March 1993 the executive directors of the World Bank 
approved a new policy. 56 
The World Bank maintained that the use of the negative pledge clause was fully 
compatible with the long-term interests of a borrowing country because critical export 
earnings should not be mortgaged to meet current needs and that the use of the clause 
remains a crucial component of the World Bank's risk management and financial 
standing. However, flexibility was indeed possible and desirable for countries in 
transition. 57 The rationale being the preponderance of economically important assets 
residing in state hands. A privately owned oil production enterprise is free to pledge its 
53 World Bank, "Review of IBRD's Negative Pledge Policy With Respect to Debt and Debt Service 
Reduction Operations, " R90-151,19 July 1990, on file with author. For an additional review of this 
document see Hurlock (1994) supra note 46, pp 361-368. 
54 Aid, Para. 34(b). §9.03 of the IBRD General Terms and Conditions, dealing specifically with its 
negative pledge clause is reproduced herein at Appendix D. 1. 
55 Ibid. 
56 World Bank, "IBRD's Negative Pledge Policy With Respect to Lending for Investment Projects, " 
Memorandum to the Executive Directors, R92-214/2,30 Mar. 1993, on file with author. 
57 Ibid., Para. 3. 
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assets in project financing and the World Bank does not have any legal basis to claim 
rateably to such assets, however, this is not the case for a public enterprise. The 
definition of `public assets' as stated in §9.03(a)(ii) of the IBRD General Terms and 
Conditions (see Appendix D. 1) in relation to 
"... assets of a joint venture between a government or public entity on the 
one hand and a foreign private enterprise on the other will not fall under 
the scope of the [World] Bank's negative pledge clause unless the joint 
venture is controlled by, or operates mainly for the account or benefit of, 
the government or public entity. (A 50/50 owned and controlled joint 
venture would not normally fall under this definition). " 58 
This raises the interesting question of what is the permitted -maximum interest of the state 
in the domestic partner's share of a joint venture involving a foreign investor which 
would not invoke the World Bank's negative pledge clause in the case of secured lending. 
Assuming a cut-off of 50% in accordance with the above statement, Table 5.1 shows the 
maximum state shareholding for decreasing amounts of foreign participation. For 
example, if the Russian State chooses to retain a 60% interest in any of its key oil 
producing enterprises, then theoretically a JV in which the domestic entity owns 83% 
should not attract the World Bank's negative pledge (i. e. 0.83 x 0.60 <_ 50%). But in 
other FSRs where the state continues to maintain 100% ownership of the domestic 
enterprises (e. g. SOCAR in Azerbaijan) then a 50: 50 JV is the limit. 
Table 5.1 Maximum State Share in a JV without invoking the Negative Pledge Clause 
JOINI'VENTURE Ownership Structure 
Max. State Share of 
Domestic Entity in JV 
Domestic Entity's are 
in JV 
( 
Foreign Entity's are in 
JV 
N/A, 0 100 
100.0 1u 90 
100.0 20 80 
100.0 3u A) 
100-0,, 40 60 
.Ü 
83.3 60 40 
-71.4 70 30 
80 20 
: _ 59A 100 0 
i I'< ( (11111in1 1 1)(, ) . 'n, I (o I imir is always less than or equal to u..: )u. 
58 Ibid., Para 3, note 2. 
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Provided JVs adhere to the above general guideline they should not be hindered from 
seeking secured lending, at least as far as the World Bank's negative pledge policy is 
concerned. Moreover as our research indicates the most common ownership structure for 
upstream sectors JVs involving western partner(s) is the 50: 50 JV (See Figure 3.2). This 
implies that western commercial banks or ECAs should not have claimed a reluctance to 
extend credit59 due to the presence of the World Bank's negative pledge clause at least in 
the case of the majority of JVs. In other words, if the absence of the negative pledge 
waiver was not the real reason for the lack of credits; then its presence could not by itself 
be the cure-all. Reality is that the World Bank's negative pledge clause was only one of a 
number of factors inhibiting the flow of western credit. However for domestic enterprises 
whom are seeking external commercial debt on their own account, the negative pledge 
policy does create a problem where the State retains an interest of greater than 50%. 
Therefore, in order to facilitate the flow of private capital and augment a transitional 
economy's export capacity (i. e. their ability to generate hard currency) the World Bank 
agreed to waive its negative pledge under the following principal criteria: 
" Firstly, in response to a request from a member state "... where income producing 
public assets constitute a predominant share [at least 75%], provided that a 
programme of structural change, including satisfactory macroeconomic policies, has 
been decided upon by the country and is supported by the [World] Bank. " 60 
" Secondly, eligible countries would be granted a waiver for an initial period of three 
years, with possible two year extension subject to a review by the World Bank. 
However, "all eligible transactions during the waiver period would be covered for the 
full maturity of the liens established. " 61 
" Thirdly, "[t]he waiver would be granted with respect to lien to secure the repayment 
of external debt under a loan made to finance a specific investment 
59 "Negative Pledge: World Bank Tussles with Export Credit Agencies, " Nefte Compass, 26 Feb. 
1993, p 12. 
60 ]bid., Para 12. 
61 Ibid., Para 13. 
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project... provided... the original maturity of the loan is not less than 5 years, and that 
the lien does not permit the accumulation of more that 12 months' projected debt 
obligations in any related escrow accounts. " 62 
" Fourthly, the borrower is a special-purpose entity, 63 that is, an entity with separate 
legal personality which is specifically established for the purpose of implementing the 
project in question and whose own assets and liabilities are limited to the project at 
hand. 64 
" Fifthly, the lender does not enjoy a guarantee by the full faith and credit backing of 
the country. 65 
" Sixthly, the lender is private in character, although some provision is made for co- 
financing arrangements involving official bilateral agencies, export credit agencies 
(infra §5.3.1.1 on US Eximbank's Oil and Gas Framework Agreement) or 
multilateral development banks 66 
" Lastly, the World Bank in not a cofinancier of the investment project 67 
Ideally, the World Bank (in accordance with concerns expressed by the IMF)68 would 
have preferred to review individual projects on a case by case basis, however, such a 
mechanism would have resulted in an overly onerous commitment of the World Bank's 
management resources. Therefore, it was recommended that the Bank should grant a 
general waiver for all transactions satisfying the above criteria on a country by country 
basis. 
62 Ibid., Para 14. 
63 Ibid., Para. 14(i). 
64 Ibid., Para. 16. 
65 Ibid., Para. 14(ü). 
66 Ibid., Para. 14(iii). 
67 Ibid., Para. 14(iv). 
68 Ibid., Para. 31. 
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As far as we are aware, the only transitional economies to have been granted such 
waivers are Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. 69 In the case of the two former 
countries the World Bank's staff readily approved their waivers as the countries had 
easily met the minimum 75% criteria and at the time both had demonstrated their 
commitment to reform. 7° Russia's waiver commenced on 14 December 1993 for an 
initial period of only two years not three71 
5.2.1.2.2.3 Influence of EBRD's Negative Pledge Waiver 
As opposed to the World Bank which only lends to public sector entities, the EBRD, 
according to its Articles of Agreement, may not provide more than 40% its funds to the 
state sector (i. e. a minimum of 60% to the private sector) 72 Therefore, the EBRD whose 
mandate specifically emphases the fostering of the private sector73 appears justified in its 
decision to provide a much more liberal waiver of its negative pledge clause. 74 
The EBRD will consider granting an initial three year waiver for countries which have 
entered into a public sector loan with the EBRD and are not in default, providing that the 
country could prove it was "... implementing policies furthering the transition to the open 
market-oriented economy. " 75 The EBRD's waiver is exclusively limited to liens 
"... securing external debt in connection with the financing of the acquisition, construction 
69 The World Bank Annual Report 1994, p 18. 
70 Hurlock (1994) supra note 46, p 385. 
71 Ben Edwards, "How to finance projects in risky countries, " Euromonev. Jan. 1994, p 87. 
72 Art. 11(3), EBRD Articles of Agreement infra note 141. This criteria was finally achieved in 
1994 when 73% of projects signed that fiscal year were in the private sector, thus bringing the total 
commitment of EBRD's resources allocated to this sector to 62%. EBRD Annual Report 1994, p 5. 
73 Ibid., Art. 1. 
74 The EBRD's negative pledge clause, which is modelled on the World Bank's is reproduced in 
Appendix D. 2 for comparative purposes. 
75 EBRD, "Limited Waiver of Bank's Negative Pledge Clause, " BDS93-140/Rev 2,17 Nov. 1993, 
p 5. [hereinafter EBRD Negative Pledge Waiver] See Hurlock (1994) supra note 46, pp 378-383 for 
additional discussion. 
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or development of any properties in connection with a project (a `project financing'). "76 
Its principal differences compared to the World Bank's much less flexible negative 
pledge waiver are as follows: 
" The EBRD does not require the use of a Special Purpose Entity. 
" The EBRD does not distinguish between the types of lenders, that is, public entities 
such as ECAs will be included without qualification. 
" The EBRD does not require a minimum term (the World Bank specifies a minimum 
five year term loan). 
With regards to the definition of "public assets", 77 the requirement that the lien not cover 
more than 12 months accumulation of debt in escrow, 78 and the criteria that other sources 
of security cannot be available, 79 the World Bank and EBRD apply the same treatment. 
However, the EBRD's more flexible waiver is only be effective in countries which are 
solely indebted by EBRD public sector loans, as the EBRD's waiver has no jurisdiction 
over the World Bank's negative pledge clause. Therefore, countries which have 
outstanding loans with the World Bank would still be subject to the World Bank's 
negative pledge clause including its relatively more inflexible waiver if granted. The 
World Bank, recognising the benefits of the EBRD's waiver and seeking to harmonise 
their policy, amended its waiver on 14 Dec. 1993 - only 22 days after the EBRD's 
policy came into effect. 8° Specifically, the World Bank, modified its waiver by relaxing 
the condition of compliance with the macroeconomic adjustment programme to 
"making progress in privatisation and... moving toward a market 
economy... [while] experiencing improvement in its macroeconomic 
76 § 1(1), EBRD Negative Pledge Waiver, supra note 75. 
77 Ibid., § 1(1)(a)(i)-(iii). 
78 Ibid., §1(1)(c). 
79 Aid., § 1(2). 
80 Hurlock (1994) supra note 46, p 384, citing World Bank, "IBRD Negative Pledge Policy With 
Respect to Lending for Investment Projects, " R93-199,24. Nov. 1993. 
132 
situation and [that] the waiver of the negative pledge clause would be 
deemed further to contribute to the accomplishment of the above goals. " 81 
Secondly, the `special purpose vehicle' requirement was abandoned in favour of the 
EBRD's `project financing' approach whereby eligible security would be restricted to the 
"financing of the acquisition, construction or development of properties which are part of 
the project concerned, without any further recourse to other parties or assets. " 82 
5.2.1.2.2.4 Effectiveness of Negative Pledge Waiver? 
The decision by these two MLAs to waive their negative pledge clauses was based on the 
observation that commercial banks and ECAs would be unwilling to extend credits in 
transitional economies in the absence of security. 83 Undoubtedly, this view is not 
without its merit, but can be misleading. The willingness of commercial banks to provide 
debt financing should have theoretically improved after the World Bank and the EBRD 
established a mechanism and criteria for obtaining waivers to their respective negative 
pledge clauses. Indeed, the Head of Emerging Markets and Sectors Division, DAIWA 
Europe Ltd., International Energy Group, expressed the view that as 55 export credit 
agencies globally supported the decision of the World Bank to provide a negative pledge 
waiver, bilateral financing deals to the Russian oil and gas sector should swell. 84 
However, our research indicates (see §5.3) that this is not the case. Prudent bankers do 
not lend on the strength of security alone. 
"It is... neither commercially sensible nor, perhaps, morally acceptable in 
most cases to enter [into] a transaction where you are likely to be repaid 
only by realisation of security or by exercise of your rights under other 
protective provisions. Such protection must be secondary - your 
insurance against failure. " 85 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Reinhold Heus as cited in Edwards (1994) supra note 71, p 87. 
85 John Willingham, "Principles of Lending-Part V, " in International Finance and Investment: 
Multinational Corporate Banking, 3rd ed., Ed. Brian Terry, (London: The Chartered Institute of Bankers, 
1994): p 157. 
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Just as covenant protection will not turn a bad loan to a good loan, the availability of 
security should not prejudice one's judgement about the underlying loan facility. 86 This 
is particularly true in oil and gas development project financing where project assets are 
taken as security predominantly for defensive purposes. This prevents a subsequent third 
party from acquiring such rights in priority of the original lenders. 87 As opposed to 
conventional secured financing whereby pledged tangible assets have an intrinsic value 
on the open market which the bank may sell relatively easily following an event of 
default, the break-up value of a fixed platform or pipeline (even if the bank could sell it) 
will be substantially less than its value as a going concern. In other words, the value of 
the security over the project's immovable assets is dependent on the successful operation 
of the project. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent a western bank will be able to 
enforce its claim over project assets located in the FSU. 88 To recapitulate, security for oil 
and gas projects in the FSU is never the principal means of repayment. Despite the 
existence of the waiver of the both the EBRD's and World Bank's negative pledge 
clause, western creditors will be looking at the underlying cash flow of the project for 
repayment. But the success of any project is dependent upon the legal and fiscal 
environment in which it is situated. In other words, unless the commercial environment 
is such that the project can generate sufficient cash flow above and beyond its operating 
costs and debt servicing, western creditors are no more likely to provide debt financing. 
The ex post possibility for a bank to enforce its security, is a pre-condition for lending, 
but only if ex ante belief that the project is capable of generating the required cash flow. 
86 Ibid., p 177. 
87 Graham Vinter, Project Finance, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995): pp 80-81; Wood (1995) 
supra note 46, p 30; Roger McCormick, "Project Finance - Legal Aspects, " in Project Lending, Ed. T. H. 
Donaldson (London: Butterworths, 1992): pp 188-189; and Gordon McKechnie, "Oil and Gas 
Development Finance, " in Energy Finance, (London: Euromoney Publications, 1983): pp 132-133. 
88 Robert Starr, "Legal Aspects of Natural Resource Projects in the CIS, " N. R. F. 18, no. 1(1994): p 
65; and Robert Drake, "Financing Oil Projects in the Russian Federation: The Legal Perspective, " 
O. G. L. T. R. 12 (1995): pp 470-472. 
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5.2.1.2.2.5 Summary of Negative Pledge Waiver 
The waiver of the MLAs' negative pledge clause bypasses what would have otherwise 
been a western induced legal barrier for those FSRs trying to raise external debt finance 
on a project specific basis, but the waiver itself cannot address the uncertain political and 
economic environment in which the project is situated. One of the principal themes 
running throughout the rest of this chapter is that even the MLAs with all their `risk 
mitigating' attributes have been relatively unsuccessful in overcoming the real barriers to 
foreign investment. 
Having reviewed both the pre-existing oil and gas lending policy of the World Bank and 
its change in attitude towards the waiver of its negative pledge policy, we will now 
examine its lending record in the FSU. 
5.2.1.3 World Bank support for Petroleum Operations in the FSU 
The World Bank's energy lending programme for the region categorised as Eastern and 
Central Asia (which includes the FSU) derives "... from the specific requirements to 
supply and use energy more efficiently and in an environmentally sustainable manner, 
and to mobilise private capital for sector development. " 89 In the process of adhering to 
this policy the World Bank applies a two-pronged approach. Firstly it assists the 
authorities in designing their reform programme, and secondly, it assists in the 
development of a focused programme in energy lending. 90 The former category consist 
of technical assistance projects similar the EU's TACIS programme and combined with 
the Energy Charter Treaty represent efforts by the international community to help 
establish the institutional building blocks on which investment is buttressed. Areas of 
89 Joerg-Uwe Richter, Energy Issues in Central and Eastern Europe: Considerations fc 
Bank Group and Other International Financial Institutions, Industry and Energy Department 
Paper, Energy Series Paper no. 50 (Washington, DC.: World Bank, Mar. 1992): p vi. 
90 The World Bank, Russian Federation Second Oil Rehabilitation Project, Staff Appraisal Report 
12943-RU, 13 Jun. 1994, p 5. 
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particular focus include: (a) prices and exports; (b) taxation; (c) legislation; 9' (d) 
enterprise restructuring; (e) oil transport; and (f) oil project tendering. 92 
The second category of World Bank funding involves direct credits to enterprises for the 
support of productive investments. Figure 5.3 graphically displays the level of World 
Bank oil & gas lending to E&CA as a whole, whereas Appendix D. 3 provides details of 
the individual projects. From an annual average of $56 million per year during the period 
of 1985-89, to none in 1990, credits to this region's petroleum sector have since expanded 
rapidly, reaching a peak of $856 million in 1994. This pattern is consistent with the 
opening up of the FSU and the international community's desire to support their reform 
process. However, it is a pattern which now looks to be tapering off, both in absolute 
terms and percentage wise, which is very similar the initial cycle of euphoria and then 
emerging realism/pessimism felt by foreign investors 93 In recent years the World Bank's 
global oil and gas lending programme has been dominated by its lending to the E&CA 
region. However within the whole EC&A portfolio, oil and gas lending commands a 
much less dominant position. This demonstrates that while the petroleum industry is an 
important economic sector within the EC&A region the World Bank supports a full 
spectrum of economic activities and the bulk of its resources are directed elsewhere. We 
suspect that in relation to the World Bank's total E&CA portfolio, oil and gas sector 
lending will remain below its peak of 23% attained in 1994. While the World Bank can 
be regarded as an important potential source of financing for the petroleum industries of 
the FSU its role should not be over-estimated. After all, the non-displacement of private 
investors and focus on a catalytic role remain at the fore of its petroleum lending policy. 
91 See William T. Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development, Policy 
Research Working Paper no. 1420 (Washington DC.: The World Bank, Feb. 1995). 
92 SAR 12943-RU, supra note 90, p 5. 
93 The actual dynamics of the attractiveness Russian oil and gas industry by foreign investors has 
been described by Konoplyanik as a classic sinusoid. Andrei A. Konoplyanik, "Foreign Investment Risk 
in Russia (the Pattern of Oil and Gas Industry), " in Foreign Investment in Russia: Salient Features and 
Trends, Ed. Alexander Z. Astapovich, (Moscow: Infornant Agency, 1995): pp 74 and 79. 
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Figure 5.3 World Bank Oil & Gas Lending to Europe & Central Asia (E&CA) 
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Within the limits of its oil and gas portfolio, the importance of the region is demonstrated 
by the fact that in 1993, lending to this region represented 72% of its total portfolio, 
although it dropped to 43% by 1995. For the period 1995-99, the World Bank expects to 
maintain approximately 50% of its oil and gas portfolio in this region, corresponding to 
$3.3 billion (or 660 million per year). 94 But the structure of the portfolio is fluid and 
expected to change over the next few years. 
5.2.1.3.1 Oil Rehabilitation Projects 
Hitherto, the focus of oil and gas lending in the FSU has been dominated by two very 
large rehabilitation projects: (a) First Oil Rehabilitation Project - the board approved a 
$610 million World Bank credit to three Russian Production Associations (Purneftegas, 
Kogalymneftegas and Varyeganneftegas) in fiscal year 1993, including an additional 
$174 million granted to Purneftegas cofinanced by the EBRD; and (b) Second Oil 
Rehabilitation Project - the board initially approved a $500 million World Bank credit 
to three other Russian Production Associations in fiscal year 1994, but in fiscal year 1995 
94 World Bank, "The World Bank's Role in Oil and Gas: Review and Recommendations, " Draft 5b, 
17 Feb. 1995, Annex 2, p 2. 
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this was re-approved as $600 million (see Appendix D. 3). The rationale for such projects 
according World Bank staff are their expected positive impact on oil production, the 
fiscal deficit and foreign exchange earnings, the favourable demonstration effect, and 
support of petroleum policy reforms conducive to private sector investment. 95 Though in 
practice, the real attraction of such projects likely lies in their estimated economic and 
financial rates of return - the forecast of the project economics for the original Second 
Oil Rehabilitation Loan shown in Table 5.2 is illustrative. 96 With economic rates of 
return of greater than 50%97 or a corresponding Benefit/Cost Ratio of approximately 2.4 
at a 15% discount rate the project appears very attractive from the host country 
perspective. From a financial analysis perspective the Internal Rate of Return of the 
project for each producer exceeds 40%. Given such rates, it is not surprising that World 
Bank support of such projects in Russia and Romania has been forthcoming, although 
prompting some commentators to claim that the World Bank has in effect "cherry 
picked" the best projects on offer. 98 However, these projects do have their risks, and in 
this respect four key issues have been identified: oil prices, both international and 
domestic, tax levels, access to the export market and well productivity. Staff at the World 
Bank conclude that "... the Project could not tolerate an increase in tax levels until such 
time as profitability is assured due to improvement in (commercial] conditions, such as 
higher oil prices. " 99 
95 SAR 12943-RU supra note 90, p Summary. 
96 The World Bank is to supply a total Currency Pool Loan of $500 million to the Russian Government 
for a total term of 17 years including a five year grace period at the World Bank's Variable Interest Rate 
(VIR). These funds would be on-lent to the Production Associations for a maximum term of 10 years 
including a two years grace period at VIR plus a premium of 75 basis points (i. e. + 0.75%). 
Megionneftegas is to receive $150 million, Tomskneft $160 million and Yuganskneftegas $190 million, in 
return for putting up $46 million, $65 million and $67 million respectively (i. e. a total of $178 million) of 
their own funds. Ibid., p 34. 
97 Calculated as 1+ (B/C Ratio - 1). 
98 CS First Boston, "Russian Oil Production Sector A Gusher in Russia? Part II: The Companies, " 2 
Mar. 1995, p 6. 
99 SAR 12943-RU supra note 90, p 47. 
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Table 5.2 Forecast Economic & Financial Return for 2nd Oil Rehabilitation Project 
This acknowledgement is implicit evidence that even the best intentioned efforts by 
MLAs can be thwarted by commercial uncertainty. In other words there is a limit to what 
the international financial institutions can achieve as far as mitigating investment risks 
facing oil and gas projects in the FSU. The assumptions on which attractive financial 
forecasts are produced may not, in the end, correspond to economic reality as it unfolds in 
the FSU. While disbursement data is difficult to obtain, a press reporting on the World 
Bank's disbursement record provides a much bleaker outlook for these projects than one 
obtains from reading the associated Staff Appraisal Reports. 
" As of May 1995, almost two years after the signing, it was reported that only $76 
million from the First Oil Rehabilitation Loan had been disbursed although another 
$144 million had been committed under signed procurement contracts. 100 
" Another report over a year later states that the initial First Oil Rehabilitation Loan had 
be revised downwards from $600 million to $385 million of which only $177 million 
had been used up by the three enterprises as of 20 July 1996.101 This represents a 
disbursement of less that 30% of the original loan value in a period of just under three 
years. 
" Furthermore the same reports state that as of 20 July 1996 only $64.1 million of the 
Second Oil Rehabilitation Loan had been disbursed (i. e. 13%). 102 
100 "Running from Rehab, " R. P. I.. May 1995, p 25. 
101 "Breaking the Barrier, " R. P. I., Aug. 1996, p 24. 
102 Ibid. 
' Megionneftegas (MNG), Tomskneft (TN) and Yuganskneftegas (YNG). 
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Contrast these reports with the World Bank staffs statement in June 1994 that 
"implementation [of the First Oil Rehabilitation Loan] has for the most part gone very 
smoothly. " 103 Clearly, there is a discrepancy of interpretation. In defence of the World 
Bank the problem of disbursement does not originate solely within itself (although 
unnecessary bureaucracy with the World Bank has be cited). Both loans enjoy the 
sovereign guarantee of the Russian Federation'04 and employ critical financial 
performance covenants. 105 Rather, the lack of disbursement lies with the unwillingness 
of the Production Associations to undertake hard-currency debt as they are expected to 
meet the debt-service requirements of the loans. But this is a side-effect not the cause 
and is curious given the absence of comparable domestic credit on equally favourable 
terms. In the case of the EBRD and World Bank Rehabilitation Loans the principal cause 
of slow disbursement lies with the Russian Government's tax policy with respect to VAT 
and customs duty on the importation of equipment. When the First Oil Rehabilitation 
Loan was conceived, taxation of the loans and goods purchased was not envisioned. 
However, when the Production Associations began making applications for procurement, 
it appeared that several taxes would be payable. This initially included a 20% VAT on 
the entire amount of the loan, an combined 23% VAT on the oil field equipment and an 
import tariff ranging from 5-15% depending on the type of equipment. 106 Although the 
first was clarified in May 1994 as a misunderstanding - the latter two still presented 
serious obstacles to borrowing. In June 1994, imported equipment "designated to 
103 SAR 12943-RU supra note 90, p 19. 
104 Ibid., p 21. 
105 Under the Second Oil Rehabilitation Loan, the beneficiary must maintain a minimum debt-service 
ratio of 1.5 (ratio of earnings before interest and depreciation less royalties, revenue and profit taxes to total 
short and long-term debt service obligations) and a current ratio of no less than 1.25 (i. e. current 
assets/current liabilities), including restrictions to dividend payments and maintenance of average accounts 
receivable at 60 days of sales and accounts payable at not greater that 75 days of cash expenses by fiscal 
year 1995. Ibid., p 48. 
106 " Idle Loans, " R. P. I.. Jun. 1994, pp 21-23. 
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increase production" was exempted from the 23% combined VAT, 107 only to be replaced 
by a VAT of 20% plus a special 1.5% tax in March of the following year. '°8 
Thus, no matter how well intentioned the World Bank efforts may be, or the need for 
equipment imports, the responsibility of repayment (notwithstanding the sovereign 
guarantee) rests with those domestic entities which are the end-users of such credits. But, 
they continue to operate in what remains an uncertain and punitive business climate. 
Russian Production Associations are burdened by an excessively high level of taxation 
(in the summer of 1995 being 60% of gross domestic sales)109 and a continuing non- 
payment crisis. In such circumstances, it is understandable why there is a reluctance to 
incur hard-currency loans. It is not that the producers do not have a need for investment 
capital, but it is unrealistic for these companies to take on such debt under the 
aforementioned circumstances. This is not just a problem which afflicts the World 
Bank's lending programme, most other sources of official credit are similarly affected. 
5.2.1.4 Summary of the World Bank 
The World Bank may provide credits to governments or public sector entities backed by a 
sovereign guarantee and has a clear mandate to support the petroleum sector of the FSU. 
While its petroleum lending guidelines were promulgated in 1984 under a very different 
set of economic and political conditions, its policy appears relatively robust and is 
suitable for the FSU. The World Bank can provide credits to support the development of 
existing oil fields or infrastructure projects. Support for pure exploration is now 
unfashionable (nor desirable). Accusations that the World Bank may displace private 
107 Decree No. 1199 of the President of the Russian Federation "On Certain Measures to Promote 
Investment Activity, Including Foreign Loans and Related Investment Activity, " dated 10 Jun. 1994. 
I July/Aug. 1994, pp 69-71. Reprinted in "Open for Business, " R. P... 
108 Law of the Russian Federation "On Repealing Benefits to Parties Engaged in Foreign Economic 
Activities, " dated 13 Mar. 1995. See supra note 100; and Yuri Dmitriyev, "Payment of VAT on Amounts 
of Loans (Credits) extended by Foreign Legal Entities, " R. O. G. L. J. Jan. /Feb. 1995, p 12. For more recent 
changes see Richard Lewis and Maureen O'Donoghue, "Comment Section: Amendments to Russian VAT 
Law, " O. G. L. T. R. 14 (1996): pp 352-356. 
109 Eugene M. Khartukov, "Russia's Oil Prices: Passage to the Market, " East-West Centre Working 
Papers, Energy and Minerals Series, No. 20, Sept. 1995, p 15. A more recent report shows tax burden on 
domestic sales to be 67.9% of gross revenues and 61.7% of export sales. R. P. L. Feb. 1996, p 72. 
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investors -a criticism levelled against it in the early 1980s - is not likely to be voiced 
today in the FSU, as the overall investment climate remains poor. 
During the period 1993-1995 the World Bank approved financing of $1.66 billion to the 
petroleum sector of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (See Appendix D. 3.1) - dominated 
by three rehabilitation loans, one to Romania, and two to Russia. Should all these 
projects go ahead as planned, the World Bank could claim a multiplier effect of 1.6 (or as 
a ratio, 0.6: 1), 110 although when one considers the effect of other sources of official 
finance (e. g. EBRD or other western governments), the combined multiplier effect is 
reduced to 1.3. 
Looking towards the future, the level of World Bank financing for petroleum 
developments in Eastern Europe and Central Asia appears promising as it intends to 
provide another $4.5 billion for 22 projects during the financial years 1994-1998, which 
represents 57% of its forecast global oil and gas sector lending portfolio. l ll This amount 
is to include the Uzen oil field rehabilitation project in Kazakhstan' 12 and a possible $500 
million credit to Yuganskneftegas to allow it to meet its first phase cash call of the 
proposed joint development of the Priobskoye oil field in Western Siberia with Amoco 
(see Appendix D. 3.2). However, any such optimistic forecasts must be realistically 
tempered by the World Bank's lending record to date. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
disbursements have been well below expectations. It becomes apparent that the very 
existence of western credit is not a solution in itself - rather the commercial 
environment must permit such credits to be used efficiently. This is still not the case, due 
to excessive taxes and the continuing non-payment crisis which burden domestic 
producers in Russia. Stated in another manner the absorptive capacity of the domestic 
110 That is for every $1 put up by the World Bank, another 600 is sourced elsewhere. 
III See supra note 17, p 5. 
1 12 The World Bank approved $109 million loan for the project estimated to cost $220 million. 
"World Bank Loan to boost Kazakhstan's Oil Production, " OMRI Daily Digest, No. 129, Part I, 3 July 
1996. 
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market for external credits is still limited, despite the obvious need for modernisation and 
the lack of investment. We conclude that the World Bank has not yet achieved its 
objective of injecting large scale western credits into Russia's ailing petroleum sector, 
despite having approved such programmes. The two features which tend to be glossed 
over (and forgotten about) after the favourable press announcements are: disbursements 
can and do fall short of commitments and secondly, the draw down period can be sprebd 
over a number of years. Both factors weigh heavily in our analysis of credit support for 
the FSU. 
5.2.2 International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
The International Finance Corporation, established in 1956, is the arm of the World Bank 
Group whose financing activities are dedicated solely to the private sector113 and is 
specifically prohibited from accepting host-government guarantees for its investments. ' 14 
It enjoys, as compared to the World Bank, the additional flexibility of being able to 
provide both debt and quasi-equity. Thus, although the IFC supports the objective of 
"further[ing] economic development by encouraging the growth of productive private 
enterprise... in less developed areas", 115 it is subject to the `discipline of the market'. In 
other words, the IFC does not provide concessional type financing. 1"6 Indeed, the first 
President of IFC, R. L. Garner, stated in the organisation's inaugural meeting that 
"... the IFC would have to earn returns commensurate with the risk 
undertaken, and would make its investments not on `easy' terms, but on 
terms approximating as closely as possible those which the market found 
attractive. " (emphasis added)117 
113 Art UI, § 1, "International Finance Corporation Articles of Agreement, " dated 25 May 1956, in 
force 20 Jul. 1956 reprinted in A. M. L. 51(1957): pp 486-501. 
114 Ibid., Art. I(i). 
115 Ibid., Art. I. 
116 Ibid., Art. III, §3(vi) states that "the Corporation shall undertake its financing on terms and 
conditions which its considers appropriate, taking into account the requirements of the enterprise, the risks 
being undertaken by the Corporation and the terms and conditions normally obtained by private investors 
for similar financing. " 
117 "International Finance Corporation, " International Organisation XI (1957): p 166. 
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Because of the IFC's alliance with the private sector, 118 both its experience in, and policy 
of lending to the oil and gas sector differs from that of the World Bank. These 
idiosyncrasies go some distance in explaining what has hitherto been the limited 
involvement in the FSU's oil and gas sector by the IFC - despite having explicitly 
recognised this sector as an area of importance: 
"In Russia, for example, the [World] Bank's objective for the oil and gas 
sector is to achieve levels of investment of between US $2 - US $3 billion 
per year over the next decade by creating a system that would attract 
international private capital in the form of commercial loans, export 
credits and equity participation by international oil companies. [The] IFC 
expects to play an important part in this process. " (emphasis added)' 19 
We argue that by adhering to the `discipline of the market', the IFC is effectively unable 
and unlikely to expand lending to the FSU's oil and gas sector to any great extent under 
the current economic and political climate. This is not necessarily an unwelcome 
outcome but rather a reflection of reality - the IFC appears to be stymied by the same 
uncertain economic and political climate which plagues foreign investors. From this 
perspective, the orthodox view that this organisation, like other MLAs, is successfully 
able to mitigate political risks is called into question. 
5.2.2.1 History of IFC support for Petroleum Operations 
As of the May 1996 the IFC participated in projects for the extraction of fuel minerals 
and oil refining with a combined cumulative total project cost of $13.4 billion, of which 
the IFC's own commitment was $1.8 billion. 120 While this represents an important 
component of the IFC's efforts, its role in the oil and gas sector must be understood in the 
context of its overall portfolio. In this regard the extraction of fuels minerals and oil 
refining is only 7% and 1% of the IFC's total financing respectively. The IFC like other 
MLAs support the full range of economic sectors and as such the oil and gas sector tends 
118 See Gary Bond and Laurence Carter, "Financing Energy Projects: Experience of the International 
Finance Corporation, " Enemy Policy. 23 (1995) pp 967-975; and Gary Bond and Laurence Carter, 
Financing Private Infrastructure Projects: Emerging Trends from IFC's Experience. IFC Discussion Paper 
No. 23 (Washington. DC.: IFC. 1994). 
119 IFC, "IFC Oil and Gas Policy Paper, " IFC/R92-221,21 Dec. 1992, Para. 72. 
120 "IFC Involvement By Sector/Industry, " IFC Home Page, IFC, 1996. [Accessed through the 
Internet: http: //www. ifc. org/data/sector/sector. htm. ] 
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to only receive a relatively small, but not insignificant portion of the total. As we shall 
see this general observation applies to equally to the IFC's approach in the FSU. Within 
the oil and gas sector, the IFC appears to focus on upstream projects (84% of their own 
commitment and 75% of total project costs) versus 16% and 25% respectively for oil 
refining. Their claimed impressive `catalytic role' (in this case 6.3: 1) is partially assured 
by its own internal guidelines which forbid the provision of anymore that 25% of the total 
project costs whether in the form of debt, equity or any combination thereof. 121 This 
condition ensures that the IFC will be able to claim a minimum catalytic role of 3: 1. 
Thus their claimed multiplier effect by itself is not a true measure of success in which to 
benchmark to IFC. Undoubtedly, it is `a' yardstick, but it does not by itself provide a 
complete picture. Two further qualifications are necessary. 
Firstly, the true measure of success for any MLA is whether their participation provides 
the ultimate project facilitating role. That is, without their involvement, the project would 
not have proceeded. It is a question of causality (does the involvement of the IFC bring 
the project to fruition? ) and is an attribute which officials from MLAs are quick to 
espouse. 122 However, the decision of the IFC to pull-out of the Nigerian Bonny Island 
LNG project123 after having earlier claimed "that the financing cannot be raised without 
the IFC" 124 suggests otherwise as the project is now going ahead without the IFC's 
involvement. The IFC's presence alone cannot convert a `bad' project into a `good' one 
and since the IFC does not use sovereign guarantees, its project selection must be 
121 The IFC may, however, provide up to 35% of the equity capital provided it is never the largest 
shareholder. IFC, "IFC Brief: Basic Facts About IFC, " Mar. 1994. 
122 Hugh Henry-May, "Financing Oil and Gas Field Development, " Paper presented to 
PP 
123 The IFC was to take a 2% equity stake in the $4.3 billion, to be built and operated by the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation, Royal Dutch/Shell, Elf Acquitaine and AGIP. The initial role of the IFC 
was to provide financial advice to the government and act as a neutral party in the negotiations. Following 
the execution of the Nigerian Human Rights Activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa in November 1995 and several other 
citizens, the IFC pulled out of the project. See Sola Adepetun and Kemi Segun, "Nigeria: The Liquefied 
Natural Gas Project, " O. G. L. T. R. 13 (1995): pp 436-439. "Nigeria Foaming, " Economist, 18 Nov. 1995, 
p 17; and "Nigeria $4.3 billion gas project hit by US ban, " Financial Times, 25 Apr. 1996, p 6. 
124 gC/R92_221 supra note 119, Para. 56. 
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strongly influenced by commercial criteria. Therefore, the IFC (justifiably so) will not 
involve itself in a commercially unsound venture. But, whether the IFC proves to be the 
ultimate facilitator is another matter, as opposed to being an alternative (and replaceable) 
source of quasi-commercial finance. The claim of `causality' is difficult to refute, but 
this does not mean that it should always be assumed to be the case. 
The second qualification for assessing the success of MLAs, revolves around the measure 
of their catalytic role. The IFC, like all MLAs, justifies their operations on the claim that 
for every one dollar of financing put forth by their organisation, X dollars were raised 
elsewhere. Financing investment projects in the FSU typically involves multisourcing 
with every organisation claiming a catalytic role. It is misleading to examine the catalytic 
role of each organisation and instead one should assess the combined effect of official 
sources of financing in mobilising private sources of financing. Consider the case of the 
Polar Lights N shown in Table 5.3 which is one of only two oil & gas projects involving 
the IFC in Russia. The project itself is estimated to cost $320 million of which $200 
million was raised by three official sources: OPIC, IFC and the EBRD. 
Each organisation can claim individually a multiplier ratio of 5.4: 1,4.3: 1 and 2.6: 1 
respectively. However when one examines the combined catalytic effect of all official 
sources of finance the ratio drops to 0.6: 1 (i. e. for every $1 raised by the MLAs only 
another 600 was raised by the private sector). From this perspective, the catalytic role of 
MLAs is not as impressive as individual claims suggest. For this reason the tabulation of 
projects receiving official sources of finance in Appendix D, includes both an estimate of 
the individual organisation's multiplier role and the combined financing multiplier role. 
Table 5.3 The Apparent vs. Real Catalytic Effect 
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Bearing these points in mind we shall review the IFC's guidelines on petroleum financing 
followed an analysis of the IFC's efforts in the FSU's petroleum industry. 
5.2.2.2 IFC Guidelines for Petroleum Financing 
The challenge for the IFC in the FSU is to locate projects which satisfy it oil and gas 
sector guidelines. As we shall see these guidelines are consistent with the overall aim of 
economic development, but the specific circumstances of the FSU may render the 
application of these principles necessarily prohibitive. We openly accept these 
constraints - the IFC is not a source of concessional aid - but it does highlight the 
difficulty in finding suitable FSU projects which can successfully seek IFC support. 
" §VII. Proposed IFC Guidelines to the Oil and Gas Sector 
74. In many countries, especially in Africa and in the Former Soviet 
Union, the oil and gas sector is seen as an important revenue source which 
plays a major role in GNP growth, and foreign exchange earnings. Since 
these are also the regions which often have the highest level of perceived 
country risk, IFC involvement in oil/gas development can support growth 
for the entire economy. The operational approach to IFC's activity in the 
vitally important sector can create the highest value added by focusing on 
projects where the IFC's ability to make a contribution is maximised. 
Accordingly, management proposes that the Corporation's activities in this 
sector be governed by the following guidelines: 
1. Exploration: IFC will not promote or make new investments in stand 
alone `wildcat' explorations. 
2. Development: The Corporation will continue its activities in oil field 
development financing, giving priority to circumstances of capital and 
country risk where 1FC's catalytic and resource mobilisation role will 
be maximised. 
3. IFC will support privatisation of a domestic oil and gas industry, 
particularly by assisting domestic private oil and gas companies to 
access capital markets and international lenders, as they address the 
financing needs of oil field development. 
4. Development projects conventionally include the costs of exploration 
to further increase the reserve base of the project. In appropriate cases, 
IFC will finance, as part of an overall development financing plan, 
exploration drilling provided the risks of any exploration failure are 
well covered by cash flow from production wells and success in the 
exploration venture is not required for the commercial viability of the 
enterprise and recovery of IFC's investment. 
5. Where appropriate, IFC will promote and finance services ancillary to 
oil development, such as field services and oil and gas pipelines, 
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placing priority on those country and capital risk circumstances where 
IFC's role is maximised. " 125 
The IFC, similar to the World Bank, is now reluctant to support wildcat exploration - 
neither organisation's previous efforts in this sphere have amounted to an established 
record of success. The consensus being that such activity involves high risks that are 
better executed by the private sector as neither organisation's staff offer a comparative 
advantage over the former. 126 This guideline in itself has little impact on activities in the 
FSU as 91% of all potential projects involving foreign investors focus on known deposits 
of petroleum. Of this amount, 34% of the projects envisage further exploration in 
surrounding areas. In the latter case the IFC guidelines do not specifically exclude 
financial support because the associated exploration is no longer true `wild-cat' 
exploration and as such geological risk (due to the proximity of known oil bearing strata) 
and financial risk (as cash-flow from production would be supporting additional 
exploration efforts) are substantially reduced. 127 But such a scenario may displace 
private investors who are interested in the FSU because of the low geological risk. 
Equally if a project is up and running with a positive cash-flow, it seems unlikely that the 
project's equity sponsors would be seeking support from the IFC. If there is a window of 
opportunity for the IFC to support associated exploration it may lie with those newly 
privatised domestic companies, who lack sufficient capital to maintain adequate 
exploration activities. Chapter 2 showed how the region's exploration efforts have 
dramatically declined. However, the underpinning of any exploration effort is the 
ultimate ability to sell one's production for a profit, but until the systemic risks of the 
petroleum sector are resolved even the presence of the IFC is not enough to guarantee 
success, nor from their point of view would such an allocation of funds necessarily be the 
most efficient. 
125 IFC/R92_221 supra note 119, Para. 74. 
126 Ibid., Para. 32-42; IFC, "Summary of Discussion at the Meeting of the Board of Directors of IFC, 
Jan. 15,1993: IFC Oil and Gas Policy Paper, " IFGSD93-1,4 Mar. 1993, Para. 22; World Bank (1995) 
supra note 94, Para. 5.2. 
127 IFCISD93-1 supra note 126, Para. 22. 
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This argument perpetuates itself into development activities as well. In principle the IFC 
will undertake development financing. but its decision to do so lies in the commercial 
viability of the venture and their ability to maximise the mobilisation of additional 
sources of finance. Once again, the systemic problems of the oil and gas sector are at the 
present time undermining many potential projects, and if this were not the case, we 
believe substantial private capital would otherwise be available. It becomes a circular 
argument. Businesses may look to the IFC to provide a source of capital when sufficient 
private capital is not available, but the presence of the organisation by itself has little or 
no effect on improving the economics of the sector as a whole, which begs the question 
should the organisation be involved in a potentially uncertain commercial venture. The 
answer is emphatically `No'. If and when the economics of the petroleum sector 
improve, the IFC may consider participating to the extent that it can mobilise reluctant 
sources of commercial debt. But, by the time the petroleum sector of the FSU is a viable 
and healthy industry, MLA funding should no longer be necessary. 
This raises the question of what kind of organisations are willing to operate in such 
volatile environments. We believe that the only private enterprises which are capable of 
withstanding the long-term uncertainty of the region are the so-called `Majors' (e. g. 
Amoco, BP, Mobil, Shell etc. ). They alone have the financial and technical resources 
capable of seeing them through the uncertain times ahead. But this is precisely the 
category of investors which the IFC is probably least willing to support. As several 
members of the IFC's board observed the... 
"... IFC should participate only when its involvement was critical to the 
success of a project; when the reserves were too modest for large oil 
companies.... but not for the domestic private sector or for smaller foreign 
independents; and when building up domestic technical capacity was a key 
consideration in ventures with major oil companies. ' (emphasis added)128 
But until smaller foreign independents or domestic private enterprises are able to 
demonstrate a commercially sound operating record in the FSU, there appears little 
128 ]bid., Para. 9. 
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rationale for supporting their associated investments. If and when the majority of 
problems which currently plague the oil and gas sector are resolved, then there is a real 
justification for allocating a portion of the IFC's limited resources to such projects. 
5.2.2.3 IFC support for Petroleum Operations in the FSU 
The IFC through its Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) has been particularly 
active by providing technical assistance and advice to the FSU. 129 But as a direct source 
of investment capital (either through debt, equity or syndication) the IFC's role has 
remained limited. Russia became a member of the IFC on 12 April 1993 and the IFC 
approved financing of $86.5 million, $31.4 million, and $256.5 million in 1993,1994 and 
1995 respectively. 130 Of these amounts the only funds directed to the oil and gas sector 
occurred in 1993, when the IFC committed $60 million to the Polar Lights N and $11.5 
million to the Vasyugan Services JV in Russia (see Appendix D. 4). 131 By the end of 
1995 no further IFC support for oil and gas projects had been secured. This is somewhat 
surprising since the IFC intended to "play an important part" in the World Bank's 
efforts132 and hoped "... that these [two joint ventures] will be the first of many 
opportunities [the] IFC will have to support this critical sector of the Russian 
economy" (emphasis added). 133 One year later, Robert Gale, the Head of IFC's Moscow 
Office, stated publicly that their experience has been positive as the financial and 
economic results from its involvement in the Polar Lights project were average and the 
results from its participation in the Tomskeneftegas-Fracmaster well workover project 
were "... as high as we've seen anywhere in the world. " 134 Why then, was the IFC's FSU 
129 During the years 1993,1994, and 1995 the IFC had an ongoing portfolio of Technical Assistance 
and Advisory Projects of 20,22, and 27 respectively - the majority of which were associated with Privatisation. IFC Annual Reports 1993.1994,1995. 
130 Ibid. 
131 "IFC Approves First Projects in Russia, " IFC Press Release No. 93/84,17 Jun. 1993. 
132 Supra note 4. 
133 Supra note 131, p 2. 
134 "Western investors still await Russian legislation protection, " E. E. E. Renort, May 1994, p 4. 
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oil and gas portfolio confined to these two projects? The postponement of a third project 
provides part of the answer. 
The 1FC did approve $57.5 million in financing ($40 million loan, $10 million quasi- 
equity, and $7.5 million syndication) for the Kazgermunai JV in Kazakhstan in 1994 to 
develop the Akshabulak oil field in central Kazakhstan which was estimated to cost $296 
million. 135 However, the deal was never concluded by the project's sponsors, which 
accounts for the decline in growth of the IFC's FSU portfolio in the year 1994. Had this 
deal gone through, the level of IFC's portfolio would have stood at $91.1 million rather 
than $33.6 million. Generally speaking, it is not uncommon to hear company executives 
speak of the difficulties when trying to raise requisite financing for investment projects in 
the FSU - invariably financing appears to be the crucial missing ingredient for many 
projects. The Annual Report of Veba Oel (one of the participants) provides insight into 
why the N turned down the `elusive' financing they had arranged: 
"The project to develop an oil field in the South Turgay region of Central 
Kazakhstan was brought to a close at the beginning of 1995 owing to its 
economic unfeasibility in what remains an uncertain political climate. " 
(emphasis added)136 
Their justification is sound, but what is interesting is that such a decision was taken in the 
presence of approved financial support by the IFC. We believe this example highlights 
the practical limitation of MLA support for FDI in the FSU. Multilateral funding per se 
is not (and cannot be) the panacea which investors seek, on the contrary, investors need 
the basic assurance of the ability to earn an adequate rate of return from their investment. 
If the political or economic circumstances are too unfavourable or uncertain, even the 
presence of MLA support cannot assure success. Project sponsors are expected to repay 
loans in a timely fashion, and in the case of the IFC, the cost of such funds is based on 
market rates without recourse to sovereign guarantees. VEBA Oel likely believed the 
uncertainty was too great that the project would not generate sufficient revenues to cover 
135 IFC Annual Report 1994, p 61. 
136 VEBA Annual Report 1994, p 57. 
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repayment and contribute an appropriate profit margin. This is quite plausible, as there is 
currently no westbound pipeline from the Southern Turgay Basin -- the only existing 
infrastructure runs south into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Any early oil production 
would have to be exported via a swap arrangement and because the IFC insisted that the 
project sponsors bear a significant part of the transportation risk137 VEBA Oel's caution 
does seem warranted. 
If the sole investment risk facing a foreign investor was that of expropriation, then the 
presence of a MLA may very well provide the requisite protection. However, in the case 
of the FSU, where the very economic foundation of a project may be unreliable due any 
number of factors (e. g. possible changes in the tax regime or general laws and 
regulations, rising export tariffs, restricted access to pipelines, etc. ), it is difficult to see 
how the IFC can provide that crucial assurance which permits projects to proceed, or 
whether the project sponsor would be willing to pay the premium attached to such credit. 
Clearly, VEBA Oel was unwilling to do so at the time. 138 Unfortunately successful 
upstream projects involving foreign investors in the FSU remain few and far between and 
attracting credit to future projects will remain problematic until the economic basis of the 
oil and gas projects improve. 
5.2.2.4 Summary of the IFC 
The IFC's involvement in the oil & gas sector in the FSU has remained quite small, 
despite a growing regional portfolio. In many ways the experience of the IFC parallels 
that of the World Bank (already shown) and of the EBRD and ECAs (to be shown). Each 
organisation, partially driven by the April 1993 G-7 pledge of $28.4 billion in financial 
137 "Kazakhstan: Oil project scaled down, " P. F. I., 2 Mar. 1995, p 32. 
138 In July 1996 a $65 million combined loan and equity financing package was finally signed 
between the IFC and the Kazgermunai N. R. P. I. Aug. 1996, p 38. As few details have been released., one 
can only speculate as to what circumstantial changes occurred which prompted signing, but a logical factor 
would be the increased oil export quota for Kazakhstan by Russia following the restructuring of the CPC in 
the spring of 1996. This would presumably permit the Kazgermunai N to enter into a swap arrangement 
with the Government of Kazakhstan. The Kazgermunai N would supply the local domestic market in 
exchange for oil exported on its behalf out of Western Kazakhstan through the Russian pipeline network. 
See discussion in Chapter 8. 
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support to Russia, 139 were of the opinion that the oil and gas sector was a receptive target 
for credits. We in the West had to be seen to be doing something - but what no western 
policy maker had foreseen is the extent to which this sector would remain problematic 
both to foreign and domestic investors given the uncertain nature of oil prices, taxes, and 
export rights etc. Of all MLAs the IFC has exhibited the most restraint of all. We believe 
that until the underlying conditions of this sector improve, IFC support for the oil and gas 
industry of the FSU is unlikely to expand. 
5.2.3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
The idea to create a European Bank was first publicly suggested by President Mitterrand 
of France in a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 25 October 1989, by 
asking and subsequently answering the following question: "What can Europe do? So 
much more! Why not set up a Bank for Europe.... " 140 Relatively speaking the EBRD, 
which became operational on 15 April 1991, is unique compared to the IFC and the 
World Bank in that its conception and associated policies do not predate the collapse of 
FSU. Article 1 of the Agreement Establishing the EBRD, outlines its novel mandate: 
"... to foster the transition towards open market-oriented economies and to 
promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in its member countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe [and the former Soviet Union] committed to 
and applying the principles of multiparty democracy, pluralism and market 
economics. " 41 
This political aspect of the EBRD's mandate makes this much younger organisation truly 
unique among the international financial institutions, 142 as its regional focus is combined 
with a project specific financing policy rather than being based on the financing of 
139 See Robert E. Ebel, Energy Choices in Russia, (Washington, DC.:, CSIS, 1994): pp 95-107; and 
P 
no. 332-338. Publication 2656. (Washington, 
140 EBRD Annual Report 1991, p 18. 
141 Art. 1, "Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, " dated 
29 May 1990 (hereinafter EBRD Agreement) I. L. M. 29 (1990): pp 1077- 1107. See also EBRD, "Basic 
Documents of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, " N. d. 
142 Andre Newburg, "The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, " in Energy & 
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balance of payments or on macro-economic reform packages. 143 One would therefore 
expect the EBRD to be the most active MLA in the region and this is indeed the case. 
But, before analysing its lending record, we shall first provide an overview of certain 
aspects of the EBRD's energy policy and the basic terms and conditions the EBRD 
applies to its financing activity. 
5.2.3.1 Energy Policy of the EBRD 
Any petroleum related lending activities fall within the ambit of the EBRD's Energy 
Operations Policy which is broadly defined as 
"... assist[ing] countries to reorient sector development away from a 
narrow focus of supply expansion to a broader `least-cost' focus, where 
the principal consideration is the efficiency which resources are 
used... [and]... ensure that resources applied to improving the environmental 
performance of the sector are allocated in the most rational way. " 144 
In order to implement this objective, the following operational guidelines are 
recommended: 
" "enhance the efficiency of existing energy supply operations; 
" promote improvements in countries' security of supplies; 
" promote regional interconnection for economic and security reasons; 
" give particular emphasis to projects which assist countries to increase 
energy exports, and which provide additional energy supplies for the 
world market; 
" stimulate the injection of foreign capital and the introduction of 
commercial management techniques; [and] 
" improve the environmental performance of fuel industries and energy 
utilities. " 145 
Since the energy situation in each transitional economy is unique vis-a-vis resource 
endowment, energy infrastructure, composition of primary energy consumption, etc., no 
one formula will satisfy all, therefore the EBRD's emphasis is adjusted accordingly on a 
country by country basis. In the case of energy import dependent countries, security 
143 John L. Taylor, "Role of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Reducing 
Certain Risks of Project Financing, " in Proceedings of IBA's 11th Advanced Seminar on Petroleum, 
Mineral. Energy and Resources Law, Barcelona, Spain. 24-29 Apr. 1994, p 41. Art. 13(ii) of the EBRD 
Agreement states that "... the operations of the Bank shall provide for the financing of specific projects, 
whether individual or in the context of specific investment programmes, and for technical assistance. " See 
also Gavin Anderson, "Project financing at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, " 
P. F. Yb. (1994/95): pp 15-19; and Charles Wrangham, "The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, " P. F. Yb. (1992/93): pp 15-18. 
144 EBRD, "Energy Operations Policy, " Mar. 1992, p 2. 
145 Ibid., p3. 
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supply and the budgetary impact of allocating scarce hard currency reserves to import 
energy are singled out as key areas of concern. If indigenous sources of petroleum can be 
developed in net energy importing countries, then EBRD support for upstream operations 
is permissible. '46 However, the bulk of their upstream activities will naturally coincide 
with the principal petroleum producing countries, namely the Russian Federation. 
At the time of establishing its Energy Policy, the EBRD expected its short-term efforts to 
focus on the "... repairing and rehabilitating of existing supply facilities... (and] ... private 
sector projects which promote liberalisation of supply and the injection of foreign 
capital. " 147 Moreover, the Bank was to concentrate its institutional and commercial 
aspects of operations on the "oil and gas sector where there is the most interest among 
private investors, and where efficiency gains can be secured comparatively quickly" las 
(emphasis added). Over the medium term, the EBRD intends to shift its focus to 
encouraging private sector participation in improving security of supply, including the 
modernisation and upgrading of supply facilities, and mitigating the environmental 
impacts of energy production and supply. 149 The promotion of regional infrastructure is 
singled out as a priority area within its medium term mandate, 150 thus it is probable that 
the EBRD will try to support, or at least consider very carefully, projects such as the 
Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline (infra §5.2.5). At a conference in 1995 a representative of 
the EBRD reaffirmed that: 
"[t]he Bank intends to play an important role in establishing the financing 
of the transportation system in the region [Central Asia & the Caspian 
Sea]. There are very critical issues to be resolved in the pipeline sector 
with huge investments in the years to come. " 151 
146 For instance, the EBRD provided an $8 million loan facility to JKX Oil and Gas plc to support its 
Poltava Project in Ukraine. Infra §5.2.3.3. 
147 Ibid., pp 3-4. 
148 Ibid., p 4. 
149 Ibid., p S. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Günther Vowinckel, "EBRD: Financing Oil and Gas Projects in the former Soviet Union, " Paper 
presented to the Adam Smith Institute's Third International Conference on Marketisation of the Former 
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Responsibility for all petroleum related projects resides within the Natural Resources 
Group whose likely mission statement can be inferred as being 
"... to develop a portfolio of sound investments in the oil and gas, mining 
and chemicals sectors of our countries of operations by focusing on private 
sector development with sponsors capable of providing risk capital, 
management skills and real transfer of technology. We are pursuing a 
portfolio diversification among country and commodity risks and 
instrument types and maturities. " 52 
One may conclude that the EBRD, with its regional focus on Eastern Europe and the 
FSU, has a clear and specific mandate to support petroleum operations. 
5.2.3.2 EBRD Terms and Conditions 
The most salient feature of the EBRD's financing policy is that it is able to support both 
public and private initiatives (as opposed to the World Bank and the IFC), although 
mandate stipulates that support for the public sector may not exceed 40% of its 
portfolio. 153 Initially, EBRD support for the state sector dominated its portfolio, but by 
the end of fiscal year 1995, the cumulative share of private sector projects had risen to 
62.2%, 154 thereby fulfilling its mandate. Given the EBRD's project-specific focus and 
desire to "promote private and entrepreneurial initiative" we expect this trend to 
continue, which should be welcomed by region's growing private petroleum sector. 
With regards to private sector project specific financing, the EBRD considers the 
minimum lending requirement by the Bank to be ECU 5 million (-- $6.4 million)'55 while 
the Natural Resources group considers that the minimum gross project investment from 
Soviet Union: Financing the Oil and Gas Sector, Vienna, 22-23 Feb. 1995. More recent discussions with 
Günther Vowinckel and Sergey Popov (both Acting Directors of the EBRD's Natural Resources Group) on 
23 Feb. 1996 and 15 May 1996 respectively at the University of Dundee, confirm the EBRD's continued 
interest in this field. 
152 EBRD, Natural Resources Group, "Quarterly Update: Oil & Gas, Mining and Chemicals (1st 
Quarter, 1994), " p 2. 
153 Art. 11, "EBRD Agreement, " supra note 141. 
154 EBRD Annual Report 1995, p 6. 
155 EBRD, "Financing with the EBRD, " Apr. 1994, p 4. 
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all capital providers is generally $75 million, although it can be smaller in certain 
circumstances. '56 The EBRD can supply up to 35% of the total project cost for a 
greenfield project or 35% of long-term capitalisation in case of an established company. 
But the maximum permissible debt to equity ratio of the overall project is 2: 1 thereby 
requiring a significant equity contribution from the project sponsors and/or other 
investors. 157 Funding by other cofinanciers is also typically required. 158 Generally 
speaking the EBRD applies the "1/3,1/3,1/3 Rule", whereby the EBRD, the project 
sponsor and third parties each contribute one third. '59 The EBRD has the added financial 
flexibility in that it can either provide loans, equity, guarantees or some combination 
thereof (see Figure 5.4). 160 
From its public/private mandate and mixture of financial instrument, to its innovative 
approach to its negative pledge policy, the EBRD appears theoretically best suited (of the 
MLAs) to facilitate the flow of investment capital from the West to the East. In the 
words of the eminent international lawyer Dr. Ibriham Shihata 
" [i]t win... be interesting to note the extent to which the new provisions in 
the EBRD Agreement may influence the practice of other MDBs or inspire 
calls for the amendment of their constituent instruments. " 161 
156 EBRD Natural Resources Group (1994) supra note 152. 
157 EBRD (Apr. 1994) supra note 155, p S. 
iss Ibid. 
159 G, ther Vowinckel speaking at CEPMLP's Friday Afternoon Lecture Series, 23 Feb. 1996. 
160 The EBRD does not however provide export credit guarantees nor undertake insurance activities, 
in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of services already on offer. Art. 12(4), "EBRD Agreement, " 
supra note 141. Loans can be made in any of the hard currencies ($US, DM, ECU, etc. ) and when made to 
a private commercial enterprise will not normally require host government guarantees and will be without 
recourse to foreign sponsors once the project has successfully passed its completion test. In this sense the 
EBRD is engaging in "project financing" as opposed to the "financing of projects" in that it is looking to 
the cash flows of the project for repayment - the latter category applies to unsecured loans made to a 
sovereign state for the financing of an infrastructure project. Loans for project financing will be set at a 
margin over London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) on either a variable or fixed rate basis with loan 
maturities of 5 to 10 years being the norm (up to IS years would be an exception) and grace periods being 
negotiable. Equity or quasi-equity may be undertaken by the EBRD where it expects to earn an 
appropriate return on its investment and has developed a clear exit strategy, in such circumstances their 
share shall be limited to a minority position. Because of the EBRD's limited resources it does not seek 
long-term investments nor take a controlling interest nor assume responsibility for management of such 
companies. Guarantees can be provided by the EBRD to assist clients in gaining access to financing, 
however, the maximum exposure must be known and measurable and the credit risk needs to acceptable. 
161 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Constituent Agreement, (London: Graham & Trotman, 1990): p 4. 
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Given its apparent advantages we now address whether the EBRD has been any more or 
less successful in supporting the petroleum sector of the FSU in comparison to the efforts 
of the World Bank and the IFC. 
Figure 5.4 Eligible Uses, Recipients & Instruments of EBRD Financing162 
ELIGIBLE USES 
PROJECTS OR PROGRAMMES FOR PROJECTS OR PROGRAMMES INFRASTRUCTURE 
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE 
MEMBER PUBLIC SECTOR OPERATIVE COMPETITIVELY PRIVATE SECTOR 
RECIPIENTS COUNTRY ENTITY OR IN TRANSITION TO ENTERPRISE 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 
EBRD's FINANCING INSTRUMENTS 
Yes, normally Yes, possibly with member Yes, without member EBRD Loans for its own account Yes with member 
country guarantee country guarantee country guarantee 
EBRD Loans for account of cofinanders Undecided Undecided Undecided 
Yes, without member 
('Lander of Record Syndication") country guarantee 
Yes, but conditions Yes, but conditions Yes, but conditions to be Yes, but conditions to Participation of Loans of Others to be decided to be decided decided be decided 
Investments in Equity Capital No No Yes Yes 
Investments in Equity Issues No No Yes Yes 
Guarantees and other forms of credit support No No Yes, possibly with member Yes 
including underwriting of debt Issues country counter-guarantee 
Yes, but only from Yes, but only from Yes, but only from 
Technical Assistance - Grants Cooperation or Cooperation or Cooperation or Special Funds 
No 
Special Funds Special Funds 
Yes, normally Yes, possibly with member Yes, without member 
Technical Assistance - Loans Yes with member country guarantee country guarantee country guarante 
162 Reproduced from Taylor (1994) supra note 143, p 64. 
158 
5. Z. 3.3 EBRD support for Petroleum Operations in the FSU 
In early 1994, the EBRD's Natural Resources Group reasoned that they faced two key 
challenges: firstly, to demonstrate to policy makers of the transitional economies the 
value of and need for foreign investment; and secondly, to demonstrate to western 
investors the EBRD's real ability to arrange financing and to share risk in this area. )63 
The attainment of either goal would be predicated by the emergence of a growing 
portfolio of successful projects. The EBRD's petroleum related activity commenced in 
1991 with the approval of a $12.5 million loan to the Parker Drilling Company of the US 
for the purpose of building three drilling rigs to be used under contract to the White 
Nights JV. 1M Subsequently, the annual level of approved projects rapidly rose to a peak 
of $404 million by the year 1993 (see Figure 5.5). 
Whereas as the EBRD's overall portfolio of approved projects increased by a factor of 5 
during the period 1991 to 1993; the value of oil and gas approved projects increased by a 
factor of 34 over the same period. During this early period the EBRD adopted a 
philosophy consistent with most policy makers and investors by rationalising that the oil 
and gas sector would be an easy target for western credits. The reasoning appeared 
sound: a massive reserve base, an obvious need for modernisation and a product which 
could be readily sold on the world market for hard currency (i. e. the same logic applied in 
the foundation of the European Energy Charter). However, few fully appreciated the 
depth of the oil industry's predicament, nor more importantly, foresaw the length of time 
it would take to install a rational and workable regime for foreign investors. 
163 EBRD Natural Resources Group (1994) supra note 152, p 1. 
164 EBRD Annual Report 1991, p 109. 
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Figure 5.5 EBRD Oil & Gas Financin 165 
Year 1991 1992 1993 9994 1995 
Exchange Rate ($/ECU) 1.3409 1.2109 1.1157 1.2264 1.2826 
Total EBRD Portfolio 
No. of Approved Projects in E&CA 16 54 91 109 134 
Value of Approved Projects (ECU MM) 427 1,226 2,276 2,409 2,855 
Value of Approved Pro ects ($US MM) $573 $1,485 $2 539 $2,954 $3,662 
E&CA OII&Gas Sector 
No. of OiI&Gas Sector Projects in E&CA 1 4 4 4 3 
Value of OiI&Gas Sector Projects (ECU MM) 9 83 362 128 50 
Value of Oil&Gas Sector Pro ects $US MM $12 $100 $404 $157 $65 
FSU Oli&Gas Sector 
No. of Oil&Gas Sector Projects in FSU 1 3 4 1 2 
Value of OiI&Gas Sector Projects (ECU MM) 9 60 362 10 42 
Value of Oil&Gas Sector Projects ($US MM) $12 $73 $404 $12 $54 
Upstream 
Value of Upstream O&G Projects (ECU MM) 9 60 362 0 42 
Value of Upstream O&G Pro acts ($US MM) $12 $73 $404 $0 $54 
Percentages 
% No. of O&G Projects to E&CA Portfolio 6.25% 7.41% 4.40% 3.67% 2.24% 
% Value of O&G Projects to E&CA Portfolio 2.17% 6.77% 15.92% 5.31% 1.76% 
% No. of FSU to E&CA O&G Portfolio 100.00% 75.00% 100.00% 25.00% 66.67% 
% Value of FSU to E&CA O&G Portfolio 100.00% 72.63% 100.00% 7.66% 83.70% 
, 
1% 
_Value 
of Upstream in O&G Portfolio 96.98% 72.63% 100.00% 0.00% 83.70% 
EBRD Oil & Gas Portfo lio 
E&CA Oil&Gas Sector 1 -4-% O&G to Total E&CA Portfolio 
--0-% FSU to E&CA O&G Portfolio --A -% Upstream 
($US MM) 
$450 100.00% 
40 
$400 90.00% 
o 
$350 80.00% 
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70.00% 
0 60.00% a $250 F0 50.00% ,,. C7 $200 
to 157 40.00% 
$150 
0 100 30.00% 
$100 65 20.00% 
$50 
12 10.00% 
$0 0.00% 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Years 
165 EBRD Annual Reports 1991,1992.1993,1994 and 1995; EBRD, Natural Resources Group, 
"Progress Update for Oil and Gas Mining and Chemical Projects, " Oct, 1995; and EBRD, Natural 
Resources Group, "Quarterly Update: Oil & Gas, Mining and Chemicals (1st Quarter, 1994), " Mar. 1994. 
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The practical result of this miscalculation is that the "Boom" everyone expected has 
never materialised and this is reflected in the EBRD's portfolio of approved projects. 
After peaking in 1993, EBRD approved oil & gas financing fell to $157 million in 1994 
and $65 million in 1995, thus resulting in a clearly identified bell-shaped pattern of 
approved projects. The left hand side of the bell (1991-1993) represents the time period 
during which optimism towards the FSU's oil and gas sector prevailed, although it is 
likely that even by 1993 some of the projects being approved were carried through by 
their own momentum. Whereas the right hand side of the bell (1993-1995) represents the 
time period during which a much more sombre assessment of the oil and gas sector 
emerged. Its not that region's geological potential had somehow dramatically worsened, 
only that investors have begun to understand the difficulties (i. e. risks) associated with 
political and economic environment in which the industry is embroiled. 
As to the composition of the EBRD's portfolio of approved projects, the data in Figure 
5.5, show that apart from the year 1994, upstream investments have accounted for greater 
than 70% of the approved projects. A natural consequence of this strategy is that the 
geographical location of the EBRD's oil and gas portfolio of approved projects resides 
overwhelmingly in the FSU (i. e. where the reserves are located), namely the Russian 
Federation, as opposed to Eastern Europe. The anomaly year appears to be 1994 which 
was largely influenced by a combined loan and equity financing of $89 million for 
Slovnaft a. s. in support of its privatisation programme and modernisation of its retail 
petrol service station network. A full summary of all confirmed and unconfirmed EBRD 
financed oil and gas projects is found in Appendix D. 5. 
The preceding analysis requires some qualification as it is based entirely on the level of 
approved projects (i. e. those which are identified as such in the EBRD's annual reports), 
However, this is only the first stage of the loan process which if carried through to a 
successful conclusion, would be followed by signing and the satisfaction condition 
precedents before actual disbursement can begin. Therefore, even if the EBRD approves 
161 
financial support for a given project, there is no assurance that the loan will actually 
materialise. The difficulty we face then as an external analyst is that EBRD project 
specific disbursement data is confidential. So our analysis based on approved projects 
requires refinement, but due to the aforementioned data constraints we are unable to 
exactly quantify this refinement, although an approximation is feasible. According to the 
EBRD's 1995 Annual Report, the cumulative level of disbursement as of the end of 1995 
stood at 26% of cumulative level of approved financing. 166 What we cannot know is how 
the oil and gas sector projects have faired in relation to this figure as they are just a 
component of the EBRD's overall portfolio. But assuming that the principle of 
proportionality holds, we deem it likely that of the cumulative level of approved EBRD 
oil and gas financing activity, $738 million, only $193 million has been disbursed to date. 
The following press reports provide anecdotal evidence supporting the claim of 
disbursement difficulties. 
For instance the Chernogorskoye JV was to receive a $40 million loan from the EBRD as 
part of an approved project financing package negotiated with OPIC on 15 December 
1992. But in June 1994 it was reported that the EBRD, having disbursed $11.5 million 
for the completion of the first phase, was at the time unwilling to release the remaining 
$28.5 million. 167 The reason given was that as the limited recourse nature of the loan 
came into effect on 1 June 1994, (i. e. conversion took place), meaning that project 
sponsor guarantees dropped away leaving both OPIC and EBRD fully exposed in the case 
of default. Both the EBRD and OPIC were unwilling to continue disbursements until a 
reasonable tax structure was put in place which would allow the project to earn revenues 
sufficient to repay debt (i. e. a condition precedent built into the loan agreement). 
Similarly, Purneftegas, a subsidiary of Rosneft, has apparently refused $80 million of the 
166 EBRD Annual Report 1995, p 2. 
167 "Time out in Chernogorsk, " R. P. I.. Jun. 1994, pp 59-60. See also "It's tentative, it's tiny, but its 
real lending to Russia, " P. I. W.. 25 Apr. 1994, p 3. 
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original $174 million credit offered by the EBRD. 168 It appears that while institutions 
such as the EBRD may be able to mitigate the more traditional political risks, there is no 
assurance that they will be able to circumvent the hazards of an uncertain commercial 
environment. Another example involving the EBRD is their $8 million loan to JKX Oil 
& Gas to support its Poltava production project in Ukraine. Approved and committed in 
April 1995, first disbursement did not occur until one year later, likely due to 
"... difficulties in concluding transportation and substitution 
arrangements... [which]... delayed commercial gas production until 1 October 1995. "169 
Achieving commercial production for a stated period of time is a normal condition 
precedent of any completion test used in project financing. 
Therefore while the EBRD approved oil & gas financing of approximately $740 million 
from its own account, their disbursement record has most certainly fallen well short of 
that mark. The practical consequence of this assessment is that it compromises their 
claimed catalytic role. Although estimated cumulative project costs of $2.4 billion (see 
Appendix D. 5.1) permit the EBRD to claim a multiplier effect of 3.2 (or 2.2: 1), this 
appears overly optimistic given their disbursement record. The perception of the EBRD's 
multiplier effect is further diluted when one considers that frequently, other providers of 
external credit are themselves MLAs or other official sources of credit such as ECAs or 
OPIC. Similar to the analysis provided for the IFC, we observe the total multiplier effect 
of official sources from the perspective of projects involving the EBRD is only 2.2 (or 
1.2: 1) assuming all approved projects go ahead. Unless, the underlying legal, fiscal, and 
political environment in which the oil and gas industry is situated improves, the EBRD 
like other MLAs will continue to experience disbursement difficulties so long as they 
choose to operate according to "sound banking principles" 170 as they must. These 
168 "Oilmen turn down foreign loans, " OMRI Daily Digest, No. 149, Part I, 2 Aug. 1996. 
169 JKX Oil & Gas 121c Reports and Accounts 1995, p 7. 
170 Art, 13(i), "EBRD Agreement, " supra note 141. 
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findings are consistent with our previous examination of the `self-financing' strategy as a 
means of risk management outlined in Chapter 4. 
5.2.3.4 Summary of the EBRD 
The EBRD, as the youngest and most flexible MLA, has proven itself to be the most 
active international financial institution in the oil and gas sector of the FSU. It has a 
comprehensive mandate through which to support the petroleum sector. Of the 16 oil and 
gas projects which have received board approval - 12 occur in the FSU and are 
predominantly in the upstream sector. 
We began the previous section by stipulating the two objectives that the Natural 
Resources Group of the EBRD had set for themselves: namely to demonstrate the need 
for and value of foreign investment; and the Bank's ability to arrange financing and share 
risk. As the EBRD has demonstrated its ability to arrange and/or participate in western 
based financing packages for 16 approved projects the attainment of the both goals seem 
realisable. However, the success of many projects is still far from certain, '7' as the 
EBRD's disbursement record, similar to all MLAs, is below expectations. If the EBRD is 
to operate according to sound banking principles it is not unrealistic to expect the EBRD 
to act otherwise in light of the current economic and political climate. This questions the 
theory that MLAs successfully perform the essential and often missing risk-mitigating 
function due to their supra-national status. With respect to the traditional political risks 
of expropriation or nationalisation, the theory appears robust, but when it comes to 
operating within the volatile legal, fiscal and political climate of the FSU, we believe the 
theory is dubious. 
To what extent the EBRD will expand its FSU petroleum operations in the future is not 
known. At the aggregate lending level there is the issue of the EBRD's authorised capital 
171 As of Aug. 1995 the only two oil and gas credits to be fully disbursed were the $90 million loan to 
the Polar Lights N and a $9 million loan to the Vasyugan Services JV. See EBRD, Natural Resources 
Group, "Progress Update for Oil and Gas Mining and Chemical Projects, " Oct. 1995. 
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base which was initially set at ECU 10 billion. 172 By the end of fiscal year 1995 the 
EBRD had approved 368 projects (across all economic sectors) with Bank financing of 
ECU 7,853 million. But as the EBRD is mandated to a gearing ratio of one to one (i. e. 
the combined value of its loans, equity investments and guarantees are not to exceed its 
unimpaired capital, reserves and surpluses included in its ordinary capital resources)173 its 
capital base was expected to be exhausted by the end of 1997,174 thereby constraining any 
further lending to the level and timing of repayments from previous loans. Fortunately, 
the EBRD's proposal to double its capital base to ECU 20 billion was unanimously 
adopted by its shareholders at its annual general meeting on 15 April 1996.15 Thus the 
Bank appears to have adequate resources to expand the financing of petroleum related 
activities until the year 2010. However, one cannot say unequivocally that the petroleum 
sector is the most efficient target for its limited resources (experience to date, suggests 
otherwise). Referring again to Figure 5.5, the right-hand tail end of the bell-shaped 
pattern of the EBRD's approved petroleum financing is unlikely to change until the 
systemic risks which have frustrated many of the efforts of foreign investors in this sector 
are resolved. If this occurs, it is likely that no-more than 10% (i. e. one billion ECU) of its 
additional capital base may be used to support the oil and gas sector. After all, in the 
peak year of 1993, oil and gas sector projects accounted for a maximum of 16% of the 
entire portfolio of approved projects for that year, but the average over the five year 
period is only 6%. The EBRD will continue to seek to "maintain reasonable 
diversification" 176 across industrial sectors and its `first love' with the oil and gas sector 
is unlikely to be repeated. Further funds may well become available as previous loans are 
172 Art. 4(1), ibid. 
173 Art. 12(1), ibid. 
174 Kevin Done, "Bank cast off its profligate image, " Financial Times, 7 Mar. 1996, p 2. 
175 "The EBRD's nuclear reaction, " The Economist, 20-26 Apr. 1996, p 84. However, the structure 
of the new capital is to be different than from before: 22.5% will be paid in shares payable over eight years 
in equal payments of which 40% is in cash and 60% is in promissory notes; and 77.5% will be in `callable 
shares'. See also Kevin Done, " West fords a formula to boost EBRD, " Financial Times, 18 Mar. 1996, p 
3; and "EBRD to have its capital doubled, " Financial Times, 7 Mar. 1996, p 2. 
176 Art. 13(v), "EBRD Agreement, " supra note 141. 
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repaid, but with typical maturities of 5-10 years hence, this is unlikely to be a significant 
source of funds for the oil and gas sector over the near to medium-term future. 
5.2.4 Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
In contrast to the World Bank, IFC and EBRD, OPIC is not truly multilateral in the sense 
that it is a self-sustaining US Government agency, but it falls within our general category 
of official sources of financing. It is more bilateral in character and nationally oriented 
(with respect to clients) but has a very strong international remit (including that of the 
FSU/NIS) - its closest relational equivalent is probably Keditanstalft für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) of Germany. As OPIC's basic mission is to: 
"finance and insure projects that have a positive effect on the U. S. 
economy, are financially sound, and promise significant benefits to the 
social and economic development of developing countries and newly 
emerging democracies, " 177 
it warrants attention in this thesis. Its assistance may take the form of either project 
finance, political risk insurance, or facilitating equity capital for investments in emerging 
markets by guaranteeing long-term loans to private investment funds. 178 
With regards to the first category, investment finance, OPIC may provide medium (5 
years) and long-term financing (up to 15 years) for overseas investment projects through 
direct loans and loan guarantees. OPIC does not rely on sovereign guarantees and 
therefore financing is arranged on a project finance basis, but will not be available for 
projects which can secure adequate funding from commercial sources. It is not required 
that the foreign enterprise be wholly owned or controlled by US investors, but, as a rule 
51% of the voting shares of the company must be in private hands. The US investor must 
assume a meaningful share of the risk which means a minimum equity purchase of 25%. 
The project is expected to maintain a debt equity ratio of 60/40 for which OPIC will 
177 Jim Williams, "OPIC Programs for the Oil and Gas Industry, " Paper presented to AIPN Annual 
Meeting. San Antonio. 12 Apr. 1996. 
178 OPIC 1995 Annual Report, pp 6-7; see also Harvey Hirnberg, "The view from the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC): Support to power projects in Asia, " Energy Policy. 23 (1995): pp 
977-980; OPIC, "Programme Handbook, " Apr. 1994; and "The Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, " P. F. Yb. (1992/93): pp 92-94. 
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provide up to 50% of the cost in the case of a new project and 75% of the cost in the case 
of an expansion project. Financing is not open to projects majority owned and controlled 
by foreign governments. OPIC's all risk loan guarantees which are only issued to US 
lending institutions are normally in the range of $2 - $25 million, although they may be 
as high as $200 million in exceptional circumstances. Direct loans being much smaller 
(i. e. from $0.5 - $6 million) are reserved especially for small to medium sized companies. 
In summary, the largest greenfield upstream development project that OPIC could 
potentially finance in the FSU is a $400 million dollar project (see Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6 Maximum Greenfield OPIC Funded Project 
OPIC Loan 
Guarantee 
Other Bank 
Debt 
3rd Party Equity 
(Min. $42 Private) 
US Investor 
Min. Equity -j 
OPIC has been moderately active in the FSU's oil and gas industry having provided 
either finance or insurance eleven times during fiscal years 1992 to 1995. However, as 
insurance and finance are sometimes provided to the same project but at different times, 
the actual number of projects supported by OPIC is only seven. Full listings of their 
confirmed and unconfirmed petroleum projects in the FSU are found in Appendix D. 8.1 
and D. 8.2 respectively. Figure 5.7 details a comprehensive listing of comparative ratios 
to assess the number the annual level of OPIC support in the FSU. 
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Figure 5.7 OPIC Support for Oil & Gas Operations in E&CA 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total 
World OPIC Financing 
No. of Client Projects 17 15 30 27 89 
Value of Committed Financing ($US MM) $275 $415 $1,703 $1,800 $4,193 
Worid OPIC Insurance 
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Value of PRI Issued ($US MM) $3,400 $2,800 $6,000 $8,600 $20,800 
World OPIC OiI&Gas Financing 
No. of Client Projects 0 3 4 1 8 
Value of Committed Financing ($US MM) $0 $69 $140 $10 $219 
World OPIC Oil&Gas Insurance 
No. of Client Projects 9 10 10 4 33 
Value of PRI Issued ($US MM) $283 $340 $560 $249 $1,431 
E&CA Oil&Gas Financing 
No. of OiI&Gas Sector Projects in E&CA 0 2 2 0 4 
Value of Committed Financing ($US MM) $0 $60 $75 $0 $135 
E&CA Oil&Gas Insurance 
No. of Client Projects 1 2 3 1 7 
Value of PRI Issued ($US MM) $7 $20 $223 $2 $252 
Percentages 
% Value O&G Finance to World Total 0.00% 16.67% 8.22% 0.53% 5.22% 
Value E&CA O&G Financing to World Total 0.00% 14.46% 4.40% 0.00% 3.22% 
Value E&CA O&G Financing to O&G Total N/A 86.71% 53.57% 0.00% 61.73% 
No. O&G Insurance to World Total 8.57% 15.15% 12.05% 4.60% 9.68% 
No. E&CA O&G Insurance to World Total 0.95% 3.03% 3.61% 1.15% 2.05% 
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The first feature to note is that over the past four years both OPIC's financing portfolio 
and insurance business have grown dramatically (the former increased world-wide by a 
factor of 6.5, whereas the latter has increased by a factor of 2.5). These changes reflect 
authorised increases in OPIC's statutory limits as amended in §235 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, and specific NIS Assistance Packages. 179Its world-wide oil and 
gas activities over the past four years have only averaged 3% and 2% of its total financing 
and insurance business respectively. ' 80 The importance of the E&CA region during the 
period 1992-1995 is demonstrated by the fact that OPIC financing and insurance has 
averaged 62% and 21 % of OPIC's world-wide oil and gas financing and insurance 
activities respectively. However, the shape of Figure 5.7, suggests that OPIC too may 
have grown weary of it's initial romance with the oil and gas sector in the FSU. This 
judgement may be tempered somewhat, as OPIC is to provide long-term loan guarantees 
in support of a number of regional investment funds which themselves could become 
another avenue for investment capital into the oil and gas sector of the FSU. 181 The 
Russia Partners Company L. P. and NIS Major Project Fund L. P. (see Appendix D. 8.1) 
are two pertinent examples. In fact the latter, approved in 1995 a loan of $13.5 million to 
the UNOC JV between Caterpillar, National Oil Well and Uralmash to assist in the 
production of oil well equipment. 
As approval is only the first stage in the life of a loan we must also look beyond the level 
of approved financial support and examine OPIC's actual disbursement record. But once 
179 As of 30 Sept. 1995 OPIC's authorised amount of political risk insurance was increased to $13.5 
billion from its previous level of $9 billion, of which only $2.5 billion of the new limit remained unused. 
While OPIC's statutory authorisation for loan guarantees was increased from $2.5 billion to $9.5 billion in 
1995, these statutory ceilings to do not apply to new commitments to the NIS in accordance with 
legislation which created the NIS Assistance Package. OPIC's committed loan guarantees from the NIS 
Assistance Package stood at $524 million and $700 million on 30 Sept. 1995 and 1994 respectively. OPIC 
Annual Report 1995, pp 34-35. 
180 Because OPIC's Annual Report does not provide a comprehensive listing of insurance policies only 
the single largest amount is reported, calculated insurance percentages are, except for the very last, based 
on the number of projects rather the value of insurance cover. Thus, the bottom most calculation in Figure 
5.7 is really the ratio of the sum of largest single coverage amounts in the oil and gas sector of E&CA 
region to the sum of the largest single amounts of coverage in OPIC's world-wide oil and gas operations. 
181 When fully capitalised, OPIC's family of private investment funds could support $2.4 billion of 
investment world-wide across all industrial sectors. OPIC Annual Report 1995, p 7. 
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again we are hindered because OPIC similar to the other MLAs does not release project 
specific disbursement data. Thus, we are limited to anecdotal press reports and any 
coverage provided in Annual Reports. According to our research the only official 
reference to OPIC's disbursement record is found in the Notes to Financial Statements in 
their 1994 Annual Report which stated that of the $700 million in loan guarantees 
committed by OPIC as a result of the NIS Assistance Package, the entire amount 
remained undisbursed as of 30 September 1994.182 Unfortunately, the 1995 Annual 
Report does not contain a similar reference, but does mention that the committed amount 
had been reduced to $524 million one year later. 183 But we also know that from press 
reports regarding the Chernogorskoye JV (see main text in §5.2.3.3, at note 167 above), 
that both the EBRD and OPIC were holding back further disbursements until a reasonable 
tax structure was in place to permit the JV to make a profit or at least break even. 
Certainly, none of this evidence is conclusive, but it does suggest that OPIC's efforts 
have been frustratingly below expectation in line with the experience of MLAs. Overall, 
OPIC's foray into the petroleum sector of the FSU remains modest, if not conservative. 
5.2.5 MLA Summary 
We have reviewed the activities and policies of the World Bank, IFC, EBRD and OPIC. 
Each has a clear mandate to support petroleum operations in the FSU, and all have 
pursued this goal with enthusiasm. While the IFC and World Bank have in the past 
supported pure exploration, credit support for such activities is now unfashionable and 
given the high level of private sector interest in the FSU probably not necessary. Overall 
the lending record of the MLAs and OPIC has been much lower than expected, and their 
initial enthusiasm for the oil and gas sector appears to be waning. The combined level of 
approved credits from all four institutions for the FSU (excluding now Eastern Europe) is 
found in Figure 5.8. The aggregate shape is more skewed that than of that of the EBRD's 
bell-shaped profile - indicating an overall rapid build-up but slower decline of approved 
182 OPIC Annual Report 1994, p 35. 
183 OPIC Annual Report 1995, p 35. 
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credits. However, evidence suggests that even this modest combined total of $2.2 billion 
has been hampered by a slow disbursement - our best estimate is that no more than a 
quarter to a third of these funds has been disbursed to date (i. e. $550 - 730 million). 
Moreover, the aggregate catalytic effect of official financing appears lower than is 
suggested by each organisation's individual claims. Some observers suggest that the role 
of the MLAs is vital in assisting IOCs pursue investment in the petroleum sector of the 
FSU and their importance is increasing. 184 Our research on the other hand indicates that 
their role has remained quite modest. 
Figure 5.8 MLA Oil & Gas Credits to the FSU 
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Note 1: As the World Bank's Second Oil Rehabilitation Loan was rtrst approvea in 1994 Tor 1)Duu minion, 
and then increased to $600 million in 1995, we have allocated $500 million to 1994, and $100 million to 
1995 for the purposes of this graph. 
We believe that as MLAs become increasingly bound by quasi-commercial (the IFC and 
the EBRD showing the strongest tendencies), the less capable they are of disbursing 
184 PFC&PW (1995) infra note 230, p 27. 
171 
credits in politically uncertain environments. That is MLAs find their disbursement 
process falling hostage to the same risks that are impeding FDI. This is not necessarily a 
bad thing, but their role is shifting to that of a quasi-commercial bank which enjoys an 
added layer of traditional political risk protection due to their multilateral status and 
political clout. If IOCs were faced by the sole risk of expropriation or nationalisation 
then the benefit gained by MLA support would likely be very warranted. But by 
choosing more stringent commercial criteria, their `causality' role now seems less certain. 
If the commercial conditions satisfy the rigorous scrutiny of the IFC or the EBRD, then 
they are probably going to satisfy a commercial bank. Albeit, a commercial bank will be 
seeking to enjoy the theoretical protection of the IFC or EBRD umbrella by lending under 
its A/B Loan Structure. The justification for doing so, is that apparently very few World 
Bank or IFC loans have not been repaid (the implicit assumption being the same will 
occur for the EBRD). While the IFC or EBRD lends at its own risk under the A-Loan, it 
sells down participation in the B-Loan to commercial banks at the latter's own risk with 
the IFC or EBRD remaining the overall lender of record. Therefore a default on the 
commercial bank's portion of the B-Loan would trigger the cross-default provisions of 
the A-Loan. Nevertheless, if commercial criteria drive the decision to participate, the 
absence of a commercially friendly environment has become a serious obstacle to 
lending. The limited nature of funding from these institutions is further highlighted by 
the fact that of 400 natural resource projects screened by the EBRD, 90% were 
declined. 185 Obviously the high level of applications indicates that there is a need for 
MLA credits, but it is also a mistake to believe that the involvement of these 
organisations somehow means easy money. In practice the officials of the EBRD and 
IFC can strike just as hard a bargain as any commercial bank. 186 But, for the companies 
which choose to seek MLA support and are successful in obtaining it, a MLA's project 
seal approval, can provide a sense of comfort to the more cautious board members of 
185 EBRD Natural Resources Group (1994) supra note 152, p 2. 
186 Vinter (1995) supra note 87, p 105. 
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such companies. In other words, the MLAs are themselves recognised as providing a 
specialised function in terms of political risk assessment. 
One area where the MLA involvement may prove beneficial is infrastructure projects. 
IOCs are interested in export oriented projects and unfortunately "transportation 
uncertainty" remains a serious obstacle to foreign investment especially in Central Asia 
(see Chapter 8). However, the majority of future pipelines schemes which are currently 
under consideration will require the participation of strong project sponsors, namely the 
`Major' IOCs. If any MLA is to become involved, the presumption of causality must be 
rigorously assessed. Take for instance, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) which 
intends to build a 1,440 km pipeline from Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan to the Russian 
Black Sea Port of Novorossiysk. On 27 April 1996 Kazakhstan, Oman and Russia (the 
original members of the consortium) signed a protocol on a new project structure 
involving a 50% farm-in by IOCs. 187 The bulk of financing will now likely to be 
supplied by the group of western companies. There is the possibility that a portion of 
funds could be supplied by a MLA - the EBRD has openly expressed an interest. 
However, with the CPC having farmed-out a 50% interest to IOCs who make-up a 
formidable consortium of project sponsors, it is questionable whether the support of a 
MLA is still necessary. In fact, we believe the impetus for MLA participation, be it the 
IFC, World Bank or EBRD, is likely to come from MLAs themselves whom would relish 
the opportunity to lend to a project with such strong sponsor support. We feel it unlikely, 
that any of the `Major' western partners will seek access to MLA funds, however, this 
does not necessarily apply to domestic entities. But as all MLAs are mandated to 
perform a catalytic role, their participation is not permissible if alternative commercial 
sources of debt are available. For example LUKoil, which now has a 12.5% stake in the 
CPC represents a potential recipient for MLA financing, but CS First Boston is reportedly 
willing to lend the necessary funds or LUKoil's recent agreement with ARCO to form a 
187 Lowell Bezanis and Liz Fuller, "Caspian Pipeline Consortium Reborn, " OMRI Analytical Brief, 
Vol. 1, no. 91,30 Apr. 1996; Sander Thoenes, "Russia agrees Kazakh oil pipeline, " Financial Times, 29 
Apr. 1996, p 2; and "CIS: Caspian Pipeline, " Oxford Analytica EEDB, 26 Feb. 1996, p 1. 
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joint venture may be another source of funds. 188 Rosneft, another Russian equity 
participant, but whose financial position is considerably weaker than LUKoil's, is a 
potential candidate for MLA support. However, Rosneft has too entered into an 
agreement to form a JV, this time with Shell, for the purpose of financing Rosneft's share 
of the costs. 189 Thus, even in infrastructure projects where the beneficial knock-on effect 
to the host countries is clearly evident, MLA support is not a foregone conclusion. In the 
case of the IFC, if it is 
"... necessary for the [project sponsors] to seek other investors and lenders 
to piece together the financing package solely on the strength of the 
project... [then the] IFC has, and can play, several important roles. " 190 
Perhaps this is why the portfolios of MLAs exhibited an initial strong emphasis on the 
petroleum sector, but as time goes by their operations are shifting to areas where their 
ability to act as a catalyst in mobilising additional sources of capital is enhanced due to a 
more investor friendly (and perhaps less controversial) industrial sector. 
5.3 Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) 
Another principal avenue of officially sourced financing is through the national Export 
Credit Agencies (ECAs) of western governments. 191 ECAs possess three principal 
objectives: a) to provide an economic advantage (i. e. the encouragement of exports); b) to 
satisfy local political needs; and c) to assist the diplomatic aims of countries. 192 In April 
1993 the G-7 nations pledged $28.4 billion of previously uncommitted aid to supporting 
reforms in Russia, $10 billion of this amount was in the form of bilateral export credits 
and guarantees. 193 The political aims of such a package are self-evident, the West had to 
188 Under the agreement are ARCO is to provide $3 billion over a period of 10 years for capital 
investments. "ARCO plans joint venture with Russia's LUKoil, " Reuters Textline, 25 Mar. 1996. 
189 "Russia: Shell to help Finance Caspian Oil Pipeline - Rosneft, " Reuters Textline, 14 Jun. 1996. 
190 IFC, "IFC Oil and Gas Policy Paper, " IFC/R92-221,21 Dec. 1992, Para. 63. 
191 For an in-depth discussion on ECAs in general see Isabelle J. Kayaloff, Export and Project 
Finance: A creative approach to financial engineering, (London: Euromoney Publications, 1988). 
192 Stephen Parish, "Project Finance and the Role of Export Credit Agencies, " O. G. L. T. R. 13 (1995): 
p 222. 
193 Ebel (1994) supra note 139, p 95; and USITC (1993) supra note 139, p 5-3. 
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be seen to be doing something to support Russia's fledgling democracy, although 
Russia's brief "honeymoon with the West" 194 was already beginning to wane. 
Nevertheless, East-West co-operation was still a vote winner provided it would not. 
burden western tax-payers too much. However, that bilateral exports credits were 
mistakenly touted as "aid" would fuel the frustration of FSRs when they sought such 
financing in the future. It seems the split personality of bilateral export credits (i. e. the 
political agenda vs. the economic agenda) are at times mutually exclusive. Following the 
dissolution of the FSU the overall political message being sent "was that we in the West 
want to help. " But this should not detract from the fact that bilateral export credits are 
principally a means of promoting host-country exports and home country job creation: 
"ECGD - the Export Credits Guarantee Department - is a Government Department, created in 1919 to promote UK exports. " (emphasis added) 
195 
"The Export-Import Bank of the United States, an independent agency of 
the federal government, has one mission: to help the private sector 
maintain American jobs by financing exports. " (emphasis added)196 
If the economic agenda is not assured within an acceptable degree of risk - export 
credits will not be forthcoming regardless of the political agenda. Conversely if the 
political agenda is not satisfied export credits no matter how attractive from an economic 
perspective may still be prohibited. Each ECA will have its own list of countries, 
typically stipulated by their home governments, which are considered "off-cover". 
Historically, the US Export-Import Bank (USEXIM) was restricted to an aggregate 
ceiling of $300 million to the whole of the USSR (Byrd Amendment to the Trade Act of 
1974) and was prohibited from providing loans or guarantees to the USSR's petroleum, 
natural gas, or other fossil fuel related industries (Stevenson Amendment to the Trade Act 
of 1974). 197 These restrictions played a key role in shelving the proposed North Star 
Joint Venture Project to transport LNG from the Urengoy Field in Western Siberia to the 
194 Jack F. Matlock Jr., Autopsy on an Empire. (New York, NY.: Random House, 1995): p 734. 
195 ECGD, "A Short Guide to the ECGD Facilities, " July 1993, p 3. 
196 USEXIM Annual Report 1994, p 1. 
197 USITC (1993) supra note 139, p 4-1. 
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East coast of the United States in the 1970s. 198 During the cold-war the political agenda 
definitely subordinated the economic agenda. Following the dissolution of the FSU, the 
political agenda continued to receive more attention but in reality the underlying 
economic agenda is probably of greater importance. Export credits should not be 
considered `aid' nor will they be offered on concessional terms. The paradoxical 
situation exists however in Azerbaijan in that despite the large presence of US-based 
companies with the explicit support of the US government, US export credit cover to 
Azerbaijan is prohibited. This is due to §907 of Title IX of the Freedom of Support Act 
of 1992 which penalises Azerbaijan's use of their blockade against Armenia due to the 
dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh. In all likelihood this provision was intended to placate 
Armenian Diaspora living in America (i. e. the local political consideration). Thus, while 
ECAs may be able to assist the flow of investment capital to the FSU, their accessibility 
is and will remain a function of host country economic advantages and political 
considerations. 
ECAs have traditionally provided insurance cover (or guarantees)199 to support the export 
of goods and services. Loans either made by the ECA itself or a commercial bank are 
guaranteed by the ECA against certain political risks in the presence of an unconditional 
repayment guarantee from the receiving country's central bank or ministry of finance (i. e. 
a sovereign guarantee). 200 However, during the 1980s in response to an number of 
factors, 201 ECAs began experimenting with the a more proactive project financing 
198 Joseph T. Kosnick, Natural Gas Imports from the Soviet Union: Financing the North Star Joint 
Venture Project, (New York, NY.: Praeger Publishers 1975). 
199 For the purposes of our discussion on ECAs we make no distinction between insurance and 
guarantee although the legal consequences of the two do vary across legal jurisdictions. 
200 Loans of this sort are governed by a set of rules known as the OECD Consensus which stipulate 
that: the credits can only finance up to 85% of the contract value, maximum period of repayment is ten 
years with repayments occurring every six months; repayments should start six months after the shipment 
of goods or the commissioning of the plant; and the minimum interest rate is set according to the official 
consensus matrix as stipulated by the OECD. "Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export 
Credits, " in Kayaloff (1988) supra note 191, pp 147-158. 
201 Inter alia: the deteriorating creditworthiness of many borrowers / importers; the desire of 
recipient countries' not to consolidate any of this debt into their official country debt figures; and the 
tightening of Western aid budgets. 
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approach to export finance. The USEXIM, JEXIM, EDC of Canada, and ECGD, among 
others established internal project finance divisions in order to evaluate, negotiate and 
commit project specific financing on a limited recourse basis. Until this revision the 
ECAs had not been willing to share in any of the commercial risks and had consequently 
required project sponsor guarantees for the entire term of the loan. Today however, 
ECAs could theoretically share in absorbing some of these risks. One important 
advantage for any participating commercial bank is that it could treat the guaranteed 
portion of the loan as sovereign debt of the ECA's home country. This means a lower 
risk rating for capital adequacy purposes for the guaranteed loan than would have been 
the case of a direct loan to the project vehicle itself, thereby lowering the cost of 
lending. 202 
Having reviewed some of the essential elements of ECAs, we shall now examine their 
usefulness as a source of finance for oil and gas investments in the FSU. Today ECAs 
are employing a much wider variety of financial instruments and packages than would 
have been possible twenty years ago. However, project financing packages imply by 
their nature very high vetting standards; the principal means of repayment is the cash 
flow from the project itself, not the guarantees, although the latter are still present during 
the pre-completion phase of a project. But unless the project is viable on a stand-alone 
basis -a perfectly reasonable criterion - export credits are unlikely to materialise. The 
current trend is not general "aid" to support political objectives, but rather ECAs are 
expected to run their operations "as a business, generating sufficient reserves to give the 
level of assurance of breaking even" 203 The reality is that ECAs like the IFC or the 
EBRD are similarly constrained by their common quasi-commercial mandates, and as a 
result their efforts in the FSU, beyond the well publicised headlines, have been frustrated. 
As it is not practicable within the space of this chapter to detail the programme of each 
ECA, we shall concentrate our analysis on the activities of the USES, and in particular 
202 Infra note 238 et seq. for further explanation. 
203 ECGD, "A Short Guide to the ECGD Facilities, " July 1993, p 3. 
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its Oil and Gas Framework Agreement (OGFA). While the challenges USEXIM faces 
are indicative of all ECAs, it has exhibited the most enthusiasm and innovation through 
OGFA. 
5.3.1 Export-Import Bank of the United States 
The present day efforts of USEXIM in the FSU represent a return to its roots. It was 
founded in 1934 for the sole purpose of supporting USIUSSR trade. 204 Given the 
political implications of the end of the Cold War and the dominance of US-based fines in 
the international oil industry, USEXIM has been eager to respond, and like most external 
observers they initially perceived the oil and gas sector as an easy target for western 
credits. The two principal US statutory provisions preventing large scale official sources 
of financing - the Byrd and Stevens Amendments to the Trade Act of 1974 - were 
repealed by Joint Resolution of Congress on 1 April 1992 (four months after the 
dissolution of the FSU). As of December 1995, USEXIM's general programme for the 
NIS still consisted of : a) short to medium-term insurance, loan and guarantees secured by 
a sovereign guarantee in the case of Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan; and b) limited recourse project finance secured by the assignment of hard 
currency earnings, held in offshore escrow accounts, and other assets without recourse to 
the government in the case of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and 
Ukraine. 205 In addition to the OGFA (to be discussed below) two additional programmes 
are currently available to Russia. USE30M signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with Gazprom that will eventually support the purchase of $750 million of US goods and 
services. Russian commercial bank risk may be considered on an "exceptional case-by- 
case basis", thus far a $15 million credit guarantee facility for medium-term financing by 
Tokobank has been initiated. Tokobank is a private commercial bank based in Moscow 
204 Kayaloff (1988) supra note 191, p 2. 
205 USEXIM, "Fact Sheet: Ex-Im Bank Guidelines for Financing US Exports to the CIS and Baltic 
States, " Aug. 1995. Cover in the case of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus (expect for project finance), 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Tajikistan is not available. Limited recourse project financing facilities 
only become available after an umbrella Project Incentive Agreement (PIA) has been signed with the host 
country: PIAS have hitherto been signed with Russia (Dec. 1993), Belarus (Jan. 1994), Kazakhstan (May 
1994), Turkmenistan and Ukraine. 
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which is actively involved in Russia's petroleum sector. Thus, the USEXIM is 
endeavouring to become an active participant in the FSU's oil and gas sector, but like 
most ECAs the availability of cover throughout the region is heterogeneous. 
Furthermore, if one looks beyond the headline press reports, we discover that once again 
progress has been much slower than initially anticipated - nowhere is this more vividly 
apparent than the OGFA. 
5.3.1.1 Oil & Gas Framework Agreement (OGFA) 
Conceptualised in 1992, the idea behind OGFA was very simple - to jump-start flagging 
production by expediently injecting western credits into those Russian oil and gas fields 
whose wells were increasingly becoming idle due to a lack of spare parts. However, its 
proponents recognised that it would be difficult for lenders to extend credit based solely 
on guarantees from either the Russian government or the nascent Russian commercial 
banking sector. While the USEXIM had received hundreds of applications for financing 
US exports to Russia under its various programmes, as of 1993 only 1% had ever 
received the necessary sovereign guarantees. 206 Moreover, the reliability of such 
guarantees was questionable in light of the poor creditworthiness of the successor states 
of the FSU in general 2O7 Thus, an umbrella programme was devised whereby credits to 
the Russian oil and gas sector would be secured against hard currency payments for oil 
and gas deliveries in the future (i. e. essentially a production payment purposely limited to 
the assignment of the proceeds of sale rather than the oil itself). 208 Under the Framework 
Agreement which was signed on 6 July 1993, the USEXIM pledged that it was: 
206 Bill Hart Jr., "Suitable for Framing, " R. P. I., Nov. 1994, pp 68-69. 
207 In fact the US GAO when asked to study this very problem concluded that "most, it not all, of the 
FSU successor states are not creditworthy, and all should be considered at least high risk from a 
creditworthiness perspective. " US General Accounting Office, Former Soviet Union: Creditworthiness of 
Successor States and US Export Credit Guarantees, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, US Senate, GAO/GGD-95-60, (Washington, DC.: US GAO, Feb. 
1995): p 3. 
208 On the subject of production payments (US) or forward purchase of oil (UK) - both being 
project financing techniques adapted for the oil industry - see Uriel E. Dutton, "United States 
Techniques of Project Financing in the Oil and Gas Industry, " I. B. L. 5(ü) (1977): pp 191-206; Peter 
Marriage, "North Sea Petroleum Project Financing in the United Kingdom, " I. B. L. 5(ii) (1977): pp 207- 
224; and Geoffrey Lewis and Geoffrey Willoughby, "Production Payments in the United Kingdom, " 
Hous. J. Int'1. L. 3 (1980): pp 51-65. 
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"... prepared to offer financial support of $2 billion or more for 
transactions involving the export of goods and services of US manufacture 
of origin which will be used in the oil and gas, petroleum refining and gas 
processing sectors in the Russian Federation. " 209 
However, OGFA's ambit is strictly limited to projects involving the rehabilitation or 
revitalisation of existing facilities. Support for greenfield projects would only be 
considered under USEXIM' limited recourse project finance programme. No financing 
was to be provided by the Russian government and the Russian government was not to 
distribute any of the financing from USEXIM. Instead individual transactions would be 
set-up on a case-by-case basis between USEXIM, a Russian production association or 
refiner and a US equipment supplier. The Russian parties to the agreement (Ministry of 
Fuel and Energy, Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bank of Russia) committed 
themselves to providing USEXIM with the necessary assurances and actions that would 
permit individual transactions to proceed, and to monitoring transactions after 
disbursement. By doing so the USEXIM hoped to coalesce governmental support for the 
programme under one umbrella document. But the practicality of documenting such 
transactions in the Anglo-American tradition of contract law - whereby the lenders try 
to protect themselves from every eventuality - created a process which quickly 
ballooned into literally hundreds of pages of relatively of sophisticated financial 
commitments. Eugene Lawson, the then Vice-Chairman of USEXIM, provides the 
following explanation for the added complexity: 
" Firstly, USEXIM had never attempted such an umbrella transaction before; 
" secondly, the World Bank insisted on its involvement and the inclusion of a number 
of technical provisions and procedures; 
" thirdly, the US Congress was leery about the size of the credits and prior 
congressional approval of any transaction by USEXIM in excess of $100 million was 
a necessary; 
209 "Russian Oil and Gas Framework Agreement, " reproduced in USEXIM, Handbook for Users of 
Financing Under Eximbank's Oil and Gas Framework Agreement. (Washington, DC.: USEXIM, n. d. ): pp 
25-43. On file with author. 
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" lastly, the increasing level of corruption in Russia. 210 
In short, by trying to satisfy the interests of all parties concerned, what started out as a 
very simple concept became increasingly complex. For instance, OGFA had to be 
designed to satisfy the criteria for the World Bank's negative pledge waiver (see 
§5.2.1.2.2.2). The optimism expressed by Russia's business community when the 
programme was first announced was to be replaced by extreme scepticism in the worst 
case to reserved caution at best. In the words of one Gazprom executive 
"the US Eximbank has proposed to Russian borrowers a procedure which 
is too cumbersome. It requires too much documentation and the revelation 
of confidential information. " 211 
Perhaps, but this is the modem world of international banking and finance. This lack of 
common business language212 between the East and the West is an unfortunate reality, 
one which will take years, if not generations, to reconcile, and even then foreign credits 
will not be forthcoming unless adequate protections are in place. For the time being 
however, we are faced with a situation of two disparate extremes: a high risk investment 
environment from which commercial banks are naturally averse, and potential domestic 
clients who have little appreciation for the legal niceties of a credit agreement which runs 
hundreds of pages, but is necessary to codify the assurances sought by lenders. Some 
idea of OGFA's complexity is provided by the schematic shown in Figure 5.9. In 
hindsight, perhaps we can forgive its creators for producing such complex procedures and 
lengthy documentation. They were obviously under pressure to create a credit 
mechanism which could withstand the uncertainties of the Russian petroleum industry, 
but in so doing, the task of marketing OGFA to potential domestic clients became much 
more difficult as Russian companies were generally uncomfortable with its complexity 
and onerous commitments. 
210 Opening remarks by Eugene Lawson (President of US-Russia Business Council) on Day one of 
the Adam Smith Conference (1995) supra note 151. 
211 "No Free Lunch Here, " R. P. I. Dec. 1993/Jan. 1994, p 65. 
212 Eugene M. Khartukov and Tatyana P. Kulakova, "Pandora's Box of the Russian Petroleum 
Industry, " OPEC Bulletin, Sept. 1994, p 13. 
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It was not just Russian disillusionment of OGFA that was proving to be an obstacle. The 
Russian government's mandatory obligation that 50% of all hard currency revenues from 
exports be converted into roubles was, from the western perspective, a serious 
impediment. Considering the assignment of the product sales agreement was the 
cornerstone of OGFA's security package, an obligation to first convert half this amount to 
roubles was completely unacceptable. Since OGFA stipulates that incremental 
production must be able to generate dollar revenues in excess of 150% of debt service 
plus mandatory payments and fees, 213 a 50% mandatory hard currency conversion would 
at the extreme necessitate a cover ratio of 3: 1 rather than 1.5: 1214 Until such a time as 
the rouble becomes fully convertible and is internationally recognised as a stable currency 
such reasoning will prevail. Only in April 1995 did the Russian Government finally 
waive the commitment for those specific entities approved to receive funds under 
OGFA. 215 Similarly, the decision to impose a combined 23% VAT on both loans and 
equipment imports has proved equally contentious, until it was partially reversed (for 
loans only) in the summer of 1994.216 
213 §6.01(b), OGFA in USEXIM Handbook supra note 209, p 36. 
214 Strictly speaking this is not really true because roubles can be instantly reconverted to dollars 
under current law at an insignificant loss - but the risk that this may not always be the case was one which 
Western creditors were not willing to assume. 
215 Decree No. 418, "On Support to Priority Investment Projects Financed Under the Russian- 
American Framework Agreement of July 6,1993 for the Russian Oil/Gas Industry, " 27 Apr. 1995 
reprinted in B. R. P. M., 12 May, 1995, pp 5-6. 
216 Supra note 107. 
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Figure 5.9 Schematic of OGFA Mechanism 
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On the western side, there was the added delay caused by the Board's difficulty in 
stipulating the criteria for determining who could be considered a suitable "creditworthy 
offftake purchaser" for the purposes of entering into the product sales agreement which is 
to be assigned as security for the loan guarantee. 217 
Despite the underlying problems which plagued OGFA, its signing and subsequent 
approvals of individual transactions were announced with much fan-fare in the press. 
The preliminary commitment of $500 million which was offered in July 1993 and 
designed to expedite the approval process, appears to have been fully subscribed by 
September 1994, when USEXIM signed agreements to support a combination of $870 
million of exports to Nizhnevartovskneftegas, Permneft, Tatneft, and Chemogomeft. 218 
By February 1995, it was reported that USEXIM's Board had formally approved 11 
different deals under OGFA which would provide financing in an aggregate amount 
exceeding $1.3 billion. 219 A full account of USEXIM supported projects is found in 
Appendix D. 6. Considering that one year later, Russia's Ministry of Fuel and Energy 
was reporting that a total of $3.7 billion worth of loans were potentially on the table, one 
may get the impression that OGFA was becoming a resounding success. However, this 
was not the case: of this amount only 7 out of the possible 18 deals (which accounts for 
only 21% of the total value cited by MFE) have been signed; Tatneft reduced its original 
loan by almost 75%; Permneft has either cut its intended loan by about two thirds or has 
cancelled it altogether; and the first disbursement of funds under OGFA only occurred in 
October 1995 for Tomskneft to purchase a gas compression facility. 220 One can now 
appreciate that the experience of the USEXIM is remarkably similar to that of the MLAs. 
And while a representative of Citibank in Moscow concluded upon the lifting of the 50% 
217 David R. Slade, "USEXIM Bank Financing for CIS Oil and Gas Projects, " Paper presented to the 
Adam Smith Conference (1995) supra note 151. 
218 "Breaking the Ice, " R. P. I.. Nov. 1994, pp 66-70. 
219 Slade (1995) supra note. 
220 "Chase closes Exim finance, " E. E. E. Report, Oct. 1995, p 37; and USEXIM Annual Report 1995, 
p 14. 
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hard currency conversion obligation that "it would be difficult to see how the remaining 
obstacles [problems of tax and pipeline access] could prevent it [OGFA] from 
happening" 221- such an assessment seems overly optimistic if not naive. With only one 
deal closed during the remainder of 1995, even the waiver of the 50% mandatory 
conversion obligation did not constitute the removal of the final obstacle, as everyone 
would have believed it would. When Permneft reportedly annulled its credit agreement 
in November 1995 it stated that because taxation would absorb such a large proportion of 
the loan, the company doubted the project would be financially viable. 222 Interestingly 
the preferential treatment OFGA has enjoyed since April 1995 was in effect neutralised in 
June 1996 when the Russian Government declared the rouble convertible for current 
account purposes by accepting Article 8 of the IMF Agreement and thereby alleviating all 
Russian exporters of the requirement to immediately exchange 50% of their hard 
currency earnings. 223 If the hard currency conversion had been the sole obstacle to 
OGFA, then we should have witnessed a rash of disbursements during the past year, but 
this has not been the case. And now with full current account convertibility assured, 
theoretically the stated obstacle to OGFA has been completely eradicated. 
We conclude that while OGFA represents an innovative and focused effort to make 
available a large pool of US-based export credits to the Russian oil and gas sector it has 
been bedevilled by the volatile regulatory and fiscal climate of Russia. It is not so clear 
cut as to say that western practices and standards of international banking and finance, 
and Russian business are immiscible. Rather there is a lack of appreciation by the latter 
towards the former. Furthermore Russian Production Associations are very much 
restricted by the environment in which they operate even though some are proving 
themselves to be the most learned students of capitalism. It brings us back to the point of 
221 "US Oil Loans Closer, " Capital Markets Report, 18 May 1995, p 4. 
222 "Permneft to Annual $270 million credit from Citibank, " OMRI Economic Digest 16 Nov. 1995. 
223 However restrictions still exist with respect to capital accounts (i. e. limiting the ability of Russian 
companies to invest hard currency abroad). "Russia formally adopts rouble convertibility on current 
account, " OMRI Daily Digest. No. 107, Part I, 3 Jun. 1996. 
185 
whether exogenous efforts by the western governments or institutions are capable of 
circumventing the obstacles of the emerging markets both from the point of view of 
encouraging FDI and the availability of western credits. OGFA was an instrument for the 
latter, but for all the efforts undertaken the results hitherto have been a disappointment. 
OGFA remains a bilateral and hands on approach to encouraging the flow of western 
capital (through the use of export credits) as opposed the Energy Charter Treaty which is 
an international effort to provide a framework of investment protection and guarantees to 
encourage FDI in the energy sector. However, in our opinion, neither the hands-on 
approach of OGFA nor the more aloof Energy Charter Treaty has had the desired effect to 
date. However, some external observers do believe that OGFA offers some qualified 
benefits (in addition to attracting some criticism). Herman Mulder of ABN AMRO 
suggests that the European Union should consider its own European Private Investment 
Scheme (EPIS) which would combine the private sector orientation of OGFA (i. e. no 
direct sovereign guarantees) with the energy-import orientation of Japan. 224 Given that 
OGFA has so far failed to deliver, there is ample reason for re-examining what is the 
optimal solution - for some the EPIS is one such possibility. But ultimately, we feel 
that there is a practical limit on what can be achieved in the interim as long as the FSU's 
investment climate remains volatile and unpredictable. The suggestion by Mulder that a 
Western European official entity should offer extended political risk guarantees beyond 
the traditional (ECA/MIGA) risk categories to include a stability clause covering taxes, 
ownership, contracts, fair dispute settlements, etc. essentially shifts the investment risk 
back on to western taxpayers (albeit in the form of guarantees which may or may not be 
called upon) - the very thing which the US Congress was anxious to avoid in the first 
place. In the case of European Union member states there may be more of a political 
impetus to assisting the FSRs (just as the Energy Charter Treaty began as a European 
224 Japan typically provides financial support to projects which will improve her own energy situation 
by open up avenues to alternative sources of energy imports. Herman, Mulder, "European Energy Private 
Investment Scheme The need for a credible European Investment Program now. " Paper presented to the 
CBI Conference on the Business Implications of the European Energy Charter Treaty, London, 14 Feb. 
1995, p 7. 
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based initiative) given their closer proximity to the FSU, but this is not a foregone 
conclusion. 
The crux of the issue lies in the distinction between aid and credits. As long as the West 
wishes to avoid the former, credits will only be extended where it is justifiable on a 
commercial basis and this appears to be the underpinning of USEXIM's philosophy as 
reflected by OGFA and their PIAs supporting limited recourse project financing. 
Unfortunately, such schemes are ultimately a hostage to underlying political and 
economic environments in which the project operates. 
5.3.2 Other ECAs 
Given the poor success of OGFA hitherto, it is worth examining the efforts other ECAs. 
Essentially, all programmes similar to OGFA are a form of pre-export financing as credits 
are extended with the intention of generating incremental production, a portion of which 
will be available for repayment. However, there are some notable differences in the 
approach of individual ECAs, recalling that the activities of a specific ECA reflect the 
political needs and goals of their host nation. Appendix D. 7 provides a compilation of 
some of the more notable export credit deals (excluding the principal deals of USEXIM), 
and indicates that approximately another $3.6 billion has been offered to the petroleum 
industry of the FSU. When considering multisourced projects (i. e. involving more than 
one ECA, and in this case the USEXIM) this figure rises to $3.8 billion whose total 
projects cost is an estimated $4.5 billion. The ratio of export credits to total project costs 
turns out to be 85% which is coincidentally the maximum permissible as stipulated by the 
OECD Consensus. 225 However, such figures are at best an approximate, as they have 
been derived from press reports. Appendix D. 7.2 also lists three additional unconfirmed 
export credit packages, two of which will provide another $1.1 billion. 
225 Art. 3, "OECD Consensus, " Kayaloff(1988) supra note 191, p 147. 
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There has been criticism that the USEXIM's export credits from America can only be 
used to support expensively produced US goods and services. In comparison the 
Japanese Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) offers added flexibility via untied loans (i. e. loans 
are not tied to the procurement of goods and services from Japan) to foreign institutions 
for high priority projects and economic restructuring programs in developing countries. 226 
The most pertinent example being the proposed $700 million loan from Mitsui to LUKoi1 
and guaranteed by JEXIM for the purchase of production equipment -- only 20% of 
goods have to be sourced from Japan. 227 Signed in 1994 it was to be the first large 
commercial loan offered without a sovereign guarantee. Chevron agreed to purchase 
from LUKoil approximately 70,000 bopd for export over a period of eight years (180 
MMbbls in total) and the proceeds from the sale are to be deposited by Russia's Imperial 
Bank, in which LUKoil has a stake, into an escrow account at the Bank of Tokyo Trust 
Co. in New York. 228 As one can appreciate the mechanics of this arrangement are very 
similar to OGFA vis-a-vis the use of escrow accounts, a suitable offtake purchaser, etc. 
- the principal difference lies in their respective philosophies regarding the actual use of 
the credits. While the untied nature of Mitsui's loan makes it more attractive in theory, in 
reality it has succumbed to the same pitfalls of OGFA. As of April 1996 the deal had not 
closed due to the prohibitive nature of the high import duties. The success of these 
programmes has become conditional upon acquiring exemptions from the hostile tax 
regime. Unless the tax regime improves, exemptions remain a necessary fact of life, 
without which no progress will be made. 
226 Most importantly eligible borrowers, include inter alia, foreign corporations designated by the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance, who meet the following criteria: corporations which assume operations that 
were previously executing by foreign governments; corporations that are in charge of electricity, gas, 
communication or transportation etc. provided that such designated corporations are limited to those in 
which a foreign government is involved regarding decisions of price of the product supplied or other 
important business matters; and corporations which execute operations contributing to the development of 
industry and economy utilising the expertise of a private enterprise provided that a foreign government and 
the private enterprise are both shareholders of the corporation. The Export-Import Bank of Japan, "Guide 
to the Export-Import Bank of Japan, " Feb. 1994, p 21. 
227 "LUKoiÜ satisfied with Mitsui talks, " E. E. E. Report. Dec. 1994, pp 18-19. 
229 "Taxes for oil companies restrict Mitsui's $700 million loan to LUKoi1 and Chevron Deal, " 
Interfax Petroleum Report. 5-12 Apr. 1996, p 6. 
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The second notable feature of Appendix D. 7 is the presence of pre-export financing deals, 
similar to Mitsui's, but using a regional focus in order to take advantage of their 
associated political leverage within the Russian Federation. Germany has been 
particularly active in promoting such a credit-barter type arrangement, for example with 
Tatarstan and Tyumen, with ongoing negotiations for a second agreements. The 
Tyumen-1 Credit Barter Arrangement is illustrative of such schemes 229 In order to 
support the economic development of the Tyumen region and to counteract steady 
decreases in the centralised budget, the Oblast's Administration was authorised to 
independently dispose of a portion of products produced locally. To this end a Special 
Trade Agreement was signed between the Tyumen Regional Government and the 
Republic of Germany in January 1993. In September 1993, Sibneftebank signed a Basic 
Agreement with Deutsche Bank for a credit of DM 290 million (4590 million) to be 
repaid from the delivery of oil produced in the Oblast. An of$ake contract was then 
concluded in November 1993 with the German firm Veba Oel. Although supported by 
Hermes and guaranteed by the Administration of the Tyumen Oblast on the basis of its 
large known oil reserves, the keystone that came from the Russian Government was the 
granting to the Oblast an export quota of 1 MMtpy for 3 years. We believe that the 
political leverage which regions can exert on the federal government may allow them to 
achieve the stability of conditions which permit such programs to go ahead as opposed to 
individual company deals. This feature is probably strengthened further as one moves 
towards the autonomous republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. 
5.3.3 ECA Summary 
The ECAs of the West have been active in their pursuit of extending credits to the FSU. 
While their individual approaches vary, all essentially utilise a form of pre-export 
financing in which credits are extended to domestic producers in exchange for an 
assignment of future sales proceeds from creditworthy off-take purchasers into an escrow 
account. There does not appear to be a realistic alternative. However, export credits have 
229 "Credit-Barter Agreement between the Tyumen Oblast and Germany, " B. R. P. M., 28 May 1996, 
pp 3-4; and R. P. I. Dec. 19931 Jan. 1994, p 46. 
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been subject to the same uncertainties that have plagued MLAs. Even the innovation of 
OGFA with its legal provisions against all eventualities has not proven that successful. 
Similarly, untied credits offered by JEXIM - which have clear advantages over OGFA 
- have remained beyond the reach of Russian oil and gas producers. Overall the 
provision of export credits on the scale first envisioned by the West in accordance with 
the G-7 pledge has been well below expectations. Should the FSRs provide the 
assurances and guarantees necessary then the export credits may materialise but this has a 
precondition: the unimpeded imports of foreign sourced goods and services. Host 
governments are undoubtedly being pressured by their own domestic manufacturing 
industry not to give any advantages to foreign equipment suppliers, but until a time that 
rouble based buyer and supplier credits are available on financially equivalent terms such 
a policy essentially prevents domestic enterprises from acquiring equipment from any 
other source. The choice is either to be penalised for using western export credits by 
onerous customs and import duties or charged exorbitant interest rates for utilising rouble 
credits from a very thin domestic market. Faced with such choices, it is understandable 
that domestic producers often choose to do nothing. A potential glimmer of hope, in the 
case of Russia, may lie with credit-barter arrangements of the type previously negotiated 
between Regional Administrations and Germany. Perhaps the regions themselves can 
exert greater political leverage on the Federal government in order to assure that the 
necessary conditions for project implementation are granted. 
5.4 Commercial Bank Lending 
Despite the preponderant use of internally generated cash flow by Major IOCs, the oil 
and gas industry has an established record as being a premier user of external capital in 
the international financial markets. 230 As one moves away from the Major IOCs towards 
the Independents and then to the small upstream or E&P Companies the role of the 
syndicated debt market becomes increasingly important. Syndicated debt is a loan in 
230 Petroleum Finance Company and Price Waterhouse World Petroleum Industry Group, 
Competition for Capital in the International Oil & Gas Industry. (New York, NY.: PIW Publications, Nov. 
1995): p 25; Michael E. Humphries, "The competitive environment for oil and gas financing, " Energy 
Policy, 23 (1995): pp 991-1000; and Petroleum Finance Company, Competition for Capital in the 
International Oil & Gas Industry, (Washington, DC.: PFC Ltd., Aug. 1993). 
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which a group of banks gets together to provide capital to the company on a pro rata basis 
under identical terms and conditions contained within a common credit agreement. 231 
Usually such an arrangement will be one of the three following styles: corporate 
revolving credit facilities; working capital facilities, or project finance. 232 Figure 5.10, 
compiled from Euromoney's Loanware, presents a graph of the value of the syndicated 
oil and gas loans versus oil price for the years 1980-1994. 
Figure 5.10 Syndicated Oil & Gas Loans versus Oil Price 
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Source: Euromoney Loanware as cited in Pavey (1994) infra note 234, pp 35-40; Nigel Pavey, "Borrowers 
never naa it so good, " Petroleum Economist, June 199), pp 2u-21; and Platt's as cited in BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy, June 1994, June 1995, p 12. 
Compared to our earlier analysis of upstream capital expenditures (see Table 4.2) there is 
no overall correlation with the level of syndicated oil and gas loans and oil prices, 
although there exists a strong short-term correlation in relation to the 1986 oil price 
collapse. 233 Given the aggregate levels of lending, one can appreciate that this is an 
important source of funds for the oil and gas industry. But, this data set has a wide remit 
and therefore should be treated with caution. Firstly, it includes financing for both 
231 Peter Wiseman, "Syndicated Facilities, " in Terry (1994) supra note 85, pp 259-291. 
232 Supra note 230, PFC (1993) p 12; and PFC&PW (1995) p 29. 
233 The correlation of oil prices with the value of syndicated loans produces a coefficient of -0.14521 for the years 1981-1994; 0.84185 for the years 1984-90; and 0.14376 for the years 1984-1994. 
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upstream and downstream sectors of the business. Secondly, the data set makes no 
distinction between oil and gas. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, is the regional 
breakdown of the world-wide lending levels. Euromoney has indicated that of the total 
$907.6 billion in syndicated oil and gas lending during the period 1980-1993, $558.8 
billion (61.6%) was for North America, $174 billion (19.2%) was for Western Europe, 
$77.4 billion (8.5%) was for Asia, $70.6 billion (7.8%) was for Latin America, and $26.8 
(2.9%) was for the Middle East 234 If one can make any generalisations at all from such 
all-encompassing data, it is that syndicated lending seeks stable and safe economies (80% 
of the market is accounted for by Western Europe and North America, despite the fact 
that these regions account for only 10% of the world's oil reserves, and 29% of the 
world's oil production. 235 This pattern of syndicated lending does not bode well for the 
FSU. 
Although, MLAs can and do offer co-financing packages, the interest of commercial 
banks with respect to the FSU has for the most part remained quiet. According to our 
research the EBRD has only co-arranged two to three petroleum related transactions. 
This is despite the Preferred Creditor Status which EBRD co-financing can offer. 236 
Essentially, a commercial bank operating as a parallel lender under either the IFC's / 
EBRD's B-Loan structure, or in a pre-export financing deal using a dedicated offshore 
escrow account as found under OGFA, would be exempt from the mandatory 
provisioning requirements imposed by their central banks. 237 The effect of the latter 
234 Nigel Pavey, "Energy Finance Markets: Keener pricing for the industry but only for top quality 
names, " Petroleum Economist, June 1994, p 40. 
235 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996. pp 4-6. 
236 Under the EBRD's B-Loan structure - adapted from the IFC's similar technique -- the EBRD lends on its own books under the A-Loan, but then sells down participation's to private sector commercial 
banks for all or a portion under a B-Loan. Because the EBRD remains the lender of record under such a 
structure for the entire debt, the project borrower has no-direct lending record with the commercial banks. 
On the subject of parallel lending under a B-Loan Structure see Vinter (1995) supra note 87, pp 104-105; 
David Slade, "New opportunities for project financing in Russia, " PF. I.. 2 Mar. 1995, p 35; and Morais 
(1988) supra note 10. 
237 Mulder (1995) supra note 224. In 1980's the Basle Committee -a forum for discussion by the international bank supervisors of the OECD jurisdictions - initiated work on improving the understanding 
of risks in the banking system and to developing objective supervisory standards. Their work culminated 
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regulations are to restrict the extent to which commercial banks can expand their risk 
taking activities, because of the opportunity cost associated with having a higher level of 
risk-weighted assets for which they are obliged to maintain a minimum level of capital 
resources as a provision against possible loss. 238 While the agreement on capital 
adequacy established by the Basle Committee in 1988 is not a legally binding document 
nor does it constitute an international convention or treaty, each representative country 
has nevertheless committed itself to ensuring that the banks it supervises will meet the 
agreed minima capital adequacy ratios239 
In spite of the added advantages that MLA co-financing may offer, the commercial 
banking sector's continued wariness of the FSU is a function of their perception of 
political risk. It is a perception which is diametrically opposite to that of IOCs240 and 
explains why IOCs have flocked to the FSU while commercial banks have held back. 
IOCs, as equity investors, will enjoy in the upside of a successful project, a bank's profit 
is limited to a fixed margin over the cost of lending and they are therefore reluctant (and 
justifiably so) to take any down-side risk. Therefore, any attempt to draw a parallel 
between petroleum industry operations and a standard measure of political risk used by 
the commercial banking industry is practically meaningless. IOCs are driven by 
in 1988 with a report on the "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards" 
which laid down, inter alia, standards for capital adequacy ratios and treatment of off-balance-sheet 
transactions. See Joseph J. Norton, "Trends in International Bank Supervision, " in Joseph J. Norton and 
Raymond M. Auerback eds., International Finance in the 1990's, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993): 
72-73; and Joseph J. Norton, "The Work of the Basle Committee on Bank Adequacy and the July 1988 
Report on International Convergence of Capital Measurements and Capital Standards, " Int'l Lawyer. 12 
(1989): pp 245-263. 
238 The process is quite simple whereby the various categories of bank assets - both on and off- 
balance sheet - are assigned a risk weighting category (e. g. 100% for commercial loans, 0% for loans to 
OECD Governments, plus a number of stages in between). The amounts in each category are multiplied by 
their respective risk factors whose sum becomes the total Risk-Weighted Assets. The banks are then 
required to maintain a minimum capital base equivalent 8% of the total of Risk-Weighted Assets. John 
Willingham, "Principles of Lending-Part V, " in Terry (1994) supra note 85, pp 196-199. 
239 George Emir Morgan, "Capital Adequacy, in Peter Newman, Murray Milgate, John Eatwell eds. 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Vol. I A-E, (London: MacMillian Press Limited, 
1992): pp 284 - 287; and Peter C. Hayward, "Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, 
" in The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Vol. I A-E (1992): pp 185-188. 
240 Jan R. Prins, "Energy Finance in the Emerging Markets, " Paper presented to CEPMLP's 
r: «-;.,,. nil anA r,. c flnPrntinnc -A Business Seminnr St Andrews_ Scotland 1 8-19 
P 
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favourable geology and the applicable tax regime, unfortunately the former respects no 
political boundaries. IOCs continue to operate in some of the most inhospitable political 
climes in the world (e. g. Algeria, Angola, Myanmar, Nigeria, Russia, Yemen etc. ), but 
not so in the case of commercial banks. For these reasons, it is illuminating to examine 
the relative position of FSRs as determined by standard country risk rating surveys that 
are regularly published. 
5.4.1 Country Risk Rating Survey 
The purpose of a country risk rating survey is to provide a comparative standing of 
individual countries with respect to the overall level of country risk exposure a foreign 
investor is theoretically exposed. Essentially, the concept of country risk can be divided 
into two components: 241 a) Political Country Risks which encompass the traditional 
political risks of war, nationalisation, expropriation, confiscation and any form of 
governmental interference, but also includes the risk of currency inconvertibility or 
restrictions on repatriation; and b) Economic Country Risks which provide a measure of 
the economic well being of a particular country which would affect a borrower's ability 
to repay debt and thus includes an assessment of inflation, currency devaluation and 
sovereign creditworthiness. For our purposes, we have chosen the survey published by 
Euromoney242 which uses a weighted average methodology to compute an overall 
country risk rating for each country. 243 
241 Ibid., p 10. On the subject of Country Risk Assessment see Stocks, Michael. "Country Risk 
Assessment and Sovereign Debt Rescheduling. " in Terry (1994) supra note 85, pp 471-509; "How to Rate 
a State, " Euromoney. Sept. 1992, pp 61-70; John Calverly, Country Risk Analysis. 2nd ed. (London: 
Butterworths, 1990); and Charles R. Kennedy Jr., Political Risk Management, (London: Quorum Books, 
1987). 
242 Other country risk rating services, not covered herein, are published by the Institutional Investor 
and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). 
243 Economic Data (25%) from Euromoney' global economic performance projections for the current 
and subsequent year; Political Risk (25%) by polling political risk analysts, risk insurance brokers and 
bank credit officers; Debt Indicators (10%) calculated from the World Bank's World Debt Tables; Debt in 
Default or Rescheduled (10%) based on World Bank's World Debt Tables; Credit Ratings (10%) from 
average of Moody's and Standard & Poor's sovereign ratings; Access to Bank Finance (5%) is taken form 
disbursements levels of long-term private debt as reported in the World Bank's World Bank Debt Tables; 
Access to Short-Term Finance (5%) is essentially a measure of available ECA coverage; Access to 
International Bond and Syndicated Loan Markets (5%) reflecting Euromoney's own analysis; and Access 
to and Discount on Forfaiting (5%) from data supplied by certain commercial banks. "Soft landing or 
recession? " Euromoney, Sept. 1995, p 306. 
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It should be understood that country risk ratings although presented in the form of a 
quantitative result is not an exact science as element of discretionary judgement is always 
present. As a result even the most strictly score-based systems possess both strengths and 
weaknesses244 and because investors are not equal (i. e. some are more risk averse than 
others) care must be taken when interpreting a final figure which is essentially a 
summation of many different factors. However, as a general indicator of the attitude of 
commercial banks, Country Risk Rating Surveys try to address three key questions: does 
the country have or is likely to develop a balance of payments problem; is this a problem 
that may affect bank debt servicing; and what are the chances of the government 
implementing corrective policies? 245 
Clearly, the successor states of the FSU which are undergoing profound changes in 
social, economic and political spheres will rank very poorly on a scale measuring country 
risk. Figure 5.11 illustrates just how poorly the region has ranked over the past five 
years. For comparison purposes, countries such as the United States, Switzerland, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Japan have typically jostled for the top three positions 
whereas Iraq is ranked consistently near the bottom. One of the most dominant features 
of this illustration is dramatic worsening of the perception of the USSR during 1991 and 
the further decline of Russia afterwards. 246 For reasons of simplicity, we have chosen to 
present the Baltic States and the 12 CIS member states in smaller regional groupings. 
The three Baltic States rank more favourably than any of the other areas with either 
Russia or NE Central Asia being the next most favourable area. In fact both Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan have been ranked more favourably than Russia since 1993, the latter's 
244 Caverly (1990) supra note 241, pp 161-168. 
245 Ibid., p 152. 
246 Given the size of Russia, it is somewhat simplistic to confer a rating which applies the country as 
a whole. Indeed, the Moscow University, has published an investment risk survey but on an intra-Russian 
level. See Eugene M. Khartukov, "Investing in Russia' Oil and Gas: Fiscal Terms, Risks and Rewards, " 
O. G. L. T. R. 12 (1994): p 123 citing Predprinimatel'sky klimat v Rossii, Moscow University, 10 May 1993. 
Interestingly enough, even in 1993, this survey rated the North Caucasus, which includes the Chechen 
Republic, as the least favourable area within the whole of Russia. Acknowledging events of the autumn of 
1994 in which Russian forces entered into open conflict with Chechen Rebels this prescient assessment 
seems quite justified and gives some credence to risk rating surveys. 
195 
ranking very much influenced by the country's positive attitude towards foreign 
investment and the dominant central authority of its President, Nursultan Nazerbayev. At 
the other extreme, we find SE Central Asia and the three Caucasus states of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. 247 The position of the latter grouping is heavily influenced by 
the fact that Armenia and Azerbaijan are engaged in a protracted war-cum-fragile cease- 
fire over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian populated enclave in Azerbaijan, while 
Georgia itself is suffering from political instability in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 
ranking of SE Central Asia has been poor due to ethnic tensions in Tajikstan and 
associated cross-border conflicts with Afghanistan. The final classification, called 
Western FSU (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) generally ranks somewhere in the middle. 
In sum, the average ranking of CIS member states in 1995 stood at 144th with 
Kazakhstan being the most favourable at 108th 248 while the average ranking of the 
Baltic States was 103rd. Obviously, one could go into great detail in explaining the 
individual rankings of each year, but that is not really necessary. It is enough to 
appreciate the highly uncertain nature of these emerging economies and that the once held 
belief that "... the most stable regime [in 1983]... is probably that of the Soviet Union, and 
for that reason the Soviet Union is regarded as a perfectly acceptable political risk in 
banking terms" 249 could not be further from the truth today. 
247 Although in fact Armenia's individual position had risen to 122nd in 1995 from 162nd in 1994. 
For analyses of the geopolitical complexities plaguing the region see Jonathan Aves, Georgia. From Chaos 
to Stability, (London, RITA, 1996) and Shireen T. Hunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition Nation- 
Building and Conflict, (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1994): Jonathon Aves, Post-Soviet Transcaucasia, 
(London: RITA, 1993). 
248 The 1995 individual rankings of each country was as follows: Estonia (76th); Kazakhstan (108th); 
Latvia (116th); Lithuania (118th); Armenia (122nd); Belarus (134th); Turkmenistan (136th); Ukraine 
(138th); Moldova (141st); Russia (142nd); Uzbekistan (143rd); Georgia (151st); Kyrgyzstan (161st); 
Azerbaijan (175th); and Tajikistan (176th). 
249 G. Miller (Chairman, Morgan Grenfell Energy Services Ltd., 1983) cited by Hasan Zakariya, 
"Political risk insurance in petroleum investment, " in Petroleum Investment Policies in Developing 
Countries. Nicky Beredjick and Thomas Wälde Eds. (London: Graham & Trotman, 1988): p 207. 
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Figure 5.11 Country Risk Ranking 
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Source: "Country Risk, " Euromonev. Sept. 1991,1992,1993,1994 and 1995. 
` For 1990 and 1991 the rating is for the USSR, 1992 onwards it is the Russian Federation alone. The 
Baltic States consist of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Western FSU consists of Ukraine, Moldova and 
Belarus. Central Asia has been divided into two groupings: north-east Central Asia consisting of 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; and south-east Central Asia consisting of Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan,. Caucasus combines Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. 2 Iraq's ranking, shown for comparison, approximates the worst ranked country in the years shown. 3 The upwards shift between 1991 and 1992 is also a function of more countries being included in the 
survey as a direct result of the dissolution of the USSR and certain countries in Eastern Europe. 
Perhaps the most telling indicator of the commercial banking sectors unwillingness to 
provide capital is highlighted by the Access to Bank Finance category in Euromoney's 
weighted average country risk rating. In their September 1995 survey, all 12 CIS 
member states and the three Baltic Republics were assigned a value 0, (with the exception 
of Ukraine which received a score of 0.04) on a scale of 0 to 10 where a score of 10 is 
enjoyed by OECD member countries. The harsh reality is that western commercial bank 
financing remains beyond the reach of the FSU's petroleum industry, despite the few 
exceptional circumstances under which lending has been achieved through official co- 
financing programmes. Country risk remains a major obstacle to mobilising large-scale 
commercial credits. 
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According to the views of one bank the following three essential preconditions must be 
met before commercial debt financing will be available: 250 increased political 
predictability; successful renegotiation of past Soviet debt; 251 and the general recognition 
that financial contracts impose certain rights and binding obligations on the parties and in 
the case of default by the borrower remedies are available which are enforceable law. 
Arguably progress has been made on all three fronts, but as the Access to Bank Finance 
measure above attests, the FSU still has a long way to go. 
5.4.2 Political Risk Ranking of the World's Oil Reserves 
To further explain the differing attitudes towards the FSU between commercial banks and 
IOCs we have constructed a Political Risk Ranking of the World's Oil Reserves by 
combining the distribution of world oil reserves as of the end of 1994 with Euromoney's 
September 1995 country risk rating. The reserve distribution was then sorted in a 
descending order of country risk ratings (i. e. from the most favourable to the least 
favourable) and presented in groupings of ten. 252 Furthermore an assumption was made 
as to whether the oil reserves were accessible to western oil companies (i. e. Open) or 
whether they were not (i. e. Closed). A summary of the results is found in Figure 5.12 
while individual country details are reproduced in Appendix E including a full page 
graphical representation. The columns represent the percentage of world oil reserves 
250 "What Bankers Want Before Lending to Russia, " P. I. W. 22 Feb. 1996, p 9. 
251 In 1993 the FSRs (excluding the Baltic States) signed an agreement whereby Russia assumed full 
responsibility for the external hard currency debt of the USSR, in exchange for the other successor states 
forgoing any claims on assets located within the territory of the Russia. As of beginning of 1996 Russia's 
external debt stood at $120.4 billion of which $103 billion was ex-USSR debt, including $20 billion to 
former COMECOM countries, and $17.4 billion of debt acquired since 1992. In April 1996 the Paris Club 
of creditors agreed to reschedule Russia's official debt, while the November 1995 preliminary rescheduling 
agreement with the London Club of creditors has yet to got into effect. For discussion on the history of ex- 
Soviet debt and Russia's negotiations with both the London and Paris Club of creditors for its rescheduling 
see "Agreement with London Club is Likely to be Implemented, " OMRI Daily Digest, No. 157, Part I, 14 
Aug. 1996; George Bowley, "Russian debt deal ready for creditor banks, " Financial Times, 2 May 1996, p 
2; "Russia set to raise funds overseas after debt deal, " Financial Times, 17 Nov. 1995, p 18; Russian 
Economic Trends, Vol. 5., No. 1 (1995): pp 93-94; US GAO/GGD-95-60 (1995)supra note 207, pp 58-80; 
Economic Bulletin for Europe 47 (1995): pp 106-107; and Economic Bulletin for Europe 46 (1994): p 115. 
252 Because the BP Statistical Review of World Energy does not list every individual county (i. e. it 
employs `Other Categories' in which the very minor reserves levels of the remaining countries are 
aggregated), the cumulative total of the world's reserves only reaches 99%. The residual 1% of oil 
reserves are spread throughout the whole spectrum of country risk rankings and therefore there exclusion 
does not materially alter our analysis. 
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within the groupings of ten risk-ranked countries and include some of the names of key 
petroleum producing nations. The area graph in the background portrays the cumulative 
level of reserves across the whole country risk ranking spectrum. 
The most salient feature is that countries which commercial banks view favourably are by 
and large not where the world's principal oil reserves are located. The top twenty rated 
countries account for only 5.2% of the world's oil reserves yet this region accounts for 
80% of the syndicated debt market supplied to the oil and gas industry. 253 The biggest 
portion of the world's oil reserves are dominated by the countries ranked 31-40 (namely 
those in the Middle East excluding Iraq and Iran which rank much more poorly). After 
that, the grouping becomes far less structured, but best characterised by a long tail 
extending to the right. The further one moves out along this tail the more poorly rated the 
countries are at least from the perception of commercial banks. High risk countries with 
significant levels of reserves include Iran (101st), Kazakhstan (108th), Nigeria (125th), 
Russia (142nd), Libya (166th), Angola (167th), Azerbaijan (175th) and Iraq (180th). But 
many countries choose not to open their upstream petroleum sector to foreign direct 
investment. The diagonal hatched pattern of the columns or the dark stipple pattern of the 
area graph in Figure 5.12 portray those reserves which are essentially `off-limits' to 
western IOCs. While the FSU possesses only 5.6% of the world's oil reserves, these 
represent 16% of all open reserves. Combined with the perception that the FSU is under- 
explored (see discussion in §3.3) it is understandable why IOCs have expressed so much 
interest in the FSU despite the high political risk ranking of individual FSRs. 
253 Supra main text at note 234. 
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Figure 5.12 Political Risk Ranking of the World's Oil Reserves 
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The observation by an executive of Exxon in 1978 that "that there are few countries 
where political risk is a totally insurmountable factor" 254 concurs with the distribution of 
open reserves across the entire spectrum of country risk rankings. Unfortunately the 
same cannot be said for commercial banks. Thus, even though commercial banks have 
long supported the international oil industry, FSRs rank very poorly according to country 
risk and there is no getting around this fact. Those who complain of the lack of 
commercial bank support in the FSU fail to appreciate the commercial banker's view of 
risk. We believe that Figure 5.12 demonstrates why foreign capital if it is to play a major 
role in the FSU's petroleum industry will be in the form of equity investment by the 
IOCs. They are realistically the only class of investor which can earn a potential rate of 
return commensurate with the level of risk. Commercial banks are naturally risk averse 
as their business does not permit them to participate in the upside potential of an 
investment. 
We conclude this section by noting the following observation with regards to our Political 
Risk Ranking of the World Oil Reserves. The FSRs face considerable competition from 
countries such as Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil and most notably the Middle East (excluding 
Iraq and Iran) as far as country risk is concerned. If their governments choose to open up 
their upstream sectors in accordance with the general reversal of the resource nationalism 
trend seen in the 1960s and 1970s, then the FSRs stand to be one of the biggest losers. 
There is some evidence to suggest that Latin America is now attracting investment dollars 
which might have otherwise been spent in the FSU. 255 The experience of the US 
independent, Benton Oil and Gas Company, reaffirms this assessment in their first half of 
1996 results which reflect "the substantial growth... in Venezuela [and] the relative slow 
254 Zakariya (1988) supra note 249, p 208. 
255 During Venezuela's very successful bidding round in January 1996, investors committed 
themselves to spending $10 billion dollars on development over the next decade and $1 billion of risk 
capital on exploration over the next five years. Raymond Colitt, " Venezuela hails success of oil 
exploration bids, " Financial Times, 26 Jan. 1996, p 4. 
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growth of Geoilbent in Russia"256 and that "of the 1996 expenditures, $30 million was 
attributable to the development of the South Monagas Unit in Venezuela [and] $3.0 
million related to the development of the North Gubkinskoye Field in Russia. "257 
Ultimately, the real danger comes from the Middle East. Should this region permit FDI 
in upstream activities the strategies of IOCs would undergo a fundamental geographic 
shift. Not only would IOCs be eager to tap into the largest and lowest cost reserve base 
of the world, but many of these countries are also less risky from a commercial banker's 
point of view compared to the FSU. 
5.5 Conclusion 
We have analysed the activities and attitude of the multilateral agencies (including the 
World Bank, IFC and EBRD), OPIC, export credit agencies and commercial banks 
towards the petroleum sector of the FSU. As far as commercial banks are concerned the 
FSU is a high risk business environment for which they are naturally reluctant to extend 
credits. Thus, there is ample justification for making available official sources of 
financing from the West. But given the difficulties associated with this sector, there is 
some evidence to suggest that this close relationship is beginning to wane. These 
organisations support activities in many different countries across all industrial sectors 
and therefore there is a practical limit to the level of funding which may be provided. 
Despite all the efforts expended by such programmes, the aggregate level of credit has 
remained well below expectations. It appears that MLAs, OPIC and ECAs, increasingly 
driven by quasi-commercial criteria, have embraced the currently fashionable project 
financing. But the outcome of this philosophy is that the disbursement process has 
proven to be exceedingly slow because the official agencies have also found themselves 
unable to cope with the volatile business climate which plagues all foreign investors. 
Western promises of aid have been offered in the form of hard credits with all their 
associated legal trappings. Western governments, driven by their own domestic economic 
256 Benton Oil and Gas Company, Form 10-0 12 Aug. 1996, p 14. 
257 Ibid. p 19. 
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and political considerations, have judged this to be the most appropriate form of support. 
But it would be naive to believe that these agencies offer the panacea which investors 
seek. Firstly, because of the limited extent of such credits and secondly, due to their 
inability to circumvent the problems which plague all forms of investment. The 
responsibility as to whether the $2.2 billion in credits hitherto approved by MLAs will be 
successfully drawn down lies with the FSRs themselves. If they choose to provide the 
prerequisite conditions then disbursement will occur, if not, even the best intentioned 
efforts will amount to naught. Perhaps the most classic example of this scenario is the 
case of the OGFA. Penalised by onerous import tariffs and customs duties Russian 
Production Associations, are essentially prevented from acquiring the equipment they 
need to use the export credits on offer by the West. As there is still no equivalent 
domestic supply of rouble based buyer or supplier credits on comparable terms they are at 
an impasse. 
It has proved very difficult, if not impossible, to enhance the large scale flow of debt 
capital to the petroleum sector of the FSU, and until such a time as the domestic political 
and commercial environment permit petroleum-related projects to earn sufficient 
revenues to cover repayment, barring the case of true aid whereby the ultimate recourse 
lies with western taxpayers, this situation is unlikely to change. If and when this happens 
the impetus for MLA support will naturally fade, but the fact remains that during this 
transition period, MLAs and ECAs have been unable to provide that bridging role on the 
scale which everyone had hoped. Even if they could, it is not certain that IOCs would 
openly embrace their support. For instance, although Royal/Dutch Shell has previously 
participated in IFC sponsored projects (outside of the FSU) the company will not accept 
any project that relies on a government guarantee in order to assure its viability258 
Furthermore, organisations like the EBRD and the IFC are in reality not an easy source of 
credits, although they may be portrayed as such. 
258 Stephen Hodge (Group Treasurer of Royal Dutch/Shell) in "Money Men Survey Market Mosaic, " 
Petroleum Economist, June 1992, p 62. 
Part IV 
INVESTMENT RISKS 
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6. INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT RISKS 
"While it would be naive to assume commercial risks can be completely 
eliminated, there are a number of ways to minimise them. " (P. Kennel, 
Senior Vice-President of Amoco Eurasia Petroleum Company, 1995)1 
6.1 Introduction 
All business activity entails a degree of risk. An investor who commits capital for the 
purpose of making an investment does so in the belief of making a profit. Any obstacles 
which may preclude or hinder an investor from doing so constitute investment risks. In 
order for an investor to accept a greater degree of risk a commensurate (i. e. higher of 
level return) must be anticipated - this axiom is known as the risk-reward function. 
From our point of view, foreign investment is necessary to assure the long-term viability 
of the FSU's petroleum industry and the failure to attract such investment is an 
unacceptable outcome. But western investors are faced with a daunting spectrum of 
investment risks, all of which must be overcome or mitigated to the extent that will 
permit a project to proceed. Table 6.1 on the following page reproduces the results of a 
survey on investment risk in Russia, others are in existence, 2 but we believe the example 
shown herein to be indicative of such polls. In the survey 42 western companies were 
asked to rank each of the disincentives (1 being the most important) within the six 
categories and also rank each of the categories. The fact that Russia's legal system is the 
most significant barrier to investment is hardly surprising. Many of the issues mentioned 
are by no means unique to the FSU nor the oil industry (e. g. legal risk, taxes, restrictions 
on exports or the repatriation of profits, etc. ) but they tend to be exacerbated by the 
uncertainties associated with the current transition process. In this sense, the smoothing 
I "Amoco expands operations in Eurasia, " ARCCI Business Report 3, no. 2 (1995): p 13. 
2 See also Ernst & Young, "Investment in emerging markets - Opportunity versus Risk, " 1995; Centre for Cooperation with Economies in Transition, Assessing Investment Opportunities in Economies in 
Transition, (Paris: OECD, 1994); and Arthur D. Little/Centrelnvest, "Taxation of Oil Companies in 
Russia: International Comparison, " Report for the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and 
Seminar on Taxation of Petroleum Companies in Russia, Jun. 1993. 
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of the commercial interface between the FSU and the global economy is one of the keys 
to reducing the level of business/operating risk in the FSU. 
Table 6.1 Survey of Investment Disincentives in 1995 
Legal Disincentives - Category Rank Average 
Fears about shareholder n is 2.6 
Weak contract law 
Securities market regulations 
enera red tape 4.8 
Export restrictions 54 
Weak ptcy law 3.6 
Import restrictions , Lack o legal information 5.9 
Economic Disincentives - Category RUM 2.5 Aver 
High Inflation 2.0 
Incoherence of tax system 2.2 
Variations in the exchange rate 
4. Lack of education (especially business education) 3.7 
Currency convertibility 4.4 
Low consumer demand 
Political Disincentives - Category RERN 3.1 verage ank 
Scepticism about commitment to reform 1.5 
Year of mass re-nationalisation 2.3 
Doubts about elections 2.7 
Fear of social unrest and war 4.4 
Extreme left 
6. Extreme right 5.3 
mancia Disincentives - Category R-El 3.7 Average Rank 
Repatriation of profits 2.1 
ormation about potential business partners 2.3 
Absence of a credit rating in Russia 3.0 
Lack o access to Russia's financial 
Poor oc banking services 4.7 
Possibility o no EAF support 3.6 
Lack of local investment brokers 6.9 
General Disincentives - Category ROE YU Average 
or -wie retreat from emerging markets 1.8 
Discriminations against foreigners 2.2 
Fear o crone a is 
enera lack of ormation 3.1 
gro-gistic Disincentives - Category Rank 5.2 Average Rank 
1. Commumcations infrastructure 1.8 
Transport infrastructure 2.6 
Language barrier 3.1 
Technological constraints 3.3 
Lack of local consulting firms 4.2 
Source: Russian Economic Trends 4, no. 1 (1995): p 120. 
On the other hand such a generic survey tends to overlook other areas of interest. We 
have chosen to focus our efforts on the following risk categories: Geological Risk, 
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Environmental Risk, Political Risk and Transportation Risk. This break-down is by no 
means complete and could be further subdivided or supplemented - depending on your 
perspective .3 But within our grouping there are issues particular to the oil and gas 
industry which warrant special attention. Furthermore, by incorporating data from the 
FOCI Database into our analysis we can make a unique and valuable contribution to the 
growing body of associated literature. Geological risk and environmental risk will be 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter, while political risk will be addressed in 
Chapter 7 and transportation risk in Chapter 8. 
6.2 Geological Risk 
6.2.1 Discovery Risk 
Geological Risk, consisting of two components, Discovery Risk and Reserve Risk, is by 
far the least troublesome risk in the FSU. It is the region's favourable geology which is 
the principle attraction for resource extraction companies in the first place. The first 
element, discovery risk, 4 is the uncertainty (i. e. the probability) of an exploration effort 
resulting in the discovery of a commercially viable deposit of oil. The implications of 
discovery risk for any extractive company, be it either petroleum or mining, must be 
assessed because this risk is high and companies only have a limited exploration budget 
(i. e. risk money) .5 In the case of a limited budget the operator is faced by two constraints: 
3 E. g. according to the senior vice-president of Amoco Eurasia Petroleum Company only three 
categories of significant risk are associated with oil projects in Russia: commercial, geotechnical and 
engineering. Supra note 1. On the other hand, Peter Davies, the chief economist of the British Petroleum, 
classifies the principle risks of production projects as market risk, operating risk and share-holder risk. 
Comments made during the concluding plenary session of The Changing Politics of International Energy 
4 Brian W. Mackenzie and Zhikai Cai, Economics of Petroleum Exploration in Australia, 
(Kingston, ON.: Centre for Resources Studies and Australian Mineral Foundation, N. d. ): p 16; and Brian 
Mackenzie and Roy Woodall, "Mineral Exploration Economics: The Search for Base Metals in Australia 
and Canada, " Working Paper No. 40, Kingston, ON.: Queen's University, Centre for Resource Studies, 
Sept. 1987. 
5 The Expected Monetary Value (EMV) of a an exploration effort is defined by the equation: EMV 
= (Reward x Ps) - Risk Capital x (1- Ps), where Reward is the present value of a discovery and includes 
the cost of successful exploration, Ps is the probability of success and Risk Capital is the cost of bonuses, 
dry hole costs and geological and geophysical costs, etc. Sometimes the formula is expressed as EMV = 
Reward x Ps - Risk Capital, in this latter case the Reward is only the present value of the revenue from the 
discovery and does not include the actual cost of successful exploration. In the end both formulas give the 
same result, it is really only a matter of semantics as to how Reward is defined. The relative importance of 
risk dollars is clearly illustrated in the first equation. If for instance the chance of success 20% then risk 
dollars outweigh reward dollars by 4: 1 whereas if the success ratio was around 10% the relationship 
changes to 9: 1. In general see Daniel Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production 
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firstly, the company must break-even in the long run; and secondly the company must 
avoid gambler's ruin. 6 Therefore the total available pool of risk capital has a very 
significant effect on the amount of risk money the company can commit to any one given 
prospect. As a corollary, the greater the amount of risk capital available for a given 
probability of success, the greater the acceptable exposure to risk. Therefore, the smaller 
operator is at a distinct disadvantage compared to a large IOC and explains the farm-in 
activity occurring within the FSU. 7 Despite the relative eagerness and success of 
entrepreneurial type companies in acquiring acreage, the original exploration and 
production company will likely try to farm-outs to more cash-rich partners. Smaller 
companies are compelled to seek farm-ins with suitable partners or otherwise risk the 
possibility of annulment of the contract by the government if the company does not have 
the financial resources to satisfy the minimum work obligation (MWO). 9 However, 
whether a transfer of a working interest to a third party will be permitted by a host 
government is another matter altogether and constitutes a potential investment risk which 
adds to illiquidity of an upstream interest. '0 In summary the farm-in mechanism 
Sharing Contacts, (Tulsa, OK.: PennWell Publishing Company, 1994): pp 18-21,118-122; Fraser H. Allen 
and Richard D. Seba, Economics of Worldwide Petroleum Production, (Tulsa, OK.: OGCI Publications, 
1993): pp 215-218; and Arthur W. McCray, Petroleum Evaluations and Economic Decisions. (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1975): pp 151-152,157-166. 
6 Gambler's ruin in probability theory concerns the risk of an operator with a limited amount of risk 
capital becoming insolvent though a continuous string of failures (i. e. a successful exploration effort is not 
realised by the time all the risk capital is expended). J. J. Arps and J. L. Arps, "Prudent Risk Taking, " 
reprinted in SPE Reprint Series No. 16 Economics and Finance. 1982 ed. (Dallas, TX.: SPE, 1982): p 138. 
7 Illustrative examples taken from the FOGI Database are as follows: In June 1994, Canadian 
Occidental acquired a 40% working interest in Turan Petroleum's QAM project in the Southern Turgay 
Basin of Kazakhstan; In July 1995 Pecten International, a subsidiary of Shell proposed a farm-in for a 40% 
working interest in foreign participation (i. e. 20% of total) of the onshore Rioni Basin and offshore Black 
Sea licence (total acreage 22,500 sq. km) in Georgia, held by the Georgian British Oil Company, a joint 
venture between JKX Oil & Gas plc and Georgian Oil; or Exxon's decision in Sept. 1995 to take a 50% 
stake in Oryx's Mertvyi Kultuk 12,200 sq. km exploration block in Kazakhstan. 
8 On the general subject of the farm-out/farm-in mechanism see Sally Gibson, "Farm Out 
Agreements, " O. G. L. T. R. 11 (1993): pp 45-51. 
9 E. g. in Kazakhstan the government terminated the exploration and production licence for the 
Kenbai field which was held by Munai JV on 5th July 1995. The domestic partners requested the 
cancellation because they claimed Biedermann (US) failed to satisfy the contractual obligations. 
Essentially Biedermann was unable secure financing to carry out the minimum work obligation (MWO). 
"Biedermann Blues: The Last Note, " R. P. I.. Oct. 1994, p 48. 
10 E. g. the failed attempt by Larmag, a Dutch energy company, to farm-out part of its working 
interest in its Turkmenistan based project in the summer of 1995 to the IPC of Canada. Apparently the 
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represents a practical means of diversifying discovery risk and is being employed 
throughout the FSU by western companies. 
World-wide the probability of success for a wild-cat well (i. e. a greenfield exploration 
well in a previously unexplored area) is approximately 13% - slightly less than one in 
eight wildcat wells result in an commercial discovery. " The historical experience in the 
FSU appears to be only half as good. Although FSU discovery rate figures are scarce we 
calculated that during the period 1966-1970 and 1971-1975 the probability of discovery 
was only 1: 13.4 (7.5%) and 1: 15.4 (6.5%) respectively. 12 One likely explanation for this 
difference is that Soviet exploration geologists did not have access to the same standard 
of technology which was available to western firms elsewhere in the world -a situation 
which is now changing. Yet the current interest of western companies is, for the most 
part, focused on existing deposits rather than greenfield exploration. This is quite logical 
as the plentiful existence of previously discovered petroleum deposits which are yet 
undeveloped significantly reduces the magnitude of geological risk because the element 
of discovery has already been removed from the chain of events. Table 6.2, reproduced 
from data presented in Chapter 3, shows the sectorial breakdown of the 292 potential 
upstream projects in the FSU involving western investors. The bulk of these projects 
(48.3%) involves the development of existing fields. The next largest category (25.7%) 
contain an element of exploration combined with development of existing reserves. 
IPC's demand for operatorship was refused. However, by Oct. 1995 it was being reported that a 30% 
farm-in by Dragon Oil (Ireland) was accepted, leaving Larmag with a 20% interest and 
Balkannevitgazsenagat (formerly Balkanneftekhimprom) with a 50% interest. See "Diminishing Interest, " 
R. P. I., Oct. 1995, pp 51-52; and "Project Briefs, " R. P. I., Nov. 1995; p 65. 
11 Daniel Johnston, Oil Company Financial Analysis in Non-technical Language, (Tulsa, OK.: 
PennWell Publishing Co., 1992): p 161. 
12 Discovery rates were calculated by the dividing number of new fields discovered by the number 
of exploration wells completed. Original figures presented in Thane Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty The 
Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1991): p 
75. 
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Table 6.2 Potential Upstream Projects in the FSU involving Foreign Investors 
er 
92.8% 
The next category (18.8%) is well rehabilitation or workover contracts in currently 
producing fields in an effort to raise incremental production. The smallest category is 
pure exploration contracts (7.2%) - this is the only activity in the FSU which involves a 
significant degree of discovery risk. Nevertheless the region's favourable geology is a 
mitigating factor. Therefore according our analysis, 93% of upstream projects involving 
western participation in the FSU are oriented towards previously discovered deposits of 
hydrocarbons. We conclude that one of the overall strategies of foreign oil companies 
operating in the FSU at the present time is to minimise discovery risk by concentrating 
efforts on known deposits. 
6.2.2 Reserve Risk 
This is not to say that geological risk is non-existent. On the contrary, reserve risk, i. e. 
the risk that recoverable reserves are not as large as expected, is still present. In the case 
of a marginal deposit, a lower than expected recovery can undermine the economic 
viability of a project. As 93% of the proposed and operational projects involving western 
investors encompass previously discovered deposits based on Soviet-era evaluation and 
classification techniques, reserve risk cannot be ignored. Furthermore, reserve estimation 
for rehabilitation projects based on previously producing fields will be more difficult to 
assess, as compared with green field deposits, due to formation damage caused by past 
practices of predatory exploitation and the extensive use of water flooding. 13 In the 
meantime, the international oil community is trying to reconcile the discrepancy between 
13 This is particularly relevant in the older producing regions of the Volga Urals and Western Siberia 
see Marshall I. Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum Half-empty or half-full? (London: George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1980): pp 34,121-125; Leslie Dienes, Istvan Dobozi and Marian Radetzki, Energy 
and Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union, (London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1994): pp 42,48, 
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the Russian classification of reserves and that produced by the Society of Petroleum 
Engineers (SPE). 
6.2.3 Comparison of Reserve Classification Systems 
Historically, FSU oil reserves have been classified as state secrets thus verification and/or 
reconciliation of the Russian classification system versus the western notion of 
commercially recoverable reserves has been difficult. Considerable disagreement still 
exists between geologists as to whether Russian estimates are realistic. Russian reserve 
estimates have traditionally been based on technical feasibility rather than economic 
feasibility, thus giving an inherent upward bias from a western perspective. Similarly, 
unrealistic recovery rates (e. g. 100%) were sometimes used, thus creating a further 
upward bias on reserves estimates. As the management of the oil industry in the USSR 
was rent-seeking as opposed to profit-seeking, 14 rewards were extracted from the State on 
the basis of meeting planned targets. Thus reserve figures were manipulated by rent- 
seeking state enterprises. Initial estimates of oil and gas reserves could be inflated in 
order to gain the maximum allocation of state credits, but once a field was put into 
production the reserves could then be down-graded to reduce the annual production 
schedule set by Moscow. 15 It is paramount that western investors be able to quantify this 
uncertainty -a comparison between Russian reserve figures and their western equivalent 
is necessary. Figure 6.1 is a general correlation between the Russian reserve classification 
system and that of the SPE. 16 According to the American system "... reserves are 
considered proved if commercial producibility of the reservoir is supported by actual 
production or formation tests. " 17 Whereas, unproved reserves, divisible into probable 
14 Anders Aslund, How Russia Became A Market Economy, (Washington, DC.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1995): p 161. `Rent-seeking' behaviour is the effort to gain income by controlling the supply 
of a scare resource or factor of production. See also Janos Kornai "The Soft Budget Constraint, " in The 
Road to Cauitalism Economic Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, David 
Kennett and Marc Leiberman eds., (Orlando, FL.: The Dryden Press, 1992): pp 15-26. 
15 Joseph A. Kliger, Business Ventures in the Former Soviet Union: Negotiation and Protocol Do's 
and Don'ts, (Tulsa, OK.: PennWell Publishing Company, 1994): p 132. 
16 "Definitions for Oil & Gas Reserves, " reprinted in Allen & Seba (1993) supra note 5, pp 47-49. 
17 Ibid., p 48. 
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and possible categories, are those "reserves... based on geologic and/or engineering data 
similar to that used in estimates of proved reserves; but technical, contractual, economic, 
or regulatory uncertainties preclude such reserves being classified as proved. " 18 If 
reserves fall into the proved and probable category they are referred to as 2P reserves, 
whereas if the possible category is also included they become classified as 3P reserves. 
Figure 6.1 Comparison of Reserve Classification Systems 
Russian Reserve asst cation SPE Reserve Classificat-ion 
Proven Reserves under 
Production 
rove - Producing 
Reserves under eve opment Proved - Undeveloped 3P 2P 
Industrial, Promyshlennye zapasy Probable - Undeveloped 
Prospective, Perspektivnye zapasy Possible (Geological? ) 
Tu- Potential 
D2 
Hypothetical 
Under the Russian Classification system, once a geological structure has been confirmed 
by an exploration/prospecting well (poiskovoeye burenie) the reserves are classified as C2 
which approximates the SPE classification of Possible. 19 Once these reserves are 
confirmed as commercially exploitable by appraisal drilling, alternatively known as 
outlining wells (razvedochnoye burenie), they are classified as CI roughly corresponding 
to the SPE classification of Probable. 20 Reserves under development are classified as B 
corresponding to SPE classification of Proved-Undeveloped and actual reserves under 
production are classified as A corresponding to the Proved-Developed category. 21 
Finally the Russian system contains two other very loose categories for which there 
seems to be no western equivalent. These are recoverable reserves in undeveloped 
formations which are either classified as DO - Potential Reserves, or Dl &D2- 
18 Ibid., p 49. 
19 Gustafson (1989) supra note 12, p 71. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Colin Glazebrook (Executive Director of Trans-Georgian Petroleum Ltd. ), "Trans Georgian 
Petroleum, Exploration, Production and Refinery Projects in the Republic of Georgia Summary, " Personal 
Communication held in author's file, 9 Jan. 1995. 
211 
Hypothetical Reserves. 22 The Russian Petroleum Investor espouses an adjusted formula 
to estimate the SPE equivalent of 2P reserves from Russian reserve data: 23 
Proven + Probable Reserves =++, 
where k is a factor between 0.7 - 0.9 
The intent of the formula is to discount Russian reserves, although the correction appears 
to be small and only applies to the Cl category. Therefore, it seems possible to loosely 
correlate Soviet reserve figures with their western counterparts, although the analysis 
cannot be extended to Russian periphery classifications as there is no realistic western 
equivalent. But at least the A, B and Cl categories have a western analogy. However, 
such a conclusion must be judged more as a `rule of thumb' as opposed to a fundamental 
truth. Certainly for the purpose of raising financing such a correlation will not be 
acceptable, and therefore the prudent investor has little choice other than to re-evaluate 
the reserves as the principle means of reducing reserve risk. 
6.2.4 Reserve Re-evaluation 
The general premise that Russian reserve figures are over-estimated has a two-fold 
significance. Firstly, if Russian reserves are over-optimistic then the 
capitalisation/reserve ratio for Russian oil companies24 is artificially low. Therefore their 
stock is not as undervalued as they appear, thus making them less attractive for investors 
from a potential capital gains perspective. Similarly, if reserves are being booked25 based 
on technical viability, without regard for commercial, the earning potential of these assets 
is being overstated. These are serious concerns for portfolio investors, but maybe less of 
a concern for IOCs who purchase blocks of equity in a domestic company for the 
purposes of forming a strategic alliance, as was the case of ARCO buying into LUKoi1. 
22 "A Second Look, " R. P. I.. Mar. 1995, p 61. 
23 "A Matter of Semantics, " R. P. L. Mar. 1995, p 60. 
24 This would apply equally to any domestic FSU companies who's stock is openly traded on an 
exchange. Hitherto, only Russia has developed an active stock market for oil and gas stocks. Kazakhstan 
will likely be next as it has a nascent stock market and is in the process of privatising Yuzhneftegaz, 
Aktyubinskneft and the Chimkent Refinery. 
25 "Booked" means recording the reserves as an asset on the balance sheet. 
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Secondly, for any investor (either domestic or foreign) trying to raise financing for a 
upstream development project, the reserves represent the key cash generating asset to 
service debt and earn a profit. Companies which raise equity financing risk a serious 
devaluation of their stock if their reserve estimates are overestimated. 26 Similarly, 
companies who choose a project financing approach based on Russian reserve estimates 
would theoretically face much more stringent coverage ratios. However, it may be stated 
as a fundamental principle of investment banking, that a project sponsor could not raise 
western sourced debt capital without first re-evaluating those reserves according to 
internationally accepted standards. 27 
While data on coverage ratios in the FSU is difficult to obtain, project financing 
experience gained in the North Sea provides an illustrative analogy. For instance, when 
the North Sea oil province initially opened-up project sponsors faced much tougher Loan 
Life Cover Ratios (LLCRs) and Project Life Cover Ratios (PLCRs)28 than is the case 
today. A 1976 credit agreement involving the Bank of Scotland used a PLCR between 
2.25 - 2.50: 1 -a figure which can be assumed as being representative of that period. 29 
Today LLCR and PLCR have typically fallen to 1.4 - 1.5: 1 and 1.75 - 2.0: 1 respectively 
for the North Sea. 30 The loosening up of coverage ratios is indicative of the progression 
26 This was the case of Vanguard Petroleum, an Australian firm which raised equity financing for the 
development of oil fields in Khanty-Mansiysk region of Russia. The reserve estimates for the Yuzhnoye 
field was subsequently lowered by 55%, causing its stock to drop from a high of 99.25 pence in 1994 to a 
mid-March price of 22.75 pence and also jeopardised an EBRD loan. "Guesstimates, " R. P. I., Apr. 1995, p 
67. 
27 Author's interview with Andrew W. Wright (manager of N. M. Rothschild & Sons Ltd. ), London, 
7 Dec. 1995; and with Luke Bridgeman & Vadim Benyatov of Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, London, 7 Sept. 
1995. 
28 LLCR is calculated by dividing the net present value of the future cash flow during the remaining 
loan life by the debt outstanding at the beginning of the discounting period. Similarly the PLCR is 
calculated by dividing the net present value of the total future cash flow by the debt outstanding at the 
beginning of the discounting period. The difference between the two is known as a Buffer which can be 
relied upon if the project under-performs. 
29 In this particular case the covenants within the credit agreement did not include the use of the 
LLCR, however, it would not be unreasonable to assume that if it had the then LLCR would be 
approximately 20-25% less than the PLCR based on today's figures. These assumptions are based on a 
written correspondence with K. J. Simpson (Assistant Manager, International Division, Oil & Energy 
Department, Bank of Scotland) dated 22 Nov. 1995, held in the author's personal file. 
30 Ibid. and Ian Ross (Chief Manager, International Division, Oil & Energy Department, Bank of 
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of banks' evaluation of risk - both geological and technical risks associated with North 
Sea projects have been reduced over time. In the case of the 1972 Forties field financing, 
the consortium of banks were willing to take on geological risk but they were not willing 
to assume the technical risk of extraction. 31 The banks assumed reservoir risk because 
the size and quality of the deposit was amply supported by extensive well data. But, they 
did not take on the technical risk of extraction because of the uncertainty of operating in 
the harsh frontier conditions of the North Sea. 
In the FSU, sole reliance on Russian reserve figures would be unacceptable from the 
point of view of raising external financing or indeed as part of a prudent company's 
internal due diligence procedures. The point of this discussion is to illustrate that any 
ambiguity surrounding reserve estimates or technical feasibility will penalise a project 
sponsor's ability to raise credit. While the current PLCRs and LLCRs seen in the North 
Sea could be considered the barest minimum in the context of the FSU it seems intuitive 
that a premium would be applied to account for the additional country risks. Taken at 
face value this would be true, but there are other instruments for mitigating risks. N. M. 
Rothschild used a LLCR and a PLCR of approximately 1.5: 1 and 2: 1 respectively for a 
mining venture in the CIS, because it used political risk insurance to mitigate the risks of 
expropriation and the inability to export gold. 32 Therefore the costs of mitigating other 
country risks were already internalised into the financial structure and accounted for in 
the LLCR and PLCR, and as such an additional premium was not applied to these ratios. 
Scotland), "Financing Independent Oil Projects, " Presentation to CPMLP, University of Dundee, Dundee, 
4 Feb. 1994; Stephen Mills, "Project Financing of Oil and Gas Field Developments: The Banker's View, " 
O. G. L. T. R 11/12 (1993): p 364; and A. S. Whyatt, "The Anatomy and importance of Project Finance for 
Oil and Gas Developments, " SPE # 24247,1992, p 3. 
31 Quentin Morris, "How BP raised its £360 million (or why there were 170 pages of legal 
documentation), " Euromoney Aug. 1972, p 16. 
32 While not explicitly stated, the likely reference is to the Zarafshan-Newmont gold heap-leaching 
project at the Marantau mine in Uzbekistan. Author's interview with Andrew W. Wright (manager of 
N. M. Rothschild & Sons Ltd. ), London, 7 Dec. 1995. 
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But the fact remains that internationally accepted reserve re-evaluation is the basic 
starting point and in this regard a project evaluated purely on a geological basis can be 
treated equally to a project in the Americas or anywhere else in the world. Additional 
measures to eliminate other risks will be built into the project's financial structure as 
further costs, but the basic LLCR and a PLCR of approximately 1.5: 1 and 2: 1 
respectively seem reasonable. But in order to get to this stage, the geological ambiguity 
surrounding reserve estimates must be brought into line with western expectations, 
recognising however that reservoir risk can never be completely removed. As long as 
differences remain between western standards of reserve estimates and the original 
Russian figures (even if only perceived), prudent companies must opt to have their 
reserves re-evaluated using the SPE classification scheme which hinges crucially on 
commercial viability. This applies equally to domestic firms which are seeking financing 
from international sources 33 Chernogorneft opted for re-evaluation using both the 
Russian and western classification systems 34 Similarly, LUKoil began this task in 1995 
and Gazprom is apparently planning to do the same. 35 The importance of checking and 
verifying reserve figures is a commercial reality, part of every investor's due diligence. 
6.2.5 Additional Strategies for Reducing Reserve Risk 
Reserve risk can be further mitigated by using a staggered investment approach. Initially, 
the foreign company will need to expend risk capital from internal cash flow to prove-up 
reserves (this is an unavoidable expense for which commercial bank financing will not be 
available). As the old saying goes "... one does not ask one's banker for a loan to play 
roulette! " 36 The prior existence of reserves alone is not enough to satisfy the concerns of 
external creditors, otherwise raising financing would not be the challenge that is today in 
CIS. Companies will, in all likelihood, have to go as far as establishing early production 
33 CS First Boston, Russian Oil Production Sector A Gusher in Russia? Part I. (London: CS First 
Boston, 2 Mar. 1995): p 13. 
34 Ibid. 
35 "A Second Look, " R. P. I.. Mar. 1995, p 61. 
36 Alain Brion, "Oil -a risk business, " Petroleum Review. Apr. 1989, p 190. 
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before further development financing can be sought. If one is seeking external financing 
it is necessary to establish the revenue generating capability of the asset, not just in theory 
but in practice. Such a strategy does not eliminate reserve risk altogether, but the 
additional information gained in establishing early production reduces some of the 
uncertainty. 
Perhaps the ultimate method to reduce reserve risk is to transfer it altogether to another 
party, and this is what was achieved by Phibro Energy and Anglo-Suisse in their 1990 JV 
agreement with Varyeganneftegas. Consider the following excerpt from Article 1.9.1.3: 
"... in the event that the extraction from the Tagrinsky and West- 
Varyegansky fields fall[s] short of the minimum required capacity of these 
fields [75 MMt], or in the event that the extraction from the Roslavlsky 
field falls short of the required minimum capacity of the field [40 MMt], 
Varyeganneftegas will present additional deposit fields for the exclusive 
exploration and production by the joint venture sufficient to meet the 
required minimum extraction from all the fields. " 37 (emphasis added) 
This is truly remarkable, the western partners are guaranteed access to reserves of 115 
MMt (836 MMbbls) even if the original fields fail to provide such reserves. This is the 
essence of the attraction of the FSU from a geological perspective -- the plentiful 
existence of known but hitherto undeveloped deposits. The White Nights 7V is but one 
of the many deals with western partners in the FSU, and is not a particularly large project. 
But those who have followed the saga of the White Nights JV will realise, even the 
presence of guaranteed reserves has done little to compensate for the myriad of other 
investments risks plaguing this particular project. However, the idea of transferring 
reserve risk to the domestic partner is innovative, but we suspect this strategy was only 
possible during the earliest times of contact between domestic companies and western 
investors. We have been unable to find similar provisions in other contracts and doubt 
whether such concessions would be acceptable to domestic partners today. 
37 Art. 1(9)(1)(3), "White Nights Contract of 12 Oct. 1990 (Phibro Energy/Anglo-Suisse)" English 
Translation and excerpts from reprinted in Basic Oil Law's Russia & NIS. Vol. 1(New York, NY.: 
Barrows, 1993): p 300; and "The White Nights Contract: Selected Excerpts, " P. I. W., 5 Aug. 1995, p 1. 
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6.2.6 Geological Risk Summary 
While the emphasis of western companies activities is the development of previously 
discovered deposits, geological risk remains low, although reserve risk is exacerbated by 
an information gap. As the gap is narrowed, reserve risk will decrease to a point more in 
line with international expectations. In the case of green field exploration, discovery risk 
exists but is mitigated to by the region's favourable geology. Overall, geological risk is 
minor as compared to other investment risks and should decrease with time. 
The significance of current western companies strategies is that the majority of potential 
projects being considered require development financing as opposed to exploration 
financing (i. e. risk capital). Risk capital has typically been sourced from a company's 
internal cash flow. The only real exceptions being selective World Bank support for 
exploration activities in oil importing countries in the early 1980s and the use of public 
drilling funds in the US in the late 1960s. In general, exploration is not debt financed. 
On the other hand, debt financing (either syndicated loans or project financing) is suited 
to development projects. This does not imply that such financing will be arranged in the 
FSU but at least the 93% of possible western upstream activity in the FSU is theoretically 
suited for debt financing should a company's internal funds be insufficient. 
Reserve re-evaluation and a staggered investment strategy are being employed to reduce 
reserve risk, while farm-in's represent a practical means of spreading such risk. The idea 
of transferring reserve risk to the domestic partner has been tried and exemplifies the 
difference between development based projects and pure exploration plays 38 But we feel 
it is unlikely that domestic companies will be willing to make such concessions in the 
future. As far as we can ascertain this approach has not been widely employed. 
38 Arthur D. Little, "Oil and Gas Agreements for the Development Existing Reserves, " Paper 
presented at the APIN Fall Conference. 12 Oct. 1995. 
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6.3 Environmental Risk 
The environmental track record of industry in the FSU has been abysmal. 39 Because 
former centrally planned economies concentrated on production with little regard for 
proper pricing (i. e. subsidisation), waste and energy inefficiency were endemic 40 The 
energy sector has been perhaps the worst culprit. A report by the MFE estimates that 
energy sector enterprises are responsible for 48% of harmful atmospheric emissions, 35% 
of waste water and over 30% of all solid wastes in Russia. 41 Within the petroleum 
industry the principal sources of damage are oil spills caused by environmentally 
unsound production, drilling and pipeline operations including the flaring of associated 
gas 42 Over a long period of time a massive environmental debt has accumulated. 43 A 
debt which unfortunately continues to grow« but must be eventually cleared. 
In view of the domestic shortage of investment funds, FDI offers a realistic means of 
amortising eco-debts at the present time. Multinational corporations acting as `good 
corporate citizens' will invest in measures to improve and clean-up the local environment 
associated with their operations. But a clear distinction needs to be made between 
voluntary and/or pre-agreed actions taken to help amortise past eco-debts and strict 
liability for past eco-debts. The uncertainty surrounding environmental requirements is 
39 Murray Feshback, Ecological Disaster. Cleaning Uy the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime, 
(New York, NY.: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995); and Murray Feshback and Alfred Friendly Jr., 
Ecocide in the USSR, (New York, NY.: Basic Books, 1992). 
40 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Energy Efficiency Technologies for Central and 
Eastern Europe, OTA-E-562 (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, May 1993): pp 53-56. 
41 lEA, Energy Policy of the Russian Federation 1995 Survey. (Paris: IEA/OECD, 1995): p 71. 
42 Ibid., p 96. 
43 Steven W. Popper, "Conversion, Regional Economies, and Direct Foreign Investment in Russia. " 
in The Former Soviet Union in Transition, US Congress, Eds. Richard F. Kaufman and John P. Hardt 
(Armonk, NY.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993): pp 767-782. 
44 The frequency at which further incidents of environmental damage occur was exemplified by an 
oil spill in the Komi region during the autumn of 1994. Officials records from the Russian Ministry for 
Civil Defence, Emergency Situations and Elimination of Natural Calamities show that 32 major pipeline 
accidents occurred in 1993 alone. Moreover, it has been estimated that 10 - 20% [sic) of all oil shipped 
through pipelines is lost due to leakage. Justin Dye and John Patterson, " The Komi spill was not an 
isolated incident, " Petroleum Review, Dec. 1994, p 566. 
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recognised by the EBRD as a "... major deterrent to those considering investing" 45 The 
IEA goes one step further by stating that "a key issue will be finding a means to protect 
new operators from financial liability for pre-existing environmental damage. "46 
A natural side-effect of current IOC strategy to minimise geological risk by concentrating 
efforts on known deposits has been to increase their exposure to eco-debts. Previous 
production has left a legacy of environmental damage associated with individual deposits, 
many of which still possess reserves that are attractive to foreign investors. Is it realistic 
to expect IOCs to take responsibility for this damage? That depends on whether a 
western company can calculate to a reasonable degree of certainty, the limits of its 
exposure to past eco-debts - no company will write a blank cheque for environmental 
risks. Furthermore, the severity of this disincentive will partially depend on a company's 
alternative investment opportunities. A company which lacks any alternatives is more 
likely to take on the risk of potential environmental liability. Consider, for instance, the 
position of Dana Petroleum, an Irish based exploration company which sought listing on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in the spring of 1996. Its principal activity is to 
develop jointly with some Russian companies the Vat-Yoganskoye and Sortymskoye oil 
fields in Western Siberia. In its prospectus, it included the following environmental 
caveat to its potential shareholders. 
"The Company's operations are subject to the environmental risks 
inherent in the oil and gas industry. The legal framework for 
environmental liability and clean-up [in Russia] is not yet fully developed. 
Local, regional and national authorities may adopt stricter environmental 
standards than those now in effect and may move towards more stringent 
enforcement of existing laws and regulations. The level of pollution and 
potential clean-up is impossible to assess against the current legal 
framework and without a consistent interpretation and enforcement of laws 
by the Government. 
The Company is unable to predict the effect of any additional regulations 
that may be adopted in the future, including whether any such laws or 
regulations would increase the cost to the Company of doing business or 
45 Jacques de Larosiere (President of the EBRD), "Forward" in EBRD, 
Guidelines, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, Estonia. Hungary 
Romania, (London: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): p xxiii. 
46 IEA (1995) supra note 41, p 96. 
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require alternation or cessation of its operations in any area. Accordingly, 
the extent of potential liability, if any, for the costs of abatement of 
environmental hazards cannot be accurately determined and, 
consequently, no assurances can be given that the costs of implementing 
environmental measures in the future will not be material. " 47 
For small exploration and production companies the securing of one or more contracts in 
the FSU often represents the "big opportunity" or the "spring-broad" for launching a 
new international company. For such a company, a decision not to invest due to potential 
environmental liabilities would mean for all intents and purposes the cessation of the 
company's entire operations or its very raison d'etre. It is clear that Dana recognises this 
risk and warns its shareholders of the possible adverse financial consequences, but 
nevertheless the project proceeds, as it must. The fact that Dana successfully raised £11.7 
million ($18 million)48 suggests that investors have discounted this risk. JKX Oil & Gas 
plc is another exploration company with upstream prospects in Ukraine, Georgia and 
Dagestan (an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation). Their placing and public 
offer was oversubscribed 2.1 times on the LSE in July 1995.49 In the case of JKX their 
prospectus contained no explicit environmental caveat, only a warning that future 
legislative changes may have adverse consequence on the company's operations 5° 
Whether the shareholders of these companies are really aware of the potential 
environmental liabilities is thus debatable, if they are, then the environmental risk is 
being heavily discounted, but this would not be so surprising as these stocks are generally 
of a speculative nature. Clearly shareholders in these companies are not risk-averse. 
Environmental concerns are equally valid to suppliers of debt capital who are concerned 
about their potential liability as a lender (i. e. issue of "lender liability"). 51 In project 
47 Dana Petroleum p1c., Admission to the Official lists of the London Stock Exchange and Irish 
Stock Exchange, Placing, Oven Offer and Intermediate Offer. Dec. 1995, p 23. 
48 "Dana Petroleum Raises £11.7 million, " Financial Times, 25 Jan. 1996, p 28; and author's 
telephone conversation with Thomas Cross (CEO, Dana Petroleum) on 1st Feb. 1996. 
49 "News in Brief, " Petroleum Review, Aug. 1995, p 343. 
50 JKX Oil & Gas p1c., Placing and Public Offer, Jun. 1995, p 29. 
51 See Patrica Thomas, Chairman, Environmental Liability: IBA Section on Business Law 7th 
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financing a lender could be made directly liable for non-compliance as a result of their 
participation in the project. Institutions such as the EBRD and IFC carry out stringent 
environmental due diligence and evaluation process to assess "... environmental, health, 
and safety risk and liabilities associated with past and present practices, potential future 
impacts, and appraise the adequacy of mitigation measures selected to reduce adverse 
environmental impacts. " 52 Perhaps the EBRD's announcement (in May 1995, just two 
months prior to JKX's public placing) to approve an $8 million loan for the Poltava 
project gave some comfort to potential shareholders in allaying any environmental fears 
by in inferring that the outcome of the bank's environmental audit must have been 
favourable. In the case of portfolio investors such as pension funds or mutual funds, their 
managers have a fiduciary duty to protect their stock-holders. Management could be 
found negligent for investing money in a venture which resulted in an onerous 
environmental liability causing a substantial loss to the fund. 
In summary the legacy of environmental damage in the FSU is widespread -- each FSR 
has inherited a substantial amount of eco-debts which must be amortised. In view of the 
domestic shortage of investment funds, foreign direct investment offers a realistic means 
of paying off these debts. However, a distinction needs to be made between a voluntary 
or pre-agreed response and compulsory expenditures imposed retroactively because of an 
incurred liability for past environmental damage. Companies which act as `good 
corporate citizens' are willing to assist in improving the local conditions of their 
operations, but they will be strongly opposed to having those obligations legally forced 
upon them. Under the present circumstances, the uncertain treatment of liability for past 
damage is a disincentive for investment. Furthermore, western companies pursuing a 
Residential Seminar on Environmental Law. 9-13 June 1990. Switzerland. IBA Series. (London: Graham 
& Trotman, 1991); M. J. Kiernan., "Corporate Greening, " Environment Resources Journal. Mar. 1993; and 
"Rethink on Lender Liability, " Environment Resources Journal. May 1993. 
52 Mehrdad Nazari (Environmental Appraisal Unit, EBRD), "Environmental Appraisal of Mining 
Projects: A Lenders Approach and Perspective, " Paper presented to the CPMLP International Mining 
Investment and Regulation Seminar 1995, University of Dundee. Scotland. 4-8 Sent. 1995, p 3. 
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strategy which concentrates on existing deposits rather than greenfield sites increase their 
exposure to environmental liability as many of the sites are already contaminated 
6.4 Conclusion 
Geological Risk appears to be the least acute of all, particularly as the focus of western 
interest is previously discovered deposits, but its two components differ widely. As long 
as IOCs are not engaging in pure exploration, discovery risk is essentially negligible. 
However, the risk that insufficient reserves exist is exacerbated by the current information 
gap. Until a time when FSU reserve estimates are reconciled with the more pervasive 
standard developed by the SPE, reserve risk remains higher than is normally the case. 
Reserve re-evaluation, a staggered investment strategy and farm-ins are the principal 
means available for mitigating or diversifying reserve risk. The innovative approach of 
Phibro and Anglo-Suisse to transfer reserve risk to the local partner is unlikely to be 
acceptable in the future and will probably become a relic of the early transition period. 
There is little doubt that the legacy of environmental damage in the FSU is widespread 
and liability for past damage is an investment risk for foreign investors. But, because 
93% of potential upstream projects involve existing deposits this suggests that western 
investors do believe the risks associated with environmental liability are outweighed by 
the potential rewards. The success of public placements by companies such as Dana 
Petroleum or JKX Oil and Gas support this viewpoint. We argued that for these small 
companies, their FSU operations represent their core activity -- a decision not too invest 
would mean for all intents and purposes, the cessation of the company's entire operations. 
Major IOCs will likely take a much more critical view of environmental liability as they 
have `deep pockets'. The extensive Environmental Impact Assessment carried out by 
Arthur D. Little on behalf of the North Caspian Seismic Consortium attests to the 
environmental awareness of the largest oil companies in the FSU. However, in this 
particular case liability for past environmental damage was less of an issue, as their 
activities in the north-eastern quadrant of the Caspian Sea represents one of the largest 
and most important greenfield exploration ventures in the FSU. 
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7. POLITICAL RISK 
7.1 What is Political Risk? 
Political risk is and always will be an unavoidable aspect of international business., 
Despite substantial analysis and literature on the subject2, political risk suffers from 
definitional ambiguities. Little consensus as to what actually constitutes political risk 
exists. 3 As far as the oil industry is concerned political risk can be broadly defined as 
anything non-geological. 4 We choose to define political risk as the probability of a 
commercial operation being adversely affected by politically caused actions or 
circumstances over which a foreign investor has little or no control. Our definition 
undoubtedly has a wide ambit, as it not only includes the traditional risks of expropriation 
and nationalisation, but also includes restrictions on foreign exchange or profit 
repatriation, adverse tax changes, abrogation of contracts, insecurity of tenure, forced re- 
negotiation, or even discriminatory access to export routes/quotas. In any of these latter 
i Lax (1983) infra note 2, p 175. 
2 On the general subject of political risk an the international oil industry see Andrew Seck, 
"Investing in the Former Soviet Union's Oil Industry: The Energy Charter Treaty and its Implications for 
Mitigating Political Risk, " in The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade, 
Ed. Thomas W. Walde, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996): pp 110-134; Proceedings of AIPN 
1996 Fall Conference on Managing Political Risk in the Next Millennium, Banff, Alberta. 22-25 Sept. 
1996. Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, "Political Risk and Petroleum Investment in Russia, " 
Currents (Summer, 1993): pp 48-56; M. V. Makhija, "Government Intervention in the Venezuelan 
Petroleum Industry An Empirical Investigation of Political Risk, " J. I. B. S. 24 (1993): pp 531-555; Panos E. 
Cavoulacos, Charles R. Blitzer and David G. Laughton, "Project-Level Political Risk and Petroleum 
Project Evaluation, " Working Paper no. 6-89, Institute for Financial Research, Faculty of Business, 
University of Alberta, Sept. 1992; James Bond and Ted Gorton, "Non-Commercial Risk and Financing 
Energy Investments in the Least Developed Countries, " paper presented at the SPE Conference on Oil & 
Gas Economics, Finance and Management. London, 28-29 Apr. 1992; Thomas Stauffer, "Political Risk and 
Overseas Oil Investment. " SPE Technical Paper #18514 (1988); Hansen Zakariya, "Political Risk 
Insurance in Petroleum Investment, " in Nicky Beredjick and Thomas Wälde eds., Petroleum Investment 
Policies in Developing Countries, (London: Graham & Trotman, 1988): pp 205-233; H. G. Broadman, 
"Political Risk in the International Oil Industry, " Energy Policy 14 (1986): pp 178-180; R. E. Megill, 
Review of Political Risk and the International Oil and Gas Industry, by H. L. Lax, A. A. P. G. Bulletin 67 
(1983): p 2265; H. L. Lax, Political Risk in the International Oil and Gas Industry, (Boston, MA.: 
International Human Resources Development Corp., 1983); C. A. Gebelin, C. E. Pearson and M. Silbergh, 
"Assessing Political Risk of Oil Investment Ventures, " reprinted in Economics & Finance, SPE Reprint 
Series No. 16, (Dallas, TX.: SPE, 1982): pp 67-72; and F. Ghadar, "Political Risk and the Erosion of 
Control - The Case of the Oil Industry, " C. J. W. B. 17 (1982): pp 47-5 1. 
3 Jeffrey D. Simon, "Political Risk Assessment: Past Trends And Future Prospects, " C. J. W. B. (Fall, 
1982): p 62. In this article, eighteen definitions of political risk (from different sources) are presented, 
none are identical yet all possess similarities. 
4 Bond and Gorton (1992) supra note 2, p 8. 
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circumstances, the key is a unilateral changes in circumstances imposed on a foreign 
investor to their detriment under the auspices of the government or one of its agents. 
However, politically motivated actions outside the authority of the government may also 
impose hardship on foreign investors. Non-governmental forms of insecurity such as 
insurgency, civil war, terrorism or rioting can be of equal concern. Political risk may be a 
singular measure, like nationalisation, or it could be more gradual whereby the 
compounded effect of many minor actions may have the equivalent effect of the former 
(often referred to as creeping expropriation). Here the dilemma is to distinguish between 
what is legitimate regulation on behalf of a government and what constitutes concerted 
discriminatory action directed against a foreign investor. 6 
In light of the above, an investor must continually anticipate, identify and monitor 
political risks in response to a changing investment climate -- this is particularly relevant 
to the FSU where the situation is extremely fluid and IOCs are contemplating capital 
intensive, long-term upstream projects. In §5.4.2 we ranked the world's oil reserves 
according to Euromoney's country risk ranking in order to illustrate the differing attitudes 
towards political risk between IOCs and commercial banks. This chapter builds on this 
earlier discussion. Our aim is not to reinvent the "political risk wheel" but rather to 
provide a current analysis as it pertains to foreign investments in the oil industries of the 
FSU and provide some new insight into what is already a well established area of 
research. 
7.2 Nationalisation and Expropriation 
Traditionally, political risk was more commonly known as hostile government actions 
such as the wholesale expropriation and nationalisation of investors' assets - indeed the 
frequency of such actions in the oil industry in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the 
5 Unilateral in the sense that the foreign investor has little or no control. 
6 Abba Kolo, "State Regulation of Foreign Property Rights: Between legitimate regulation and 
nationalisation - an analysis of current international economic law in light of the jurisprudence by the 
Iran/US claims Tribunal" Ph. D. diss., CEPMLP, University of Dundee, 1994. 
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stature of political risk. For IOCs operating in the FSU the conditions of entry are 
radically different to the initial circumstances experienced by the global oil industry 
which eventually led to the Middle Eastern expropriations. In a study from the 1980s 
Fariborz Ghadar, argued that "... a significant part of political risk results from erosion of 
control. "7 As an IOC losses control of its operations, political risk increases. 
"Nationalisation is merely the last step in a logical sequence that occurs when the firm 
loses control over the crucial elements of its operation. "8 By comparing the change in 
level of state ownership surrounding ten such nationalisation's, 9 the initial position of the 
foreign investor vis-ä-vis the government is shown to be a crucial ingredient. In each of 
these cases the foreign investor entered or created a nascent production operation in 
which the percentage of state control was very low (typically less than ten percent). At 
that point in time, the state's primary concern was monetary (i. e. extracting an economic 
rent from the foreign company). '° As the nation's economy expands, the host 
government desires an assimilation of the oil industry enclave into the rest of its 
economy. " This event marks the beginning of conflict between the two parties and the 
erosion of control by the foreign investor. The graphs for each country presented in 
Ghadar's article are not identical, but they are all similar in the fact that the increased 
percentage of state participation is shown as a line trending upwards from left to right 
(some of which are reproduced in Figure 7.1). The exact pattern is dependent on the 
individual actions taken by each government. 
7 Ghadar (1982) supra note 2, p 47. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Iran, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria and Abu Dhabi. 
10 Ghadar (1982) supra note 2, p 48. 
11 This usually begins with the desire for a two way interaction between the local economy and the 
enclave oil industry (e. g. supplying the local market with petroleum, foreign companies will purchase 
goods and services from the local economy and train nationals for employment). Typically, the loss of 
foreign control begins in the domestic marketing, followed by refining, and then finally in the crude 
production operations themselves. Ghadar (1982) supra note 2, pp 50-51. 
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Contrasted with the current situation in the FSU, an entirely different perception of 
nationalisation or expropriation arises. When the FSU dissolved in 1991, all three 
segments of the existin oil industry, marketing, refining and production were 100% 
owned by the state - the exact inverse of the experience in the Middle-East, Mexico or 
for that matter Baku at the turn of this century. Of the three principal oil producing FSRs, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia, only the latter has hitherto established a significant 
change in domestic ownership. Azerbaijan has indicated that it has no intention of 
privatising its production although it is actively attracting foreign investment. 13 
Similarly, Kazakhstan has been very successful in attracting foreign investment, but has 
hitherto only tried to privatise three of its oil industry enterprises (Aktubinskneft, 
Chimkent Oil Refinery and Yuzhneftegas). 
The case of Russia is quite striking by comparison. The Russian State began to divest its 
interest in the oil sector in the spring and summer of 1993 when it created the holding 
companies of LUKoi1, Surgutneftegas, and Yukos. Since then others have been added 
making a total of 14 vertically integrated companies. While most of the production chain 
is under the control of private operators the state still maintains a 40 to 50% golden share 
in many of the firms. The exceptions appear to be LUKoil and KomiTEK in which the 
state only maintains a 20% interest. 14 Earlier the Russian Government announced its 
intention not to reduce its holding until at least the end of the decade although the 
controversial loan for shares scheme has at least temporarily relinquished some of the 
government's holding. Ultimately, the final ownership structure of Russia's oil industry 
remains uncertain. Meanwhile foreign oil companies through the use of JVs are actively 
involved in oil production, but their contribution to total Russian oil production remains 
quite small. 
13 Fuad Kuliev (Acting Prime Minister, Azerbaijan) responding to a question at the Adam Smitl 
Institute's Third International Conference on Marketisation of the Former Soviet Union: Financing tthe 
and Gas Sector Vienna. 22-23 Feb. 1995. see Andrew Seck, "Summary of Question and Answers, " in 
II Documentation. 
14 "Gaining Ground, " R. P. L. Aug. 1996, p 11. 
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Table 7.1 Contribution of Joint Ventures to Russian Oil Production and Exports 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total Production (MMt) 395.11 351.81 317.95 306.86 
JV Exclusive Product (MMt) 1.91 9.1' 8.45 10.86 
JV Production (% of Total) 0.5%1 2.6%1 2.6%5 3.5%6 
Total Exports ex-FSU (MMt) 66.22 79.82 91.85 95.64 
JV Exports (MMt) 4.63 7.83 9.75 11.55 
JV Exports (% of Total) 7%3 10%3 10.6%5 12%5 
JV Exports (MMt) MFE forecast N/A 10.07 12.67 15.37 
' PlanEcon Energy Report 5, no. 1 (Apr. 1995): p 6. 
2 IEA, Energy Policy of the Russian Federation 1995 Survey, p 130. 
3 Ibid., pp 120-121. 
4 Interfax Petroleum Report, 9-16 Feb. 1996, p 3. 
5 "Trading Places, " R. P. I.. Feb. 1996, p 46. 
6 "Appendix: Oil Production in 1995, " R. P. I.. Mar. 1996, p 85. 
7 Igor K. Lavrovsky, "Case Study of Joint Ventures in the Oil Sector or Russia, " Aug. 1993, p 9. 
Table 7.1 shows that in Russian JVs their exclusive production has only increased to 
3.5% of the total production by 1995. Foreign investors enjoy a slightly better position 
with respect to hard currency exports (i. e. outside of the FSU) which have increased from 
7% in 1992 to 12% in 1995, but are still below early Russian MFE estimates. So, 
although foreign companies are now operating in Russia their direct responsibility for 
production has remained quite small. This data can now be combined with the ongoing 
changes of the domestic industry to reveal a more complete ownership structure of 
Russian oil production. 
Figure 7.2 Estimated Ownership Structure of Russian Oil Production 
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The results contrast sharply with those of Ghadar's study. The dominance of foreign 
control does not exist - the most essential precondition of expropriation is absent. As to 
what will happen in the future, increased foreign involvement is likely as it is necessary. 
But based on the 1991 starting position foreign domination of the Russian oil industry is 
extremely unlikely (nor desirable). Even if the PSA framework is established in the next 
year or so and subsequent investment takes place, foreign controlled production will 
likely remain below 25%, even by the year 2010 in the best of circumstances Consider 
the following calculations based on estimated production rates for some the proposed 
PSAs in Russia. 
Table 7.2 Potential Contribution of Early PSAs to Russian Oil Production 
projects proceed and achieve peak production by the year 2010, one may generously 
estimate that 80 MIvltpy could be added to Russian production on-top of an assumed 
stabilised production of 310 MMtpy. If we then include the 5% `exclusive production' of 
JVs, the total production controlled by foreign investors would be at the very maximum 
24 to 25%. But this is unrealistic. Firstly, it is highly unlikely that peak production 
would be achieved so quickly - from the limited data available, start-up production 
varies anywhere from 50% to 60% of peak production; and secondly, with the exception 
of the Sakhalin projects which can use tankers for export, insufficient pipeline capacity 
currently exists to handle such an increase in production from Western Siberia and 
Timan-Pechora. Both these factors apply a downward pressure on immediate increases in 
foreign oil production on Russian soil, even if the proper legal and fiscal regimes were in 
place. Furthermore, just because these projects involve foreign investors, does not mean 
Assuming the worst case scenario (from a foreign dominance perspective) that all these 
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the latter control 100% of the production. Consider the MrB MS production sharing 
arrangement which contains the following terms: a royalty of 6%; a profit tax of 32%; 
and a before tax profit oil split for MIEA MS of 90: 10 if FIRR is less than 17.5%, 50: 50 if 
FIRR is between 17.5% and 24%, and 30: 70 if FIRR is greater than 24%. 15 Thus, it is 
somewhat unfair to attribute all the production of these projects to the category of foreign 
production - both Russia and the domestic partners will share in the revenues. 
However, the time needed to reach peak production and the limitation of existing export 
infrastructure will constrain increases in foreign `controlled' production in a physical 
sense and are easily appreciated. The division of revenue argument may not necessarily 
be appreciated by nationalists who are opposed to any foreign involvement at all costs. In 
their eyes a PSA is still a foreign-dominated project irrespective of the fiscal details. 
Given that foreign controlled production will be less than 25% of the total, the impetus 
for a one-off expropriation or nationalisation of foreign oil producing assets should not 
exist. The crucial ingredient outlined in Ghadar's study is missing. Thus, we believe the 
risk of out-right expropriation or nationalisation is minimal. 
This should not be construed as believing that Ghadar's earlier study is the only thesis on 
expropriation. After all history never repeats itself exactly. Nevertheless, the key 
ingredient which Ghadar identified - the foreign domination factor -- remains true. 
What likely varies over time and across cultures is the threshold level which triggers a 
hostile and nationalistic reaction. In the case of Russia, the actual percentage of FDI may 
not be so relevant as the public's perception of it whether justified or not. Perhaps only 
10% foreign controlled production would be enough to be considered a national threat. 
Despite the obvious uncertainties of establishing that critical hurdle rate, we believe it is 
important, that proponents of FDI grasp the thrust of Ghadar's earlier argument, as a 
means of placating the concerns of Russians who fear foreign domination of their oil 
15 "All's Well That Ends Well, " R. P. I.. July/Aug. 1994, pp 53-55,58. 
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industry; concerns which seem unjustified. However, this assessment is most relevant to 
the case of Russia where such a large oil industry already exists. 
In the case of the smaller producers such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan or 
Turkmenistan, such assessment is less straightforward. None of these countries are likely 
to privatise their oil sectors to the same extent as Russia has done, but due to their smaller 
size, large one-off foreign investments, such as Chevron's Tengiz project or AIOC'S 
offshore development project in the Caspian Sea could account for a substantial portion 
of the host country's future production. 
Oil production in Azerbaijan has been declining at an average of 5.1% per annum since 
its peak to result in a production level of 9.1 MMt in 1995. According to AIOC's 
projections, their project alone could be producing 700,000 bopd (35 MMtpy) in fifteen 
years time. Thus, this single project (for which SOCAR has a 10% equity stake) could 
account for 89% of Azerbaijan's production of crude oil in the year 2010. This is an 
extreme illustration as the calculations assume a continuing decline of existing production 
with no additional projects, which is unlikely to be the case. We do not believe that the 
current Azeri Government would even consider an outright expropriation of a foreign 
company's producing assets. The downside of such a response is overwhelmingly in 
favour of the international community at the present time. 16 But it is important to realise 
that conditions may arise similar to the situation which led to previous expropriations in 
the Middle-East - the overwhelming dominance of production by foreign oil companies. 
16 The geopolitics of the Transcaucasus is highly complex. Azerbaijan, located at the cross-roads of 
three former empires - the Persian, the Ottoman, and most recently the Russian - needs a western 
counter-balance to the latter. The country itself could not afford to turn its back on the West, unless it was 
willing to subordinate itself to the Russian Federation. 
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Now consider the production forecast for Kazakhstan. 
Table 7.3 Forecast of Oil Production in Kazakhstan 
19952 
Total Oil Production (MMt) 
- 
20.6 1 26.3 1 3U. 6 1 33.5 1 40.0 1 4" 
ercentage by Joint Ventures T76) 13.9% 1 29.0'10 .o . 3U. 9/o 31.3% M . )/o 1 46.7% o 
All figures from 1996 onwards are based on estimates provided by Munaigaz. "Kazakhstan Hopes to 
Triple its Oil Output by the Year 2010, " Interfax Petroleum Report, 17-24 Nov. 1995, p 10. 
2 Interfax Petroleum Report. 12- 19 Jan. 1996, p 22. 
In 1995 JVs with foreign partners accounted for 13.9% of all oil production jn 
Kazakhstan (a percentage which is considerably higher than the 1995 figure for Russia). 
Clearly the Government of Kazakhstan intends that foreign investment will play a very 
large role in the development of its oil industry. By the year 2010 some 57% of 
Kazakhstan's oil production will come from foreign companies - with the 
TengizChevroil JV contributing about 36 MMt (i. e. 51% of total oil production or 89% of 
foreign contributions). It seems that Kazakhstan's intended production profile is quite 
balanced with respect to the interests of both foreign companies and state-owned 
companies. Whether such a profile will materialise is a matter of conjecture similar to 
that provided for Azerbaijan. But comparing the two, other things being equal, 
Kazakhstan's scenario is less exposed to the risks of nationalisation or expropriation 
because of a more balanced production profile between foreign investors and domestic 
entities. 
Somewhere there exists a balance, clearly foreign interests can expand considerably in all 
oil producing FSRs, more so than they have done to-date, without raising the sceptre of 
outright nationalisation. We conclude the risk of out-right expropriation or 
nationalisation is extremely low at the present time. But it will be up to both parties, 
particularly the foreign companies to manage their assets in such a manner that an 
equitable distribution of rewards remains for as long a period as possible. The analysis 
carried out by Ghadar in 1982 is just as relevant -today and must not be forgotten. The 
essential precondition of expropriation or nationalisation is the overwhelming dominance 
of foreign interests in a country's oil production. Equally though, the occurrence of 
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actual losses due to nationalisation are in fact quite rare. '? But one must never be too 
complacent about the future even if the risks are at present quite low. As stated earlier 
political risks must be continually anticipated, identified and monitored in response to a 
changing investment climate. What is of immediate concern for foreign investors is risk 
of creeping expropriation due to the nascent legal and fiscal regimes. 
7.3 Creeping Expropriation 
Creeping expropriation is the risk of unilateral renegotiation, government sponsored 
interference with operations or adverse tax changes having the equivalent effect of 
expropriation. A host state may decide to take advantage of its position during the 
project cycle due to a condition known as obsolescing bargaining. 18 As Raymond 
Vernon, the father of the theory explains, the initial concession contract between an 
investor and host government will likely be tilted towards the former in order to 
compensate for high up-front risks associated with a resource extractive project. But 
once a project is on-line and profitable, the bargaining position shifts in favour of the host 
state. The investor having incurred sunk costs must do everything to keep the project a 
going concern in order to recover its investment, even if this requires making further 
concessions. A host state may use this weakness to gain a larger share of the economic 
rent, either through renegotiation or a change in the fiscal regime. It has been recognised 
that "... few large natural resource concessions in underdeveloped countries remain long 
unchanged. " 19 
The fact that 93% of potential upstream projects in the FSU involve existing deposits 
should theoretically lessen the risk of obsolescing bargaining because discovery risk has, 
17 Study cited in Bond and Gorton (1992) supra p S. 
18 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Mu 
Longman Group Ltd., 1971): pp 46-53; Raymond Verna 
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977): p 151; and J 
Present, " Resources Policy. 18, no 3 (1992): p 170. 
(London: 
19 Theodore H. Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Cower in Chile, 
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1974). 
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to some extent, been removed from the chain of events. Thus when a contract is being 
negotiated a much better understanding of the future revenues (uncertainties in future oil 
prices, etc. notwithstanding) will be known rather than at the beginning of an exploration 
contract. Assuming a more equitable distribution of profits is achieved from the outset, 
there should not be the same impetus for renegotiation. While this sounds fine in theory 
it does break-down in practice. Even if revenue forecasts are closer to their actual values, 
opportunistic behaviour by the state is still possible, nor is opportunism the sole preserve 
of governments. Companies can be just as guilty and bring the risk of creeping 
expropriation on themselves. In the case of an existing deposit both parties may be 
negotiating from a position of better geological knowledge, but there is little to stop an 
unscrupulous investor from negotiating a less than ideal contract for the host government. 
(,, 
One can only speculate as to what portion of contracts entered into immediately j{ 
following the dissolution of the FSU, fall into this category. 20 As officials in FSRs 
become more knowledgeable in the ways of international business transactions, foreign 
investor opportunism will be less feasible. 
{ 
In the FSU, government opportunism is a very real threat because of the nascent legal and 
fiscal framework. The absence of pervasive "economic legality" 21 described as a 
mutually consistent set of laws and the belief in the stability and enforcement of those 
laws, affords foreign investors with few defences against adverse changes of terms in the r 
future. It has long been recognised that the `absence of a clear legal and fiscal 
framework' is the principal impediment to foreign investment in the FSU. 22 Barring true{ 
20 E. g. see Joseph A. Kliger, Business Ventures in the Former Soviet Union: Negotiation and 
Protocol Do's and Don'ts, (Tulsa, OK.: PennWell Publishing Company, 1994): pp 89-90. 
21 Litwack (1992) infra note 22, p 111. 
22 From our point of view some of the better writings include: Thomas W. Wilde and James L. 
Gunderson "Legislative Reform in Transition Economies: Western Transplants -A short-cut to Social 
Market Economy Status? " I. C. L. O. 43 (1994): pp 347-378; Thomas W. Wilde, "Oil and Gas Legislation 
in Russia: From Texas to Siberia - Is a Russian Model Emerging? " in International Oil and Gas 
Investment Moving Eastward? Thomas W. Wilde and George Ndi eds. (London: Graham & Trotman, 
1994): pp 235-252; Paul R. Gregory, "Creating a Legislative Framework for a Market in Energy 
Resources: An Economist's View, " Hous. J. Int'l. L. 15 (Winter/Spring, 1993): pp 539-552; and John M. 
Litwack, "Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies, " in The Road to Capitalism Economic 
Transformation in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, David Kennett and Marc Leiberman eds., 
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legislative stability the principal protection from creeping expropriation takes the form of 
stabilisation clauses both at the level of host country legislation and in the natural 
resource contracts themselves: 
"The function of stabilisation clauses - their specific formulation and legal value - is best understood in the context of the negotiation and 
subsequent operation of a foreign investment project. The relative 
stability of key investment conditions responsible for the economic and 
financial performance of the investment venture is at the heart of investor 
concerns, and is therefore at the centre of both the negotiation of the 
specific contractual regime and the proper design of a standard regulatory 
regime. This is particularly so for natural resource and energy projects 
where duration and risk exposure is particularly long, capital investment 
particularly intensive, and project risk... particularly acute. Stability of the 
fiscal regime... is probably the key issue for stabilisation concerns. " 23 
(emphasis added) 
With this in mind, we shall briefly review the differing experiences of Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Russia. 
7.3.1 Stabilisation Provisions in Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan's first Law on Foreign Investment24 contained no guarantees with respect to 
adverse changes in laws or regulations, but its current version explicitly does so: 
"In the case of a deterioration of the position of a foreign investor which is 
the result of changes in legislation and/or entering into force and/or 
changes in the provisions of international treaties, the legislation which 
was in effect at the moment the investment was made shall apply to 
foreign investments for a period of 10 years, and with respect to those 
investments carried out in accordance with long-term contracts (more than 
10 years) with authorised state bodies - until the expiry of the effective 
period of the contract, unless the contract stipulates otherwise. In the case 
of an improvement of the position of a foreign investor, which is the result 
of changes in legislation-the contracts-may be altered with the mutual 
consent of the parties for the purpose of achieving a balance of economic 
interests of the participants. "25 
(Orlando, FL.: The Dryden Press, 1992): pp 110-119. 
23 Thomas W. Wilde and George Ndi, "Stabilising International Investment Commitments: 
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, " Texas Int'l. L. J. 31(1996): p 220. 
24 "Law on Foreign Investments in the Kazakh SSR, " adopted by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, 
7 Dec. 1990 as amended 8 Apr. 1993. W. E. Butler, Maryann E Gashi-Butler and Iu V. Maltsev eds. 
Foreign Investment and Privatisation in Kazakhstan, 2nd ed. (London: Clifford Chance & Interlist 
Publishing Ltd., 1994): pp 350-355. 
25 Art. 6(1), "Law #266 - XIII of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Foreign Investments dated 27 Dec. 1994, adopted 20th January 1995, " English translation by Baker & McKenzie, photocopy 
n. d., in author's file. 
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This stabilisation clause was reaffirmed in its long-awaited Petroleum Law published on 
20th July 1995. Article 57 states that... 
"the contractor is guaranteed protection of its rights in accordance with 
Kazakh Republic legislation. Amendments and supplements to the 
legislation which damages the contractor's position do not apply to 
licences and contracts issued and concluded before such amendments and 
supplements were adopted. " 26 
Kazakhstan has gone a long way towards guaranteeing the stability of investment terms, 
however, there is some uncertainty as to whether the fiscal terms of resource contacts are 
truly stabilised. The above two pieces of legislation suggest this is the case, but Article 
94(4) of the Kazakhstan's new tax code may indicate otherwise. Changes in tax 
legislation will apply, with the only remedy being the possible amendment of their 
contracts to restore a balance of interests?? For Kazakhstan's most important oil project, 
the TengizChevroil JV, the government removed any ambiguity by issuing a special edict 
on stabilisation. 
"The established mechanism of assessment and payment of royalties, 
profit tax, value added tax, and other mandatory payments defined by the 
pertinent Agreement is to be preserved during the entire period of activity 
of said joint venture enterprise. "28 
7.3.2 Stabilisation Provisions in Russia 
Soviet stabilisation clauses first emerged under the reforms initiated by Gorbachev. The 
1987 "Law on the State Enterprise" prescribed stable taxes for state enterprises for a 
period of five years while the 1988 "Law on Co-operation", also provided stable tax 
rates for at least a five year period for co-operatives. It was another five years before 
Russia would offer a semblance of legislative stability to foreign investors. Decree No. 
1466, "On Improving Work with Foreign Investment, " dated 27 Sept. 1993 stated 
26 Art. 57, "Presidential Decree of the Kazakh Republic with the Force of a Law on Oil, " first 
published on 20 July 1995 in Kazakhtanskya Pravda, but dated 28 June 1995 and entered into effect on I 
July 1995. Photocopy n. d. in author's file. 
27 Art. 94(4), Decree No. 2235 On Taxes and Other Obligatory Payments to the Budget, dated 24 
Apr. 1995. See Jonathan H. Hines and Natalya V. Brainina, "Kazakhstan paves its Legal Road for 
Resource and Other Large-Scale Investments: Some Bumps Remain, " International Practitioners 
Notebook, nos. 58 & 59, Aug. 1995. 
28 Art. 3, Edict of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Activities of the TengizChevroil 
Joint Venture, " dated 8 Apr. 1994, reprinted in Barrows, Russian & NIS Basic Oil Laws & Contracts, 
Supp. 16 (New York, NY.: Barrows Company, 1996): p 71. 
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"that it be established that newly issued normative acts defining the 
conditions of operation on the territory of the Russian Federation for 
foreign enterprises and joint ventures shall not apply for a term of three 
years to those enterprises and ventures that exist at the moment of issuance 
of such acts. This provision will not apply to normative acts creating more 
beneficial conditions of operation on the territory of the Russian 
Federation for foreign enterprises and joint ventures. " 29 
These rights were subsequently extended to PSAs with the promulgation of Decree No. 
2285 dated 24 Dec. 1993. 
"Should legislative acts passed in the Russian Federation create norms 
adversely affecting the economic conditions of the investor's operations 
under a production-sharing agreement during its term of validity, the 
agreement shall be amended so as to guarantee commercial results that 
the investor could have achieved under the legislation, effective as of the 
date the agreement was made. The procedure for amending a production- 
sharing agreement as aforementioned shall be defined in the agreement. "30 
(emphasis added) 
In theory the above two clauses were to stabilise legislative provisions governing JVs for 
a period of three years, and possibly for the entire term of a PSA. Unfortunately, the 
effectiveness of Decree No. 1466 appeared to last all of three months when Decree No. 
2270 introduced a variety of new taxes. 31 All subsequent efforts by foreign investors to 
invoke the protection of Decree No. 1466 have been in vain. The stabilisation provision 
was simply ignored or it provided too many loop-holes allowing the Government ample 
room to manoeuvre. Russia finally enacted its "Law on PSA" on 30 December 199532 
and western investors recognised it as an important milestone but were disappointed on a 
number of a counts including the stabilisation clause. While Article 17(2) allows a PSA 
to be amended to guarantee the same commercial results to the investor in the event of a 
change in legislation; Article 17(1) enables the government to alter the conditions of the 
29 "A Matter of Semantics, " R. P. L. . May 1994, p 26. 
30 Art, 11, Decree No. 2285 of the President of the Russian Federation ," 
On Matters Pertaining to 
Production Sharing in the Use of Underground Resources, " dated 24 Dec. 1993 reprinted in R. P. L. . 
Feb. 
1994, pp 74-75; and Petroconsultants, Acreage. Laws & Tax: CIS - Russia, V-R-8, pp 1-2. 
31 Decree No. 2270 of the President of the Russian Federation, "On Changes in Taxation and in the 
Relationship Between Budgets of Different Levels, " dated 22 Dec. 1993. 
32 Russian Federation Federal Law No. 225-FZ "On Production Sharing Agreements, " dated 30 
Dec. 1995 reprinted in FBIS-SOV-96-020-S, 30 Jan. 1996, pp 35-44; and Russia & NIS Basic Oil Laws & 
Contracts, Supp. 16, pp 90-103. 
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PSA in response to a "a substantial change in circumstances. " Foreign investors have 
sought clarification of the wording but would prefer the offending provision be deleted. 
As the instability of Russia's legal and fiscal regime is recognised as the principal 
impediment to foreign investment, the need for an enforceable grandfather clause is 
paramount. The essence of a PSA is to isolate the contract from such instability. This 
mechanism does not eliminate the risk of obsolescing bargaining (that is unpreventable 
following sunk costs), but it does help to discourage host government opportunism. 
Hitherto Russia has not provided the contractual stability which IOCs seek. 
7.3.3 Stabilisation Provisions in Turkmenistan 
In September 1994 Turkmenistan embarked on renegotiating three oil production JV 
contracts: Keymir JV involving Bridas of Argentina; Yashlar JV also with Bridas; and the 
Larmag-Cheleken JV with Larmag Energy of the Netherlands. According to Khekim 
Ishanov, the Minister of Oil and Gas, these renegotiations were necessary to correct the 
mistakes of the past and assure Turkmenistan a greater share of the benefits 33 The 
subsequent Minister, Amangeldy Esenov, maintains that their efforts were "an 
elaboration of certain clauses with the JVs charter documents and agreements-concluded 
to the mutual satisfaction of all parties involved. " 34 Semantics notwithstanding, the 
underlying reality is a unilateral renegotiation and is a classic example of ex post 
creeping expropriation. To the best of our knowledge the only stabilisation clause in 
existence is Article 20 of the "Law On Foreign Investments in Turkmenistan" which 
states that: 
"in case of change in legislation concerning foreign investments, a foreign 
investor's requirement the Law, that was in force at the moment of 
investment registration, is used for the period of 10 year [sic]. " 35 
33 "Quick Fix, " R. P. L. Nov. 1994, pp 48-48. 
34 "Esenov on Investment, " R. P. L. Apr. 1995, pp 48-52. 
35 Art. 20, "Law of Turlanenistan About Foreign Investments in Turkmenistan, " dated 19 May 1993 
as amended 8 Oct 1993. Department of Contractual and Legal Affairs The Ministry of Oil and Gas of 
Turkmenistan, Photocopy, 21 Sept. 1995 held in author's file. 
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As this grandfather clause deals solely with legislative changes it does not provide any 
protection against the aforementioned cases of contractual renegotiation. If the JV 
documents contained a stabilisation clause we can surmise that they too appear to have 
been ineffective. 
The significance of the Turkmen renegotiations is that it seriously tarnished the 
reputation of the country's administration. Without knowing the full details of each 
contract we cannot pass judgement, but perhaps some of the original agreements were 
unfairly biased in the favour of the foreign companies. For instance, the Keymir JV 
renegotiation involved a change in the division of base oil. The original contract 
stipulated that the government was to receive 10% of the `base oil' -- normally defined 
as the decline curve without foreign investment. Under the revised contract 
Turkmenistan would receive 100%. As to whether this was an unreasonable demand we 
can only speculate. But it seems the original treatment of `base oil' by Bridas is not 
typical in the FSU. From contracts to which we have access, `base oil' is treated as 
belonging 'solely to the domestic partner while the foreign partner shares in a portion of 
the incremental production. 36 In Russia a N's `own production' is calculated as the 
excess above the base amount. 37 Perhaps Turkmenistan was justified in renegotiating the 
Keymir JV contract with Bridas; but it is also worthwhile to reflect on the experience of 
another major oil producer. When Indonesia signed their first PSC with the Independent 
Indonesia American Petroleum Company (IIAPCO) in 1966, the terms were considered 
favourable to IIAPCO and formed a basis for future contracts which became known as 
the first generation PSCs. 38 In response to Indonesia's flourishing oil industry and rising 
36 Azerbaijan - "Agreement on the Formation and Business of the Joint Venture `Ansad Petrol"' 
reprinted in Russian & NIS Basic Oil Laws & Contracts, Supp. 5, pp 16-34; Kazakhstan -- Art. 2(6)(3), "Service Contract No. 3-95 Between Uzenmunaigas and Double Eagle Energy Co. Inc. " dated 14 Feb. 
1995, Photocopy. held in the author's file; Kazakhstan - Art. 1(4)(14), "Service Contract No. 9 Between Manistaumunaigas and Double Eagle Energy Co. Inc. " dated 26 Dec. 1994, Photocopy held in the author's 
file. 
37 Se Petroconsultants, Acreage. Laws & Tax: CIS-Russia, (London: Petroconsultants, SeptiAug. 
1994): pp 93-94. 
38 Zbiguo Gao, International Petroleum Contracts: Current Trends and New Directions (London: 
Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): pp 68-69. 
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oil prices, the bargaining position began to shift and Indonesia chose to tighten the terms 
in the second and third generation PSCs. But Indonesia never discriminated against any 
single PSC, even the most favourable 39 The long-term success of Indonesia's oil 
industry suggests this is a message worth impressing upon Turkmenistan. A country's 
good reputation is a precondition for attracting FDI over the long-term. It is unfortunate 
that Turkmenistan chose to tarnish its reputation over the operations of three small JVs. 
Only in the summer of 1996 did Turkmenistan finally conclude its first two PSAs (the 
first with Petronas (Malaysia) and the second with Monument Oil & Gas of the UK). 
One can be certain that these PSAs contain stabilisation clauses. 
7.3.4 Summary of Stabilisation Provisions 
Of the three countries surveyed, Kazakhstan has made the greatest progress in 
guaranteeing the stability of contractual terms and conditions for foreign investors. 
Whether or not Turkmenistan was justified in renegotiating three JV contracts is a moot 
point, but the government undoubtedly damaged its reputation for a period of time. 
Although Russia initially attracted the greatest deal of attention from IOCs, the country 
has hitherto failed to capitalise on this opportunity by not providing, inter alia, adequate 
protection from legislative changes. We believe the PSA mechanism with its built-in 
stabilisation clause is a means of reducing exposure to creeping expropriation which is a 
concern in the FSU today. Whether or not the stabilisation clause can truly achieve its 
purported goal over a long period of time is debatable and the author's Wälde and Ndi 
have examined this issue in some detail. 40 But regardless of one's views on this 
discussion, at the present time, the mere existence of a stabilisation clause(s) remains on 
the check-list of investor's pre-conditions. 
39 This requires some qualification in that Indonesia, following the example of the United States in 
imposing a "windfall profits tax" on oil companies in the face of rising oil prices, raised the profit oil split 
from 65/35 to 85/15 on all contracts in 1976. The Indonesian government's decision was largely based on 
an IMF report which advocated that oil company profits in Indonesia " appeared to be very high by 
historical standards and even more so by international comparison. " See Donald F. Todd, "An Indonesian 
Experience, " in The Oil Finders: A Collection of Stories About Exploration. Ed. Allen G. Hatley, (Utopia, 
TX.: Centex Press, 1995): p 115. 
'a "From a practical point of view, therefore, the degree of protection which the stabalisation clause 
can offer to the foreign can offer to the foreign investor under international law is by no means easily 
determined. " Supra note 23, p 247. 
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7.4 Ex Post versus Ex Ante Political Risks 
The preceding analyses on political risk has been carried out from an ex post perspective, 
that is, once an investment has been made and is an ongoing concern. The bargaining 
position of the investor is weakened (and potential exposure to risk increased) once sunk 
costs are incurred, particularly before pay back has been reached. While the phenomenon 
of `obsolescing bargaining' is applicable to the FSU it does not provide a complete 
picture. The investment process in the FSU should be segregated into two time frames: 
the ex post position which is the typical perspective used in political risk analysis; and 
the ex ante period when a potential investor is considering an investment. Given the 
high transaction costs associated with securing a deal in FSRs the exposure to risk in the 
pre-investment stage is very real. Not in the sense that a physical asset may be lost, but 
in the time, money and management resources expended to obtain a deal. 
The ex ante phase of an investment cycle typically begins with a desk top study followed 
by further researching, country visits, possibly setting up representative offices, 
submitting application for tenders, and negotiating. We refer to these as the transaction 
costs of securing a deal. Obviously, the investor is less exposed to risk at ex ante stage 
as compared to its position after the investment has been made, but there is still an 
opportunity cost at risk particularly for smaller companies with limited financial and 
managerial resources. Companies can only pursue a limited number of opportunities at 
once and resources directed to a specific proposal will be to the detriment of other 
possible projects. Thus the cost of failure in the pre-investment stage for one project is 
not just the monetary costs on that specific project, but could also include the opportunity 
cost of foregoing other opportunities. As the Chairman of Ramco Oil Services plc (UK) 
stated in their 1993 Annual Report "although we have no external costs in connection 
with our Caspian Sea interests, we are carrying an increased overhead in support of our 
strategic objectives. " 41 Therefore exposure to political risks at the pre-investment stage 
does carry consequences for a foreign investor. Consider the following, in May 1993, the 
41 Ramco Oil Services p1c., Annual Report and Accounts 1993, p 9. 
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Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomydrin, denounced a contract with Conoco for the 
exploration and development of the Shtokomanovskoye natural gas and condensate field 
even though the company had completed the feasibility study in 1992. Conoco, acting in 
good faith had signed a deal, carried out the required feasibility study only to be told that 
Gazprom and Rosshelf were to be awarded the development license. This is a classic 
example of a ex ante political risk. Finally, in October 1995, Conoco along with Neste, 
Total and Norsk Hydro signed a protocol of intent with Gazprom and Rosshelf to 
examine a joint development programme for Shtokomanovskoye. Conoco is not out of 
the picture just yet, but they now acknowledge the "management burden required for 
success. "42 Conoco will likely succeed in the end but the costs incurred will run tens of 
millions of dollars. Not insignificant transaction costs. While the large IOCs can 
weather the peaks and troughs of the ex ante investment stage, it is highly unlikely that 
E&P companies or even some of the independents can assume such risks. Unless, a small 
company is astute enough and probably lucky enough to enjoy a `free carry' through the 
torturous negotiation period lasting a number of years, the ex ante cost of securing a deal 
in the FSU may be too prohibitive. 
There is no doubt that the lure of the FSU's hydrocarbon potential has whet the appetite 
of may IOCs. But the cost of securing a deal is high. Only as the commercial interface is 
smoothed between the East and West will transaction costs be lowered. In the meantime, 
the ex ante risk of expending valuable resources without a result (a version of gambler's 
ruin) remains a real concern. The corollary is that only those with `deep pockets' should 
venture into the FSU's oil industry. 
42 David Rossiter (Vice President of Conoco) presenting a talk entitled, "Russian energy: experience 
of an international producer, " The Chan¢ine Politics of International Enerev Investment Conference held 
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7.5 Risk of Russian Hegemony 
FSRs were initially encouraged to "take all the sovereignty you can swallow. "43 This 
attitude reflected the pragmatic approach of reformers who wished to relinquish Russia's 
commitment to costly subsidies which helped bind the former empire, but were also 
impeding macroeconomic reforms 44 At the same time Russian attentions were drawn 
away from the peripheries towards their own heightened internal turmoil. But, as 
Russia's economic transformation has progressed, policy makers are re-examining 
Russia's role in its near abroad. The West must adopt a pragmatic approach which 
recognises that Russia has and will play a major role in the future development of its near 
abroad. 
Those states which offer little attraction for Russian business concerns will inevitably be 
pushed back to the periphery of her influence, unless other political considerations 
prevail. 45 In states with significant deposits of petroleum, foreign and Russian oil 
interests will meet. We have identified three pillars of Russian policy which have a direct 
bearing on petroleum developments in its near abroad: Russian claims of equity 
compensation for deposits previously discovered; the legal status of the Caspian Sea; and 
control over export routes. The latter subject is addressed separately in Chapter 8. 
7.5.1 Resurgence of Russian Hegemony 
Western oil companies investing in FSRs must contend with Russian hegemony. Its 
existence is undeniable, the uncertainty lies in the degree to which Russian hegemony 
will prevail and how IOCs can best accommodate Russia. The oil industry which was 
43 Quoting Boris Yeltsin from a speech in 1990. Jack F. Matlock Jr., Autopsy on an Empire, (New 
York, NY.: Random House, 1995): p 398. 
44 William E. Schmickle, "The Yeltsin Revolution and Russian Export Protectionism, " in supra 
Palmieri (1994): p 72. For further discussion on the Russian policy debate in Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus see Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, (London: RITA, 1995); 
Mohiaddin Mesbahi ed. Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union, (Gainesville, FL.: 
University Press of Florida, 1994); and Shireen T. Hunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation- 
building and Conflict, (Washington, DC.: CSIS, 1994); and Jonathan Aves, Post-Soviet Transcaucasia, 
(London: RHA, Feb. 1993). 
45 Zviagelskaia (1995) ibid., p 28. 
243 
once among the confines of a single sovereign nation has now been segregated into 
fifteen individual republics. As one Russian commentator states... 
"... distinct from the matryoshka style, quasi-political structure of the former Soviet Union, the economic structure was a complex of industries, 
each of which was built as a single organism with subsidiaries distributed 
among different political and administrative parts of the state without 
consideration for their possible nationalisation by the new republics. What 
we have now is a set of states with different levels of sovereignty that 
exists within a single economic area, each having different fragments of a 
once united oil and gas complex" 46 
This segregation has been an instrumental factor in attracting foreign investment because 
it provided the opportunity to capitalise on existing inequalities between the remnant 
fragments of the oil and gas complex in each FSR. In the place of a united Soviet oil and 
gas complex, each petroleum producing country is now trying to establish its own 
vertically integrated industry from the well head to burner tip. However, officials within 
Russia's Fuel and Energy complex resent this loss of direct control. In 1994, the Russian 
Fuel and Energy Minister, Yuri Shafranik, charging that Russia would continue to 
produce outside her own borders stated `it is unforgivable to lose these markets'. On 
another occasion he even went so far as to say... 
"Russia must have only one version of access to the resources of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. We by virtue of our labour, mind, 
energy, have created all this.... We think that it is in Russia's interest to 
participate in resources-related projects in other CIS countries. "47 
A confrontation between Russian and western business concerns seems inevitable as a 
natural consequence of the vast petroleum potential of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. 
The eagerness of western firms to quickly conclude deals has further fuelled this 
economic rivalry. We may interpret the rejuvenation of the region's petroleum industry 
as a microcosm, albeit the most vital component, of the wider issue of Russia's desire to 
maintain ascendancy over the entire economic and geopolitical sphere of its near 
abroad. 48 
46 Alexander Arbatov et al., "Oil and Gas in the Foreign Policy of Russia, " A policy paper of the 
Russian Foreign Policy Fund, SWP-AP 2798, Stiftung Wissenschart und Politik, June 1993, p 24. 
47 Press conference by Yuri Shafranik on 7 Nov. 1994 cited in Uibopuu (1995) infra note 90, p 121. 
48 The evolving economic-political struggle has been coined as the new Great Game in reference to 
the past Great Game in which Russia advanced through Central Asia towards the British colony of India 
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Russian dominance may be limited to the economic sphere as illustrated by the previous 
quote from Arbatov who recognises the region as "... a set of states with different levels of 
sovereignty that exists within a single economic area "49 (emphasis added). But, even 
this relatively mild point of view uses the term "different levels of sovereignty" not 
equal levels of sovereignty. Such attitudes lean towards the possible revival of Russian 
imperialism. Mr. Yeltsin has even asked the UN " `... to grant Russia special powers as a 
guarantor of peace and stability in the former countries of the USSR. "'50 The implicit 
reference to the Monroe doctrine is undeniable. It would in fact be unprecedented for 
Russia to make a clean break from her near abroad because "historical experience has 
shown that divorces between colonies and imperial powers have seldom meant a total and 
immediate rupture of relations, except where the loss of an empire has been the result of 
military defeat" 51 and the latter condition does not apply in the case of the FSU. This 
fact combined with recent Russian actions and statements are persuasive arguments for a 
prolonged quasi-Russian empire. 52 
during the 19th century. "The new cockpit of power for the 21st century, the great source of energy on 
which the industrial powers depend, lies in the oil and gas fields of Central Asia... a modern version of the 
Great Game. " Martin Walker, "Battle of the Black Stuff, " The Guardian. 3 Oct. 1995, p 6. For a historical 
account see Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: Straggle for Empire in Central Asia, (London: John Murray 
(Publishers) Ltd., 1992). Other commentators, however, are cautious of using such a simple analogy. Dr. 
Roland Danreuther of Edinburgh University, warns that two principal factors have been over-looked. 
Firstly, the MS of Transcaucasia and Central Asia are not in a political vacuum; and secondly, the 
expectation of Russian decline was premature. See Roland Danreuther, "The Caspian Sea in International 
Politics, " in Gurdon and Lloyd (1995) supra note 90, p 1. Dr. Fred Halliday of the London School of 
Economics, points to a limited strategic western interest in Central Asia and the Cacausus. Talk delivered 
to The Changing Politics of International Enerev Investment Conference held by IAEE. BIEE. Montreaux 
49 Arbatov (1993) supra note 46, p 24. 
50 Mehmet Ögiltcü, "Eurasian Energy Prospects: Need for a Long-Term European Strategy, " 
TEPSA, Feb. 1994, p 39. 
51 Hunter (1994) supra note 44, p x. 
52 Jonathan Stern, on the other hand argues that it is no longer prudent to carry-out a collective 
analysis of the FSU petroleum industry as a whole. The concept of the FSU may fit comfortably with our 
historical understanding of 20th century global divisions, but it is time to look forward and not to the past. 
Jonathan Stern, Review of Energy and Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union, by Leslie Dienes, 
Istvan Dobozi and Marian Radetski, Energy Policy 23 (1995): p 99. 
245 
7.5.2 Russian Claims of Equity Compensation 
Although Soviet oil interests shifted to the Volga-Urals and Western Siberia in the latter 
half of the 20th century, major deposits of petroleum were still being discovered in 
Central Asia and the Caspian Sea region. 53 Some members of Russia's oil community 
maintain that as the known but yet hitherto undeveloped deposits were discovered during 
the Soviet era, Russia has a right to participate in their development. The conjectural 
justification being that Soviet resources and technology discovered these deposits (i. e. the 
USSR absorbed the exploration risk) and thus Russia, as the successor state of the USSR, 
is due compensation for these efforts in as much as a right to participate in their future 
development. Some have gone so far as to suggest that Moscow has an "inherent 
proprietary interest" in the natural resources discovered in the Soviet era. 54 First Deputy 
Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and Fuel and Energy Minister Yuri Shafranik have 
expressed the view that Azerbaijan and Central Asian Republics at least owe a debt to 
Russia. 55 
For instance some of the more recent discoveries can be partially attributed to a major 
investment programme financed by the ex-Soviet Ministry of Oil (MNP) and the ex- 
Soviet Ministry of Geology (Mingeo) to study the principal petroleum basins of the 
FSU. 56 In this respect, one may recognise a quasi-moral basis for participation rights in 
lieu of compensation for past exploration efforts, but we believe such a position is 
53 E. g. in the Caspian Sea, the Guneshi, Chirag and Azeri fields were discovered in 1979,1985 and 
1987 respectively. In Kazakhstan the Uzen field was discovered in 1959, Zhteybay around 1961, while 
Karachaganak and Tengiz fields were discovered in 1979 and Kumkol in 1984. The Mingbulak field in 
Uzbekistan was discovered in 1983. In general see E. I. A, Oil and Gas Resources of the Fergana Basin 
(Uzbekistan. Taiikistan and Kyr¢yzstan), DOE/EIA-TR-057, (Washington, DC.: GPO, Jan. 1995): p 16, 
Matthew J. Sagers, "The Oil Industry in the Southern-Tier Former Soviet Republics, " Post-Soviet 
Geography 35 (1994): pp 267-298; Joseph P. Riva Jr., Petroleum Exploration Opportunities in the Former 
Soviet Union, (Tulsa, OK.: PennWell Publishing Company, 1994); Joseph P. Riva Jr. "The Petroleum 
Resources of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States, " in The Former Soviet Union in 
Transition, US Congress, Eds. Richard F. Kaufman and John P. Hardt. (Armonk, NY.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993): 
pp 461-476; and E. N. Tiratsoo, Oilfields of the World. 3rd ed. (Houston, TX. Gulf Publishing Company, 
1986): pp 117-123. 
54 "Moscow seeks Kazakh oil share as production declines, " E. E. E. Report, Mar. 1994, p 3. 
55 Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996): p 55. 
56 Kliger (1994) supra note 20, pp 81-82. 
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indefensible under international law. This issue is, albeit in very peculiar circumstances, 
a question of `security of tenure' following the formal dissolution of the USSR and as 
such must be addressed in the light of the doctrine on state succession and acquired 
rights. Unfortunately, when the subject of state succession is raised, one encounters a 
divergence of academic opinion, state practice and an absence of consistent rules of 
international law. 57 If Russia's position is to be justified, a contractual right to enjoy in 
the development of previously discovered deposits must have survived the formal 
dissolution of the USSR. We believe this is not the case and the balance of this section is 
an elaboration of our reasoning. 
The question of state succession arises whenever there is a replacement of one state by 
another for the responsibility of international territorial relations. The most benign form 
of change would be that of state continuity which is completely distinguishable from state 
succession as the former only encompasses a change in government. Western countries 
invariably hold that changes in government do not affect a state's obligations and the 
continuity of the state. 58 In the case of the FSU the fundamental change of sovereignty is 
unquestionable. 59 According to the Convention on Succession of State Property adopted 
in 1983, the break-up of the USSR would be interpreted as a "dissolution", 60 that is, the 
57 Phillip Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1980): p 
120; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1990): p 655. 
58 Wood (1980) ibid. 
59 Following a number of aborted attempts to negotiate a new form of political union among the 
FSRs, excluding the Baltic States whose succession had been recognised by the USSR State Council in 
August 1991, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine concluded a new agreement in December 1991 which annulled 
the 1922 Treaty on the formation of the Soviet Union and formed a new entity the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). On 21 Dec. 1991 this arrangement was extended to the 11 other FSRs - 
Georgia opted out but became a member in late 1993. "Alma-Ata Declaration" done on 21 Dec. 1991, UN 
Doc. 1/47/60 of 30 Dec. 1991 reprinted in I. L. M. 31 (1992): pp 148-149. According to UN Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER. EJ10, as of 24 Dec. 1991 the USSR's membership to the UN is continued by the Russian 
Federation who maintains full responsibility for the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Charter 
of the United Nations and multilateral treaties deposited with the UN Secretary General. 
60 Art 23, "Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts, " adopted in 1983 (hereinafter the Convention on Succession of State Property) UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 117/14 and reprinted in I. L. M. 22 (1983): pp 298-306. The convention was not universally 
accepted, particularly by western nations with 54 votes in favour, 11 votes against (including France, UK, 
Germany and the US), and 11 abstentions (including Australia, Japan & Sweden). As of the end of 1993 
only eight countries were signatories, including the recent additions of Estonia (21. Oct. 1991) and Ukraine 
(8 Jan. 1993), and is therefore not in force. 
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USSR ceased to exist and each of the constituent republics became a `newly independent 
state', 61 hence the acronym NIS. The question is to what extent has this change affected 
the status of previously discovered petroleum deposits and Russia's claim to them? This 
is critical for foreign investors because any surviving rights may theoretically displace 
newly acquired rights. 
The succession of state property is for the most part an acknowledged principle of 
customary international law and supported by jurisprudence of the ICJ. 62 There is no 
doubt that each NIS enjoys sovereignty over the entire territory within its boundaries 
including the subsoil, and in situ petroleum and minerals. This principle is consistent 
with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 1803 (XVII) which recognised 
"... the inalienable right of all states freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources 
in accordance with their national interest" 63 and more recently reaffirmed by ECT to 
which all FSRs are signatories. While the ECT maintains a states' sovereignty and 
sovereign right over energy resources, M the treaty does "... in no way prejudice the 
rules... governing the system of property ownership of energy resources. " 65 Therefore, 
states have exclusive power (imperium) over mineral resources including petroleum in its 
territory and continental shelf and are free to choose the form of ownership governing 
their natural resources. Global practice is to vest ownership of in situ petroleum 
resources with the State or Crown who also enjoy the exclusive right to explore and 
exploit these resources (domainal system). A few exceptions to this rule are found in 
61 Art. 2(1)(e), Convention on State Succession of Property ibid. 
62 Brownlie (1990) supra note 57, p 658. 
63 UN Doc. A/RES/I803(XVII), 19 Dec. 1962 reprinted in I. L. M. 2 (1995): pp 223-226. See also 
P. J. Okeefe, "The United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, " J. W. T. 8 (1974): 
pp 239-2 82; S. K. Banerjee, "The Concept of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources - An 
Analysis, " I. J. I. L. 8 (1968); Karol N. Gess, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: An 
Analytical Review of the United Nations Declaration and its Genesis, " I. C. L"O. 13 (1964): pp398-449; and 
J. N. Hyde, "Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources, " A. J. I. L. 50 (1956): pp 854-867. 
64 Art. 18(1), ECT reprinted in I. L. M. 33 (1995): pp 360-454. 
65 Art. 18(2), ECT ibid. 
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parts of the US, Canada and The Netherlands where private title to the petroleum 
underground by the surface owner of the land is permitted (accession system), but these 
instances remain firmly as exceptions not as established international practice 66 In this 
regard all FSRs have vested the ownership of petroleum and mineral resources in the 
state. 67 Although various doctrines of state succession do exist, none question the 
inherent right of a successor state acquiring sovereignty over its subsoil and in situ 
petroleum and minerals68 Therefore Russia should not try to claim a proprietary interest 
in the deposits situated within the sovereign territory of other FSRs. But what about a 
claim for future development rights in lieu of compensation for exploration risks 
previously incurred? Whether this position is justified depends on whether a contractual 
right existed prior to the cessation of the USSR; whether this right was transferred to 
Russia; and whether such a claim would still be recognised by a successor state. 
If such rights existed, there is strong evidence that Russia would have inherited these 
rights. In conformity with the doctrine of Self-Abnegation69, Russia assumed the rights 
and obligations of the USSR, in particular with respect to its international treaty 
obligations and responsibility for the sovereign debt of the USSR. The alternative 
66 In general see William T. Onorato, Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum 
Development, Policy Research Working Paper 1420, (Washington, DC.: The World Bank, Feb. 1995): pp 
5-6; Bernard Taverne, An Introduction to the Regulation of the Petroleum Industry: Laws, Contracts and 
Conventions, International Energy and Resources Law and Policy Series, (London: Graham & Trotman / 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1994): pp 11-12; Ernest E. Smith et al., International Petroleum Transactions (Denver, 
CO.: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 1993): p 4.; K. W. Blinn et al., International Petroleum 
Exploration and Exploitation Agreements, (New York: Barrows Company Inc., 1986): pp 21-31; and 
Nicolas J. Campbell Jr., "Principles of Mineral Ownership in the Civil Law and Common Law Systems, " 
Tul. L. Rev. 31 (1956-1957): pp 303-312. 
67 E. g. in the case of the Kazakhstan see Art. 19, "Law on Ownership of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, " adopted 15 Dec. 1990, as amended 9 Apr. 1993 which states that "Land, its subsoil... and 
other natural resources shall be in the state-ownership of the Republic of Kazakhstan.; and Art. 3(1), 
"Presidential Decree of the Kazakh Republic with the Force of Law `On Oil', " dated 28 Jul. 1995, which 
states "all oil in the subsoil of the Kazakh Republic is the exclusive property of the Kazakh Republic. " 
68 O'Connell, D. P. State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law: Volume 1 Internal 
Relations. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967): pp 3-35. 
69 The doctrine of Self-Abnegation asserts that although "... the State is formally at liberty to take 
over or reject whatever suits it in the previous legal order, it is in fact materially required in the interest of 
realising its owns aims to permit on the least disturbance thereof. Therefore, in practice, it integrates 
within its own legal order all existing law which is compatible therewith an which is not expressly 
repealed. " Ibid. p 14. 
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solution in the latter case of sovereign debt would have been quite complicated to carry 
out in practice because the theory of Universal Succession implies that a successor state 
must assume the obligations of the predecessor state, but in this case the successor state 
was in reality 12 MS excluding the three Baltic States. This presented the practical 
problem of how to apportion the sovereign debt. Alter extensive negotiations with the 
other FSRs, Russia assumed the entire responsibly for the past sovereign debts of the 
FSU in exchange for the latter giving up any claim of `their' assets within Russia. The 
strategy followed was very much in line with the doctrine of Self-Abnegation as Russia 
was anxious not to disturb any more than necessary her relations with her international 
creditors. Russia also agreed to honour all obligations resulting from international 
treaties concluded by the FSU and in this respect has `slipped into the shoes of the 
USSR. '70 As Russia has generally assumed responsibility for past FSU obligations, it is 
perfectly reasonable to expect Russia to enjoy any rights which were transferred in the 
process. The question is: were any future development rights in existence prior to the 
dissolution of the USSR? We will now examine whether the hierarchy and operations the 
oil and gas ministries would allow one to assume such rights did exist. 
In the USSR the centrally planned economy was organised along the lines of branch 
economies - in the case of the petroleum industry, it was administered by the Ministry 
of Oil (MNP), Ministry of Gas (MGP), and Ministry of Geology (Mingeo) which 
operated a large number of subordinate enterprises which were typically geographically 
based. 7' Each of these was responsible for a portion of oil and gas exploration activities 
- generally speaking MNP and MGP explored older provinces while Mingeo 
concentrated on the newer ones 72 MNP and MGP were combined into a single Ministry 
70 Supra note 59. 
71 IEA, Energy Policy of the Russian Federation 1995 Survey, (Paris: IEA/OECD, 1995): p 97. 
72 Thane Gustafson, Crisis amid Plenty: The Politics of Soviet Energy under Brezhnev and 
Gorbachev, (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1989): p 70. 
250 
of Oil and Gas in 1989, but the administrative apparatus and enterprises of the Gas 
Industry (the pre-cursor of Gazprom) survived as an independent concern. 73 
The process of petroleum exploration was divided into two time periods, each with their 
own sources of financing. The first stage, involving geophysical surveying, mapping and 
core-hole drilling, was conducted by Mingeo and financed predominantly by the state 
budget, in addition to a geological exploration fee collected by Mingeo from MNP and 
MGP. 74 The subsequent stage, known as deep drilling was considered capital investment 
which was carried out and financed by the MNP and MGP, although the latter two often 
contracted out the work to Mingeo. The MNP and MGP tended to favour production and 
appraisal drilling instead of further high risk exploratory drilling. 75 The significance of 
this structure is that it establishes who absorbed the exploration risk. Firstly, Mingeo 
assumed the greatest part of exploration risk using funds sourced directly from the state 
and indirectly from the state via the MNP and MGP; secondly all republics made their 
contributions to the state budget from which Mingeo's exploration expenses were 
ultimately covered; and thirdly, while the union-level headquarters in Moscow dictated 
and approved exploration and development plans, the actual work was carried out by the 
regional sub-units of each Ministry. 76 Thus it was the regional sub-unit of Mingeo which 
carried out the exploration, then it was the regional sub-unit of either MNP or MGP 
which carried out the actual production of oil and gas respectively. With the dissolution 
of the USSR, each FSR absorbed these regional enterprises within their own Ministries. 77 
73 TEA (1995) supra note 71, p 97. 
74 Ibid. p 122; and Gustafson (1989) supra note 72, pp 71-71. 
75 TEA (1995) supra note 71, p 122. 
76 Kliger (1994) supra note 56, p 131. 
77 Sagers (1994) supra note 53, p 247. E. g. in Turkmenistan the following independent structures 
evolved from the former Soviet organisations in 1992: Turkmengaz responsible for gas production and 
transportation; Turkmennefteprodukt responsible for distribution of refined products; Turkmengeofizika 
responsible for geological exploration; and Turkmenneft responsible for oil production. Subsequently 
these `concerns' were absorbed into the Turkmenistan Ministry of Oil and Gas in November 1993. 
Similarly Azerbaijan inherited Azneft (onshore production) and Kazpomorneftegaz (offshore production) 
which was subsequently merged into SOCAR; Kazakhstan inherited the Mangyshlakueft, Embaneft, 
Aktyubinskneft and Tengizneftegas production associations; Uzbekistan acquired Uzbekneft; Tajikistan 
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If we were to assume that some form of security of tenure did exist between the 
preliminary exploration stage and the production stage, and we have no evidence to 
support this, then it appears logical that such rights occurred at the regional level and not 
between the republics and RSFSR. 
Failing to identify some form of contractual right which linked both the exploration and 
production stage we cannot support a Russian hypothesis which espouses the right of 
compensation for past exploration risks previously incurred in Central Asia and the 
Caspian Sea ipso jure. Anything less than an actual contractual right or equivalent 
economic concession arrangement would not have survived the succession of states. 78 
Furthermore, all republics made their own pro-rata contribution to the state budget from 
which exploration was ultimately financed. 79 RSFSR, as the largest member of the 
Union, undoubtedly contributed the most to the state budget, but this does not confer 
special compensatory rights. We conclude that Russia is neither guaranteed a stake as 
compensation or in fact due compensation. This will not prevent Russia from exerting 
her political leverage to obtain a participatory stake for her companies. Russian 
companies will seek to obtain such rights as would any other IOC. Acknowledging that 
Russia maintains a sphere of influence over its near abroad, western companies should 
probably accept Russian participation in the largest and most visible upstream and 
infrastructure projects as being inevitable. But, this is a practical conclusion based upon 
political realities, not upon the false premise of compensation for past exploration efforts. 
acquired Tajilmeft; Kyrgyzstan acquired Kyrgyzneft; and so on. See Anthony E. Reinsch, Igor Lavrovsky 
and Jennifer I. Considine, Oil in the Former Soviet Union: Historical Perspectives Long-Term Outlook, 
(Calgary: CERI, 1992): pp 22-25. 
78 Even in the case an economic concession agreement between a public authority of a successor 
state and the concessionaire of a predecessor it is not clear whether the successor will honour this 
obligation, or indeed must do so. It depends on which doctrine of state succession is followed. With 
respect to judicial and diplomatic practice of States it is first "necessary to inquire to what extent such 
practice establishes the duty of the successor state to respect the interest of a concessionaire as an acquired 
right. Secondly, it is necessary to examine the juridical character of such right. " O'Connell (1967) supra 
note 68, p 307. 
79 This view is not necessarily shared by all Russians. Eg. A. Michurin, the President of 
Saratovneftegophyzika when commenting on the ownership of geological records on Kyrgyzstan held by 
his company was quoted as stating "Theirs! They didn't pay a penny either for seismic exploration or for 
well logging. It was money from the Union Oil Ministry... " Kliger (1994) supra note 56, p 26. 
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7.5.3 Legal Status of the Caspian Sea 
The Caspian Sea -- 750 miles north to south, 250 miles across at its widest point, 
covering an area of 143,243 square miles80 - is the largest body of enclosed water in the 
world. Furthermore, the water is saline but not affected by tides. Although it is often 
referred to as land-locked it is connected to the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea via the 
Volga and Don Rivers together with the artificial Volga-Don Canal. Following the 
signing of AIOC contract in Azerbaijan, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed, 
in a letter to the British Embassy in Moscow, that there is no official demarcation of the 
Caspian Sea between its five littoral states and that 
"... the Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single ecosystem 
and represents an object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues or 
activities including resource development have to be resolved with the 
participation of all the Caspian countries... Any steps by whichever 
Caspian state aimed at acquiring any kind of advantages with regard to the 
areas and resources... cannot be recognised... [and]... any unilateral actions 
are devoid of a legal basis. "81 
The letter has been interpreted as a warning of Russian determination to secure 
participation in the development of all Caspian Sea resources 82 The reaction of 
Azerbaijan's President was predictable; in a statement to the British Ambassador, he 
stated that "Azeri oilmen have been extracting oil from the Caspian basin since 1949. No 
one, no force, no country can deprive us of this right. "83 Access to the Caspian's rich 
deposits of petroleum lies at the heart of the political debate. 
7.5.3.1 Geological Potential 
Beneath the Caspian Sea, very favourable geology exists - the Apsheron Sill trending 
south-east from Baku to the Cheleken peninsula in Turkmenistan contains a high 
so Oxford Hammond, Atlas of the World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994): p 211. For a 
good description of the physical features of the Caspian Sea see "Caspian Sea, " The New Encyclopaedia 
Britannica - Vol 14 - Micropaedia. 15 ed. (Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago, 1993): pp 223-226. 
81 From an unofficial translation, J. Lloyd and S. Levine, "Russia demands veto over Caspian oil 
deals, " Financial Times, 31 May 1994, p 2; and "Dear Sirs, " R. P. I.. Jun. 1994, p 50. 
82 Barylski, Robert V. "Russia, The West and the Caspian Energy Hub. " The Middle East Journal 49 
(Spring, 1995): pp 217-232; and Lev Klepatsky and Valery Pospelov, "Manoeuvring Round the Caspian 
Sea, " International Affairs Vol. 11-12 (1995): pp 59-65. 
83 "Russia not blocking the Caspian Deal, " E. E. E. Report, June 1994, p 13. 
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concentration of known deposits. Further to the south is largely unexplored but beneath 
the deep waters lie promising structures such as Shakh Deniz, while in the north-eastern 
comer of the Caspian Sea, the North Caspian Seismic Consortium is undertaking a 
massive seismic and environmental study. Many experts believe the on-shore oil rich 
provinces of Kazakhstan extend beneath the Caspian Sea. Figure 7.3 shows the 
geological potential of the Caspian Sea according to a Russian based study; recoverable 
petroleum resources are estimated to be 7,000 MMt of oil and condensate and 5 Tcm of 
natural gas. 84 Although the Caspian Sea has yet to be officially demarcated we 
superimposed potential maritime boundaries on Figure 7.3 based on the principle of 
equidistance. These lines in no way imply accepted boundaries among the littoral states, 
nor do they summarise a consensus for their future location, their sole purpose is to 
illustrate the geological inferiority of a possible Russian sector which is the key to 
understanding Russia's stance. The sector would encompass the north-western quadrant 
including the Astrakhan Delta which is suspected of being predominantly gas-bearing not 
oil bearing. Given that Russia possesses 34% of the world's reserves of natural gas, the 
need for additional supplies is negligible. Oil reserves are another matter and the 
application of the equidistance principle would not grant Russia an automatic right to 
participate in the development of the southern sector nor the promising north-eastern 
quadrant. Therefore the ultimate goal of any Russian policy is to gain concessions that 
will compensate for their inherent geological disadvantage. Had Russia's territorial 
position been more favourable from a geological perspective (i. e. supplant Russia's 
position for that of Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan) Russian policy would likely be reversed as 
well. 
84 Business Moscow News, Nov. 9,1994, p 12 as cited in Dorian, James P. and Peter S. Kort. 
"Russian Dominance Over `Near Abroad' Linked to Energy. " East-West Centre Working Papers. Energy 
and Minerals Series. No. 21, Sept. 1995, p 13. 
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Figure 7.3 Geological Potential of the Caspian Sea 
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7.5.3.2 Dual Legal Theories (Sea versus Lake) 
Prior to the break-up of the FSU the management of the Caspian Sea was solely regulated 
by bilateral treaties signed between Iran and the RSFSR in 192185 and the USSR and Iran 
in 193586 and 1940.87 Within these treaties no maritime boundary was ever established 
nor were any provisions for the exploitation of sea-bed resources mentioned. 
Furthermore, none reflect the current political reality of five independent littoral states. 
Whether Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan recognise these treaties is a moot 
point, but Russia considers them to be bound, 88 by virtue of their membership to CIS. 89 
The two principal theories on the status of the Caspian Sea are that it is either a sea or a 
lake; a third alternative is that is neither (i. e. sui generis). 90 In very basic terms, if one 
85 "Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, " signed at 
Moscow 26 Feb. 1921, League of Nations Trea! y Series 9 (1922): pp 401-413. This treaty abrogated the 
"Boundary Treaty of Goolestan" between Iran and the Tsarist Government signed in 1821 and the "Treaty 
of Turrnanchia" signed on 10 Feb. 1828. 
86 "Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation between Iran and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, " signed at Teheran, 27 Aug. 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series 176 (1937): pp 
301-333. 
87 "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Iran and the Soviet Union with Exchange Notes, " 
signed at Teheran, 25 Mar. 1940, British and Foreign State Papers 144 (1940-42): pp 419-434. 
88 Khodakov in Gurdon and Lloyd (1995) infra note 90, p 26. 
89 The "Alma-At Declaration" states that its signatories "... guarantee in accordance with their 
constitutional procedures the discharge of the international obligations deriving from treaties and 
agreements concluded by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. " Supra note 59. 
90 For recent discussion on the legal status of the Caspian Sea see Rodman R. Bundy, "The Caspian 
- Sea or Lake?: Consequences in International Law, " in Oil & Caviar in the Caspian, eds. Charles Gurdon 
and Sarah Lloyd (London: Menas Associates Ltd., Sept. 1995): pp 15-25; Alexander Khodakov, "The 
Legal Framework for Regional Co-operation in the Caspian Region, " in Gurdon and Lloyd (1995): pp 26- 
31; Viacheslav Gizzatov, "The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, " in Gurdon and Lloyd (1995): pp 32-38; 
The Institute for International Energy Studies and The Institute for Political and International Studies, 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Oil and Gas Prospects in the Caspian Region. Tehran. 10- 
11 Dec. 1995; Sergei Vinogradov and Patricia Wouters, "The Caspian Sea: Quest for a New Legal 
Regime, " Leiden Journal of International Law 9 (1996): pp 87-98; Sergei Vinogradov and Patricia 
Wouters, "The Caspian Sea: Current Legal Problems. " Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht 55 (1995): pp 604-623; Henn-Jüri Uibopuu, "The Caspian Sea: a tangle of legal problems, " 
The World Today Jun. 1995, pp 119-123; Blanche Sas, "Legal Issues in the Control of the Construction 
and Operation of Pipelines and the Issue of Transit in the Caspian and Black Sea Regions, " O. G. L. T. R. 13 
(1995): pp 274-279; Jeremy Carver and Greg Englefield, "The Future development of the Caspian Sea, " 
O. G. L. T. R. 13 (1995): pp 40-44; Christopher Pala, "Is the Caspian a lake or a Sea? " Petroleum Review, 
Dec. 1994, p 569. "When a Sea is not a Sea, " R. P. I. Jun. 1994, pp 49-52; Dabiri, Mohammad-Reza. "A 
New Approach to the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea as a Basis for Peace and Development. " I. J. I. A. 
(Spring/Sunnmer, 1994): pp 29-46; and Mansour Pournouri, "Law of the Sea and its Impact Upon Iran and 
Iran's Contribution to it. " Ph. D. Thesis, University of Dundee, CPMLS, 1991: pp 344-380. 
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adopts the principle that the Caspian Sea is a `sea', its jurisdiction would be exercised by 
the littoral states according to principles of international law established the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty. 91 If, on the other hand, the Caspian 
Sea is a `lake' then jurisdiction might be exercised according to the exclusive rights of the 
riparian states and be subject to a regime of joint sovereignty (i. e. condominium). This is 
the solution favoured by Russia. 92 A final possibility is to treat the Caspian Sea as sui 
generis (i. e. it is neither a lake nor a sea), in which case there is no precedent for 
establishing jurisdiction. Accordingly the status of the Caspian Sea is perceived as one of 
the most interesting international legal questions remaining in the 20th century, 93 and will 
have a direct bearing on demarcation and title to the petroleum resources. 
7.5.3.3 Demarcation of the Caspian Sea 
Whenever an international boundary is called into question, the resolution thereof is 
complicated by the existence of over-riding economic considerations. It is inconceivable 
to believe that the 1965 delimitation of the maritime boundary between Norway and the 
UK could have been carried out with the alacrity of the British negotiators had the 
hydrocarbon potential of the region been known. 94 When petroleum resources are known 
or believed to exist the shifting of an international boundary by a few kilometres could 
91 This treaty represented the culmination of three conferences during the period of 1958 to 1982. 
UNCLOS was adopted by the 1982 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS-III) on 30 Apr. 1982 
by 130 votes in favour, 4 against and 17 abstentions. Strictly speaking UNCLOS refers to the final Treaty 
itself, whereas UNCLOS-I, UNCLOS-II, UNCLOS-III refers to the conventions which were held in 1958, 
1960 and 1973-1982 respectively. For complete text of the Final Act of UNCLOS see UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 62/122 of 21 Oct. 1982; also reprinted in I. L. M. 21(1982): pp 1261-1354; or United Nations, 
ew York, NY.: St Martins Press Inc., 1983). As of the 30 Jun. 
States and 3 other entities and had been ratified or acceded to 
by 62 States. 
92 See Khodakov in Gurdon and Lloyd (1995) supra note 90, p 26; and supra note 81. 
93 William T. Onorato (Principal Counsel of the Energy & Mining Legal Department, The World 
Bank) conversation with the author, 21 Sept. 1995. 
94 "Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf between the Two Countries, " London, March 10,1965, in force June 29,1965 (ST/LEG/SER. B/15, 
p 775). Following the discovery of the Groningen Gas Field in 1959 on the coast of Denmark and prior to 
the discovery of the giant Forties oil field in the northern UK sector of the North Sea in 1970, British 
interests had predominantly focused on the gas-bearing southern sector. See Ian Townsend Gault, 
"Petroleum development offshore: legal and contractual issues, " in Beredjick and Wälde (1998) supra 
note 2, p 134; and Terence Daintith and Geoffrey Willoughby eds. United Kingdom Oil and Gas Law. 
(London: Oyez Publishing Ltd., 1977): pp 12-14. 
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mean the difference of billions of dollars in revenue and therefore the process of 
demarcation becomes a protracted and complex affair. The Caspian Sea falls into this 
category. 
If one advocates the application of UNCLOS then "every state has the right to establish a 
territorial sea. " 95 This right exists ab nito as part of its eminent domain and no other 
state may infringe on this right. With respect to the ownership of sea bed resources "this 
sovereignty extends... over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. "96 Beyond 
the territorial sea exists a continental shelf, which "... comprises the sea-bed and subsoil 
of the submarine areas, "97 and coastal states can exercise their "sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. " 98 The creation of a 12-mile 
wide territorial sea and continental shelf is supported by Kazakhstan who rejects Iranian 
and Russian calls for common ownership. 99 As far as Azerbaijan is concerned a 12 mile 
territorial sea by itself does not go far enough to confirm their exclusive rights over its 
historical oil fields which necessitates the existence of a continental shelf. Table 7.4 
presents estimates of the allocation of petroleum resources under different demarcation 
scenarios according to a Russian study. Complete sectorial delimitation (which we 
assume is closely based on the principle of equidistance) results in Russia only receiving 
14% of the oil resources while Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan would receive 
43%, 36% and 7% respectively (excluding an Iranian Sector). The detrimental effect of 
joint or shared zone as proposed by Russia vis-a-vis the other FSRs is clearly visible. 
95 Art. 3, UNCLOS, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 supra note 91. 
96 Art. 2(2) ibid. 
97 Art. 76 ibid. 
98 Art. 77 ibid. 
99 "Kazakhstan Proposal over Caspian Sea Division, " OMRI Daily Digest, No. 194, Part I, 5 Oct. 
1995. 
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Table 7.4 Proposed Allocation of Caspian Sea Recoverable Petroleum Resources 
e tation by Sector 
(Russian Variant) 
Oil (Bnt) Gas (Tcm) 
Twelve-mile 
Territorial Sea 
Oil (Bnt) Gas (Tcm) 
Twenty-five mile 
Territorial Sea 
Oil (Bnt) Gas (Tcm) 
Russia 
Kazakhstan 3.0 
Azerbaijan 
ur emstan 
Shared one 
ota 
source: uonan et ai (ýiept. iyyý) op cit. note 64, p ii. 
Note: Bnt = billion tonnes, Tcm = trillion cubic metres and Oil includes gas condensate. 
If a petroleum deposit straddles an international boundary established by a treaty, then 
unitisation may be employed. That is, both states agree to exploit the petroleum deposit in 
the most effective manner as possible and apportion the proceeds based on the percentage 
of reserves existing on either side of the dividing line. This was the method employed by 
Norway and the United Kingdom to exploit the Frigg Gas Field discovered in 1969100 
which straddled the international boundary delimited by the 1965 Treaty. '°' Given that 
none of the seven potential maritime boundaries in the Caspian Sea (see Figure 7.3) are 
settled, unitisation is not a feasible solution at present. In the meantime a mechanism 
must be sought to proceed with exploration and development while ambiguity over 
boundaries remains. Judge Jessup, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, observed 
that, 
"... even if it is not [yet] considered to reveal an emerging rule of 
international law, [the principle of co-operation] may at least be regarded 
as an elaboration of the factors to be taken into account in the negotiations 
now to be undertaken by the Parties" 102 
Enough examples of joint co-operation have since occurred for some commentators to 
suggest this principal has sufficiently developed to be considered an emerging rule of 
100 "Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the Exploitation of the Frigg Field 
Reservoir and the Transmission of Gas Therefrom to the United Kingdom, " done 10 May 1972, London; 
U. K. T. S. 113(1977); 1037 U. N. T. S. 3; and 1976 Cmnd 7043; also reprinted in Terence Daintith and 
Geoffrey Willoughby eds. United Kingdom Oil & Gas Law. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, Release 12: 24- 
ix-90): pp 2020-2039. For discussion on unitisation see Gault (1988) supra note 94, pp 146-147; William 
T. Onorato, "Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit, " I. C. L. Q. 26 (1977): pp 
324-337; J. C. Woodliffe, "International Unitisation of an Offshore Gas Field, " I. C. L. O. 26 (1977): pp 338- 
353; and R. Lagoni, "Oil and Gas Deposits across National Frontiers, " A. M. L. 73 (1979): pp 215-243. 
101 Supra note 94. 
102 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic 
of Germany v Netherlands) ICJ Rehorts 3 (1969): p 84. 
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customary international law. 103 This implies that the littoral states of the Caspian Sea 
must co-operate to establish a joint development regime in areas of dispute by abiding by 
three emerging rules of international law: a state may not unilaterally exploit a common 
deposit over the timely objection of another interested state; the method of exploitation 
and underlying legal basis for apportionment must be agreed by the parties; and the states 
should enter into good faith negotiations to arrive at such an agreement. '04 The practical 
obstacle to joint development or joint sovereignty is that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan believe they are relinquishing what is rightfully theirs in the first place. 
It has also been suggested that offshore development under a jurisdiction of 
condominium can not be financed. 105 In the late 1960s and early 1970s commercial 
banks involved in North Sea project financing packages sought assurance that their 
security would not be infringed by discretionary acts or decisions by the British 
authorities concerning the licence holder (e. g. revocation). These were known as the 
Varley Assurances, 106 but were only temporarily given as it was considered unacceptable 
for a state to fetter its future freedom of executive action by contract, at least where public 
interest was concerned. Under joint sovereignty, project sponsors and their bankers 
would require inter governmental assurances that future objections to a project would not 
be raised. This is more complex than in the case a single government, but to believe joint 
sovereignty precludes financing is incorrect. Debt financing in a region of joint 
development is perfectly possible provided there is a priori consent for the project by the 
states involved. We would also argue that any long-term exploitation of petroleum 
resources on the scale now being envisioned is untenable without the littoral states 
103 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata and William T. Onorato. "Joint Development of International Petroleum 
Resources in Undefined and Disputed Areas. " Paper presented to the International Conference of the 
LAWASIA Energy Section, Kuala Lumpur, 18-22 Oct. 1992, p 3. 
104 Ibid., p 4. 
105 Comment by US Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary. "US Wades into the Dispute Over Caspian Sea 
Delineation, " Nefte Compass, 1 Jun. 1995, p 7. 
106 United Kingdom Oil & Gas Law, (Release 14: 25-vii-91) supra note 100, pp 1030/1-1030/2. 
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reaching a consensus. There are too many issues at stake for any state to successfully 
pursue a unilateral policy. 107 Undoubtedly, the current legal vacuum discourages project 
financing as bankers will take little comfort in security in the form of a mortgage over 
offshore assets or licences located in a contested jurisdiction. But, for the time being 
there is very little evidence to suggest that project sponsors are even pursuing a project 
financing approach for offshore projects. 108 Nothing herein implies that condominium is 
more appropriate than sectorial division; only that a consensus be achieved as to which 
regime applies. Provided agreement exists, raising financing for development under 
either method is feasible. But, in order to reach a solution far more co-operation is 
needed than has hitherto been the case. 
7.5.3.4 Empirical Practice 
The uncertain status of the Caspian Sea, its demarcation and the rules governing the 
exploitation of petroleum resources combined with the political interaction of the littoral 
states in this debate constitute a `political risk' in that IOCs may have little control over 
the eventual outcome. But does this represent an insurmountable barrier to foreign 
investment? The empirical evidence suggests not. All four of the FSRs are in the process 
of awarding rehabilitation, exploration and/or development rights to foreign companies in 
areas adjacent to their own coasts (see Table 7.5). In total, 23 such arrangements have 
been identified in various stages of negotiation. Azeri agreements account for the lion's 
share with 16 (i. e. 70% of the total), Turkmenistan accounts for five (22%), while Russia 
and Kazakhstan have only concluded one agreement each with foreign companies. Of the 
23 projects listed only half can at the present time be classified as being `concluded'. 
107 E. g. export routes, access to the Volga-Don Canal, caviar, etc. 
108 This first large project to be completed in the Caspian was the construction of a natural gas 
compression facility for SOCAR by Pennzoil. This was completed in 1993 and cost approximately $98 
million. Pennzoil funded the project from its own internal cash flow and signed a gas utilisation agreement 
with SOCAR to recover its costs. Subsequently Pennzoil's began to recoup its investment by a credit for 
Pennzoil's portion of the first bonus payment made by members of AIOC, hard currency payments by the 
Azerbaijan Government in 1995 and an interest in another project. See Pennzoil Company Annual 
Reports, 1993 and 1994. 
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Table 7.5 Upstream Projects in the Caspian Sea 
Host Fields Blocks Project ame Partners Type 
Country 
- 
JV or Consortium 
A zerSai-jan en, ag and deep- er aijan MIT' SOCAR - 13P, Amoco, ev 
water section of the Operating Co. (AIOC) Pennzoil, UNOCAL, 
Guneshli Oil Fields Statoil, LUKoi1, TPAO, 
Exxon, Itochu, Ramco, 
& Delta-Nimir 
Azerbaijan Bakhar Oil Field Negotiating 7M SOCAR - Statoil Dev 
Azerbaijan an uzu and Ashrati Negotiating -, Fields Amoco and Itochu 
Azerbaijan D-3, -- oc s Preliminary Expl. Rights SOCAR - Exxon xp 
awarded 
Azerbaijan Offshore Rehabilitation SOCAR - Ponder Rehab 
Azerbaijan Uuneshli Oil ie Proposal - Conoco MeMaT Rehabilitation 
Azerbaijan ones i an de Compression SOCAR, - ennzoi ev 
- 
Dashlary Fields Facility Ramco 
Azerbaijan Arazdash, ame tatus - egotiating xp 
and Tagiev Blocks Chevron 
Azerbaijan paz i ie arm-in Likely Apache Corp. ev 
Azerbaijan a ie Caspian t Petroleum SOCAR- of , ev Co. - Karabakh PSA AGIP, Pennzoil 
Azerbaijan Lenkoran-Demz Block Negotiating 
Azerbaijan Mashal Field Hallwood Caspian a woo 
(Gryazevaya Sopka) 
- - 
Petroleum JV Energy Partners 
Azerbaijan SNIETE n-iz Structure Shakh emz , tatoil, E&D Elf, TPAO, LUKoil & 
- - 
Iran 
erbaijan 71 mi Babaka Structure Negotiating PST SOCAR - Occidental 
Azerbaijan Exploration Negotiating SUCAR -oi xp 
Azerbaijan xp oration Agreed to orrn - an xp 
K. azakhstan Exploration o the North Caspian eismic KazakhstancasDisheit - xp 
north-east Quadrant of Consortium Mobil, Shell, BP, AGIP 
the Caspian Sea British Gas, Statoil & 
Total 
Russia c e- ore Block sp agne -o & Rosneft 
ur emstan ee en- ea 131ock: ee en- oc ov t of ur emstan - E&D 
Gubkin, Livanov, and Petronas (previously 
Banka Barinova Fields LAPIS Oil Capital) 
Turkmenistan Cheleken-11 Block: gee en ee enmorne eeas - ev 
Banka LAM, Zhdanova Larmag 
and Pricheleken Fields 
Turkmenistan Seismic Gov't of Turkmenistan - Expl 
Terminated Elf 
Turkmenistan South Caspian Study Gov't of Turkmenistan - Expl Status - Negotiating JNOC 
Turkmenistan Trilateral Agreement for Gov't of Turkmenistan - Expl 
Offshore Exploration Russia & Iran 
Source: FOCI Database 
According to the FOGI Database upstream projects worth $16 billion are currently under 
consideration in the Caspian Sea and the overall number of deposits on offer is expected 
to increase in the future. 109 Iran has yet to invite any foreign companies to work in the 
109 E. g. Turkmenistan has divided its offshore `sector' into two blocks. Block 1 in the south contains 
40 known anticlinal closures; while Block 2 in the north is to be divided into three sections and contains 23 
known anticlinal closures. Kazakhstan is expected to announce a tender for the awarding of offshore 
exploration and development rights following the conclusion of the North Caspian Seismic Survey. In 
Azerbaijan, it was reported that SOCAR had plans to develop up to seventeen new offshore projects. 
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`Iranian Sector', but NIOC was, at the end of 1995, drilling a well at Merdat and planned 
another for 1996 in the nearby Maysem structure. "" Furthermore, Iran is now a 
participant in a consortium to explore and develop the Shakh Deniz structure and has 
entered into several preliminary agreements with other littoral states regarding joint 
upstream activities in the Caspian Sea. 
7.5.4 Summary of Legal Status of the Caspian Sea 
We conclude that each FSR is acting in a manner in which they are asserting their de 
facto jurisdiction over the seaward areas beyond their coasts, even though they cannot 
among themselves currently achieve a consensus on the legal status or demarcation of the 
Caspian Sea. A wide variety of contracts have been awarded to foreign investors and 
include seismic, geological and environmental studies, rehabilitation projects involving 
existing facilities, and full-fledged exploration and development rights. The current legal 
vacuum is a potential risk for IOCs but it is one which they appear perfectly willing to 
bear. 
In the meantime a $500,000 study has been commissioned by the World Bank at the 
request of Azerbaijan to prepare a document on the legal foundation, based on the norms 
of international law, for the development of the Caspian Sea. This will make a useful 
contribution to the evolution of this debate, but it remains to be seen to what extent such 
opinions will become authoritative. Russia's stance towards the Caspian Sea is very 
simple. Any solution which solely involves a division of the Caspian Sea into sovereign 
sectors based on the principle of equidistance will be unacceptable due to Russia's 
inherent geological disadvantage. The geopolitics of the region are such that Russian 
companies will continue to be involved in the biggest and most visible projects. It is in 
the interest of all littoral states to co-operate to establish a new modus vivendi in an 
equitable and timely fashion. The new regime should not necessarily be based on past 
perceptions, but must reflect new political realities. But under no uncertain terms will 
110 "Caspian Upstream Builds Momentum Despite Loose Rules, " P. I. W.. 18 Dec. 1995, pp 4-5. 
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this be easily achieved as the economic considerations of future oil production from the 
Caspian Sea will remain an over-riding concern. 
7.5.5 Implications for Foreign Investors 
We believe that no major upstream development in either the Caspian Sea or Central Asia 
will take place without Russian involvement. This should not be interpreted as an 
obstacle per se, but rather as a factor which must be accounted for in the planning stages 
and carried through the entire project cycle. By recognising Russia's strong bargaining 
position and her vested interests in the economic and political development of her near 
abroad western companies may begin to develop coherent strategies that promote mutual 
interests. Furthermore, strong personal relationships still exist between Russian oil 
industry executives and their counterparts in the FSRs. These ties have a long history and 
are an integral part of the region's oil culture. Yuri Shafranik, the Russian Minister for 
Fuel and Energy, describes Azerbaijan as his oil "motherland" or the "Mecca" for 
Russian oil workers-' 11 Granted such statements are full of rhetoric, the passion and 
deep conviction of Russia's oil industry towards it southern neighbours is unmistakable. 
To the extent that participation by LUKoil or Gazprom offers an effective means of 
placating Russian demands, their participation should be considered, but only if these 
companies can meet their proportional share of the financial burden. 
Since gaining independence all southern FSRs have sought to develop their petroleum 
resources to the fullest extent. As the requisite technology, management and financial 
resources were (and still are) not available locally, the southern Soviet republics have 
been particularly active in soliciting the interest of western firms. At the same time 
Russia's strategy has been to exert pressure at the highest political level if necessary in 
order to secure for Russia and her companies the largest possible share of economic rent 
from the region's petroleum industry. This may be in the form of exports of Russian 
goods and services, taxes on the profits of Russian companies operating in the region, or 
III Interview with Yuri Shafranik, "Russia: Oil Minister Shafranik sets out the agenda. " W. P. A.. 20 
Jun. 1994, p 19. 
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from tariffs of oil exports crossing Russian territory. Table 7.6 provides clear evidence 
that despite Russia's loss of direct control, Moscow still wields the wherewithal to 
muscle itself into the future resource development projects of its near abroad. "2 
One must not lightly dismiss future Russian involvement. In seven of the nine petroleum 
projects listed in Table 7.6 Russian participation is confirmed. We have classified these 
projects into three categories. Firstly, Type-A cases where Russian interests have been 
accommodated at an advanced stage of negotiations (e. g. LUKoi1's 10% stake in AIOC 
and Gazprom's 15% stake in the development of the Karachaganak gas and condensate 
field). Secondly, Type-B cases where Russian interests have been involved from an early 
stage (e. g. CPC, Turkmenistan Transcontinental Pipeline or Gazprom's involvement in 
Enron's proposal to develop 15 natural gas fields in Uzbekistan). The final category, 
Type-C consists of projects where we think that future Russian involvement is still 
possible, if and when this occurs the project would be re-classified as Type-A. This latter 
category, includes the TengizChevroil JV or the North Caspian Seismic Consortium 
which is carrying out a $280 million exploration program of the north-eastern sector of 
the Caspian Sea. We believe the pattern with respect to the largest and most visible 
development projects (i. e. 500 MMbbls plus) is now firmly established. However, not all 
projects will attract the same geopolitical attention and there are plenty of deposits which 
will be developed without direct Russian involvement. 
112 Thomas W. Wilde, "Foreign Investment in CIS oil and gas and its implications for other 
countries, " OPEC Bulletin, July/Aug. 1994, p 17. 
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Table 7.6 Mega-Proiects in FSRs involving Russian Companies (Confirmed & Potential) 
Host Project Foreign Russian Russian Type 
Country Partner(s) Partner(s) Stake 
r ailan Chirag, en deep- Mo-co, of o 
water section of the Pennzoil, 
Guneshli Oil Fields UNOCAL, Statoil, 
TPAO, Exxon, 
Itochu, Ramco, 
Delta-Nimir 
Azerbaijan Karabakh Pennzoil of 32.5% 
Azerbaijan Shakh Deniz BF, Statoil, Elf, 
TPAO, & Iran 
o 0 
Kazakhstan aspian ipe me Chevron, Mobil, ov t 01 ussia 44% 
Company (CPC) AGIP, Oryx, British LUKoil 
Gas, Oman Oil Co. Rosneft 
Kazakhstan Karachaganak as Field British as azprom 15% 
possible farm- 
out to LUKoi1 
Kazakhstan North Caspian eismic 
Consortium 
Mobil, Shell, 
British Gas AGIP, 
osne 
LUKoil 
Possible 
Statoil & Total 
- Kazakhstan engiz Oil Field Chevron, Mob7 of Possible 
Turkmenistan Turkmenistan ov to an, ov t ov to Russia-- Yes 
Transcontinental of Turkey, Gov't of (%? ) 
Pipeline (TTP) Kazakhstan 
Uzbekistan ie in the Enron azprom es 
Bukhara & (%? ) 
Surkhandur'ya Oblast 
ovuLt. c. ryUL LawuOJC 
7.6 Conclusion 
We defined political risk as the probability of commercial operations being adversely 
affected by politically caused actions or circumstances over which a foreign investor has 
little or no control. We feel the more commonly known aspect of political risk - the risk 
of expropriation or nationalisation -- is greatly exaggerated in the case of the FSU. In 
1982 Fariboz Ghadar showed that the essential precondition for expropriation is an 
overwhelming dominance by foreign actors. We believe this assessment is still 
applicable, but does not accurately describe the current level of FDI in the FSU's oil 
industry. Our most optimistic scenario for foreign oil production by the year 2010 in 
Russia is only 25% of the total. The size of Russia's existing domestic industry makes 
foreign domination highly unlikely, particularly with the emergence of a new class of 
Russian based `Majors'. For other FSRs, the condition of foreign dominance is more of a 
concern because of the significant impact single mega-projects may have on the country's 
production profile. Kazakhstan seems to have a balanced approach towards foreign 
investment by intending to build-up a production profile split equally between domestic 
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companies and foreign companies. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, could face a situation 
whereby almost 90% of its crude production is carried out by foreign companies. The 
onus is upon both the host government and the oil companies to ensure that an equitable 
balance is maintained over time. 
Creeping expropriation is more of an immediate concern given the fluid legal and fiscal 
environment which characterises much of the FSU. Of the three countries surveyed 
(Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan), only Kazakhstan has taken any reasonable 
efforts to mitigate the risk of creeping expropriation by providing comprehensive 
stabilisation clauses. Hitherto the experience of Turkmenistan and Russia has not been 
encouraging. 
We briefly touched on the difference of ex ante and ex post political risks. While the 
latter is obviously more important, the former is considered to be significant given the 
high transaction costs associated with securing a deal in the FSU. Only investors with 
`deep pockets' may be able to weather the peaks and troughs associated with the long pre- 
investment period. 
Next, the issue of Russian hegemony was discussed at length -- the two relevant pillars 
of Russian policy being their attitude towards existing but hitherto undeveloped deposits 
in other FSRs and the status of the Caspian Sea. While there exists no a priori legal 
grounds for a Russian entitlement to these deposits, there is nothing to prevent Russian 
companies from seeking exploration and development rights as would any other IOC. 
Where Russian companies choose to participate with western companies in other FSRs 
projects, we feel the former should not enjoy preferential treatment. 
The vexed issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea is both complex and emotive. 
Given the over-riding economic considerations associated with the demarcation of the 
Caspian Sea a final solution among all littoral States will likely be many years in the 
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making. Even the most elaborate legal arguments are likely to be subordinated by over- 
riding political and economic factors. In the meantime, littoral states continue to enter 
into contracts with foreign companies for petroleum related activities within the Caspian 
Sea. While the uncertain status of the Caspian is an obvious investment risk for IOCs we 
conclude that it is not an insurmountable factor at this stage. We suspect it will become 
more of an issue as development of the first few projects proceed. 
Russian resolve and pressure is being rewarded with equity interests for her domestic 
companies in upstream projects throughout Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Western 
companies involved in major upstream and infrastructure projects in Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus must accept a Russian participation as inevitable. Russia will continue to 
enjoy a high degree of influence in the region's development. However, LUKoi1 and 
Gazprom appear content on securing for themselves only a seat at the highest profile 
developments. It remains to be seen whether LUKoil will become involved in the 
development of the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan. For smaller development projects, the 
late arrival of Russian companies is less likely. What is also of concern is Russian policy 
and actions surrounding export pipelines. The subject of transportation risk will be 
addressed in the following chapter. 
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8. TRANSPORTATION RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
8.1 Introduction 
It was once said of Russia that no land in the world with such possibilities is so 
unfavourably situated as regards outlets to the sea. ' It is an observation which now seems 
particularly apt to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. All upstream oil projects face the 
common challenge of transporting production to a viable market. The most prolific oil 
field is of little value unless the crude can be transported to the hard currency markets of 
the West. The determination of Russia to maintain control over future export routes 
represents the third pillar of a strategy to maintain hegemony over its near abroad. In this 
chapter we shall examine the issue of transportation risk and uncertainty in the context of 
oil export alternatives from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. As any existing 
pipelines are an integral part of the oil export infrastructure inherited from the FSU we 
shall begin by examining the position of Russia within whose territory the bulk of the 
current network resides. 
8.2 The Physical System 
8.2.1 Pipelines of Russia 
The historic rise of Soviet oil production in the latter half of the twentieth century was 
accompanied by the construction of a vast network of pipelines - by the end of 1990 the 
system consisted of 66,200 km of pipelines, of which 52,900 km (80%) are situated in 
Russia. 2 The percentage of total crude transported by pipelines has also increased: in 
1980,91% of all crude was transported by pipeline; in 1985 and 1990 the proportion was 
94%. 3 Moreover, little new trunk line capacity has been built over the last 15 years. 
These three factors reflect the status of the inherited pipeline network: an ageing and 
I C. E. W. Petersson and W. Barnes Steveni, How to do Business with Russia: Hints and Advice to 
Business Men Dealing with Russia, (London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd., 1917): p 6. 
2 IFA, Energy Policies of the Russian Federation, (Paris: IEA/OECD, 1995): p 123. 
3 Ibid. 
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stagnant network, 4 the majority of which is located in Russia and which accounts for 
94% of all crude oil transported in the FSU. 
The infrastructure is, however, no longer fully compatible with the needs of exporters 
although its export design capacity is 124 MMtpy. s Previously, large amounts of crude 
were supplied to the refineries of Eastern Europe via the Druzhba pipeline. But the 
collapse of the CMEA and rising prices of Russian exports resulted in sharp fall of 
exports to Eastern Europe. Simultaneously, there has been an increase of hard currency 
earning oil exports to the West. From Russia's perspective any continued reliance on 
either Ventspils (Latvia) or Odessa (Ukraine) is considered undesirable as there is little 
defence from these countries imposing higher transit fees and port charges. Apart from 
political considerations, market and technical factors may also reduce actual capacity 
below design capacity. Inefficient management and the lack of adequate maintenance are 
common place during the transition period. On the other hand design capacity is not an 
absolute and can be exceeded. For instance the official design capacity of the 
TransAlaska pipeline is 1.2 MMbopd but peak throughput exceeds 2 MMbopd. 
However, given the circumstances of the FSU, an educated judgement would treat design 
capacity as an absolute maximum, with the actual capacity being lower. The overall 
result of all these factors is that the Russian export pipeline network operated at only 
76.6% capacity in 1995 and 72.1% in 1994 (see Table 8.1). It appears there is adequate 
capacity, but an examination of its composition reveals localised deficiencies. 
The bulk of excess capacity is the result of the Druzhba pipeline which accounts for half 
of Russia's export design capacity. As exports shift away from Eastern Europe and the 
rest of the CIS towards Western markets, the southern ports of Odessa and Novorossiysk 
4 The majority of the pipelines and storage tanks are more than 20 years old and thus substantial 
capital investment will be required for modernisation, but during the period 1990 - 1994 repairs were only 
carried out on as little as I% of the pipelines on an annual basis. Robert L. Drake, "Financing Oil Projects 
in the Russian Federation: The Legal Perspective, " O. G. L. T. R. 13 (1995): p 466. 
5 R. Hildahl, T. Gustafson and L. Ruseckas, "How to Get the Oil Out? Oil Pipelines in the Former 
Soviet Union, " CERA Private Report - FSU Energy, Sept. 1994, p 6. 
270 
are becoming strained. Both are now operating at above 90% capacity. It is this southern 
bottleneck which is of particular concern to Russia as Novorossiysk remains their 
principal warm-water port (the only other being Tuapse). 
Table 8.1 Capacity Utilisation of Export Pipelines 
Export 
Terminal 
Design 
Capacityl 
(MMtpy) 
Exports2 
(MMt) 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
Exports3 
(MMt) 
Capacity 
Utilisation 
DEERE 62.8 39.9 o 41.3 65.6% 
Novorossiysk 90.3% 29.3 91-6"/o( 
Odessa 6.2 77.5% 7.8 o 
uapse 4.4 .o 4.4 .o Ventspils 15.6 11.0 70.5% 12.1 .o Total 11 89.3 72.1% 94.9 .o 
" LtKA (bept. 1YY') supra note 3. p. e. 
2 LEA (1995) supra note 2, p. 126. 
3 Interfax Petroleum Rev 12-19 Jan. 1996, p 10. 
While oil exports at Ventspils could be increased by 3.5 MMtpy within existing 
infrastructure, Russian anxiety towards the Baltic States, tends to make this the least 
desirable option. In the spring of 1995 LUKoi1 chose to pull out of a joint venture with 
AGIP to build the new Butinge Oil Terminal on the Baltic coast of Lithuania. LUKoi1, at 
least, appears to be advocating a strong southern-based strategy evidenced by its 
proposed $1.5 billion refinery project in Krasnodar, its 12.5% stake in the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium, the accession of Astrakhanneft by LUKoil, 6 and more recently the 
reports of LUKoi1 taking over Gazprom's 15% stake in the giant Karachaganak gas 
condensate field development 7. Such anecdotal evidence combined with the shifting 
pattern of exports leads us to conclude that pressure on Novorossiysk is unlikely to abate, 
and that the highest priority for new capacity is within this southern corridor. Further 
impetus to construct new capacity also comes from the production potential of Central 
Asia and the Caspian Sea. 
6 "LUKoil Holding Company Establishes Bridgehead to Caspian Sea, " Interfax Petroleum Report, 
8-15 Dec. 1995, pp 6-7. 
7 "Kazakhstan: Gazprom Stake for LUKoil, " Lloyd's List, 2 July 1996; and "Kazakhstan: LUKoil 
Replaces Gazprom in International Kazakh Gas Deal, " Reuters News Service, 1 July 1996. 
271 
8.2.2 Pipelines of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus 
As opposed to Russia, where substantial export infrastructure exists, the oil pipeline 
network of Central Asia8 and the Transcaucasus is much less advanced, non-existent in 
places, and was often designed for imports rather than exports. The latter point is a 
legacy of Soviet command system. A central pillar of Soviet unification was to make 
each republic dependent on another for crucial imports, despite the obvious inefficiencies 
associated with transporting raw materials over vast distances. For instance, the eastern 
refineries of Pavlodar and Chimkent in Kazakhstan and the Chardzhev refinery in 
Turkmenistan are dependent on Western Siberian crude. Whereas, the oil rich western 
oblasts of Kazakhstan supplied the Russian refineries in Bashkortostan and the Samara 
Oblast. There are still no pipelines connecting oil production in the western parts of 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan with their refining and consumption centres of the East. 
Azerbaijan being geographically much smaller and self-sufficient in oil did not 
experience such dependencies, but nevertheless, imported crude oil from Kazakhstan and 
Russia to refine and then re-export as products. Obviously the break-up of the FSU was 
never considered - for the oil rich former Soviet Republics (FSRs) of Central Asia and 
the Caspian Sea, this divorce has been severe. 
8.2.2.1 The Kazakh Pipeline Experience 
The situation of Kazakh exports to the West has been far from satisfactory from the point 
of view of both foreign investors and the Kazakh authorities. Each year Kazakhstan must 
apply to the Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy for its quota of crude oil which it may 
input into Transneft's pipeline network. The quota is divided into two portions: one for 
delivery to Russian and FSU consumers and one as a pass-through quota to the hard 
currency markets of Europe. Kazakhstan's initial quota for 1995 was 50,000 bopd (2.5 
8 In general see John Roberts, Caspian Pipelines, (London: RIIA, 1996); Jeremy Carver and Greg 
Englefield, "An International Pipeline Authority: The Case for the Central Asian Pipeline Organisation 
(CAPO), " O. G. L. T. R. 13 (1995): pp 291-301; Ottar Skagen, "Central Asia and Trans-Cacausia: Pipeline 
Needs and Options, " 15 Jun. 1995, paper presented to CEPMLP International Oil and Gas Investment 
Policies Conference. St. Andrews, Scotland, 22 Sept. 1995; Yilmaz Oz, "Eurasian Pipeline Projects 
through Turkey: An Economics and Legal Overview, " O. G. L. T. R. 13 (1995): pp 153-155; Derek Barober, 
"Pipeline Politics, " World Link May-Jun. 1995, pp 6-11; James P. Dorian, Ian Sheffield Rosi and S. Tony 
Indriyanto, "Central Asia's Oil and Gas Pipeline Network: Current and Future Flows, " Post-Soviet 
Geography 35 (1994): pp 412-430; and Jeremy P. Carver and Greg Englefield, "Oil and gas pipelines from 
Central Asia: a new approach, " The World Today, Jun. 1994, pp 119-121. 
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MMtpy) to FSU refineries and 70,000 bopd (3.5 MMtpy) to Europe. 9 The latter is 
considered insufficient when compared to potential levels of production. PlanEcon 
estimates that net exports from Kazakhstan, including those to other FSRs, could be as 
high as 350,000 bopd (17.6 MMtpy) by the year 2000,10 moreover Chevron has indicated 
that it has the on-stream capacity to raise production from the Tengiz to 120,000 bopd (6 
MMtpy) if the export infrastructure existed. Ultimately new capacity must be constructed 
and in this respect analysts have not been shy in suggesting a maze of possible 
alternatives (see Figure 8.1). Any major export pipeline route through Iran can safely be 
rejected barring a major shift in US foreign policy towards Iran. A pipeline crossing the 
Caspian Sea is improbable until the legal status of the Caspian Sea is resolved. " In the 
end the only realistic option is for a pipeline crossing Russia although the location of the 
final terminal may not necessarily be located in Russia. It is conceivable that a pipeline 
skirting the northern shores of the Caspian could connect up with future infrastructure 
transiting the Transcaucasus, rather than progressing eastward to the Russian port of 
Novorossiysk. But with the latter being the preferred route of Russian interests, various 
pressures have been exerted on Kazakhstan to acquiesce. When Chevron began to 
develop the Tengiz field, Russia insisted that the foul smelling mercaptans be first 
removed from the crude oil before export. Chevron complied by constructing a $102 
million demercaptanisation facility. However, insufficient quotas remained and as a 
result Chevron announced in February 1995 that it was cutting back its investment 
programme from $500 million per year to $50 million per year in-line with the principle 
of making the joint venture self-fmancing. Then in September 1995, the hard currency 
export quota of Kazakh crude was cut further to a mere 30,000 bopd of which Chevron 
was apportioned 80% -- leaving only 6,000 bopd for all other joint ventures and 
9 Valera Belousov and Isabel Gorst, "Pipeline problems block oil sector development, " Petroleum 
Economist, Apr. 1996, p 10. 
10 PlanEcon Energy Report (1994) as cited in Dorian, Rosi and Indriyanto (1994) supra note 8, p 
414. 
11 Perhaps, the littoral states could come to an interim agreement on a pipeline crossing, before 
reaching a unanimous position on the legal status of the Caspian. However, such a option implies that 
Russia would willingly relinquish one of her best bargaining chips with land-locked Kazakhstan. 
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production associations. 12 Meanwhile, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) - 
formed by the Governments of Oman, Russia and Kazakhstan to build and operate a 
1,440 km pipeline from Tengiz to Novorossiysk - had made little progress. The 
principal reason being that none of the participants could raise the requisite financing and 
Chevron, as one of the main intended users, found the terms on offer by CPC 
unsatisfactory. In April 1996 it was finally announced that a new consortium would be 
formed. In addition to the original three governments of Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman, 
50% of the shares would be held by private companies-13 While the presence of western 
IOCs is necessary to ensure that the requisite financing will be forthcoming, the decision 
to give a 12.5% stake to LUKoi1 and a 7.5% stake to Rosnefft, is an obvious concession to 
Russia. Simultaneously, Russia increased Kazakhstan's hard currency quota to Europe to 
80-100,000 bopd (4-5 MMtpy). 
Despite the improved quota and optimistic production forecasts, no major increase in 
production will take place until additional export capacity is built. Furthermore, if the 
machinations of the key players hitherto are any indication of what is to come in the 
future, one should not expect an expedient resolution to Kazakhstan's export problems. 
After all when in 1992 CPC first proposed to build an export pipeline, completion was 
forecast for 1995. Today, project completion is estimated to be in 2001, a full six years 
later than the original forecast. While the decision to bring on board financially sound 
IOCs is a step in the right direction significant outstanding issues remain -- the least of 
which is the future tariff structure. The failure to secure access to export capacity has 
been and will continue to be a major disincentive to foreign investment -- the situation of 
Kazakhstan is a prime example and the experience of Azerbaijan reinforces this 
assessment. 
12 Frank C. Alexader Jr., "Kazakhstan: New Legislation, But No New Pipeline, Is now the time to 
make an E&P Investment, " Presented to the AIPN Fall 1995 Conference, Rome 12 Oct. 1995, p 6. 
13 The intended ownership structure of the new CPC is as follows: Government of Russia (24%), 
Government of Kazakhstan (19%), Chevron (15%), LUKoil (12.5%), Rosneft (7.5%), Mobil (7.5%), Oman 
Oil Company (7%), British Gas (2%), AGIP (2%), Oyrx (1.75%), and Tengizmunaigaz (1.75%). 
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8.2.2.2 The Azeri Pipeline Experience 
Azerbaijan, like Kazakhstan, has made substantial progress in attracting foreign interest 
in its upstream sector. The largest deal secured to-date is the $8 billion project to develop 
the Azeri, Chirag and deep water sections of the Guneshli offshore oil fields. Estimated 
to contain over 4 billion barrels of recoverable oil reserves, these fields are worthless to 
IOCs unless the capability exists to export future production to hard currency markets. A 
similar export debate has surrounded this project as has the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan. 
The Russian Government, anxious to maintain their historical ascendancy over the 
region, are the main proponents of a northern export route which crosses their territory. 
When the contract was ratified in November 1994, AIOC agreed to choose an export 
route by June 1995.14 But the issue proved too contentious with Russia pitted against 
Turkey and the United States who were advocating a Turkish based route. Finally in 
October 1995, AIOC announced that early production from the Chirag field would be 
exported via a dual export route: one via Georgia to the Black Sea port of Supsa; and the 
other via Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. 15 
On a pure capital expenditure basis (see Table 8.2) the Georgian route is approximately 
four to five times more expensive than the Russian route, and observed on a cost per unit 
of annual capacity distance basis the differential increases to a factor of eight to nine. 
But, comparing capital expenditures alone provides an incomplete analysis, we should 
also incorporate pipeline operating costs and the intended tariff structure. The reported 
cost of shipping oil from Baku to Rotterdam is estimated to be approximately $5 per 
14 According to Valekh F. Aleskerov, Advisor to President of SOCAR. Comment made at a 
15 John Roberts, "Caspian pipeline decision, " Petroleum Review, Nov. 1995: pp 492-493; "Behind 
the Smoke, Little Moves On Caspian Export Lines, " P. I. W., 16 Oct. 1995, pp 2-3; Jonas Bernstein, "Twin 
Routes Chosen for Pipeline, " The Moscow Times International Weekly Edition, 15 Oct. 1995, pp 26-27; 
Steve LeVine and Bruce Clark, "Turkish port to gain from oil deal, " Financial Times, 10 Oct. 1995, p 6; 
Steve LeVine and Bruce Clark, "Compromise deal today on Caspian oil route, " Financial Times, 9 Oct. 
1995, p 2; Daniel Southerland and Thomas W. Lippman, "Oil Firms Lean Toward 2 Pipelines, " 
International Herald Tribune, 26 Sept. 1995, p 1; and Robert Corzine, "Azeri oil seeks way to market, " 
Financial Times, 4 Sept. 1995, p 3. 
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barrel. 16 This certainly includes the cost of shipping oil via tanker from the Black Sea to 
Rotterdam, which if loaded at Novorossiysk is estimated to cost $1.85 per barrel and if 
loaded at Supsa would cost $1.20 per barrel. '? This could imply an operating cost of 
$3.15 per barrel for the Russian route and a $3.80 per barrel for the Georgian route. 
Table 8.2 Comparison of CAPEX for Azerbaiian's Early Oil Export Routes 
Route CAIPEX Capacity Distance CAJPEX/Capacity* Distance 
($MM) (MMtPY) (Ian) ($/MMtkmpy) 
Georgian Route 0, -_, , 
,.. -2 -30,855 - 385 
Russian Route 5- cif 
- 
21 1,146) 16,716 1S, 573 
-5G 5 6,686-7429 
45 - 50 174 1,346 1,967 - 2,185 
Early production throughput from Chirag field. 
2 Based on 18 Jan. 1996, transit agreement between Azerbaijan and Russia, for guaranteed throughput of 5 
MMtpy by the year 2002. 
3 Based on 9 MMtpy capacity from Baku to Grozny. 
4 Maximum pipeline design throughput of 17 MMtpy from Grozny to Novorossiysk. 
However, as we don't know whether the $5 per barrel total estimate incorporates pipeline 
tariffs, nor do we know whether the operating cost takes into account depreciation of the 
original capital expenditures, any such analysis is subject to too many uncertainties. 
Therefore, for the purposes of our comparison we shall concentrate on the more certain 
data which are the capital expenditure estimates and the known tariff structure. 
The Georgian pipeline will attract a tariff of $0.43 per barrel (Azerbaijan is to receive 
$0.26 and Georgia is to receive $0.17) as compared to the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline 
whose tariff is five times as large at $2.15 per barrel. The proportional difference in tariff 
rates is coincidentally the inverse of the capital expenditure comparison. Thus, while the 
AIOC may have to spend more initially to complete the Baku-Supsa line, it has likely 
used this as a justification for insisting on a lower tariff structure. So with the Georgian 
option having a higher capital expenditure but lower tariff and the Russian option having 
a lower capital expenditure but higher tariff which is cheaper? In order to answer this 
16 Supra note 14. 
17 Roberts (1996) supra note 8, pp 37-38. 
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question we constructed a "cost" cash flow comparison, ignoring operating costs because 
of insufficient data as discussed above and incorporating the following assumptions. 
" Start-up production from the Chirag field is estimated to be 40,000 bopd in mid-1997 
rising to 80,000 bopd in 1998. 
" According to the transit agreement signed between Azerbaijan and Russia, the former 
guarantees that Azeri oil exports through Novorossiysk will increase annually to 
reach a minimum of 5 MMtpy by the year 2002.18 
" During the build-up to 2002, we assume that exports are evenly split between the 
Russian route and the Georgian route. 
" After 2002, we assume that AIOC will continue to satisfy Azerbaijan's obligation to 
Russia, but will make full use of Georgian capacity as it attracts the lower tariff. 
" The AIOC intends that by 2003 operational export capacity will be 200,000 bopd (10 
MMtpy). 19 
" By 2010, production and export capacity will be 700,000 bopd (35 MMtpy). 20 
" The maximum combined design throughput of Georgian and Russian options from 
Azerbaijan is 320,000 bopd (16 MMtpy). Although the capacity of the Russian line 
will be 17 MMtpy from Grozny to Novorossiysk the capacity of the line from Baku to 
Grozny will only be 9 MMtpy. 21 
These assumptions are used to calculate the comparative cost structure in current terms 
(i. e. no account of inflation) on a discounted basis shown in Figure 8.2. Over a twenty 
year period and at a discount rate of 10% the Russian option is more expensive at $0.77 
per barrel as opposed to the Georgian option which is $0.44 per barrel. At higher 
discount rates the difference between the two routes begins to converge with the Russian 
costs dropping more rapidly. This is to be expected as the larger proportion of the Russia 
18 John Thornhill, "Azerbaijan agrees oil transit, " Financial Times, 19 Jan. 1996, p 2. 
19 AIOC, "A new oil era for Azerbaijan, " Pamphlet, n. d., p 9. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Roberts (1996) supra note 8, p 37. 
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route's costs are associated with its higher throughput in the future. At a discount rate of 
21% the cost structure of the two routes coincides at $0.35 per barrel. Viewed from this 
perspective the Russian route, despite its high tariff, is not nearly as punitive as it may 
first appear. 
Economic analysis notwithstanding, the practical limitation of the dual early export 
scheme is its limited throughput capacity of 16 MMtpy. If production is as forecast then 
both pipelines will be operating at fully capacity by the year 2005. Thus additional 
pipeline capacity (i. e. the long-term export solution) becomes necessary otherwise 
production will constrained as has been the case of the Tengiz Field in Kazakhstan. 
5 
In summary, the rationale for choosing the dual pipeline option appears justified on three 
fronts. Firstly, the ex ante cost differential between the two routes is not that great 
despite the high differential in tariff rates, although at discount rates of less than 21% the 
Georgian route is more favourable on per barrel basis. Secondly, until a long-term export 
pipeline is built, Azerbaijan exports will be limited to the combined 16 MMtpy capacity 
of both routes. Thirdly, the dual pipeline option offers some security of access to export 
capacity should one of the routes become unusable for whatever reason. But real export 
security will only be achieved when excess capacity exists, and as our analysis shows 
these two pipelines will be insufficient by the year 2005. 
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Figure 8.2 Costing Azeri Oil Exports Across Georgia & Russia 
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Azerbaijan can still fall victim to either Georgia or Russia seeking to maximise transit 
revenues. The Georgian route may be particularly susceptible to increased tariff rates 
given that the Georgian portion of the tariff is only $0.17/bbl out of $0.43/bbl. 
Undoubtedly, the lower tariff rate was seen as compensation for the higher fixed cost of 
building the Georgian pipeline, but once the fixed costs are sunk they no longer play a 
part in a decision of whether to keep using the pipeline. In other words should Georgia 
seek to equate their pipeline tariffs with those of Russia, then the AIOC would only be 
avoiding smaller variable costs by choosing not to use the pipeline, not the higher fixed 
capital costs already incurred. Provided, AIOC is generating sufficient revenue to cover 
the increased variable costs, then it would choose to keep pumping oil via the same until 
a competitive alternative arose. 22 The obvious qualification to the "bygones rule" is that 
it takes no account of the political consequences of a transit nation taking such action 
which would naturally be considered beforehand. Georgia eager to secure foreign 
investment and the possible future routing of a long-term export pipeline across her 
territory is unlikely to do anything which would discourage such investment at least in 
the interim period. 
With regards to the routing of a long-term pipeline for Azeri oil exports (i. e. post-2005 by 
our estimates), the issue is still outstanding and once more a variety of alternatives have 
been suggested. The AIOC has until June 1997 to submit its proposal to the Azeri 
government. One possible route is via Iran to the Persian Gulf, and although this allows 
easy access to the markets of the far East, it is currently being disregarded for political 
reasons. Any proposals terminating on the Black Sea (either through Russia or Georgia) 
will need to address the issue of increased tanker traffic through the Straits of Bosphorus 
which Turkey is adamantly opposing. 23 
22 This is known by economists as the "Bygones Rule. " See Prof. Paul Stevens, "A History of 
Transit Pipelines in the Middle East: Lessons for the Future, " Paper delivered to Boundaries and Ener 
P 
23 Turkey's concern about the high level of tanker traffic passing through the Straits is not without 
justification - on the 12th March 1994, Nassia, a Greek/Cypriot registered oil tanker collided with a dry 
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The final option is a route via Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. However, the 
middle leg of any such pipeline would have to cross either the territory of Armenia, Iran, 
or Georgia. Until such a time as Azerbaijan normalises is relations with Armenia the first 
option is ruled out, and similarly any route transiting Iran is politically unfeasible. A 
long-term route which incorporates Georgia will be enhanced if the AIOC's plan to 
export early oil via the same proves successful. Whether such a route would ultimately 
terminate on the Black Sea or be connected to infrastructure through Turkey depends on a 
multiplicity of factors which are practically impossible to predict. But history has shown 
us that the very existence of infrastructure, even if non-operational, is a powerful 
incentive for choosing the same route again. The first oil exports by rail from Baku 
passed through Georgia as did the first pipeline. History is on the verge of repeating 
itself. 
8.2.2.3 The Turkmen Pipeline Experience 
With regards to southern Central Asia, Turkmenistan is the only republic which is likely 
to attract substantial foreign investment into its petroleum sector and if its estimated oil 
resources of 6.8 billion tonnes24 are to be fully developed then its own secure export route 
is necessary. But Turkmenistan is also one of the most geographically disadvantaged oil 
producing FSRs and faces the stark choice of 685 km pipeline through Iran to the Persian 
Gulf with a planned first stage capacity of 2 MMtpy increasing to 14 MMtpy in the 
second stage25 or UNOCAL's proposal to build a $5 billion, 1,800 km, 50 MMtpy 
cargo ship in Turkey's Bosphorus Strait. In the wake of the accident, Turkey temporarily suspended the 
passage of any commercial vessels through the Straits. Their particular worry is the potential increase of 
tanker traffic, in an already congested waterway, should the oil reserves of the Central Asia and the 
Caspian Sea be developed. Turkey, making a direct reference to Chevron's development of the Tengiz 
field and AIOC's project in the Caspian Sea, claimed that these new projects could add annually 75 MMt 
of crude on top of the 5 MMt which is presently being shipped. While shipping through the Straits of 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara are regulated by the 1936 International Montreux 
Convention which allows free passage of any commercial vessels, Turkey unilaterally imposed new 
navigation regulations in 1994. Russia opposes any such changes which infringe her right of free passage. 
24 Proceedings of International Conference on Oil & Gas Cpportuiities of Turlanenistan. Vienna, 
26-28 Sent. 1995, p 4. 
25 Ibid., p 25. 
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pipeline from Chardzhou to the southern port of Gwadar in Pakistan via Afghanistan. 26 
Neither of these options are feasible given the current political climate in Iran and 
Afghanistan which effectively precludes raising the necessary international financing. As 
Turkmenistan borders on the Caspian Sea, should any of the other littoral states be 
successful in their efforts to build an export pipeline, Turkmenistan may be able to 
purchase throughput capacity to use in combination with cross-Caspian tankers. 
8.2.3 Summary of the Physical System 
The pipeline system inherited from the FSU is best described as an ageing and stagnant 
network, the majority of which is located in Russia, and accounts for 94% of all crude oil 
transported within the FSU. Despite the appearance of sufficient design capacity (124 
MMtpy) the existing infrastructure is ill-suited for present needs. The Druzhba pipeline 
is only running at 66% capacity due to the collapse of exports to Eastern Europe while 
bottlenecks are a common feature of the southern pipelines terminating on the Black Sea. 
The situation of the land-locked countries of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus is dire. 
Not only is there an absence of infrastructure, that which does exist typically crosses the 
territory of Russia. The experience of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan illustrates the 
challenges facing FSRs and their foreign investors in securing a reliable export route to 
the international oil market. Until new capacity is built, the southern petroleum 
producing FSRs will remain vulnerable to the weaknesses of the current system including 
at times the vicissitude of the Russian Government. 
But the construction of new pipelines is not only a daunting task from a geopolitical point 
of view (as most pipelines will cross one or more third party states) these projects are also 
very expensive. This is because pipelines are driven by huge economies of scale. 27 Table 
8.3 compares 25 proposed pipelines in the Central Asia, Transcaucasus and Black Sea 
26 "Fresh Start, " R. P. I., Apr. 1996, pp 60-61. 
27 Stevens (1996) supra note 22, pp 5-6. 
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regions. 28 For ease of comparison, we calculated the capital expenditure per unit of 
annual capacity distance (i. e. dollars per million tonne kilometres per year) for each 
proposal and sorted them in an ascending order. The entries at the top of the table 
represent the longest and largest capacity projects which enjoy the lowest CAPEX per 
unit of annual capacity distance. Whereas the smallest projects at the bottom of the table 
are the cheapest from a capital expenditure basis, they are the most expensive on a 
CAPEX per unit of annual capacity distance. Overall the range forecasts varies from 
$17,671 - $127,333 per MMtkmpy and can be further compared to the early export 
pipeline scheme for Azerbaijan shown in Table 8.2. The proposed early production 
pipeline from Baku to Supsa in Georgia has a CAPEX per yearly annual capacity distance 
of around $31,000 - $38,000 per MMtkmpy. Only the extensive use of existing 
infrastructure allows the Baku to Novorossiysk proposal to have lowest CAPEX per 
annual capacity distance of all possible pipelines -a fact that the Russians are no doubt 
eager to point out. 
To summarise, IOCs have exhibited a high level of interest in undertaking upstream oil 
projects in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. But in order for these project to move 
beyond the preliminary phases to the development stage (i. e. when the bulk of the 
investment takes place) the ability to export and sell one's production in the international 
market place must be secured. Barring the use of existing infrastructure the economic 
rationale for constructing larger more integrated pipeline schemes is well substantiated. 
These are however the most difficult category of projects to undertake especially when 
they cross one or more sovereign boundaries. Given the political situation of the region, 
it remains to be seen how quickly grandiose pipeline projects will materialise. The 
advantage of smaller projects is their lower front-end capital expenditure whose financing 
will be easier to arrange. Smaller projects also dovetail with a staggered investment 
strategy. Ultimately the pace of upstream development in this region is tied to the 
28 See Appendix A. 3, "FOGI Database: Infrastructure, " for details on actual and proposed oil and 
gas infrastructure projects (pipelines and terminals) involving foreign investors. 
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availability of export capacity. The problem for the mega-projects remains one of 
uncertainty, because they will not proceed without first establishing export capability, 
while for the smaller operational projects the problem is transportation risk. We now 
examine the management and regulation of the existing pipeline system which affects 
ongoing operations. 
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Table 8.3 Capital Expenditure Estimates of Selected Pipeline Proposals 
Route Description Length Diameter Capacity CAPE( CAPDV 
Capacity*km 
Km (Inches) MMt $US MM ($IMMtkmpy) 
Tengiz-Aktau-Makhachkala- 2993 46-42-32- 45 $2,380 $17,671 
Tbilisi-Horasan-Ceyhan/Baku 30-24 
Iran-Nakhichevan-Horasan- 
Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Turkmenbashi-Baku- 2575 46-42-32- 45 $2,188 $18,882 
Armenia-Nakhichevan- 30-24 
Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Turkmenbashi-Baku- 2557 46-42-32- 45 $2,175 $18,902 
Iran-Nakhichevan-Ceyhan 30-24 
Tengiz-Aktau-Makhachkaia- 2635 46-42-32- 45 $2,255 $19,017 
Tbilisi-Ceyhan 30-24 
Tengiz Turkmenbashi-Baku- 2512 46-42-32- 45 $2,158 $19,091 
Armenia-Nakhichevan- 30-24 
Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Aktau-Makhachkala- 2707 46-42-32- 45 $2,347 $19,267 
Baku-Iran-Nakhichevan- 30-24 
Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Aktau-Makhachkala- 2662 46-42-32- 45 $2,317 $19,342 
Baku-Armenia-Nakhichevan- 30-24 
Ceyhan 
Burgas-Mord 853 48 40 $700 $20,516 
Baku-Georgia-Ce hen 1695 36-32 25 $983 $23,198 
Baku-Iran-Nakhichevan- 1677 36-32 25 $981 $23,399 
Ceyhan 
Baku-Armenia-Nakhichevan- 
Ceyhon 
1632 36-32 25 $958 $23,480 
Tengiz-Turkmenbashi-Baku- 2612 32-30-24 20 $1,741 $33,327 
Armenia-Nakhichevan- 
Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Turkmenbashi-Baku- 2575 32-30-24 20 $1,727 $33,534 
Georgia-Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Turkmenbashi-Baku- 2557 32-30-24 20 $1,725 $33,731 
Iran-Nakhichevan-Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Aktau-Makhachkala- 2707 32-30-24 20 $1,881 $34,743 
Baku-Iran-Nakh ichevan- 
Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Aktau-Makhachkala- 2662 32-30-24 20 $1,868 $35,086 
Baku-Armenia-Nakhichevan- 
Ceyhan 
Tengiz-Aktau-Makhachkala- 2163 32-30-24 20 $1,618 $37,402 
lisi-Ceyhan 
Chardzhou-Gwadar 1800 ? 50 $5,000 $55,556 
Bur as-Alexandrou lis 317 36 30 $668 $70,242 
Kl iko -ibrikbana 180 ? 75 $1,109 $82,148 
IGrishi-Muua a 425 ? 25 $1,000 $94,118 
Kro otkin-Novoross isk 250 40 15 $375 $100,000 
Vyshka-Tehran 685 28 14 $1,000 $104,275 
Ki iko -Ibrikbana 180 ? 40 $795 $110,417 
IG iko -Ibrikbana 180 ? 25 $573 $127,333 
Source: Skagen (1995) p 43; Roberts (1996) pp 19 & 59; Nadir Biyikogiu, 'Caspian- 
Mediterranean Oil Export Pipelines The Route via Turkey, " In Charles and Lloyd (1995) pp 57-61; 
and FOGI Database. 
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8.3 The Management & Regulation of the Pipeline System 
The integrated pipeline network of the FSU was historically managed by the Soviet 
organisation Glavtransneft, and while each NIS took ownership of the pipelines within 
their respective territories following the dissolution of the FSU, the network is still 
managed for the most part by Russia's Transneft. However, the new modus operandi of 
Transneft compared to the now defunct Glavtransneft is substantially different. 
8.3.1 Introduction of Export Tariffs 
Glavtransneft, used to perform a merchant function whereby it bought crude from 
producers for on-selling to domestic refineries and export agencies (the latter principally 
being the then Soyuznefteexport, the Union Oil Exporter). 29 Significantly, Glavtransneft 
took title to the oil at the entry point into its system and then delivered it according to the 
central plan and a system of state orders. However, in January 1992 Transneft, having 
studied the North American common-carrier pipeline mechanism, initiated a major 
change in modus operandi. The ownership and marketing function of Transneft was 
shelved in favour of a common-carrier system whereby Transneft would provide 
transportation services on tariff basis 30 The tariff structure was broadly based upon the 
American cost-of-service model, but is still highly imperfect. The domestic rouble cost 
for each pipeline association is determined by summing operating costs, depreciation and 
an allowance for income tax to which is added an allowed level of profit, but the profit is 
stated as a percentage of operating expenses. Thus, there is little incentive for Transneft 
to cut costs and any cost increases will be passed through to the actual pipeline users. In 
addition to the domestic rouble content of the tariff, there is a hard currency component 
for exporters as well as a port fee for marine terminals. Although, the hard currency 
component is by far the largest element, the domestic portion has risen rapidly to 
accommodate rises in inflation. Because the ageing pipeline system is in need of 
29 Anthony E. Reinsch, Igor Lavrovsky and Jennifer I. Considine Oil in the former Soviet Union: 
Historical Perspectives Long-term Outlook, (Calgary: CERI, 1992): p 61. 
30 See IEA (1995) supra note 2, pp 125-126; and CERA (Sept, 1994) supra note 5, pp 4-5. 
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widespread repairs, modernisation and upgrading there is a theoretical justification for 
Transneft imposing higher tariffs. Since 1991 there have been at least 11 such increases 
collectively amounting to 200% rise in the price of hard currency exports. 31 But there is a 
limit to what producers can bear and the indications are that the ceiling is fast 
approaching if not already breached. The international average cost of shipping oil to 
export terminals is around 5% of its price, but in Russia it has reached almost 25%. It is 
worrying that such increases are subsidising continuing inefficiency within Transneft 
rather than funding new capital investment. 
Unpredictable rises in the cost of exporting crude oil is not only a problem for foreign 
investors but also for Russia itself whose exports cross third party states. Consider the 
recent dispute between Ukraine and Russia. On 1 January 1996 Ukraine unilaterally 
raised its oil tariff to $5.20 per tonne ($0.72 per bbl) from $4.53 dollars per tonne ($0.62 
per bbl) and Russian producers reacted by temporarily curtailing supplies to Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic 32 This was not the first time this had occurred, supplies to Eastern 
Europe were also disrupted at the beginning of the 1995 for similar reasons 33 It seems 
the battle over transit fees has become an annual event threatening the passage of Russian 
oil supplies to Eastern Europe. Ukraine's action was in part an effort to make up for 
reduced transit income due to lower throughput, but from Moscow's perspective there is 
no reason why Ukraine should be allowed to recover this lost revenue through increases 
in oil transit fees. On the other hand Ukraine should not be subsidising Russian exports 
either. On a per barrel basis the Ukrainian rate is only a quarter to a third of what 
Transneft charges internally, although on a$ per barrel per thousand kilometres basis the 
Ukrainian rate is higher (see Table 8.4). Interestingly Russia's attitude exhibits a 180 
degree about-face when it comes to transit fees for an oil export pipeline from Tengiz in 
31 For instance in 1991, it cost the White Nights JV $7.80 to ship a tonne of crude from Western 
Siberia through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary or Slovakia, in Mar, 1996 it cost $24.00. "So Far Away, " 
R. P. I.. Apr. 1996, p 34. 
32 "Russo-Ukrainian Dispute Over Oil Pipeline, " OMRI Daily Digest, No. 3, Part I, 4 Jan. 1996. 
33 Markus, Ustina. "Ukraine Gas: Debt and Desperation. " Transition, 14 Apr. 1995, pp 14-19. 
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Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea. Although the issue is still outstanding, 
Russia's proposed tariff ($3.50 per bbl or a lower rate of $3.25 per bbl for preferential 
customers who participate in financing the project) was rejected by Chevron as being too 
high. On a per barrel basis Russia's proposed tariff for the Tengiz pipeline is almost five 
times what Ukraine is charging and on a per barrel basis per thousand kilometre is still 
twice what Ukraine currently charges. Provided tariffs are based on the `revenue 
requirements' of the pipeline's owner/operator, some of the discrepancy between 
Ukrainian fees and the proposed Russian tariff rates between Tengiz and Novorossiysk 
can be accounted for by the fact that in the latter case both the capital expenditure of 
building and operating the new pipeline must be recovered, whereas in the former only 
operating costs must now be met. 34 But the Ukrainian section of the Druzhba pipeline is 
also in need of modernisation for which Ukraine's Oil Transportation Institute recently 
called a new international tender. 35 If Russian producers wish to continue to use the 
Druzhba pipeline then tariff rates will need to reflect the costs of future upgrades as well. 
In the meantime Russia and Ukraine announced their intention to submit their dispute 
over tariffs to the Secretariat of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)36 as the first formal 
34 In other words, the tariff rates for a new pipeline must be sufficient to recover the capital costs of 
building the pipeline plus cover any financing charges and operating costs with enough left over to provide 
for a `reasonable profit margin' to its owner. On the other hand, tariffs on oil passing through a fully 
depreciated pipeline have only to cover operating costs, any foreseeable maintenance costs, and a 
'reasonable profit margin'. This argument weakens, however, if tariffs are based on the `replacement 
value' of the pipeline, in which case there is little difference between the scenarios of fully depreciated 
pipeline and a brand new pipeline. 
35 "Ukraine: Oil Transportation Institute Calls on Oil Pipeline Tender, " Novocon EcoTass. 9 Dec. 
1995. 
36 The Energy Charter Treaty is the first East-West multilateral treaty, signed in Lisbon on 17 Dec. 
1994, which imposes extensive obligations on signatories with respect to the protection and treatment of 
investment in the field of energy. Text with introductory note by Thomas W. Wilde reprinted in I. L. M. 
33 (1995): pp 509 et seq. See also Regina S. Axelrod, "The European Energy Charter [sic] Treaty: 
Reality or Illusion? " Energy Policy, 24 (1996): pp 497-505; Thomas Wilde ed. European Energy Charter 
Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade, (London: Graham & Trotman / Martinus 
Nijhoff/Kluwer, 1996); Thomas W. Wilde, "International Investment Under the 1994 Energy Charter 
Treaty - Legal, Negotiating and Policy Implications for International Investors within Western and 
Commonwealth of Independent States / Eastern European Countries, " J. W. T. 29 (1995): pp 5-72; and Julia 
Dore and Robert De Bauw, Energy Charter Treaty Origins Aims and Prospects, (London: RIIA, 1995). 
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application to the treaty's dispute resolution procedures 37 Article 7 of the ECT, dealing 
specifically with the transit of energy states that... 
"each Contracting Party shall take the necessary measures to facilitate the 
Transit of Energy Materials and Products consistent with the principles of 
freedom of transit and without distinction as to the origin, destination or 
ownership of such Energy Materials and Products.... "38 Moreover, each 
Contracting Party "... shall treat Energy Materials and Products in Transit 
in no less favourable manner than its provisions treat such materials and 
products originating in or destined for its own area, unless an existing 
international agreement provides otherwise. "39 "In the event that 
facilities for the Transit of Energy Materials and Products cannot be 
achieved on commercial terms... the Contracting Parties shall not place 
obstacles in the way of new capacity being established.... " 40 More 
importantly, "a Contracting Party... shall not, in the event of a dispute over 
any matter arising from that Transit, interrupt or reduce... the existing flow 
of Energy Materials and Products. " 41 However, a Contracting Party may 
do so after the conclusion of the dispute resolution procedures, or where 
this is specifically provided for in a contract or other agreement governing 
such Transit or permitted in accordance with the conciliator's decision. 42 
Unfortunately, at that time the Charter Secretariat had not yet established the practical 
conciliation procedures for dealing with transit disputes. As a result the views of the 
Charter Secretariat with regards to the Ukrainian/Russian dispute remain unknown. But 
had the dispute been resolved within the auspices of the ECT, it could have become a 
watershed event in the international relations of transit of energy. Russia's exposure to 
Ukrainian whims or Kazakhstan's/Chevron's exposure to Russian whims emphasises that 
no matter who is in control of a pipeline, the temptation to raise tariff rates is always 
present. To summarise the volatile history of tariff changes throughout the whole region 
over the past five years, means that investors are effectively prevented from formulating a 
reliable business forecast, an absolutely essential prerequisite of any long-term 
investment. As there is little assurance that future increases will be carried out in a more 
37 "Ukraine and Russia Appeal to the European Energy Charter To Mediate in Tariff Dispute, " 
Interfax Petroleum Reuort, 9-16 Feb. 1996, p 15. 
38 Art. 7(1), "Energy Charter Treaty" supra note 36. 
39 Art. 7(3), ibid. 
`a Art. 7(4), ibid. 
41 Art. 7(6), ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
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rationale and predictable fashion, the uncertainty of pipeline tariffs remains the first of 
three key concerns with regards to the management of and regulatory framework 
governing pipelines. 
8.3.2 Allocation of Export Capacity 
The constraint on export capacity described earlier, flags the second concern for western 
investors, which is the allocation of existing export capacity. Because of the initially 
large differential between the international price of crude and those within Russia, the 
Government was compelled to restrict exports by utilising an allocation system. Since 
1992 priority for exports has been assigned in the following order: firstly, " state needs" 
exports whereby much of the revenue goes directly to the government; secondly, oil 
exported according to inter-republican agreements within the FSU; and lastly, all other 
quota-holding shippers on a pro rata basis 43 Organisations classified as "special 
exporters" enjoyed the sole right to export oil by acting as agents for the oil producers. 
This included companies such as Nafta Moscow (the largest government-controlled 
trader) and others such as Balkar Trading, Alfa-Eco and Manoil. However, the initial 
mechanism for establishing oil exports quotas was mediocre at best because quotas were 
set at an aggregate level by the Ministry of Economics based on forecasts of supply and 
demand. The aggregate figure was then broken down into individual producer 
allocations; a process which involved several more ministries. But the forecasts were 
generally inaccurate and resulted in an over-allocation to the domestic and inter- 
republican markets. Thus, it became necessary to revise export quotas for delivery of oil 
outside of Russia several times a year. 4' In general, exports to the West were increased 
while exports to FSRs were scaled back. The increase in hard-currency exports was not 
unwelcome but it was achieved in a piecemeal fashion with little foresight and led to 
bottlenecks. But the biggest drawback of the quota system was that it acted as an policy 
43 CERA (Sept., 1994) supra note 5, p 12. 
44 IEA (1995) supra note 2, p 131. 
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instrument to restrain a rise in domestic oil prices, and was susceptible to corruption 
through grafts to officials responsible for allocating quotas. 
Both the M ff and the World Bank have exerted considerable pressure on Russia to 
liberalise its oil market - but measures taken have not yet had the desired effect. 
Anyone who has followed the history of pipeline access would probably characterise it as 
being a roller-coaster ride, but one which is still very much in motion. While numerous 
changes have taken place, reality is far from the coherent, stable and transparent system 
which investors desire. This is not too surprising as the allocation of export quotas 
represents the distribution of access to an economic asset which in 1995 flowed 16% (i. e. 
$12 billion) of the entire value of all Russian exports. It is only natural that control over 
such a politically charged and economically powerful asset proves contentious. Transneft 
is directly responsible for its operation while the government is in a regulatory position. 
Caught in the middle are domestic and foreign companies throughout the FSU for whom 
access to the system remains a cornerstone of their upstream operations. The interaction 
of these players, each driven by their own self-interest, has resulted in a patchwork of 
changes. 
Decree No. 1007,45 under which the three-tier system of oil export priorities was to have 
ended was supposed to be a significant step forward. If fully implemented it opened the 
possibility for creating a transparent system, less susceptible to corruption, whereby 
capacity could be allocated according to those who valued it the most. Under the Decree, 
only for goods and services exported under an international commitment by Russia, 
would a system of licences and export quotas be maintained, for all others the latter 
would be abolished. Ironically Decree No. 1007 also drew serious criticism from those 
foreign investors who were at the time enjoying special quotas, including a tax-exempt 
status, but looked likely to lose those privileges under the new regulations. Article 25 of 
45 Decree No. 1007 of the President of the Russian Federation, "On the Abolition of Quotas and 
Licences for Goods and Services Supplied for Export, " dated 23 May 1994 reprinted in R. P. L. June 
1994, p 14. 
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the Russian Foreign Investment Law dated 4 July 1991 stipulated that any enterprises 
with foreign share participation exceeding 30% may export their own production without 
a licence. However Decree No. 1385 issued shortly afterwards revoked Decree No. 1007 
and represented an admission by the Government that it was not prepared to completely 
deregulate oil exports. 46 This did not necessarily mean that the Government did not 
believe in the goal of abolishing export quotas, but rather would take more time to devise 
a new system before scrapping the old one. 
Since then a variety of proposals have been put forth including the right to ship oil be put 
up for tender while quotas and licences be preserved for 50% of the pipeline capacity. 
Although this idea is attractive from an economic perspective as it introduces a system 
whereby the Government will extract maximum rent for 50% of the pipeline's capacity, it 
was generally viewed with disdain as it would naturally favour the large vertically 
integrated companies with the greatest financial resources. But, again such a system 
without an exemption for JVs would contravene Article 25 of the Law on Foreign 
Investment. In December 1994, the Russian Government announced its intention to scrap 
the export quotas in return for introducing domestic quotas. But this was hardly the 
solution the international financial institutions were seeking and Russia, realising that 
future loans from both the E MY and the World Bank were in jeopardy, capitulated. 47 
The first quarter of 1995 witnessed a rash of new regulations. Decree No. 220 "On 
Certain Measures of State Regulation of Natural Monopolies in the Russian Federation, " 
dated 28 February 1995 established federal executive bodies to regulate natural 
monopolies including inter alia oil and gas transportation through pipelines. Ordinance 
No. 209, freed all oil exporters from mandatory sales to domestic markets and further 
46 Presidential Decree No. 1385, "On Export Crude Oil and Petroleum Products in 1994, " reprinted 
in JuiiAug. 1994, p 19. 
47 Ordinance No. 1446, "On the Shipment of Oil and Petroleum Products Outside the Customs 
Border of the Russian Federation from January 1,1995", dated 31 Dec. 1995 reprinted in R. P. I., Feb. 
1995, pp 74-75; and "Addendum to Ordinance No. 1446 of the Russian Federation Government, " dated 31 
Dec. 1995, reprinted in R. P. I., Feb. 1995, p 30. 
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stipulated that access to throughput capacity should be granted in proportion to 
production volumes in the preceding quarter. 48 Furthermore the Russian Government 
assured its commitment to 
"ensure right-of-access priority to transportation systems: for those 
entities carrying out shipments of oil and oil products in accordance with 
international obligations of the Russian Federation; [and] for enterprises 
with foreign investments that have been granted export-tariff benefits 
allowing them to export deliveries of their own production in the volume 
required to recoup investments made before January 1,1995. "49 
On 6th March 1995 Yeltsin issued Decree No. 245, "On the Main Principles of Foreign 
Trade Practices in the Russian Federation, " which annulled previous restrictions on the 
export and import of goods and services, including raw materials, and repealed the 
"special exporter status" registration requirements. 5° The most concrete form of progress 
for foreign investors was seen in the results of the second quarter of 1995 export 
schedules which permitted 13 JVs who had previously obtained exemption from export 
tariffs, to export 100% of their `own production' to the hard currency markets of the 
West. 51 But, this was resented by some domestic producers. In summary, pipeline 
capacity is firstly allocated to satisfy international commitments of the Russian 
Government, secondly to any JVs whom are receiving preferential treatment, and lastly to 
all other producers on a proportional basis. Finally, a system of assignment permits oil 
producers to assign (i. e. sell or lease) to another legal entity their right of access to 
pipelines. 52 In some ways this was a throwback, at least in economic terms, to the earlier 
proposal of a tender for export rights. Although, both have the advantage of assigning 
export capacity to those who value it the most, the allocation system only allows the oil 
48 Art. 1, Ordinance No. 209, "On Regulating Access to the System of Main Oil Pipelines, Oil- 
Product Pipelines, and Seaports for Exporting Oil and Oil Products beyond the Customs Territory of the 
Russian Federation, " dated 28 Feb. 1995, reprinted in R. P. L. . Apr. 1995, p 75. 
49 Art. 3, ibid. 
50 "Legal Backing, " R. P. I.. Apr. 1995, p 11. 
51 This list consisted of AmKomi, Chernogorskoye, Geoilbent, KomiArcticOil, Komiquest, 
Mekamineft, Nobel Oil, Polar Lights, SANK, Tatex, Tatoilgas, Tatoilpetro, and White Nights JVs. 
52 See "Draft Procedure for Assignment of the Right to Access the System of Oil Mains, Petroleum 
Product Lines, and Sea Terminals for Export of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products beyond the Limits of 
the Customs Territory of the Russian Federation, " n. d. reprinted in R. P. I., Jul. /Aug. 1995, p 25. 
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producer as the assignor to gain the extra income, not Transneft or the Government. In 
fact the "Law on Natural Monopolies" which became effective on 24 August 1995 
prohibits Transneft as the owner of the mains pipelines from selling or leasing their 
facilities. 
From the above discussion it seems that uncertainty has been a central theme which 
provides little comfort to investors. A corollary is that foreign companies are effectively 
precluded from raising long-term debt capital on a project specific basis as there is little 
guarantee of securing affordable access to export sales sufficient to cover debt servicing. 
In all fairness to Russian officials whom are trying to balance a multitude of interests, the 
actual export record of Ns in Russia has not been all that bad. But the piecemeal 
approach in which foreign oil companies gain access to export capacity prohibits long- 
term upstream investments. The IMF concludes that "Russia should ensure a transparent 
regulatory regime for the oil pipeline system in order to safeguard domestic producers 
and continue attracting foreign investment. " 53 
8.3.3 Commingling 
The final consideration regarding the management and regulation of export pipelines 
stems from the physical limitation that oil for export is commingled into what is known 
as the "Urals Blend" within the existing pipeline infrastructure and storage facilities. 
Thus, each exporter receives the same price for their exports regardless of the quality of 
their crude which is injected into the pipeline system. Such a system is economically 
inefficient as high quality crude producers are in effect subsidising low quality crude 
producers. The KomiArcticOil N operating in the Timan-Pechora Basin of Russia 
estimates that it loses $10 to $15 per tonne of oil sold for export due to comminglingM, 
this loss is not insignificant (i. e. 8-13% of the gross export price). 
53 IEA (1995) supra note 2, p 128. 
54 "A Rotten Cocktail, " R. P. I., Jul. /Aug. 1994, p 27. 
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The need for a `quality bank' whereby crude is graded at both the input and outlet of a 
given pipeline and to introduce a system of price compensation has been recognised by 
Transneft, 55 and highlighted by the IEA. 56 But it is questionable if and when Transneft's 
proposal may materialise. Under Transneft's proposal, compensation rates are to be 
adjusted annually with initial rates set at $0.03 / bbl / °API and $0.05 / bbl / 0.1% of 
sulphur content. For instance, Bashneft would pay a penalty of $1.13 per tonne (or $0.16 
per barrel) of crude it sells to Germany, while Purneftegas would gain $1.57 per tonne (or 
$0.22 per barrel) of crude shipped to Novorossiysk. 57 Thus there would be both winners 
and losers among existing producers. High quality crude producers will be in favour of 
implementing such a system, while low crude quality producers of the type commonly 
found in the Volga-Urals will be opposed to such changes. Any attempt to reduce the oil 
revenues of the ethnic regions of Bashkortostan or Tatarstan (both within the Volga-Urals 
geological province) will be met by fierce resistance as these Muslim enclaves have 
strong feelings of independence and self-determination. 58 Despite the difficulty Transneft 
faces in winning majority approval among producers for a `Quality Crude Banking 
System' (QCBS), the system itself is one of the important steps towards achieving the 
state's long-term goal of maximising economic rent from petroleum production. 
If we assume there is a fixed sum of investment capital, then a QCBS will help ensure 
that investment capital is directed towards the most profitable deposits. If deposits 
containing poorer quality crude are to be developed then other reservoir characteristics 
(e. g. shallower depth or higher natural pressure) will have to compensate for the lower 
55 "Quality Banking, " R. P. L. July/Aug. 1994, pp 27-28. 
56 gp (1995) supra note 2, p 126. 
57 That is, Bashneft inputs 27.90°API crude with 2.63% sulphur to the system while Germany 
receives 30.42°API crude with 1.04 % sulphur; and Purneftegas inputs 36.40°API crude with 0.34% 
sulphur to the system while the blend sold at Novorossiysk is 30.43°API with 1.08% sulphur. "Different 
Strokes, " R. P. I. May 1995, pp 18-19. 
58 See Marie Bennigsen Broxup, "The `Internal' Muslim Factor in the Politics of Russia: Tatarstan 
and the North Caucasus, " in Central Asia and the Caucasus After the Soviet Union: Domestic and 
International Dynamics. Mohiaddin Mesbahi ed. (Gainesville, FL.: University Press of Florida, 1994): pp 
75-98. 
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price which the poorer quality crude attracts. It is paramount that a linkage be established 
between the international market's valuation of a particular crude and the price which is 
paid to an individual producer. Economic efficiency requires that individuals make 
investment decisions mainly in response to undistorted market signals. The current 
export system based solely on a blended crude does not achieve this at an individual 
producer level, and therefore does little to encourage the most efficient allocation of 
investment resources. 
The absence of QCBS is not just a concern of producers operating in Russia, but is also 
of importance to oil producers elsewhere in the FSU who use the Russian pipeline 
system. Crude oil from either the Tengiz field in Kazakhstan or the Chirag, Azeri, and 
Guneshli fields in the Caspian are of superior quality compared with the `Urals Blend'. If 
Kazakhstan or Azerbaijan are to use Russian export infrastructure then compensation for 
commingled crude will be necessary. Notwithstanding the need of the TengizChevroil 
IV to remove the high sulphur content (15%) in the form of Mercaptans before shipping, 
Tengiz crude at 46.5 °API59 could theoretically receive compensation of $3.5 per tonne 
(or $0.482 per bbl) compared with the average Russian export blend at Novorossiysk 
according to the above schedule. It is unknown whether this would be a sufficient level 
of compensation from Chevron's point of view, however, we suspect that it may be 
considered too low. 60 Thus while Transneft is attempting to move in the right direction, 
it may not be enough for other republics, particularly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In the 
end the question of large volumes of Azeri or Kazakh exports crossing Russian territory 
may only be achieved with dedicated pipelines where commingling with lower grade 
crudes is minimised as a design criteria. But surely the operators of these new pipelines 
59 Characteristics of Tengiz crude from Paul Thomas, Kazakhstan Investment Opportunities in the 
Energy Sector. (London: Financial Times Energy Publishing, 1995): p 49. 
60 A sample of gravity corrections used in North American Crude Pricing Bulletins typically vary 
from $0.15-0.20/ API. See Fraser H. Allen and Richard D. Seba, Economics of Worldwide Petroleum 
Production, (Tulsa, OK.: Oil & Gas Consultants Inc., 1993): pp 74-75; and Exxon, "Crude Oil Price 
Bulletin Summary, " May 1995. One must be careful not to infer too much from these less than ideal 
comparisons, but as the level of compensation proposed by Transneft is of the order of 5-6 times less than 
the cited examples, it is likely that the Russian model is on the low side. 
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would install proper monitoring equipment to permit commingling for the large number 
of producers which are likely to materialise in the future. 
8.3.4 Summary of Management & Regulatory System for Pipelines 
The management and regulation of the FSU's pipeline system has changed considerably 
since the days of Glavtransneft, and although each NIS has taken ownership of pipelines 
within their own territory, the network is still operated for the most part by Russia's 
Transneft. While Transneft enjoys a monopoly position, its ultimate control has waxed 
and waned depending on the wide variety of legislative changes which have been 
frequently introduced. The regulation of the main (or trunk) pipelines since 1991 has 
been characterised by relentless uncertainty - in regards to both the level of export 
tariffs and the allocation of export quotas. The FSU suffers from a shortage of existing 
pipeline capacity, particularly to the hard-currency markets of the West and this physical 
capacity constraint becomes intertwined within the export allocation decision making 
process. In hindsight perhaps we should not judge this process too harshly, after all the 
task of restructuring this sector is immense and the Russian Government is all the time 
having to balance a number of conflicting interests - the need to placate domestic 
producers, the need to satisfy inter-governmental agreements with other FSRs, to honour 
its obligations to foreign investors and last but not least to maximise government 
revenues. In some respects, the export record of foreign JVs has not been all that bad, but 
it has been achieved in a piecemeal fashion and still does not provide the assurance which 
foreign investors require before undertaking long-term capital intensive investments. 
On a final note, the present infrastructure of pipelines and storage tanks commingles all 
crudes into the "Urals Blend". Transneft has yet to implement a Quality Crude Banking 
System whereby individual producers are exposed to the true market valuation of their 
individual production streams. The current system, whereby all producers receive the 
same export price for their crude irrespective of the quality, perpetuates economic 
inefficiency. High quality crude producers are in effect subsidising low quality crude 
producers. Given the existence of insufficient pipeline capacity and uncertainty in 
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gaining access to that capacity on a commercially viable basis, it is necessary to examine 
alternatives to pipelines. 
8.4 Alternatives to Pipelines 
Until new pipeline capacity is constructed, the production potential of areas such as the 
Caspian Sea and Central Asia will remain essentially dormant. This presents foreign 
investors with two basic options: avoid concluding a deal until further pipeline capacity is 
constructed; or secure acreage and stagger investment as export capacity becomes 
available. The former is undoubtedly the safer choice. However, a significant drawback 
of this strategy is that the cost of 'capturing an opportunity' will go up once a deal on an 
export pipeline has been struck. 61 The government will try to apportion a great share of 
the economic rent - either by raising the minimum work obligation or adjusting the 
overall fiscal regime upwards in their favour. Another, obvious disadvantage of this 
strategy is that it will become much more costly to obtain throughput once a pipeline is in 
place. The call on new capacity is likely to be high, and reserving throughput capacity 
will be cheaper at the ex ante stage rather than at the ex post stage. For these reasons it 
is desirable for a foreign company to have secured a position prior to new export capacity 
being built. When the announcement was made to form a new Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium, the 50% stake on offer was divided among 8 interested parties - all with 
the exception of Rosneft already holding upstream acreage in Kazakhstan. In some cases 
the proposed participation is a mere two percent or less, but even such a small stake 
ensures a foot in the door when the pipeline finally materialises. 
As an added incentive companies have also sought to link "Government Take" to the 
completion of export infrastructure. Both Chevron and the AIOC have employed this 
tactic in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan respectively. The AIOC's four tier bonus system 
comprised of an initial payment of $81 million for costs previously incurred, followed by 
another $69 million upon parliamentary ratification. An additional $75 million is due 
61 Alexander (1995) supra note 12, p 9. 
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when production reaches 40,000 bopd and a final payment of $75 million is to be made 
when the first pipeline export begins ($300 million in total). 62 Similarly, Chevron has 
made its second contractual bonus payment of $210 million to Kazakhstan conditional 
upon ninety days of continuous operation of an export system with a throughput of not 
less that 260,000 bopd. 63 Such incentive do not mitigate the uncertainty that adequate 
export capacity will be available, but in the context of the FSRs, they represent a 
substantial financial contribution to their national treasuries. Notwithstanding the size of 
the "carrots" on offer, the slow progress to-date suggests that they are of limited practical 
value when securing an export pipeline which involves third party states (as is the case in 
Central Asia and the Transcaucasus) where geopolitics seems to be the over-riding factor. 
Chevron faced with insufficient allocation of export quotas choose to reduce their 
investment in Tengiz from $500 million per year to $50 million per year. 64 This decision 
is a rational, reaction to an adverse change in circumstances, and furthermore it represents 
the strategy of staggering one's investment according to available export capacity. 
Chevron adopted this stance stating that the investment cutbacks are " consistent with the 
original plans to make the project self-funding. "65 Thus, foreign investors will tend to 
structure their deals in such a manner so that investments are tied to export earnings. As 
sufficient pipeline capacity is not yet available, and is likely to remain so for the time 
being. The only chance for both governments and foreign investors to increase 
investment is to employ alternative methods of exporting (i. e. by rail, by tanker barge and 
through the use of oil swaps). The foundation documents of the TengizChevroil IV 
specifically recognise the possibility of alternatives by referring to the "... transportation 
through the export systems from the field pumping station to the export facilities having 
62 Andrew Seck, Oil and Gas Investments in Azerbaiian Part 2: Economic and Legal Profile of the 
Energy Sector, (Dundee, CEPMLP, 1994): p 53. 
63 Art. 1(f), "Chevron Joint Enterprise Foundation Agreement (Tengiz), " 18 May 1991, reprinted 
in Russia & NIS Basic Oil Laws & Contracts, Supp. 18, (New York, NY.: Barrows Inc., 1996): p 16. 
64 "Chevron Slashes Outlays for Kazakhstan Oil Field, " World Energy Update, May. 1995, p 7. 
65 Ibid. 
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access to the world's oceans, and... other transportation means including railroad 
66 transport .... 1166 
8.4.1 Rail and Sea - Economic Alternatives? 
The decision to use alternative means of transporting crude oil will be based purely on 
economics and availability. The cost will be a function of the capacity of the vessel, the 
distance the crude must be transported and the availability of alternative competitive 
methods. Although we have discussed at great length the difficulties of gaining access to 
pipeline capacity, how do the other modes of transport compare? Table 8.4 which 
provides a comparison of selected crude oil transportation costs, indicates that alternative 
modes offer little comfort from a pure economic point of view. Not only do expensive 
pipelines remain the cheapest form of transport, the difference between established 
pipelines rates and their sea and rail alternatives is a factor of 6 to 8. The most expensive 
form of export on a per barrel basis is Chevron's trial use of railway exports to Finland at 
$9-10 per bbl, although on a$ per bbl per Mkms basis the Cross-Caspian tanker rate is 
the most expensive form of transport. However, these alternative methods do possess the 
advantage that the infrastructure exists: the Volga-Don canal is operational and railway 
tracks have long since been laid. But can investors secure reliable access? Again the 
answer is not straight forward, although it is clear that the commercial starting point is 
not as favourable. 
We believe there exists a limited window of opportunity to use of alternative modes of 
export before new pipeline capacity is installed. Furthermore, a pertinent historical 
example exists -- much of the expansion of Nobel's empire during the late 19th century 
was accomplished through the construction of an integrated barge and rail system. 67 A 
competing railway link was built by Rothschild in 1883 running from Baku to Poti. 
Eventually this link was to be superseded by Nobel's pipeline in 1889. History 
66 Art, 10(b), "Chevron Joint Enterprise Foundation Agreement (Tengiz), " supra note 63, p 48. 
67 Robert W. To1f, The Russian Rockefellers. (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, 1976): p 61. 
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demonstrates that inferior methods of transportation are feasible in the absence of 
commercial alternatives. But, as Nobel's pipeline in 1889 under-priced the then existing 
rail link, so too will new pipelines of today be economically superior to oil exports by 
barge or rail. However, until such a time as sufficient pipeline capacity exists alternatives 
will, if priced accordingly, warrant consideration. The problem is that for land-locked 
states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, even shipments by tanker barge or rail will 
transit a third party state, which is in most cases is Russia. The Russian Government is 
likely to use the accessibility and pricing of current alternatives as leverage in the 
negotiations over final pipeline export routes 68 
68 As a historical parallel it is worth remember that the Russia government imposed a number of 
obstacles which delayed the completion of Nobel's pipeline for a total of 17 years until 1889 - domestic 
content requirements among other things were used. The catch was that the government railway-freight 
rates were pegged to the difference between American kerosene and the lower Baku price. Increasing the 
volume by piping Baku oil would affect this formula to the disadvantage of the government and thus the 
completion of the pipeline was delayed accordingly. Tolf (1976) ibid., p 97. 
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Table 8.4 Examples of Transportation Costs Relating to the FSU 
Type Route Capacity Distance 
Approx. 
() 
arº 
($/bbl) 
ari 
($/bbUMkms) 
Pipeline EIE ac Sea ropose Stan - 
(Tengiz- Novorossiysk) 
9 [tpy , 2.431 
Pipeline Proposed Black ea - Aegean ea 
(Burgas - Alexandroupolis) 
20 tpy 350 0.60 
Pipeline Proposed - ovorossrys tpy 1346 2.15 1.597 
Pipeline Proposed ä- Supsa via tpy 0.43 0.45 
Pipeline a Pipeline Across Ukraine --7UO 0.72-0.99 1.029 - 1.414 
Pipeline Western Siberia - uapse 
Pipeline esters Siberia - ovorossiys 4000 3.209 
Ship8 ross- aspian (Cheleken - BEW N/A 305 4.918 
ship Caspian ea - Black ea (Cheleken - Novorossiysk) 
3000 DWT 3.076 
Rail tan - Finland (Atyrau - 
Finnish Border) 
NIA tt 9-10 - 3.77- 3.396 
I "Twisting the Pipe, " R. P. I., Nov. 1995, p 48; while another report states that CPC set rates from Tengiz 
to Novorossiysk at $3.50/bbl with a preferential rate of $3.25/bbl for consortium founders supplying 
finance for the project. J. Ray Jones, and Jeffrey M. Kadet, "Russian Tax Developments, " Russian Oil & 
Gas Guide 3, no. 3 (1994): p 30. 
2 Estimated capacity of 1st phase. 
3 Dorian, Rosi and Indriyanto (1994) supra note 8, p 422. 
4 "Azerbaijan Government Approves Draft Deal to Ship Its Caspian Oil Via Russia, " Interfax Petroleum 
Report, 5-12 Jan. 1996, p 14. 
5 "US Companies AT&T and Bechtel Sign Deals To Participate In Georgian Pipeline Project, " Interfax 
Petroleum Report, 16 - 23 Feb. 1996, p 10. As 480 km of the line is in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan will collect 
$0.26 of the tariff, while Georgia will receive the other $0.17. 
6 On 1 Jan. 1995, the Ukrainian Government unilaterally raised the tariff of oil crossing its territory in the 
Druzhba pipeline from $0.62 per bbl to $0.72 per bbl, although a Ukrainian spokesperson suggested that 
0.99 per bbl would be a more reasonable figure. See OMRI Daily Digest, 4 Jan. 1996, supra note 32. 
7 As of 1 Feb. 1996, "So far away, " R. P. L. Apr. 1996, p 36. See also R. P. L. Jun. 1994, p 66; and 
"Monopoly Rents, " R. P. I.. Apr. 1994, pp 21-23. 
8 Courtesy of Monument Oil and Gas plc. 
9 "Railroads area new Egress for Tengiz, " Platt's Oilararn News. 6 Jun. 1995, p 1. 
8.4.1.1 By Rail 
Railway lines do exist, but are at present of limited value for exporting crude. The rail 
link between Azerbaijan and Russia, which had in the past been used for the export of oil 
products from Azerbaijan has been closed since the hostilities in Chechenya. 69 The 
Russian Government claims it closed the link as a direct result of the hostilities in 
Chechenya, yet a view commonly held by Azeris is that Russia has in fact imposed a de 
facto economic blockade as a means of exerting political pressure on Azerbaijan. Even if 
this was not the intended purpose of the rail closure, it most certainly strengthens 
69 "Azerbaijan, " Newsninht, BBC, London, 5 Apr. 1995. 
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Russia's bargaining position and weakens Azerbaijan's. Until the line is reopened, the 
exporting oil or oil products via this route is not possible. 
As far as we are aware Chevron is the only company to have carried out trial crude 
exports by rail when it shipped 9 MMt of crude from Tengiz to Neste's refineries in 
Porvoo, Finland in June 199570 While feasible from a physical point of view, such an 
option was extremely expensive - approximately $9-10 per barrel or $3.4 - 3.8 per 
barrel per thousand kilometres. Compared to the pipeline options shown in Table 8.4, 
the rail charges are uncompetitive and only large fields with extremely low production 
costs (e. g. Tengiz) are likely to be able to afford the net-backs offered by this alternative. 
One advantage rail offers is that Tengiz crude shipped in a uncommingled manner may 
command a 25% premium over the Urals Blend, equivalent to about $2 per bbl over 
Brent7i - this would certainly help lessen the impact of the high rail tariffs. If rail 
shipments are to provide a viable alternative to pipelines in the interim then internal 
Russian factors must permit transit on a reliable basis - this is far from certain. There is 
nothing to suggest that Russian officials may act differently than has been the case for 
pipeline access. Coupled to this uncertainty is the fact that rail gauges are not necessarily 
consistent across international boundaries as is the case between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, 
Russia and Finland. For instance, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia's rail gauge is not 
compatible with that of Russia's. Thus crude exports to these countries via rail requires 
an intermediate handling point which raises the overall transportation cost. We conclude 
that the export of crude by rail is inherently more expensive, but provided the political 
will exists, rail could provide an alternative for limited exports until additional pipeline 
capacity is built. 
70 Peter Zipf, "Railroads Are a new Egress for Tengiz, " Platt's Oilgram News, 6 Jun. 1995, p 1. In 
August 1996 it was reported that Chevron was examining the possibility of oil exports via rail through 
Georgia. 
71 Ibid., p 2. 
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8.4.1.2 By Tanker Barge 
Small tankers have traditionally plied the waters of the Caspian Sea and historically 
Nobel made wide spread use of tankers on the Volga-Baltic system. Typical rates quoted 
for crude shipments between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea are currently around 
$8/bbl or roughly $3 per bbl per thousand kilometres, the latter depending on exact points 
of loading and unloading. Similar to shipments by rail, small tanker (limited to a 
maximum of 3000 D)W)72 shipments are more expensive than the proposed pipeline 
tariffs and would therefore only be a viable alternative in the interim. However, there are 
two further considerations. Firstly, the Volga-Don/River-Canal System (VDRCS) is 
closed between the end of November to the end of March or early April (i. e. 
approximately 4-5 months of the year) 73 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly is the 
issue of access to the water-way. That is, do the other littoral states of the Caspian Sea, 
other than Russia whose territory the VDRCS entirely resides, have a legal right of 
access? As a practical first answer one would conclude no. Only one shipping company 
has a license to carry crude through this waterway, in effect a monopoly, and any ship 
must fly a Russian flag. 74 Small quantities of crude have been exported from the Caspian 
by ship, but as yet there is no regularity. For instance, Kazakhstan began shipping crude 
from Aktau to the Bulgarian port of Burgas in June of 1994 75 and the first export by sea 
from Turkmenistan in 70 years commenced in February 1995 when production from the 
Larmag Cheleken JV was shipped from Cheleken port. 76 But if the other littoral states 
do not have a legal right of access to the VDRCS then the scope for shipping crude oil via 
this method will remain haphazard at best with Russian flag companies retaining a 
monopoly. We shall now consider the legal status of the VDRCS. 
72 "'Summary of `Ansad Petrol' Joint Venture between SOCAR and Attila Dogan Petrol, " reprinted 
in Basic Oil Law's Russia & NIS, Supp. 5 (New York, NY.: Barrows, 1993): p 7. 
73 Tolf (1976) supra note 67, p 63. 
74 Adrian Skelt (Commercial Consultant, Monument Oil and Gas plc. ) conversation with the author, 
30 Oct. 1995. 
75 "On the Wire, " R. P. I., Ju1JAug. 1994, p 38. 
76 US Department of Energy, "Foreign Energy Ventures in the FSU/EE, " Mar. 1995, p 29. 
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U1.3 Status of the Volga Don /River-Canal System 
"The commerce besides which any nation can carry on by means of a river 
which does not break itself into any great number of branches or canals, 
and which runs into another territory before it reaches the sea, can never 
be very considerable; because it is always in the power of the nations who 
possess that other territory to obstruct the communication between the 
upper country and the sea. " (Adam Smith, 1776)77 
One may surmise that Adam Smith's observation over 200 years ago would be just as 
valid today for the Volga-Don/River-Canal system (VDRCS), if it were not for the 
evolution of international law under which the rights of navigation and freedom of access 
are well established. If Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan or Iran are to enjoy these 
privileges then one must first decide what is the status of the VDRCS under international 
law. There are two possible interpretations: either it is an international water-way or it is 
not. Obviously the littoral states other than Russia would prefer the former interpretation, 
but is there any legal basis for this? 
The seminal point of our analysis begins with an examination of the geographical 
location of the aforesaid river-canal system. The Volga River delta opens on to the 
northern coast of the Caspian Sea and its eastern bank is approximately located at the 
Russian-Kazakhstan border. But being a natural delta its banks are shifting and as such 
portions of the delta are within Kazakhstan' territory. Indeed the mouth of the Akhtuba 
River, a branch of the Volga, is within Kazakh territory. Approximately 450 kilometres 
(as the crow flies) upstream, just south of where the Volga River turns sharply north at 
Volgograd, a 101 km canal traverses westward to Tsimlyansk Reservoir which flows out 
the Don River past Rostov on the Don to the Taganrog Gulf on the Sea of Azov (see 
Figure 8.1). Apart from the Akhtuba River, an unnavigable distributary of the Volga, the 
entire VDRCS system resides within the territory of Russia and would thus be considered 
the latter's internal waters. 
77 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. (1776; reprint, Germany: Everyman's Library, 1991): p 19. 
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Both theory and international practice agree that rivers and canals are part of the territory 
of the riparian state and if a river lies wholly within the boundaries of one state then, the 
waters and mouth are considered national or internal waters. 78 As far as the passage of 
public or private vessels of foreign states there is no general rule of international law 
which guarantees such rights except in the presence of a treaty. Obviously, it is in the 
interest of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to negotiate with Russia such a 
treaty, but it is Russia who will be bargaining from a position of strength. Any 
concessions given by Russia could very well be linked to the settlement of the 
demarcation of the Caspian Sea in her favour. We are not confident that the littoral states 
of the Caspian Sea will in the near future secure rights of passage to the VDRCS except 
on an ad-hoc basis. Exporters will likely have to contend with a small number of 
shippers, high transit fees and the potential risk of blocked shipments. The latter could 
easily occur through administrative delays in issuing licences or the revocation of license 
due to a breach of certain standards or regulations -- the most likely candidate being 
environmental or safety standards. 
However, our interpretation of the VDRCS is not necessarily supported by all. The 
Government of Kazakhstan, for instance believes that the VDRCS is an international 
waterway, because the Caspian Sea is a Sea. 79 Whether, this is the correct interpretation 
of the Caspian Sea is a current source of debate among international lawyers. But, failing 
this, the Kazakhs also cite that UNCLOS80, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas8' 
78 Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts eds. Om enheim's International Law - Volume I -- Peace, 9th ed. (Harlow, Essex: Longman Group UK Ltd., 1992): p 574 and p 591. 
79 Vyacheslav Gizzatov, "The Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, " in Oil and Caviar in the Caspian, 
Eds. Charles Gurdon and Sarah Lloyd, (London, Menas Associates Ltd., 1995): p 37. 
80 Art. 125, UNCLOS, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122. "Land-locked state shall have the right of access 
to and from the sea... [and]... shall enjoy freedom of transit though the territory of the transit States by all 
means of transport. " Furthermore, this provision is not just limited to water craft, but also encompasses 
other modes of transport including road and rail (Art 124 (1)(d)(i)). But, in order for a littoral state to 
qualify under this provision it must be considered a land-locked state, that is a State which has no sea-coast 
(Art 124 (1)(a)). 
81 Art. 3, "Convention On The High Seas", signed in Geneva on 29 Apr. 1958, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 13/L. 53 and reprinted in A. M. L. 52 (1958): pp 842-851. 
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and the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States82 all support the premise that 
states which do not possess a sea-shore should have a right of free access to the sea. But, 
such interpretation appears to be reading too much into Article 3(2) of the Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas. This convention does not create an absolute right of access 
to the high seas for land-locked states, rather it only creates the requirement that this is to 
be accomplished by mutual agreement and that the parties consider the rights of the 
coastal states, the state of transit and the special circumstances of the land locked states. 
Therefore, an automatic right of transit is not established by the Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas, rather it is subject to negotiation. 
From a different angle the Government of Kazakhstan has put forth the position that as 
the Volga-Don Canal was constructed with the participation (i. e. financial and labour 
resources) of all the republics of the FSU, thus FSRs are now entitled to utilise the 
VDRCS. This argument is remarkably similar to Russian claims of equity compensation 
for deposits discovered in Central Asia and the Caspian prior to the dissolution of the 
FSU. Undoubtedly, during the construction of the Volga-Don canal, which started in 
1948 and completed in 1952,83 resources from all over the FSU were used, but in the 
absence of a right either established by contract or treaty which could have survived state 
succession it is difficult to see that FSRs can legitimately assert a right of access to the 
VDRCS a priori. While the existence of a treaty between the members of the FSU 
might not have been necessary given their political union, certainly the absence of a 
Treaty between Iran and FSU regarding navigation and rights of passage specifically on 
the VDRCS gives some indication that neither RSFSR nor Iran ever considered this an 
international water-way. This is not to say that Iranian ships did not use this water-way, 
they often shipped goods both to and from Europe, but the rights of passage were 
82 Preamble, "Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked States, " signed in New York on 8 Jul. 
1965, UN Doc. TD/TRANSIT/9/Corr. 1 and reprinted in I. L. M. 4 (1965): pp 957-968. 
83 Peter the Great made an abortive attempt to join the Volga and Don Rivers in 1697. See " Volga- 
Don Ship Canal" in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica - Vol. 12 - Microyaedia, 15 ed. (Chicago, IL.: 
University of Chicago, 1993): p 421. 
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mutually agreed by generic navigation treaties, but in no way were either the VDRCS nor 
the Volga-Baltic Canal ever considered international water-ways. Furthermore, the 
Volga-Don Canal was only completed 12 years after the signing of the 1940 Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation between Iran and the FSU. 
We conclude that rights of access to the VDRCS is another outstanding issue that will 
eventually need to be settled on a mutual basis by all littoral states of the Caspian Sea. 
However, it seems that Russia will enjoy the upper hand in any negotiations because a) 
the VDRCS is situated entirely within its territory, and b) there is no historical precedent 
for treating the VDRCS as an international water-way. 
As long as the status quo remains investors will have to contend with ad-hoc, and 
uncertain export capacity via river barges and tankers. Given that no regular market 
exists for such exports - prices will be corresponding high. As a secondary observation, 
this situation helps to justify AIOC's decision to put LUKoil in charge of logistics. 84 
Because considerable amounts of heavy equipment will need to be imported into the 
Caspian Sea via the VDRCS, it is hoped that the direct involvement of a powerful 
economic Russian interest will mitigate any political risk associated with the use of this 
water-way. 
In summary, the Volga-Don/River-Canal system does not offer at the present time a 
secure means to export crude. It is plagued by short operating season (7-8 months per 
year), insufficient competition, and uncertainty over rights of passage. The latter two are 
within the realm of change if the political will to do so exists, but the window of 
opportunity from an economic perspective only remains open while insufficient pipeline 
capacity prevails. Once the latter is rectified, crude oil exports via river barges and 
tankers are unlikely to be able to compete with lower pipeline tariffs. Thus, the simple 
84 Geoffrey H. Lyon (Office of International Energy Policy, US Department of State) conversation 
with author on 25 Sept. 1995. 
309 
observation cited at the beginning of this discussion, made over 200 years ago by one of 
the world's most renowned economists (Adam Smith) appears timeless in its application. 
8.4.2 Oil Swaps 
In the absence of a physical means of exporting crude, another option is oil swaps, 85 
whereby producer "A" delivers physical barrels of oil to producer "B" at a given point 
in one country in exchange for receiving physical barrels of oil from producer "B" at 
another point which may or may not be in the same country. The rationale being that the 
transaction obviates the need for expensive infrastructure in between. 
Oil swaps have an established history as an oil trading mechanism in the FSU. Indeed, 
they were a natural modus operandi of former central planning which advocated inter- 
Republic dependency. The Pavlodar refinery in eastern Kazakhstan is an ideal case in 
point. Not connected by a pipeline to the oil producing region of western Kazakhstan, 
crude oil is supplied from Western Siberia in exchange for oil produced in eastern 
Kazakhstan and delivered to the Russian refinery in Samara. However, domestic oil 
swaps or the inter-CIS oil swaps are of limited use for foreign investors unless they can 
facilitate the export of crude oil to the hard currency markets of the West. But even an 
oil-swap cannot over-come the fact that insufficient pipeline capacity exists for exporting 
crude to the West within the CIS. That is, without first expanding the pipelines and 
terminals on the Black Sea, the oil-swap for Central Asian states via Russia remains 
limited at best. 
Conversely, Iran could be an ideal East-West oil swap partner because: a) it borders on 
the Caspian Sea; b) it is a major oil producer in its own right accounting for 8.7% of the 
85 This is not to be confused with the financial transaction also known as an oil swap, whereby one 
party agrees to pay a fixed price for a quantity of oil, while the other party accepts to make payment for the 
same quantity of oil but based on a floating or variable price. See Petroleum Intelligence Weekly and 
Price Waterhouse World Petroleum Industry Group, The Complete Guide to Oil and Gas Derivatives. 
(New York, NY.: PIW Publications, 1995): pp 11- 32; Kevin Heffron, "Using Financial Derivatives to 
Manage Oil Project Risk, " O. G. L. T. R. 12 (1994): pp 149-153; Samir Mankabady, "Oil Swaps, " in Ernest 
E. Smith et. al., International Petroleum Transactions. (Denver, Co.: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Foundation, 1993): pp 707-708; and "Futures and Derivatives -A Special Report, " Petroleum Economist. Nov. 1993, pp 13-32. 
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world's oil reserves and 5.6% of global oil production in 1995; 86 c) tankers loading at 
Iran's oil export infrastructure on the Persian Gulf have easy access to the growing 
economies of South East Asia; and d) existing pipeline capacity between Iran's northern 
refineries and its oil producing regions in the south are limited. Thus Iran's northern 
refinerieS87 could be supplied more easily by Central Asian or Caspian Sea oil 
production. Given the complementarities of Iran's situation and the export predicament 
facing the southern oil producers of the FSU, oil swaps could allow the latter to receive 
international market price for oil while avoiding the onerous expense of building 
pipelines which they presently cannot afford. 88 
To this end Kazakhstan has been negotiating over the past few years with Iran for an oil 
swap of up to 5 MMtpy (or 100,000 bopd). Under such a scenario, Kazakh crude would 
be shipped by tanker barge from the port of Atyrau to the Iranian port of Bandar-Anzali. 
The reversal of an existing products line would then carry the crude to a refinery in 
Tehran in exchange for Iranian crude shipped out of Kharg Island on the Persian Gulf on 
behalf of Kazakhstan. But, in order to handle more than 66,000 bopd, the Iranian port 
facilities at Amirabad or Moshar will need to undergo expansion. 89 Consequently, 
Kazakhstan and Iran's efforts have focused on an initial oil-swap of 40,000 bopd. 90 For 
awhile the talks appeared stalled on the issues of transit fees and delivery dates, 9t but 
86 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996. 
87 Iran's northernmost refineries are located in Tabriz and Tehran and have a capacity of 90,000 
bopd (or 4.5 MMtpy) and 220,000 bopd (or 11 MMtpy) respectively. Energy Map of the Middle East, 2nd 
Ed. (London: Petroleum Economist, Mar. 1993). 
88 Dr. Narsi Ghorban, "The Route South Through Iran, " in Gurdon and Lloyd (1995) supra note 
79, p 62. 
89 "Caspian Upstream Builds Momentum Despite Loose Rules, " P. I. W., 18 Dec. 1995, p 5. 
90 "Misgivings Still Dodging Kazakhstan's Oil Pipeline Deal, " P. I. W., 20 May 1996, p 1. 
91 "Iran-Kazakhstan Oil-Swap Talks End Without Accord, Kazakhs Say, " Bloomberg, 15 July 
1996. 
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finally on 12 August 1996 it was reported that Kazakhstan and Iran concluded a swap 
arrangement for 2 MMtpy. 92 
Similarly Turkmenistan, which also maintains good relations with Iran, 93 signed an 
agreement of intent for a swap arrangement of 6 MMtpy (120,000 bopd) with the Tehran 
refinery. 94 But as the 3.76 MMt of oil which Turkmenistan's produced in 199595 was 
almost entirely consumed domestically this agreement appears premature. Furthermore, 
with the combined volume of the two intended swap agreements exceeding spare Iranian 
export capacity, either Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan can be accommodated but not both. 
Barring any expansion of Iranian export infrastructure on the Persian Gulf, the interim 
benefit of an oil swap will only arise to Iran's first customer. For all intents and purposes 
this looks likely to remain Kazakhstan, but Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are also 
potential candidates. 
Throughout the Kazakh-Iranian negotiations, Chevron has naturally be very reluctant to 
speak publicly on the matter. Being the largest shareholder in the Tengizchevroil JV, it is 
more eager than most in reaching a solution to its export problems. However, Chevron 
must be cautious of the US government's "Containment Policy" towards Iran which 
centres on legislation requiring that the US vote against any Iranian request for an 
international development bank loans, and prohibits US companies from doing business 
with Iran. 96 The lack of support from any international financial institution effectively 
92 "Kazakhstani Oil to Run Through Iran, " OMRI Daily Digest, No. 155, Part I, 12 Aug. 1996. 
93 Prof. Fred Halliday, "Iran and the Caspian, " in Gurdon and Lloyd (1995) supra note 79, p 11. 
94 Mr. Nyazov (Chief Specialist of Turkmenistan Ministry of Oil and Gas), conversation with author, 
Ashgabat, 26 Mar. 1996. 
95 Turkmenistan's oil production was 5.3 MMt in 1991,5.2 MMt in 1992,3.91 MMt in 1993,3.86 
MMt in 1994 and 3.76 MMt in 1995. "Duke of Oil, " R. P. I. Aug. 1996, p 40. Current level of production 
represents a drop of more than 75% from its peak level of around 16 MMtpy in 1975. Nadir Guerer and 
Dr. Faith Birol, "Assessing future oil export potential in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, " OPEC Bulletin, 
Sept. 1995, p 12. 
96 On 15 Mar. 1995 President Clinton issued the first of two Executive Orders restricting US 
business relating to Iran's petroleum industry. The first order (No. 12957) was subsequently superseded 
by Executive Order No. 12959 dated 8 May 1995. Restrictions include, inter alia, no capital investment, 
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prohibits the financing of any large scale pipeline project through Iran. 97 But the May 
1995 Executive Order, permits, inter alia, the use of oil swaps between Iran and non-US 
subsidiaries which are nevertheless owned or controlled by US persons. While this is an 
acknowledgement of the economic arguments in favour of an oil swap with Iran, it is still 
uncertain how the US administration would actually react in such circumstances although 
being theoretically permissible. 
In summary, an oil swap as described above offers only a limited opportunity for 
alleviating the physical restrictions facing oil exports from southern FSRs. Oil swaps are 
possible in spite of the US Government's Containment Policy towards Iran. With regards 
to the prohibition of investments on Iranian soil, American companies are certainly 
affected, although US efforts to extend these provisions extra-territorially to companies of 
other nations has not been accepted by the international community in general. 98 But, as 
36% of the international consortium to develop the Chirag, Azeri and deep-water section 
of the Guneshli field is made up of American IOCs, and that 75% of the TengizChevroil 
JV in Kazakhstan is owned by Chevron and Mobil, the effect of such restrictions cannot 
be considered minimal. Even British Petroleum is unlikely to risk antagonising the US 
Government as 45-50% of their global oil production is located within the US (i. e. Alaska 
North Slope). 99 While the recent agreement between Iran and Kazakhstan on a2 MMtpy 
oil swap provides some relief to Kazakhstan immediate export problems the overall 
no sales, no direct purchases and no direct oil sales. See Preston Brown, "Proposed US Sanctions on 
Persons or Entities Participating in the Development of the Petroleum Resources of Iran or Libya, " 
O. G. L. T. R. 14 (1996): pp 305-309. 
97 Glen Rase (Director of US Office of International Energy Policy), "A Washington Perspective on 
Caspian Oil & the Pipeline Options, " in Gurdon and Lloyd (1995) supra note 79, p 54. 
98 The Iran-Libya Oil Sanctions Act of 1996 became effective on 5 Aug. 1996 and seeks to give 
extra-territorial effect to sanctions against companies of other nations making an investment of more that 
$40 million in the petroleum industry of Iran and Libya. The European Union, among others, have 
severely criticised this legislation as being a violation of international law both prior to and after its 
enactment. See Brown (1996) supra note 96, pp 308-309; "IRAN: US signals sanctions war, " Middle 
East Economic Digest, 16 Aug. 1996, pp 23-24; Scott Parish, "Russia Blasts US Sanctions on Iran, 
Libya, " OMRI Daily Digest, No. 152, Part I, 7 Aug. 1996; and "President Clinton Will Sign the Iran- 
Libya Oil Sanctions Act, " Arab Oil & Gas, 1 Aug. 1996, pp 5-8. 
99 "BP Group Results -1st Quarter 1996 (Part 2), " BP Home Page, British Petroleum Company Ltd., 1996. [Accessed through the Internet: http: //165.121.20.76/press/pr3l. html. ] 
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volume is still small. The risk for Iran is that when progress is finally made on an export 
pipeline, the desirability of oil-swaps and the price which they can command will drop. 
The window of complimentary benefits will not last indefinitely. 
8.4.3 Summary of Alternatives to Pipelines 
The preceding sections examined alternative means of exporting oil as insufficient 
pipeline capacity currently exists. However, there is only a limited window of 
opportunity for exporting crude oil by both rail and by tanker barges. Both methods face 
capacity constraints, higher costs and restrictions of access. New pipelines, once built, 
will enjoy greater economies of scale. Just as Nobel's pipeline in 1889 provided a more 
economically efficient means of transporting crude from Baku to Batumi compared to the 
railway, a similar scenario will evolve in the future. 
In the case of Azerbaijan, its northern rail link has been inoperable since the outbreak of 
hostilities in Chechenya. Chevron's trial shipments of crude via rail to Finland have 
proven to be very expensive. With respect to the VDRCS, the essential problem for the 
littoral states, other than Russia, is gaining legitimate access. According to our 
interpretation the VDRCS is not an international waterway. This is not to say that the 
littoral states of the Caspian Sea will not be able to utilise this route, but rather they will 
have to reach a mutual agreement with Russia. Clearly, Russia will be negotiating from a 
position of strength and may choose to use this issue as a bargaining chip within the 
overall debate on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. With regards to oil swaps, Iran is 
the most obvious external outlet for crude produced from Central Asia or the Caspian 
Sea. However, even this method is currently restricted to no more than 66,000 bopd 
without a significant investment in infrastructure. 
The costs differentials cited herein are only snap-shot indicators of a constantly evolving 
set of economic circumstances. While we expect the general rate hierarchy between the 
modes of transport to remain the same (pipelines being the least expensive as compared 
to railways and tankerlbarges), current rates cannot be used to accurately forecast future 
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rates. This is because transit rates are time and circumstance specific. For instance, if in 
the future the demand for tanker/barges were to rise without a corresponding increase in 
available capacity, then the price for shipping oil via tanker/barge would naturally rise. 
Thus there is only a limited scope for expanding exports via alternative methods as 
demand would soon exceed available supply thereby pushing up the price of such exports 
and making them less attractive from an economic point of view. 
8.5 Conclusion 
Russia inherited the bulk of the FSU's pipeline network and although each FSR now 
owns the pipelines existing within its territory the overall system is basically managed by 
Transneft. The pipeline network, apart from requiring extensive maintenance and 
upgrading, is ill-suited to meet the current export needs of producers following the 
dissolution of the FSU and the collapse of the CMEA. Excess capacity exists in the 
Druzhba pipeline due to reduced exports to Eastern Europe, but severe bottlenecks have 
been created on the southern export routes to the West. While the situation may be 
difficult for Russia, it is even more critical for the land-locked countries of Central Asia 
and the Transcaucasus. For these countries is it not just an issue of insufficient pipeline 
capacity, it is often a problem of no capacity at all. 
Given the limits of expanding capacity rapidly, the Russian Government has used the 
allocation of export capacity as one of its principal policy instruments. In all fairness, the 
Russian Government faces the daunting challenge of balancing a number of conflicting 
interests (domestic producers, producers in other FSRs, foreign investors and the need to 
maximise government revenues). It will be impossible to please everyone. Foreign 
investors have managed to export crude oil, but certainly not on the scale they would 
prefer. Moreover, this has been achieved in a piecemeal fashion with a great deal of 
uncertainty - both in terms of capacity allocation and tariff rates. Uncertainty remains 
the anathema of long-term upstream development projects. The other key limitation of 
the current export mechanism is the practice of commingling. At the present time, all 
producers who input crude into the system for export to the West are paid the same price 
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(i. e. the Export / Urals Blend) with no regard to the quality of their individual crude 
stream. Until such a time as Transneft introduces a Quality Crude Banking System, 
whereby individual producers are exposed to undistorted market signals, economic 
inefficiency will prevail. High quality crude producers are in effect subsidising low 
quality crude producers. 
Exports by rail, tanker barges and oil swaps provide only a limited alternative to 
pipelines. With respect to the first two, their window of opportunity remains open until 
new pipelines are constructed. But, the success of these methods is conditional upon 
reaching a mutually acceptable agreement with Russia, through whose territory the 
exports are most likely to transit. According to our analysis the Volga-Don/River-Canal 
System is not an international waterway -- thereby precluding automatic rights of 
passage and navigation, that an affirmative interpretation would convey. Oil swaps with 
Iran are feasible for the littoral states of the Caspian Sea, but once again the surplus 
capacity of Iran's export infrastructure is limited to around 66,000 bopd barring 
significant new investment. Thus while alternatives to pipelines exist in the interim 
period they are not seen as being an integral part of a long-term export solution. 
With regards to future pipeline routes, a maze of alternatives have been suggested - all 
of which transit one or more third party states. The cost of these grandiose schemes 
necessitates a high level of cooperation among IOCs, domestic oil companies, host 
governments and the international political and financial community which has yet to 
materialise. The AIOC's proposal to export early oil through both Georgia and Russia 
enjoys the greatest probability of success among the proposals immediately on offer as it 
balances political interests, makes the greatest use of existing infrastructure and as a 
result has the lowest up-front capital expenditures. On a discounted basis there is little 
difference between the cost of shipping oil on a per barrel basis via the Russian route and 
the Georgian route. 
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To conclude, the uncertainty of being able to export one's oil production to the 
international market - remains one of the greatest disincentives for foreign investment in 
the FSU's petroleum industry at the present time. IOCs are pursuing an export oriented 
strategy with respect to upstream investments and any failure to acquire adequate export 
capacity will either preclude investment altogether or at the very least delay it 
indefinitely. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
9.1 Achievement of Objectives 
We began this thesis with a simple statement of our objectives which was to document, 
quantify, assess and explain the reaction of western capital to the opening of the former 
Soviet Union's oil and gas industry. We believe we have achieved this objective. 
Through the use of the FOGI Database we have unequivocally demonstrated the wide 
dichotomy between the high level of interest expressed by western oil companies and the 
low level of investment that has taken place. The aggregate and regional analysis 
facilitated by use of the FOGI Database represents an unique contribution to our 
understanding of the trends of potential investment, particularly when assessed in the 
context of global upstream oil and gas capital investments. Furthermore, our examination 
of the activities of the MLAs marks the first concerted effort to assess their track record 
in the petroleum industry of the FSU. These results extend beyond the borders of the 
FSU and questions their purported ability to enhance the large-scale flow of credits into 
politically and commercially unstable business climates. 
However, this thesis has by no means provided the final deliberation on such subjects and 
§9.4 suggests additional topics for research. Similarly §9.3 presents some thoughts on 
the differing roles of domestic and external financing, the former being an entire research 
agenda in itself. We now commence with a summary of each chapter and the major 
findings derived therefrom. 
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9.2 Chapter Summaries and Major Findings 
This thesis commenced with a historical review of the FSU's oil industry. Until the late 
1920s, foreign companies played an instrumental role in providing modem technology 
and investment capital. From the 1930s onwards, the isolationist policies of the Soviet 
Government were buttressed by the discovery of a prolific new basin each time the 
preceding area of core production entered into decline. Remaining technologically 
equivalent with the West was not a precondition for success. Currently the domestic 
industry faces innumerable challenges in circumstances not too dissimilar from those 
following the Bolshevik revolution when western firms were used to rejuvenate oil 
production. It is inconceivable that the FSU's oil industry as a whole could undergo the 
modernisation it requires in isolation of western resources of technology, management 
and capital. Whether IOCs will receive the level of host country acquiescence which they 
require is altogether another matter and prevailing attitudes towards FDI throughout the 
FSU do differ. Even in 1996 Russia's Prime Minister accused foreign states and 
transnational companies of trying to subordinate the CIS to their rules of the game and 
their economic interests. ' But other countries, such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, have 
embraced FDI much more readily. In this regard, the post-1991 situation does diverge 
from that of the 1920s. Although Russia continues to dominate the FSU's oil industry by 
its sheer size, Russia per se is not the only `game in town' as was the case in the 1920s 
when all production centred in and around the Caucasus. Competition to attract FDI 
exists between all FSRs, and those countries which adopt a policy of openness stand to 
benefit at the expense of others which do not. 
Similarly, foreign oil companies are aggressively competing to secure access to available 
upstream acreage. Using the FOGI Database we showed in Chapter 3 that foreign 
investors have expressed interest in 292 upstream projects involving an estimated 
potential investment of $231-$308 billion. Furthermore, we identified five key trends: a) 
I "Politics come into playas changes to E&P law awaited, " E. E. E. Reaort, May 1996, p 7. 
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a strong correlation between the location of known reserves and the value of upstream 
projects being considered; b) the predominance of rehabilitation projects located in 
Russia accounting for 70% of the total, of which Western Siberia is the focus; c) without 
prejudice to point (a) there appears to be a bias towards Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus including the Caspian Sea; d) given the preponderance of existing yet 
hitherto undeveloped deposits, pure exploration represents only 7% of upstream projects 
being considered; and e) even FSRs possessing only minor petroleum reserves are 
capable of attracting small companies to undertake development. 
A central theme of our findings is the wide dichotomy between the high level of interest 
expressed by IOCs and the actual investment which has occurred. This is evidenced by 
the fact that as of June 1995, Russia had only received just under $4 billion in FDI across 
all economic sectors. Despite the proliferation of JVs, their reputation has been tarnished 
because they cannot offer the protection and stability which IOCs require. JV operations 
have fallen victim to the volatile legal, fiscal and regulatory regime which characterises 
the FSU and are therefore incapable of facilitating large-scale flows of oil and gas related 
FDI. An exception to this rule would be the TengizChevroil JV in Kazakhstan which is 
unique in that a special Presidential Edict along with the foundation documents clearly 
set-out the terms and conditions governing the entire investment, including provisions for 
their stability. Comparatively speaking, the TengizChevroil JV secured a level of 
guarantees normally associated with a PSA. Uncertainty is the anathema of long-term 
capital intensive upstream oil and gas investments and IOCs expect a minimum standard 
of contractual stability before undertaking such investments. 
We believe the PSA offers the best means forward, not because alternatives do not exist, 
but because its use and familiarity is rising throughout the FSU. According to our 
research Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan and Ukraine have 
concluded PSAs. Furthermore, if the FSU is to have any hope of securing the bulk of 
proposed upstream investments, then clearly the PSA is being touted as the appropriate 
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mechanism. The FOGI Database identifies 43 potential PSAs valued at $108 - $162 
billion and 16 JVs seeking to transfer to PSAs valued at $15 - $18 billion; versus 145 JV 
based investment proposals of $46 - $48 billion, but includes $20 billion for 
TengizChevroil N alone. 
Given the magnitude of reported investment proposals it is important to inquiry whether 
such figures are realistic and on what time frame may we expect the investment to occur. 
Reported investment proposals suffer from the `fallacy of composition' problem. That is, 
it is not possible for every producer to produce the same thing at the same time without 
undermining the market. The FSU is competing with other oil producing countries for a 
share of the global oil market. Thus, when considering FSU investment proposals it is 
conceptually incorrect to consider them in isolation of its international setting. After all, 
IOCs will evaluate upstream projects in the FSU as an integral part of their diversified 
global portfolio. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to examine investment proposals and published forecasts 
of the capital requirements of the FSU's oil industry from a global perspective. From a 
review of five published forecasts of oil and gas capital expenditures spanning the time 
period 1990 - 2005, we established a consensus forecast of world-wide upstream capital 
expenditures of approximately $64 billion per year. Taken in the context of historical 
levels of capital expenditures, $64 billion is not particularly onerous. Utilising the strong 
correlation between upstream capital expenditures and oil prices we generated a simple 
regression model which provided an alternative forecast of $48 - $56 billion per year 
depending on the price scenario. However, both the published forecasts and the historical 
time series of upstream capital expenditures seem to ignore the relatively large 
contribution of non-western state-owned oil companies. Having estimated that western 
oil companies, only contribute 43% of the world's oil production, the true level of annual 
global upstream capital expenditures is likely to be of the order of $106 billion. 
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From this perspective, the estimates of the capital requirements of the FSU's oil industry 
do not appear disproportionately large. However, what is less certain is the degree to 
which foreign investment will be called upon to meet this challenge as this presupposes a 
substitution of domestic operations by foreign owned operations. Assuming that foreign 
companies are permitted to produced 40% of the FSU's production profile then it is not 
unreasonable to expect them to invest $4 - $5 billion per year provided suitable terms and 
conditions are on offer. Alternatively, if the $231 - $308 proposed level of investment is 
to occur over a 20 year time period, then annual investment of $12 - $15 billion per year 
would be required - this appears unrealistic. It would take almost 60 years for all the 
proposed investment to take place based at a rate of $4 - $5 billion per year. The task for 
the FSU is to attract its share (or increase its share) of global upstream capital 
expenditures and the latter implies a transfer of productive capacity from elsewhere in the 
world. IOCs are competing to secure the limited number of projects that will eventually 
materialise. In the process, an excessively high number of projects are being considered 
as IOCs seek to maintain a diversified portfolio of potential projects with the aim of 
securing one or two `winners'. For example, the FOGI Database reveals that Mobil is 
involved in 5 potential projects with an estimated total investment of $25 - $26 billion; 
Royal/Dutch Shell is participating in 9 potential projects worth an estimated $20 billion; 
and Amoco is considering involvement in 10 projects with an estimated investment of 
$63 - $90 billion. These figures represent the project's total estimated investment and not 
the contribution of individual sponsors. Consortia of IOCs are being formed to share the 
financial burden and associated risks. Another risk management strategy is a staggered or 
staged approach to investment and the intended use of reinvested earnings. We believe 
that `self-financing' is often overlooked when considering the capital requirements of the 
FSU's oil industry. We demonstrated that some foreign oil companies intend on funding 
up to 80% of their development costs from reinvested earnings. This does not change 
either the capital requirements of the FSU's oil industry nor the potential level of 
investment, but it alters our perception of where the financing burden lies. The concept 
that the global oil and gas industry is facing a shortage of investment capital because of 
322 
the needs of the FSU's oil industry is misplaced. The real onus is upon the host 
governments to provide the requisite regulatory and fiscal environment which permits 
these ventures to generate a profit and can then be reinvested. Statements to the effect 
that the FSU's upstream petroleum industry requires $50 - $100 billion over the next 
decade should not be interpreted to mean that the international financial community along 
with IOCs will supply such funds. Much of the financing will come from reinvested 
earnings or not at all. 
Within the context of undertaking future upstream projects in the FSU, the role of the 
`Major' IOCs is emphasised as they account for half of all upstream capital expenditures 
by western oil companies. We believe only the top tier of IOCs have the access to the 
technology, management and capital resources capable of supporting any of the mega- 
projects which could singularly impact on country's production profile. Additionally, the 
large IOCs can be a source of financing for smaller companies through the use of farm- 
's. This is a technique which is increasingly being employed throughout the FSU. 
Chapter 5 assessed the activities of the World Bank, EBRD, IFC, OPIC and various 
export credit agencies (ECAs). Given the cautious attitude of commercial banks towards 
high levels of country/political risk, there is a compelling logic which suggests that 
official sources of credit have a paramount role in the transition period. Official agencies, 
backed by western governments, affirmed their intention of making available large 
volumes of credit to support the economies in transition. Each MLA has a specific 
mandate to support energy sector projects and all envisioned the oil industry of the FSU 
as an easy target for western credits. This is evidenced by the rapid build-up in approved 
oil and gas project financing from $12 million in 1991 to almost $1.2 billion in 1993 (see 
Figure 5.8). But as western euphoria was replaced by a tempered sense of realism in the 
face slow reforms, petroleum sector approved credits dropped off to $380 million in 
1995. During the period 1991 to 1995 the MLAs and OPIC approved a cumulative level 
of official credits of $2.2 billion. There is evidence to suggest that the true catalytic role 
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of official sources of financing is lower than individual agency claims as multisourcing 
amongst official sponsors is a common feature of these early projects. In other words, the 
ratio of private financing to the sum of official credits is lower that the ratio of total 
project costs to the contribution of one particular agency. In practice Western promises 
of `aid' have been offered in the form of hard credits with all their associated legal 
trappings. We believe the waiver of the World Bank's and EBRD's negative pledge 
clause has not had the desired effect of facilitating the flow of commercial credits as 
many would have hoped. The simple reason is that bankers do not lend money on the 
basis of security alone. The disbursement record of official sources of credit has been 
constrained by the quasi-commercial criteria which govern their lending programmes. 
There is nothing wrong with such conditionalities, but it does place a limit the ability of 
such organisations to extend credits under difficult commercial conditions. Although 
these organisations do not release project specific disbursement data, our best estimate is 
that no more than 25 - 30% of approved funding has been disbursed to date. 
The frustration experienced by MLAs has been equally shared by western ECAs. While 
their individual approaches vary, all employ a form of pre-export financing, in that credits 
are secured against the assignment of future sales revenue generated from incremental 
production and deposited in escrow. OGFA was innovative in that it was an umbrella 
programme to extend $2 billion or more of credits to Russian production associations. 
Despite its simple concept, it became hostage to a mass of complex financial 
documentation as its architects sought to protect lenders against every eventuality. 
Similarly JEXIM's efforts to extend untied credits -- which have a clear advantage over 
the US programme - have not be fruitful. Russia's early 50% mandatory conversion of 
hard-currency sales revenues into roubles and the application of VAT on both loans and 
equipment exports were clear obstacles to the programme's success. As domestic 
companies are expected to repay their hard-currency debts, they are naturally reluctant to 
undertake such debt in adverse commercial circumstances. 
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In summary, if both lenders and borrowers are expected to operate according to sound 
commercial principles, it has proven impossible to force credits into an uncertain political 
and economic environment despite the apparent `goodwill' of the West. Barring the use 
of true `aid' whereby the ultimate recourse lies with western taxpayers, little can be done 
until the legal and economic environment of the petroleum sector improves. 
The reluctance of western commercial banks to participate in the process needs little 
explanation beyond recognition of the outstanding debt rescheduling agreement with the 
London club of creditors and the political/country risk ranking of the FSU. Commercial 
banks are by their very nature risk averse and our political risk ranking of the world's oil 
reserves paints a picture of a banker's view of the world which is radically different from 
IOCs. Eighty percent of syndicated commercial bank lending to the oil and gas sector 
occurs in North America and Western Europe. Conversely this region accounts for less 
than 5.2% of the world's oil reserves. The FSU remains a high risk environment for 
commercial banks and for this reason we believe there is a sense of inevitability when it 
comes to the involvement of the `Major' IOCs if there is to be a true rejuvenation of the 
productive capacity of the FSU's upstream oil industry. 
Our discussion on risk was not exhaustive in that we choose not to detail each and every 
investment risk. Instead we concentrated on four areas which are of particular relevance 
to the oil and gas industry. Chapter 6 dealt with geological risk and environmental risk; 
Chapter 7 covered political risk, including the risk of nationalisation or expropriation, 
creeping expropriation and the risk of Russian hegemony in the southern FSRs; and 
Chapter 8 focused on the transportation risk and uncertainty of exporting oil. 
Geological risk is the least acute of all due to the region's favourable geology and 
existence of previously discovered but hitherto undeveloped deposits. Of the 292 
upstream projects listed in the FOGI Database only 7% constitute pure exploration, 
whereas all other projects involve existing reserves possibly in conjunction with an 
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element of exploration in adjacent areas. Thus, discovery risk is negligible, but the risk 
of insufficient reserves is still present due to tendency of Soviet-era reserve statistics to be 
based on technical feasibility as opposed to economic viability. Reserve re-evaluation, 
staggered investment strategy and farm-ins represent the principal means of mitigating or 
diversifying discovery risk. 
Environmental liability for previous damage is a concern for foreign investors, 
particularly as 93% of all upstream projects involve previously known deposits. 
However, it is a risk which most investors appear willing to bear. The EMV of an 
upstream project on a post-discovery basis is just too favourable compared to a pre- 
discovery basis where a typical rate of success for a wild-cat well is approximately 1: 8. 
Environmental liability is likely to be a greater disincentive to `Major' IOCs with their 
`deep pockets' as opposed to small exploration and production companies whose core 
activity in FSU represent their springboard onto the international stage. For the latter, a 
decision not to invest would mean for all intents and purposes a cessation of their very 
existence. 
Political risk is not an insurmountable barrier for IOCs, but is one which they do consider 
carefully. Within the FSU we believe the risk of expropriation or nationalisation is low 
because the domination of a domestic industry by foreign interests is the essential 
precondition for such an event to occur. Given the size of Russia's existing oil industry, 
foreign domination is unlikely to occur. However Azerbaijan may, in the not too distant 
future, be in a position where 90% of their oil production is being carried out by foreign 
oil companies. At the present time, Kazakhstan appears to be advocating the most 
balanced approach to FDI in that its intended future production profile is split equally 
between domestic and foreign oil companies. What is of a more immediate concern to 
foreign oil companies is creeping expropriation whereby the compound effect of tax and 
regulatory changes, export restrictions, et cetera could have the equivalent effect of 
outright nationalisation or expropriation. Faced with an uncertain economic and political 
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climate foreign investors seek to protect themselves via stabilisation clauses at both the 
legislative and contractual level. Of the three countries surveyed (Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Turkmenistan), Kazakhstan has made the greatest progress in furnishing the requisite 
stabilisation or grand-fathering provisions. Azerbaijan was excluded our analysis as we 
could not gain access to any of their PSAs, although it is fair to assume that such clauses 
are included. 2 
The risk of Russian hegemony is not a barrier to investment for western oil companies 
per se but requires the pragmatic recognition that Russia's southern neighbours will 
remain in her economic and political sphere of influence for the foreseeable future. There 
is no doubt that many within Russia's oil community resent the direct loss of control over 
the southern oil industry, and there are efforts to secure Russian participation in the 
largest and most visible projects. We find Russian claims for equity compensation for 
deposits discovered during the Soviet era indefensible under the doctrine of state 
succession. While there exist no a priori legal grounds for a Russian entitlement to these 
deposits, there is nothing to prevent Russian companies from seeking exploration and 
development rights as would any other IOC. 
On the vexed issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, Russia is not only seeking to 
preserve her interests but also strengthen her claim stemming from a geologically inferior 
position compared to the other littoral states. Given the over-riding economic 
considerations associated with the division of Caspian Sea resources, a final solution 
among all littoral states will be a long time in the making. Until such a time, the region's 
petroleum potential cannot be realised. While the uncertain status of the Caspian Sea is a 
risk for IOCs it is not an insurmountable factor at this stage. Hitherto, Russian resolve 
and pressure is being rewarded with equity participation for her domestic companies in 
upstream projects in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. Provided Russian companies are 
2 This has been confirmed with the subsequent publishing of the AIOC PSA and the Karabakh PSA 
in Barrows Company Inc., Russia & MS Basic Oil Laws & Contracts, Series. 
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not receiving preferential treatment, then their involvement possesses no risk to western 
oil companies. Whether Russia's official demands can be so easily accommodated 
remains to be seen. 
In a physical sense the uncertainty of being able to export oil produced in the FSU to the 
international market is likely to transcend all other risks and will act as a natural regulator 
of the flow of upstream FDI. Despite having identified $55 - $75 billion in proposed 
upstream projects in Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Transcaucasus region no 
suitable means of exporting large volumes of crude oil yet exists. In regards to long-term 
export routes, a maze of alternatives transiting one or more third party states has been 
proposed. But the cost of these grandiose schemes necessitates a level of co-operation 
among oil companies, governments and the international financial community which has 
yet to materialise. We examined alternatives to pipelines (by rail, by barge via the Volga- 
Don/River-Canal system and by oil swaps), but conclude that they offer only a limited 
window of opportunity and their accessibility is also uncertain. The use of existing 
infrastructure in Russia suffers from uncertain access, increasing tariff rates and the 
continued practice of uncompensated commingling of different crude streams. 
Our assessment is that despite the high level of interest expressed by the international 
community, western capital remains cautious and beyond the reach of the FSU petroleum 
industry. The challenge for the FSU is to attract (or increase) its share of global upstream 
capital expenditures. Given that 60% of the world's oil reserves remain `closed' or `off- 
limits', western oil companies will remain interested in the FSU. Those companies 
undertaking projects are basically swapping geological/technical risk for political risk. 
But all investors, regardless of their size, are pursuing a staggered approach to investment 
which implies an intended reliance on reinvested earnings (or `self-financing') to support 
future investment. In this sense the real onus of financing lies with the host-governments 
to provide the economic and legal environment which permits these projects to generate 
profits. On a cautionary note, our political risk ranking of the world's oil reserves shows 
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that many 'off-limit' countries, which are perceived as being less risky than the FSU, 
could theoretically displace FSU investment budgets if they choose to open their doors to 
foreign investment. This is a factor over which the FSU has little control, other than to 
establish competitive terms and conditions capable of crystallising the high level of 
interest into actual investment before IOCs choose to go elsewhere. 
9.3 Domestic Financing versus External Financing 
At the outset of this study we chose to focus our research on the provision of and reaction 
of external sources of capital to the opening up of the FSU's petroleum industry. Despite 
our documentation of a high level of foreign interest, neither the IOCs nor MLAs have 
hitherto directed a large amount of foreign capital into the region's petroleum industry. 
The FSU is considered a high risk area and while political risk was shown not to be an 
insurmountable obstacle, IOCs do expect a certain degree of stability in their contractual 
and fiscal relations. In the case of key southern FSR's there appears to be a willingness 
on behalf of the host country government's to grant such stability, particularly through 
the use of the Production Sharing Agreements. 3 This solution is quite effective in areas, 
other than Russia, where the domestic oil industry is relatively small. However, in Russia 
the provision of a fiscal structure which placates the concerns of western oil companies' 
is much more problematic, because of the existence of a large domestic oil industry 
which currently operates in less than ideal conditions. Unless such improvements are 
extended to the domestic industry as a whole, the resulting disparity will be politically 
unstable. There is no reason why the Russia's domestic oil industry should stand on the 
sidelines and watch foreign companies extract the very conditions which they themselves 
would be able to profitably operate. But, what if a rational tax structure and pricing 
regime were extended to the domestic Russian oil industry as a whole; would there still 
be the same impetus for foreign investment? Probably not, and a simple calculation will 
illustrate why this may be the case. 
3 However, upstream capital expenditures in the land locked region of Central Asia and the Caspian 
Sea will remain tempered until sufficient export capacity is available to support increased production 
levels. 
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Assuming a production of 6 MMbopd (; z 301 MMtpy) and assuming that the Russian 
Government permits the oil industry to retain an operating cashflow (after operating costs 
and tax) of about $10 per barrel (i. e. similar to western conditions), then the Russian 
industry would have over $20 billion per year of domestic financial resources available 
for investment. This amount of domestic funds would far exceed any possible inflow in 
international capital, unless foreign companies were allowed to supplant domestic 
companies and this is unlikely to happen in Russia. This is not to say that foreign capital 
does not have a role to play in Russia. 
Table 9.1 Availability of Domestic Resources 
was Yes Nip -Yes 
source: rersonai corresponaence m iyyD wim Anarei A. r onopiyaiuh (ucpuiy ; viinisier or xussian 
Ministry for Fuel and Energy and Principal Consultant to the Russian Duma on Production Sharing 
Legislation). See also James P. Dorian and Eugene M. Khartukov, "International Oil and Gas Investment 
in the CIS States, " in The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade, Ed. 
Thomas W. Wälde, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996): p 50. 
The above table is a simplistic representation of the potential role of foreign resources 
within the domestic industry. The current "need" for financial resources in the 
traditional sector (i. e. a perpetuation of `the way it was') is only generated as a result of 
the lack of proper structuring of the Russian oil industry itself. Therefore, the 
requirement for western capital in traditional production areas, is only for a limited period 
of time, during which the Russian oil industry and institutional framework must be 
restructured. The extent to which Western involvement is necessary to transfer additional 
management skills and technological advances into these operations will be limited, 
although the provision of the former should accelerate the process of developing Russian 
management skills. The need for external resources in the case of non-traditional areas, 
is more apparent. Certainly, for key mega-projects, such as the development of oil and 
gas fields offshore Sakhalin Island, the provision of external resources - capital, 
technology and management skills - is paramount. 
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Thus, when addressing the issue of external financing, one must first carefully establish 
the set of relevant boundary conditions to which such investment would apply. It is 
certain that these conditions are not consistent throughout the FSU. Clearly, western 
capital will have a much larger role outside of Russia if the region is expected to rapidly 
increase production. Within Russia, in the case of traditional oil production, the need for 
western capital is likely to be only temporary. Once Russia adopts a pricing and fiscal 
environment comparable to that found in the West, the domestic industry will be capable 
of generating its own source of investment capital. However, for a certain class of 
projects, i. e. those in frontier areas or non-traditional developments, the facilitating role 
of western resources is crucial. Finally, the potential suppliers of western capital 
represent an important lobbying group which can assist the domestic industry efforts in 
convincing the government to establish an fiscal framework within which all oil 
companies, regardless of origin, may operate profitably. 
9.4 Further Lines of Inquiry 
The analysis undertaken within this thesis has raised a number of issues where we believe 
there is scope for additional research. The FOGI Database, in particular, provides an 
ideal platform for supporting further lines of inquiry. The following list of suggestions is 
by no means comprehensive. 
Firstly, there is a need to keep the FOGI Database current as we believe it is the most 
extensive study of foreign oil and gas projects in the FSU. It is in a format which adapts 
easily to updating and can be manipulated to support sector specific or geographical 
based studies .4 
Secondly, the downstream sector in the FSU requires examination. Refinery project 
proposals taken at the aggregate level (= $28 - 30 billion) suffer from the same `fallacy of 
composition' problem as their upstream counterparts. Hitherto, we have come across no 
4 Beginning in the autumn of 1997 the upstream portion of the FOGI Database is to be launched on 
a commercial basis under the name Interneft by the Energy Intelligence Group based in Washington DC. 
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studies which have tried to analyse the product streams of proposed new refineries and 
refinery upgrades to assess how many are likely to occur in the context of forecasted 
market requirements. We believe that the successful completion of a limited number of 
projects will preclude the undertaking of many others. 
Thirdly, in this thesis we have taken a critical view of the efforts by MLAs to inject large- 
scale credits into the petroleum industry of the FSU. Their disbursement record runs 
contrary to the orthodox belief of their ability to facilitate investment and overcome the 
types of risk posed by the economic and political climate of the FSU. We believe further 
examination of their claimed causality role, not necessarily restricted to any specific 
geographical or industrial sector, would fill a gap in current research. Such a study would 
require a high level of co-operation from these institutions. 
Fourthly, at the outset of our research agenda, we recognised that the confidential nature 
of many petroleum contracts and bidding terms would naturally limit our accessibility to 
hard contractual data. For instance, our lack of access to Azeri PSAs precluded 
Azerbaijan's inclusion in §7.3 on stabilisation clauses. This is no longer the case and in 
our opinion there now exists a sufficient volume of contractual data within the public 
domains to warrant a specific study on petroleum agreements within the FSU. 
Obviously, some contracts will remain inaccessible to the researcher, but enough material 
is currently available to proceed with such a study. 
Fifthly, the cross-border flow of energy through third-party states is a common feature of 
FSU oil and gas exports. For the future success of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea 
region their securing of reliable export routes remains crucial. There is ample scope for a 
legal-based research effort on transportation solutions for the region, drawing heavily 
upon the experience of other petroleum producing regions in the world. 
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Sixthly, the research conducted herein, focused on external sources of financing. Clearly 
there is a need to tackle the issue of financing from a domestic perspective. The ideal 
candidate to undertake such a programme would be fluent in Russian and possess solid 
connections to the Russian financial sector perhaps through sponsorship. 
Finally, in ten or twenty years time, it would be fascinating to use the FOGI Database as a 
comparative baseline study to assess the track record of proposed projects and to what 
extent FDI has or has not taken place and why this is the case. 
s In particular see series publications by PetroConsultants and Barrows Company, plus Van Meurs 
& Associates, World Fiscal Systems for Oil 1997 and World Fiscal Systems for Gas 1997- New York, NY: 
Barrows Company Inc., 1997. 
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